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Abstract 
 
This thesis looks to examine the contemporary potentiality of universal 
human rights. It begins by noting that within the modern context the idea of 
universal rights is increasingly challenged by a security dominated discourse. The 
era of the so called ‘War on Terror’ is defined by diminished appreciation of the 
concept of human rights, both in terms of government commitments and popular 
opinion. The central aim of this thesis is to determine whether the idea of 
universal human rights is justifiable within these contexts. 
In accordance with this aim, this thesis will utilise important elements of 
critical jurisprudential accounts of human rights, centred on the work of Costas 
Douzinas. These elements, based upon challenging the accepted 
standards/interpretations of legal concepts, will be employed in an attempt to 
provide an objective appraisal of the sufficiency of prevailing interpretations of 
the concept of human rights. Through utilisation of Douzinas’ authoritative body 
of work documenting the presence of human rights in the contemporary world, 
this thesis will ultimately look to challenge the perception that security and 
human rights are competing aims. This thesis will argue that the universality of 
human rights relates to their overarching purpose. In accordance with James 
Griffin, this thesis will propose that this purpose relates to the actualisation of 
‘normative agency’. 
Through a critical examination of the modern construct of human rights, 
centred around issues of human healthiness, this thesis will identify the right to 
health as a foundational claim – in that its fulfilment (either directly or indirectly) 
is a pre-requisite for the meaningfulness of other protections (and the 
actualisation of normative agency). This thesis will conclude by examining this 
concept of human healthiness within the context of national security. Here it will 
be shown that as both national security and human rights are centred on 
considerations of subsistence, they are not incompatible, and that the universality 
of the idea of rights is absolute. Further, it will be shown that this absoluteness 
reflects a permanence of purpose rather than practical implementation.    
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1 Introduction 
 
 “Human rights” is a term combining law and morality. Legal rights have been 
the building block of western law since early modernity.1 
It is evident to state that, as Costas Douzinas maintains, the idea of universal human 
rights is not a novel one. Human history is replete with philosophical accounts which seek to 
justify an entitlement to basic claims or protections deemed fundamental to the human 
experience. Though the justificatory reasoning which is used to legitimise these claims has 
developed over time, the overarching purpose of such efforts has remained largely the same – 
to provide a means of protecting the ability for individuals to live a ‘worthwhile life’.2 Defining 
what, precisely, one can regard as being ‘worthwhile’ has itself been a complex and 
controversial undertaking.3 Similarly, it is noteworthy that the meaning of ‘universal’ has itself 
changed throughout our history – originating with an interpretation which, contradictorily, 
excluded large sections of society from the capacity to claim.4 However, despite an evident 
expansion of efforts to legitimate the concept of universal human rights during the modern 
period of international law – and specifically since the end of the Second World War5 – the 
universal applicability of human rights remains highly contestable. Within the present context, 
it is clear that, whilst the idea of universal human rights persists in academic circles,6 the human 
rights movement is becoming increasingly defined by the fact that reliable implementation of 
proposed normative claims has yet to be secured. 
                                                            
1 Costas Douzinas, ‘Human Rights for Martians’ (2016) Critical Legal Thinking 
<http://criticallegalthinking.com/2016/05/03/human-rights-for-martians/> accessed 18 May 2018.   
2 See for example James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2008) 147. 
3 ibid 183. 
4 For example, gradations of worth determined within (and between) different cultures, ethnicities, and social 
and economic classes. Human history is replete with examples of different peoples/states prioritising the specific 
interests of a subsection of society over others. 
5 See for example the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR 1948), the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR 1966), and the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR 1966). 
6 ‘[H]uman rights are “indivisible” … Although the history of the concept is Western, the concept itself is 
universal’. Michael Freeman, Human Rights: An Interdisciplinary Approach (Polity Press 2002) 172. 
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Indeed, in contemporary times the level of international commitment from states to 
human rights is arguably declining. Strikingly, this appears to be true, not only in relation to 
states which have traditionally opposed this movement,7 but also those who are regarded as 
having led such efforts.8 In addition to traditional causes of resistance to the universal 
expansion of human rights such as cultural relativism,9 difficulties stemming from the recent 
re-emergence of the prioritisation of national security initiatives have also certainly contributed 
to this development. A crucial concern for states in an era largely defined by the so called ‘War 
on Terror’ is how to balance seemingly conflicting interests of state security and individual 
human liberties.10 
As consequence, there is an evident need to reassess the legitimacy of the concept of 
universal (absolute) human rights and their place in the modern world. Prevailing theoretical 
accounts of this concept purport that human rights are universal, not just in the sense that all 
peoples are entitled to them (based on various justifications as we will address in Chapter Two), 
but also in relation to the substantive content of individual claims.11 In brief, protections such 
as freedom of expression, the prohibition of torture and slavery, freedom of religion, are to be 
afforded to all human beings, and are intended to mean the same thing in one jurisdiction as in 
                                                            
7 For examples of such states, as Stephen Hopgood notes ‘China and Russia … leads the way … followed by 
states as diverse as Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Uganda and Uzbekistan’. Stephen Hopgood, ‘Challenges to the Global 
Human Rights Regime: Are Human Rights Still an Effective Language for Social Change?’ (2014) 11 SUR – 
International Journal on Human Rights 67, 71. 
8 As example, various states, such as the United States of America (U.S.), who were heavily involved in the 
creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR 1948). 
9 Principally, this school of thought posits that, as the concept of human rights (in its practical form) is Western 
in origin, it can have limited usefulness to states not based upon similar Western ideals. For more on this see 
Rhonda. E. Howard, Human Rights and the Search for Community (Harper Collins 1995). 
10 This sentiment was provocatively expressed by Michael Ignatieff when he declared ‘The question after Sept. 
11 is whether the era of human rights has come and gone … the claim that national security trumps human 
rights’. Michael Ignatieff, ‘Is the Human Rights Era Ending?’ The New York Times (New York, 5 February 
2002) <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/05/opinion/is-the-human-rights-era-ending.html> accessed 18 May 
2018.     
11 See for example Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and in Practice (Cornell University Press 
2002) 10. 
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all the others.12 Thus, the idea of human rights is founded on the presumed universal 
applicability of such claims. Amongst many proponents of human rights there appears to be 
little scope for negotiation with regards to the legitimacy of this position, only the means with 
which their application is to be achieved (and balanced in accordance with other fundamental 
protections).13 
However, in reflection of the apparent decline in support of the idea of universal rights 
within the global arena in recent years (in accordance with prioritising security), it would be 
fair to suggest that this approach has potentially undermined the purpose of such claims – as 
well as efforts to ensure their wide spread implementation. Specifically, this has occurred by 
reducing the task of determining the legitimacy of human rights provisions to discussions on 
the practicality (as well as the desirability) of their universal adoption and implementation. 
Consequently, the authenticity of rights is questioned, with growing scepticism, the longer it 
takes for their universal applicability to be acknowledged (resulting in widespread 
implementation).14 In addition, a restrictive approach to determining which ‘human’ interests 
are worthy of protection (which is heavily based on Western interpretations and which ignores 
arguments supporting the potential cultural contingency of such rights), ensures that traditional 
resistance (e.g. cultural relativism) behind such efforts persists.15 In addressing the potentiality 
of universal human rights in contemporary contexts, therefore, it is relevant to consider whether 
                                                            
12 This is persuasively articulated by Jack Donnelly when he stated that ‘one either is or is not a human being, 
and therefore has the same human rights as everyone else (or none at all)’. ibid. 
13 See for example the concept of the ‘margin of appreciation’ which affords member states of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) some flexibility when balancing so called conditional rights – such as 
Respect for Private and Family Life (Art. 8), Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion (Art. 9), and 
Freedom of Expression (Art. 10). For a detailed examination of this concept see Steven Greer, The Margin of 
Appreciation: Interpretation and Discretion Under the European Convention on Human Rights (Human Rights 
Files No. 17) (Council of Europe Publishing 2000) <http://www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/DG2/HRFILES/DG2-
EN-HRFILES-17(2000).pdf.> accessed 18 May 2018.     
14 See for example Michael Ignatieff, ‘Human Rights: The Midlife Crisis’ (1999) 46 The New York Review of 
Books 58. 
15 As an example of this, Nhina Le explains that ‘[d]ominant Muslim groups in Saudi Arabia still do not 
adequately promote marriage and religious freedoms … These groups claim that doing so contradicts their 
religious beliefs, which do not recognise marriage freedom for women and do not allow people to change their 
religions’. Nhina Le, ‘Are Human Rights Universal or Culturally Relative?’ (2016) 28 Peace Review 203, 205. 
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this universality should be held to be dependent upon absolute interpretations of the substantive 
content of specific claims. To put it simply, are contemporary definitions and interpretations 
of human rights definitive? If so, then the legitimacy of human rights can in fact reasonably be 
seen to rest solely on determining the practicality of securing universal implementation (as 
suggested above). If not, however – as this thesis proposes - then there is a need to identify an 
alternative means of testing this legitimacy and establishing the basis with which we can justify 
the universal applicability of such protections (which is not solely contingent upon accepting 
prevailing accounts/interpretations). This thesis proposes that this can be fulfilled by refocusing 
the discourse towards the purpose of such rights. 
In contemporary times, an enduring acceptance of the absoluteness of these claims 
stems from the historical legacy of the idea of such protections. Despite obvious differences 
with these historical accounts, it remains clear that the modern concept of human rights is 
significantly influenced by traditional natural rights and natural law theories.16 From Cicero to 
Aquinas to Locke, these theoretical accounts were all heavily influenced by a presupposed 
legitimacy – the idea that, like nature itself, such rights were self-evident. The modern construct 
of human rights has been shaped upon such theoretical foundations.17  In this way, modern 
human rights are effectively a product of history - an amalgamation of overlapping aspects of 
influential moral and political ideals. Throughout human history, the continual affirmation (and 
reaffirmation) of these ideals has strengthened perceptions of their legitimacy.  
Indeed, as a modern means of authenticating this legitimacy, contemporary legal 
scholarship has attempted to identify a definitive lineage of human rights – to discover the 
                                                            
16 An insightful summary of this process can be found in Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights: Critical 
Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century (Hart Publishers 2000) 7-15. 
17 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia (Belknap Press 2012) 212-230. 
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genesis of these ideals.18 A significant objective for such studies is to explain the legitimacy of 
rights by demonstrating their historical – and thus contemporary – significance. Such accounts 
purport that Human rights are important, not only because of what they have already 
accomplished, but because their eventual universal adoption is destined to be achieved. The 
perceived inevitability of human rights has been at the centre of contemporary efforts to justify 
their universal applicability. This is exemplified with Francis Fukuyama’s bold (and now 
infamous) prediction that, at the end of the Cold War, future human history would mark the 
expansion of democracy (and the corresponding fulfilment of human rights).19 
However, as previously discussed, global affairs have witnessed significant changes in 
the years since this claim was originally made. As Douzinas asserts, ‘The end of history and 
the dawn of a ‘new world order’ was announced in 1989. If it was a ‘new’ order, it was the 
shortest in history’.20  Crucially, many of the Western powers whose initial commitment to 
human rights did much to solidify their perceived validity on the international stage in the latter 
half of the twentieth century have now refocused their efforts towards the supposedly 
competing aim of combatting acts of international terrorism. These efforts have unavoidably 
resulted in conflicts emerging where states have attempted to balance national security 
initiatives with the fundamental interests of individuals.21 Simultaneously, the threat of 
terrorism has, to date, shown no real signs of abating,22 despite the legitimacy of this issue 
achieving near global consensus (and a commensurate level of national and international 
                                                            
18 For a detailed account of this see Micheline Ishay, The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the 
Globalisation Era (University of California Press 2008).  
19 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (Free Press 2006) 328-339. 
20 Costas Douzinas, Philosophy and Resistance in the Crisis (Polity Press 2013) 77. 
21 Within the context of the United Kingdom (U.K.), this was perhaps best personified by the Anti-Terrorism 
Crime and Security Act 2001. As Ipek Demirsu notes in his recent study of the impact of count-terrorist 
initiatives on human rights protections, this act was defined by ‘the notorious provision of indefinite detention 
for non-nationals’. Ipek Demirsu, Counter-Terrorism and the Prospects of Human Rights (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2017) 1.  
22 This is evidenced with multiple terrorist attacks in recent years. For example, with the attacks which took 
place at the Ataturk Airport in Istanbul, Turkey on the 28th of June 2016, and at the Promenades de Anglais in 
Nice, France on the 14th of July 2016. 
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attention).23 This, in turn, has encouraged state efforts to adopt more robust counter-terrorist 
measures which either seek to limit or interfere with human rights in increasingly 
disproportionate ways,24 or simply ignore them all together.25 Moreover, this refocusing of the 
priorities of states has facilitated a diminishment of public support for the idea of universal 
rights/protections.26 
These recent developments illustrate a significant challenge for human rights in modern 
times – how to demonstrate universal applicability in a historical context in which their 
relevance is increasingly threatened. Claims pertaining to the ‘End of History’ and the 
inevitable expansion of rights evidently appear premature in the light of this conflict. As 
previously discussed, the amalgamation of similar historical ideals has helped to shape the 
modern concept of human rights. This process has resulted in a purported universality which 
is alleged to be represented in both the substantive content and scope of such protections.27 The 
uncompromising nature of this approach is motivated by the need, not only to ensure that the 
                                                            
23 International support for global counter-terrorist initiatives is personified by numerous United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions. As example, UNSCR 1373 (2001) which, among other things, called on member 
states to ‘work together urgently to prevent and suppress terrorist acts, including through increased cooperation 
and full implementation of the relevant international conventions relating to terrorism’. United Nations Security 
Council, ‘On Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts’ (28 September 2001) UN 
Doc S/RES/1373 (UNSCR 1373) 
<http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/specialmeetings/2012/docs/United%20Nations%20Security%20Council%20Resol
ution%201373%20(2001).pdf> accessed 18 May 2018.   
24 The controversial so-called ‘Pre-emptive Anti-Terrorism Law’ recently passed in Japan is a relevant 
contemporary example of this process. For more on this see Robin Harding, ‘Japan Passes Pre-Emptive Anti-
Terrorism Law’ Financial Times (Tokyo, 15 June 2017) <https://www.ft.com/content/75130598-5181-11e7-
bfb8-997009366969?mhq5j=e1> accessed 18 May 2018.     
25 See for example the discussion on the legality of unmanned drone strikes as a legitimate counter-terrorist 
measure. For more on this see Milena Sterio, ‘The United States’ Use of Drone Strikes in the War on Terror: 
The (Il)legality of Targeted Killings Under International Law’ (2012) 45 Case Western Reserve Journal of 
International Law 196. 
26 In the context of the United States of America (U.S.), this is evidenced with enhanced public support for the 
torture of terrorist suspects as means of protecting the state. As Zachary Carpino explains, the use of torture for 
this purpose has been legitimised ‘by convincing the public that torture is a necessary evil to protect the masses 
and deter potential threats’. Zachary W Carpino, ‘Terrorising the Terrorists: Reconstructing U.S. Policy on the 
Use of Torture in the Global War on Terror’ (2013) 4 Global Security Studies 10, 17. 
27 The purported universality of human rights is encapsulated within Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948) wherein it is stated that ‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. 
They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood’. 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A (III) (UDHR) 
<http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/> accessed 18 May 2018.   
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significance of these rights is respected, but also that individual claims are protected from 
unjustifiable interference and abuse. Considering the historical context of their emergence,28 it 
is reasonable to imagine that, at least at the outset, a less forceful attempt at justifying the 
universal relevance of human rights would have risked undermining the purpose of such 
efforts. However, given that the concept of human rights has now achieved global recognition 
– even if not international application or adherence – it is perhaps worthwhile to reassess the 
means with which we communicate these ideals. 
Such a task should be accepted as worthwhile if we are prepared to acknowledge that 
previous attempts to justify the universality of rights have proven to be insufficient. This, in 
turn, can be supported by referencing the apparent difficulty in actualising human rights on a 
global scale as well as diminishing support for such protections amongst states where some 
form of implementation has already been achieved (e.g. in the context of the War on Terror). 
Furthermore, as previous attempts have been based upon a presumptive position of 
absoluteness – one which gave only limited consideration to the legitimacy of cultural 
interpretations of specific claims – it could be argued that their effectiveness was unnecessarily 
diminished.29 Through a theoretical reassessment of the universality of human rights claims, 
this thesis will consider the advantages of reimagining the justificatory foundation of such 
protections as an underlying purpose. By reconceptualising the substantive content of rights 
within this context it will be shown that, in a practical sense, it is preferable to accept all rights 
as foundational claims - open to interpretation, development and evolution. 
                                                            
28 Specifically, the atrocities and mass loss of life witnessed in the Second World War. More precisely, as 
Michael Ignatieff stated when referring to the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); 
‘the holocaust made the declaration possible’. Michael Ignatieff, ‘Human Rights: The Midlife Crisis’ (1999) 46 
The New York Review of Books 58, 58. 
29 For example, a good analysis of the inherent similarities between the Western conception of human rights and 
the teachings of Islam is provided by Abdullah Ahmed An-Na'im. Of particular interest is idea that the Qu’ran 
itself is founded on an understanding of humanity which is ‘equal in worth and dignity, regardless of gender, 
religion, or race’. Abdullah Ahmed An-Na'im, ‘Human Rights in the Muslim World’ in Patrick Hayden (ed), 
The Philosophy of Human Rights: Readings in Human Rights (Paragon House Publishers 2001) 331. 
Daniel M Lowe                           Assessing the Universality of Human Rights in the Context of Health  
17 
 
For this thesis, foundational claims can be understood to represent both fundamental 
interests – grounded in what Griffin defines as ‘personhood’30 - as well as the adaptable 
substantive content of relevant protections. Specifically, having reassessed the theoretical 
foundations of the modern concept of human rights and the limitations of prevailing efforts to 
achieve universal application, our conclusions will then be considered within the context of the 
human right to health. The right to health has been chosen as the site for investigation for 
several reasons. Firstly, as a highly controversial protection,31 it enables us to directly question 
the legitimacy of the idea of universal rights (as well as the historical hierarchisation of human 
rights claims along ‘generational’ lines).32 This will be accomplished initially by considering 
the validity of prioritising first generation protections over others. It will then invert this 
discourse to propose that human healthiness is the foundational, fundamental interest (due to 
its importance for actualising normative agency and thus making other protections 
meaningful). Finally, it will look to address the significance of human healthiness within the 
national security paradigm (and specifically state security) – itself understood by states as the 
most fundamental and thus foundational concern.33 
Secondly, and as alluded to in the previous paragraph, the right to health allows us to 
reconsider both the relevance and scope of fundamental rights within broad national security 
contexts. These incorporate developments relating to both traditional threats – such as the 
                                                            
30 James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2008) 33. 
31 As Jonathan Wolff notes, whilst civil and political rights have been ‘very widely ratified …economic and 
social rights, including the right to health, [have] encountered more resistance …’. Wolff attributes this 
resistance to various factors, including the fact that economic and social rights are (erroneously in his view) 
regarded as being more expensive to enforce. Jonathan Wolff, The Human Right to Health (W. W. Norton & 
Company 2013) 13-14. 
32 Inherent problems with attempting to categorise rights into different generations were effectively addressed 
by Jim Ife when he exclaimed ‘[u]sing the term “generation” suggests a historical lineage … with first-
generation rights being seen as somehow more important and taking precedence …’. Jim Ife, Human Rights 
from Below: Achieving Rights Through Community Development (Cambridge University Press 2009) 114. 
33 As Ben Golder notes, the alleged primacy of national security has allowed states to justify the erosion of 
human rights and civil liberties as ‘the debate on counter-terrorist legislation has proceeded on the assumption 
that the demands of national security and the protection of human rights are opposed’. Ben Golder and George 
Williams, ‘Balancing National Security and Human Rights: Assessing the Response of Common Law Nations 
to the Threat of Terrorism’ (2006) 8 Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis 43, 50. 
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weaponisation of disease34 – as well as those not necessarily predicated on human motives or 
actions – such as pandemics.35  Here, the examination of the securitisation of health will 
determine that the absoluteness of human rights protections should not be seen to relate to 
practical implementation. Indeed, it will be shown that such a conclusion may be reached when 
either the non-application or active derogation of such principles is more consistent with their 
underlying aim of actualising normative agency (by securing state subsistence). Consequently, 
this analysis will seek to identify a means by which a major dichotomy of human rights is 
capable of being resolved. Ultimately, the primary purpose of this research is to demonstrate 
the contemporary universality of human rights. 
1.1 Key Claims and Thesis Route Map 
 
As discussed, the primary purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate that the concept of 
universal human rights can be defended, even in the contemporary, security dominated climate. 
In looking to validate this position, the thesis will draw from a wide selection of academic and 
theoretical works, as well as relevant substantive law (e.g. in the form of case law and 
international treaties). There are six main claims to be advanced by this thesis. These are as 
follows: 
1. The first main thesis claim is that the idea of universal human rights can be defended 
effectively. However, traditional attempts to provide a universalisable foundation for 
human rights (e.g. based on dignity) have proven to be sub-optimal. This is because 
they invite interpretations which are counter-intuitive to the aim of such protections 
(e.g. where entitlement to claim must be earned).36 Instead a robust theoretical 
                                                            
34 See for example Larry Lutwick and Suzanne Lutwick (eds), Beyond Anthrax: The Weaponisation of 
Infectious Diseases (Humana Press 2009). 
35 See for example Catherine Lo Yuk-Ping and Nicholas Thomas, ‘How is Health a Security Issue? Politics, 
Responses and Issues’ (2010) 25 Health Policy Plan 447. 
36 See for example Makau wa Mutua, ‘The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: An Evolution of 
the Language of Duties’ (1995) 35 Virginia Journal of International Law 339. 
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foundation for the concept of universal rights may be more appropriately provided by 
referencing the justificatory purpose of such protections. This purpose is argued to be 
accurately represented by James Griffin’s account of human rights. Specifically, the 
idea that genuine human rights are those that enable normative agency – that which 
Griffin terms ‘a functioning human agent’.37 
2. The second main thesis claim is that human rights are non-definitive in relation to both 
their substantive content and the existence of potentially relevant claims. It is argued 
that they must be regarded as non-definitive because they retain the capacity to 
legitimately evolve (enhancing the standard of protection which is provided). This is 
evidenced, not only throughout the historical development of the concept of human 
rights itself (e.g. as represented by various human rights treaties), but also within 
existing case law relating to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR 
1950).38  
3. The third main thesis claim is that we can utilise the theoretical work of Ronald 
Dworkin to construct a framework by which we can effectively determine the 
legitimacy of developing interpretations of the law (as well as of legal concepts). This 
is based upon the proposed ‘perfectibility of law’, which suggests that the correct 
answer to a legal problem will be contextually contingent, and will be identifiable to us 
as the approach which most optimally reflects the ‘general principles which underlie 
and justify the settled law …’.39 In the context of human rights, it is argued that these 
                                                            
37 James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2008) 35. 
38 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as Amended by Protocols No.11 
and No.14 (opened for signature 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) CETS No. 005 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf> accessed 18 May 2018.   
39 Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (Harvard University Press 2006) 143. 
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general principles are represented by the underlying justificatory purpose of such 
protections (e.g. to enable normative agency). 
4. The fourth main thesis claim is that in order to facilitate optimal development/evolution 
of law, we can utilise a ‘critical’ approach to its study in accordance with the theoretical 
outlook of Friedrich Nietzsche.40 This outlook advocates for a scrutinous appraisal of 
prevailing accounts of relevant concepts so as to determine the merits of our continuing 
commitment to them. In the context of human rights law, it is argued that a ‘critical’ 
approach to developing interpretations of the content and scope of such protections 
allows us to ensure that the concept evolves in a legitimate manner (by confirming 
conformity with the justificatory purpose behind such claims). Ultimately, this 
establishes that existing accounts of human rights (however effective/complete they 
may appear to be at present) cannot legitimately be accepted as being definitive or 
absolute (as doing so precludes the possibility of necessary development). 
5. The fifth main thesis claim is that the benefits of the ‘perfectibility of law’ framework, 
as well as of a ‘critical’ approach to studying the development of human rights law 
itself, can be further demonstrated with an examination of the right to health. Here it 
will be argued that this protection relates to more than the provision of a sufficient level 
of health care (but is instead actually comprised of an expansive number of 
physiological, psychological, and social elements). Accordingly, it is suggested that this 
claim is best understood as a right to human healthiness (requiring the protection of a 
sufficient level of subsistence – centred on securing the enablement of normative 
agency). Due to its evident relativeness in relation to securing a satisfactory level of 
fulfilment (e.g. depending on contextual/financial circumstances within each state), it 
                                                            
40 See Friedrich Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History (Macmillan for the Library of Liberal Arts 1957). 
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will be argued that the right to health is ultimately representative of the concept of 
universal human rights in general, in that it is, in practical terms, a foundational claim 
(open to legitimate interpretation and evolution). Moreover, it is argued that this fact 
further evidences the non-definitiveness of human rights, and reinforces the benefits of 
a ‘critical’ approach to determining the sufficiency of prevailing accounts - by 
providing means of ensuring the scope of the claim continues to progressively evolve. 
6. The sixth main thesis claim is that human rights and security are not competing aims. 
This is evidenced by the fact that both interests require the fulfilment of different forms 
of subsistence (e.g. human and national/state). The compatibility (and mutual-
fulfillability) of security and human rights are to be reinforced further through an 
examination of health-based threats to the continuance of the state (e.g. a hypothetical 
pandemic). Here it will be seen that the fulfilment of the purpose of human rights (e.g. 
actualising normative agency) may be more optimally served through 
interference/violation in certain exceptional circumstances. As such, it is argued that no 
right can truly be absolute in terms of practical implementation, and all rights must be 
accepted as being derogable (though with varying degrees of derogability). To suggest 
otherwise, it is argued, is to inhibit the fulfilment of the justificatory purpose of such 
protections. For interference of this sort to be justifiable, it requires that such conduct 
accurately represent the most optimal means by which the purpose of such protections 
is fulfilled. In this way, it will be argued that, despite the fact that they are open to 
legitimate interference, human rights are still effectively absolute, but that this 
absoluteness relates to a permanence of purpose (rather than of certainty of practical 
application). 
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Having established the main claims of the thesis, it is next useful to clarify the route-
map for how they are to be presented. It should be noted that each chapter will provide a 
detailed overview of its structure and aims. This will include explanations as to the purpose for 
each section and sub-section. For the purposes of the introduction, it is important to simply 
establish the general approach of each chapter with a clear indication of how they will 
contribute towards consideration of the abovementioned claims. In addition to the introduction 
(Chapter One) and conclusion (Chapter Six), this thesis will be comprised of four substantive 
chapters:  
(Chapter Two) A Critical Appraisal of the Concept of Universal Human Rights;  
Chapter Two will look to contextualise and defend the idea of universal human rights.41 
This chapter will consider various ways in which the supposed legitimacy of the concept 
of human rights has been articulated, as well as the adequacy of historical attempts to 
justify the universal nature of such protections (e.g. grounded on the concept of dignity). 
Ultimately, this chapter will contribute towards the first main thesis claim. It will do this 
by establishing that prevailing attempts to legitimate the universality of human rights have 
proven to be insufficient, and then propose that the account offered by James Griffin – 
centred on actualising ‘normative agency’ – is a preferable alternative which is capable of 
providing a universalisable foundation for the concept of human rights in contemporary 
times.  
(Chapter Three) Justifying Universal Rights: Historical and Contemporary 
Perspectives; Chapter Three will build upon this analysis by examining the limitations of 
anchoring the validity of the concept of human rights to either traditional consequentialist 
                                                            
41 Principally, this will address traditional rights scholarship represented by the works of H.L.A. Hart, Joel 
Feinberg, Alan Gewirth, John Rawls, and Jeremy Waldron. In addition, it will also draw from more 
contemporary rights theory such as the works of James Griffin, Costas Douzinas, and William Talbott. 
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or deontological approaches exclusively. It will then make proposals for a more effective 
approach to justifying the concept of universal human rights. Thus, this chapter will 
contribute towards the second, third, and fourth main thesis claims. It will contribute 
towards the second main thesis claim by establishing the non-definitiveness of human 
rights. This is to be evidenced in relation to developments within historical accounts of the 
concept itself - as represented by the American Declaration of Independence (DOI 1776),42 
the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (DRMC 1789),43 and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR 1948)44 et al. It will contribute towards 
the third main thesis claim by constructing a theoretical framework based upon the work 
of Ronald Dworkin. The practical benefits of this framework will be demonstrated within 
an examination of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). 
Having established the ‘perfectibility of law’ and legal concepts (thus reinforcing the 
second main thesis claim once again), this chapter will next consider how the misuse of 
history - which encourages prevailing accounts/interpretations to be regarded as definitive 
- inhibits the universal realisability of human rights in contemporary times. It is from this 
analysis that this chapter will contribute towards the fourth main claim, centred upon an 
examination of the theoretical approach of Friedrich Nietzsche. Chapter Three will 
conclude with the proposal that human rights represent a contextual vehicle for actualising 
an absolute ideal (e.g. to protect fundamental interests necessary for actualised 
autonomous agency).  
                                                            
42 American Declaration of Independence, July 4 1776 (DOI) 
<http://uscode.house.gov/download/annualhistoricalarchives/pdf/OrganicLaws2006/decind.pdf> accessed 18 
May 2018. 
43 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, 26 August 1779 (DRMC) 
<https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/human_rights/french_dec_rightsofman.au
thcheckdam.pdf> accessed 18 May 2018. 
44 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A (III) (UDHR) 
<http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/> accessed 18 May 2018.   
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(Chapter Four) Human Rights as Foundational Claims: Re-Conceptualising the Right 
to Health as a Right to Healthiness; Chapter Four will provide a detailed examination of 
the theoretical concept of the right to health.45 In doing so, this chapter will contribute 
towards the first, second, and fifth main thesis claims. It will contribute towards the first 
main thesis claim by demonstrating that the concept of universal human rights can be 
defended (even in the contexts of expansive/socio-economic protections). Moreover, as it 
is to be determined that the right to health does not require a universally consistent level 
of application (but can instead be legitimately applied at varying different levels depending 
on the economic/social circumstances of each state), this chapter will contribute towards 
the second main thesis claim by further demonstrating the non-definitiveness of human 
rights protections. Finally, this chapter will contribute towards the fifth main thesis claim 
by utilising the theoretical frameworks of Dworkin and Nietzsche (addressed in Chapter 
Three) in order to assess the sufficiency of modern accounts of the human right to health 
in relation to its conformity with the justificatory purpose of such protections (e.g. to 
actualise normative agency). The results of this investigation will also reinforce the first 
main thesis claim by demonstrating the advantages of grounding the universality of human 
rights on their underlying purpose. This chapter will conclude by contributing to the fifth 
main thesis claim once again with the suggestion that, due to the evolutive nature of their 
substance, all rights are best understood as foundational claims.  
(Chapter Five) Health, Security, and Subsistence: Assessing the Absoluteness of 
Universal Human Rights; Chapter Five will consider the relevance and universality of the 
concept of human rights in the context of the contemporary national security paradigm. 
                                                            
45 This will draw from various international treaties and conventions - such as the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948) and the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (1966) – as well 
as contemporary academic commentary provided by scholars such as Lisa Foreman, Aoife Nolan, J. P. Ruger, 
Upendra Baxi, Jonathan Wolff, Steven D. Jamar, Paul Hunt, and Briget C. A. Toebes. 
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This chapter will contribute towards the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth main 
thesis claims. It will contribute towards the first main thesis claim by demonstrating that 
the idea of universal human rights can be defended effectively in the modern (security 
dominated) context as the justificatory purpose of such protections is better served through 
intervention in certain exceptional circumstances. This conclusion will also contribute 
towards the second main thesis claim by demonstrating that rights are non-definitive (e.g. 
open to legitimate evolution), as well as the sixth main thesis claim by establishing that 
rights and security are not competing aims (and that rights themselves cannot be absolute 
in practical terms). As our examination into health based threats will reinforce the fact that 
rights are open to development (as it pertains to interpretations of their 
absoluteness/derogability), this chapter will also contribute towards the fifth main thesis 
claim in demonstrating that rights are foundational claims. The legitimacy of 
developments will be seen to depend upon ensuring that changes correspond with the 
purpose behind such protections, thus contributing towards the third main thesis claim, 
which is argued to relate to the objective of actualising normative agency, therefore 
contributing towards the first main thesis claim once again. Finally, it is proposed here that 
continual affirmation of the legitimacy of such developments can be ascertained with a 
critical appraisal of the sufficiency of prevailing accounts (contributing towards the fourth 
main thesis claim). Ultimately, this chapter will represent the culmination of the six main 
thesis claims and will conclude with proposals to reconceptualise the absoluteness of 
human rights as representing the permanence of their justificatory purpose.  
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1.2 Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical foundation of this thesis will be centred on a critical legal approach to 
human rights.46 Principally, critical legal studies aim to challenge accepted positions with the 
purpose of furthering and bettering understanding. A general starting point for such studies is 
to appreciate that all accepted legal knowledge is inherently imperfect or incomplete.47 This is 
because the shaping of legal norms and theories are unavoidably influenced by, and cannot 
easily be separated from, non-legal matters (such as political and social circumstance) and other 
historical contingencies. In attempting to assess the true validity of any legal concept, therefore, 
critical legal theory suggests that it is important to firstly strip away all contingent and 
contextual knowledge which contributes to our understanding. In this way, a fundamental aim 
of a critical legal approach is to attempt to establish an unfiltered, objective appreciation of 
specific legal concepts: 
It appears, therefore, that the presentation of law as a unified and coherent body 
of norms or principles is rooted in the metaphysics of truth rather than the 
politics and ethics of justice … (t)he task of critical jurisprudence is to 
deconstruct this logonomocentrism in the texts and operations of law.48 
Ebrahim Moosa49 explains that the concept of ‘logonomocentrism’ is grounded in the 
premise, and interdependency, of an absolute rational truth existing between reason and law. It 
is the presumption of determinable correctness and rightfulness of law; principles which may 
objectively legitimise its processes and applications. Accordingly, critical jurisprudence 
represents an attempt to remove subjectivity and bias when considering the persuasiveness of 
                                                            
46 A concise definition of the general purpose of critical legal studies (CLS) is provided by J. S. Russell when he 
explains that ‘CLS writers not only examine the fundamental assumptions of law and the relationship between 
legal ideas and social action, they go further, attempting to create a “transformative” legal vision for the future 
through their ideas of alternative legal practice and theory’. J. S. Russell, ‘The Critical Legal Studies Challenge 
to Contemporary Mainstream Philosophy’ (1986) 18 Ottawa Law Review 1, 3.  
47 ibid. 
48 Costas Douzinas and Adam Gearey, Critical Jurisprudence (Hart Publishing 2005) 9-10.  
49 Ebrahim Moosa, ‘Tensions in Legal and Religious Values in the 1996 South African Constitution’ in 
Mahmood Mamandi (ed), Beyond Rights Talk and Culture Talk: Comparative Essays on the Politics of Rights 
and Culture (New York: St. Martin’s 2000), 133. 
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philosophical or legal arguments. The aim of such an approach is to forcefully challenge and 
confront accepted narratives, but only so as to correct (or perfect) our understanding of them. 
In this way, critical legal theory suggests that the integrity of law is better served through robust 
critique and re-appreciation (demystification) of ideas/ideals.50 It is in this manner that this 
thesis will employ a critical jurisprudential approach – based on an acceptance of the need to 
challenge the legitimacy/validity of pre-existing interpretations of relevant legal concepts 
(specifically relating to the concept of human rights) so as to better our own understanding of 
them (and thus enhance their ultimate realisability).  
There are notable benefits with grounding an examination on the concept of universal 
human rights – and in particular their purported universality and absoluteness - on critical legal 
scholarship. Indeed, in recent years critical legal studies have prompted us to question the 
legitimacy of various claims relating to the concept of universal rights. In essence, such works 
look to challenge the practical realisability of universal human rights. This objective is of 
course not exclusive (or restricted) to critical jurisprudence. However, the reason such 
scholarship is to be preferred over alternative criticisms of human rights stemming, for 
example, from cultural relativist51 or duty based52 critiques, is due to unique advantages 
provided by the theoretical foundation of a critical legal approach. As previously mentioned, 
this relates to the idea that the validity of legal concepts should not automatically be accepted 
as definitive or pre-determined, but may instead only be established through robust challenge 
and (re)examination. Thus, with critical legal studies, there can be no legitimate, pre-supposed, 
or fixed, correct answer in the absence of a rigorous investigation. Ultimately, therefore, 
grounding the thesis in critical legal scholarship allows for the consideration of optimal 
                                                            
50 For more on this see Costas Douzinas and Adam Gearey, Critical Jurisprudence (Hart Publishing 2005). 
51 See for example Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab, Human Rights: Cultural and Ideological Perspectives 
(New York; Praeger 1979). 
52 See for example Onora O’Neill, ‘The Dark Side of Human Rights’ (2005) 81 International Affairs 427. 
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alternatives to prevailing interpretations of human rights - rather than simply promoting one 
specific alternative (e.g. duty based) – or rejection (e.g. cultural relativism) – of the concept 
itself. This approach therefore allows for the consideration of a greater number of criticisms 
(drawing from cultural relativist, duty based critiques et al) in seeking to reach objective, robust 
conclusions.  
 For the purposes of this thesis, these studies will be utilised in order to refocus the 
discourse towards the purpose of the idea of such protections rather than the practical 
implementation of modern interpretations of the concept itself. It is suggested that such an 
approach can ensure that the process of determining the validity of universal human rights is 
not restricted to a sober assessment of the successfulness of contemporary attempts to apply 
them.  Moreover, it could encourage better consideration of the definitiveness of the concept 
as well as alternative means of fulfilling their legitimising purpose. Essentially, critical legal 
scholarship will be utilised within this thesis in order to assess notable historical and 
contemporary challenges for the concept of universal human rights through a dissimilar 
interpretative lens. By looking at known issues from an alternate perspective, the aim of this 
research is to identify potential resolutions to the aforementioned challenges which could result 
from the re-conceptualisation of universal human rights as foundational claims. 
This thesis will be centred on the work of one critical legal scholar in particular; Costas 
Douzinas. Having written extensively on the concept of human rights from a critical legal 
perspective over the past two decades,53 Douzinas’ body of work on this topic is authoritative. 
                                                            
53 See for example Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the 
Century (Hart Publishers 2000); Costas Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of 
Cosmopolitanism (Routledge Cavendish 2007); Costas Douzinas, ‘What Are Human Rights?’ The Guardian 
(London, 18 March 2009); Costas Douzinas, ‘The Paradoxes of Human Rights’ (2013) 20 Constellations 51; 
Costas Douzinas, Philosophy and Resistance in the Crisis (Polity Press 2013); Costas Douzinas and Conor 
Gearty (eds), The Meaning of Rights: The Philosophy of Social Theory and Human Rights (Cambridge 
University Press 2014); Costas Douzinas, ‘Human Rights for Martians’ (2016) Critical Legal Thinking. 
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This thesis will employ these works throughout as means of highlighting the significance of 
particular challenges confronting the idea of human rights in modern times. It is proposed that 
the collective works of Douzinas are suitable for this purpose for a number of reasons. 
Importantly, and as noted by Douzinas himself, his work on human rights has been denounced 
by both proponents and critics of this concept.54 It is therefore clearly representative of the 
‘spirit’ of critical legal jurisprudence in that it attempts to reach objective, unfiltered 
conclusions. Indeed, it would be accurate to state that the purpose of these aforementioned 
works is not to defend or condemn the concept of rights – but is rather to reflect upon their 
significance. Additionally, Douzinas’ collective works on human rights cover important 
developments within the human rights discourse throughout the emergence of the era of the 
War on Terror (and are reflective of changing perceptions during this time). They are therefore 
well-suited to the task of providing a theoretical foundation for considering the contemporary 
relevance – and universality - of human rights. In brief, therefore, the works of Douzinas are 
important to this study for two specific reasons: (a) Firstly, as mentioned, they are 
representative of a critical legal approach useful to the task of clarifying particular issues 
relating to the concept of human rights and; (b) Secondly, as they effectively identify several 
recurring challenges that the human rights movement is currently faced with and, it is 
suggested, which must be addressed if the validity of the idea of universal rights is to be 
sustained. Fundamentally, these interconnected challenges signify the collective diminishment 
of the realisability of human rights in modern times. The most significant challenges Douzinas 
identifies can generally be held to fall within one of three broad categories; ambiguity, 
                                                            
54 Douzinas expresses this as the general perception that ‘as he is attacked from both the right and the left he 
must have struck the right balance’. Although Douzinas did not necessarily endorse this view (as be believed it 
presented him as a ‘middleman’ of the discourse), it is useful in signifying the critical value of his collective 
works (in that this work does not seek to serve a particular agenda). Costas Douzinas, Human Rights and 
Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (Routledge Cavendish 2007) 8. 
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politicisation, and protective disparity. It is useful here to provide a brief explanation of each 
one: 
1) Ambiguity of human rights: This is argued to have contributed to both the conflation 
of rights (as any interest that can be articulated as a right ‘can certainly become the 
object of rights’)55 and the pervasiveness of rights (in that they are now ‘synonymous 
to being human’).56 The practical purpose and feasibility of universal rights has been 
diminished through the over-saturation of the utilisation of the idea (see point two 
below) as well as the prevalence of bogus or contradictory claims. In addition, this 
reflects the view that rights mean different things in different parts of the world (e.g. 
two different interpretations of the ‘subject’ of rights). Whilst in many Western states 
these represent actionable claims to various standards of protection (e.g. the political 
construct subject), in many non-Western states they define an entitlement to claims 
which exist only as an aspiration at this point in history (e.g. the abstract man subject). 
In brief, the ‘ambiguity of rights’ suggests that the concept of human rights is 
convoluted and that this compromises its universal relevance. 
2) The politicisation of rights: This is argued to have undermined the legitimacy of the 
concept as it results in disingenuous commitment by states to human rights norms which 
is incapable of assuring the practical fulfilment of their ideals (i.e. by turning such 
protections into tools of political expediency). Moreover, it perpetuates the fact that 
‘the recognition of humanity is never fully guaranteed to all’57 (see point three below). 
Similarly, the politicisation of the human rights discourse has facilitated public 
dissatisfaction with the movement itself. This is achieved through the implementation 
                                                            
55 ibid 56. 
56 Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century (Hart 
Publishers 2000) 255. 
57 ibid 372. 
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or promotion of populist initiatives counter-intuitive to the idea of universal 
entitlements to basic human needs (i.e. the progressive, expansive nature of state 
interference with rights which is premised on the grounds of national security). 
3) The disparity of protection: This represents the prioritisation of access (and status) to 
fundamental human rights claims – both (a) within jurisdictions in the comparison of 
innocent and criminal and; (b) between in the form of protected and unprotected citizens 
(see point one above in relation to the ‘subject’ of rights) – as well as the consequences 
of such practice. Essentially, this is indicative of the fact that ‘Human rights do not 
belong to humans, they construct a graded "humanity"’.58 This also shapes international 
law by elevating the significance of the interests of some peoples (e.g. human rights 
states) over others.59 In effect, the disparity of protection represents the non-universality 
of the practical benefits of universal human rights. 
With his collective works, Douzinas suggests that these issues compound a growing 
level of cynicism (both political and public) towards the notion of human rights. Based on his 
research it is reasonable to suggest that a simple continuation of current approaches to 
achieving the actualisation of human rights would be successful only in undermining them. 
Without variation or modification, such action can only perpetuate (or contribute to) inherent 
flaws with the concept of universal rights. This is because, through such measures, the 
discourse of human rights has become the language of political negotiation60 and the 
                                                            
58 Costas Douzinas, ‘Human Rights for Martians’ (2016) Critical Legal Thinking 
<http://criticallegalthinking.com/2016/05/03/human-rights-for-martians/> accessed 18 May 2018.   
59 For example, the inconsistent utilisation of the principle of ‘the responsibility to protect’: most notably in the 
form of humanitarian intervention. Many commentators have noted that, historically, intervening states have 
predominantly been Western powers acting against specific non-Western nations. For a more detailed analysis 
of this see Mojtaba Mahdavi, ‘A Postcolonial Critique of the Responsibility to Protect in the Middle East’ 
(2015) 20 Perceptions 7. 
60 This is expressed as the suggestion that ‘rights have mutated from a relative defence against power to a 
modality of its operations’. Costas Douzinas, ‘The Paradoxes of Human Rights’ (2013) 20 Constellations 51, 
51. 
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representation of the excess of political correctness.61 It turns the various positive benefits (and 
justifications) of practical implementation against each other, allowing rights to be accentuated 
as protections of criminals and criminality to the detriment of society at large. Deliberate 
manipulation of the public perception of the cause of human rights by both the media and 
politicians ensures that the justificatory purpose which legitimates the relevance of the 
universality of human rights is lost.62  
With this in mind, there is a need to ground future discussions of universal human rights 
in more objective understanding. By seeking to reflect key aspects of a critical jurisprudential 
approach, this thesis will address concerns identified in the categories described above with the 
aim of developing a clearer comprehension of the universality of human rights through a new 
appreciation of knowledge. This new appreciation will be developed by subjecting various 
concepts relevant to accepted understanding of human rights to additional scrutiny through the 
alternative application and interpretation of specific theoretical works. In addition to the critical 
legal scholarship noted above, these works will incorporate traditional legal theory pertinent to 
the discourse on human rights - such as the works of H.L.A. Hart, Alan Gewirth, Ronald 
Dworkin and Jeremy Bentham - as well as non-traditional texts including philosophers 
Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault. A notable advantage of looking to utilise important 
components of a critical jurisprudential approach – such as the need to challenge accepted 
narratives in order to enhance understanding/develop more objective appreciation of legal 
concepts – rather than simply adopting a critical jurisprudential approach in its entirety 
                                                            
61 According to Douzinas, this has resulted from the separation of international law and practical realities and its 
representation through ‘well-oiled diplomatic lunches and obscure academic seminars …’. Costas Douzinas, 
Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (Routledge Cavendish 2007) 198. 
62 It is through the manipulation of the human rights discourse that the concept of universal protections becomes 
decontextualised. The deliberate distancing of the practical realities of the various applications of rights from 
their legitimising cause enables their effective marginalisation. They become something unintended, and 
undesirable. In essence, as Douzinas notes, ‘they lose their utopian end’. Costas Douzinas, The End of Human 
Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century (Hart Publishers 2000) 380. 
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(wherein the possibility of definitively  – and morally - correct legal solutions is always to be 
questioned),63 is that it allows for consideration of prominent theoretical works which a purely 
critical legal approach would be unable to accept as valid (such as the legalistic outlook of 
Ronald Dworkin).64 It therefore encourages a more robust/objective appraisal of the sufficiency 
of prevailing theoretical accounts of human rights. 
Principally, our critical approach will utilise each of the aforementioned works in order 
to test the contemporary universality (and absoluteness) of the concept of human rights. 
Through the use of such texts this thesis makes an original contribution to the discourse. 
Specifically, this is accomplished through the utilisation of international law, legal theory, 
philosophy, and political science in conducting an examination of the universality of human 
rights centred on health (in the form of a foundational claim) within the context of security. To 
further emphasise the significance (and potential importance) of a critical legal appraisal of the 
universality of the human rights concept, this thesis will test the findings of the theoretical re-
evaluation within the contexts of a specific claim – namely the right to health. The practical 
benefits of centring substantive analysis on this particular right were addressed at the start of 
this introductory chapter. Therefore, this section of the introduction does not look to retrace 
them, but rather to clarify the manner within which the investigation is to take place. The 
chapters relating to the right to health and other implications of health considerations to the 
human rights discourse (chapters four and five) will also adopt a critical legal approach. The 
                                                            
63 Andrew Altman explains that, for critical legal scholars, one of the reasons for an inherent scepticism of the 
sufficiency of law stems from the observation that ‘all of those ideological controversies which play a 
significant part in the public debate of our political culture are replicated in the argument of judicial decision. In 
other words, the spectrum of ideological controversy in politics is reproduced in the law … As a patchwork quilt 
of irreconcilable ideologies, the law is a mirror which faithfully reflects the fragmentation of our political 
culture’. Andrew Altman, ‘Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, and Dworkin’ (1986) 15:3 Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 205, 222. 
64 For an excellent review of the complete philosophical works of Ronald Dworkin see Imer Flores, ‘The 
Legacy of Ronald Dworkin (1931-2013): A Legal Theory and Methodology for Hedgehogs, Hercules, and One 
Right Answers’ (2014) Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works 
<https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2466&context=facpub> accessed 18 May 
2018. 
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purpose will once again be to deconstruct accepted understanding of the concept of health, and 
specifically the right to health, as means of better appreciating the practical realisability of its 
protection as an actionable claim.  
A critical jurisprudential approach to this issue will allow us to reconsider the purpose 
of a universal right to health as well as the implications of considerations of human healthiness 
to matters of national security. This will thus look to further accentuate the results of the 
theoretical examinations conducted earlier in the thesis. The right to health is well-suited to the 
objective of reassessing the contemporary universality of human rights as it is itself a largely 
under-appreciated protection (often incorrectly reduced to a purported right to health care).65 
As such, its significance to foundational interests such as security has been largely ignored. 
However, a critical re-appreciation of the purpose of this protection allows for the reversal of 
the contemporary hierarchisation of the human rights discourse by establishing the right to 
health as an enabling right (in that its fulfilment provides others with meaning) – which must 
therefore also be accepted as a foundational claim (e.g. no less important than any other 
legitimate human right). This, in turn, enhances the credibility of the concept of human rights 
by ensuring that the prioritisation of the implementation of such protections cannot legitimately 
be based upon the definitive ranking of specific interests (e.g. with some rights regarded as 
being inherently superior to others), but instead requires acknowledgement of the fact that all 
valid human rights – those capable of securing the fulfilment of the overarching purpose of 
such protections (e.g. to actualise human agency) – deserve equal consideration. Moreover, as 
discussed, the diminishing value of rights is facilitated by an apparent ‘securitisation’ of such 
protections. This pertains to the manner in which fundamental claims are interfered with in 
                                                            
65 See for example Jennifer Prah Ruger, ‘Toward a Theory of a Right to Health: Capability and Incompletely 
Theorized Agreements’ (2006) 18 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 273, 275. 
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order to protect national security.66 Human health is itself securitised in contemporary times 
and has become something which governing powers increasingly utilise in order to protect their 
own state interests.67 As such, health is an appropriate foundation for an examination of the 
absoluteness and universal realisability of human rights in contemporary times. Ultimately, this 
investigation seeks to demonstrate how a critical examination of the right to health is able to 
provide important insights into the idea of universal human rights in general (e.g. by reinforcing 
the justificatory purpose of such protections, as well as the non-definitiveness/evolutiveness of 
their substantive content). 
The focus of this thesis will be on assessing the sufficiency of the idea of 
universal/absolute human rights. It will therefore be centred primarily on legal philosophy. 
Whilst the investigation undertaken with this thesis is principally theoretical (e.g. addressing 
the concept of rights), it will also draw from some substantive human rights law at various 
stages in order to reinforce (and contextualise) its relevant arguments 
and conclusions. Consideration of this substantive law will allow us to test both the practical 
benefits of various theoretical proposals made within this thesis (e.g. the perfectibility of law), 
as well as to examine the sufficiency of the implementation of existing human rights machinery 
in accordance with these proposals (e.g. the ECHR/ECtHR). Moreover, whilst it will make 
reference to some relevant historical developments within the wider theoretical discourse (e.g. 
                                                            
66 Rita Taureck explains that ‘[t]he main argument of securitization theory is that security is a (illocutionary) 
speech act, that solely by uttering “security” something is being done’. Ultimately, this concept intends to 
establish a need for ‘exceptional’ measures to secure against perceived threats. Rita Taureck, ‘Securitisation 
Theory and Securitisation Studies’ (2006) 9 Journal of International Relations and Development 53, 54. 
67 As Stefan Elbe notes, ‘[t]he leader of a political party … or … leaders of international organisations can 
choose whether they portray health issues as a public health concern, as a development concern, or, as they have 
done more recently, as an international security concern’. Stefan Elbe, Security and Global Health: Toward the 
Medicalisation of Insecurity (Polity Press 2010) 12. 
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natural law theory)68 this thesis does not intend to make extensive use of these influential works 
(preferring instead to prioritise more contemporary scholarship). Despite this, it is still useful 
to briefly clarify how this thesis is to be positioned alongside the legal philosophy widely 
regarded as being initiatory of the idea of contemporary human rights. On this point, it should 
be noted that this thesis considers itself as an extension of such precursory works in the sense 
that it draws inspiration from significant arguments advanced within this discourse. Most 
significantly, perhaps, the idea that there are discoverable (and inherently legitimate) means by 
which we can assess the evolution and application of law.69 This thesis argues that 
the contemporary concept of human rights is representative of a particular manifestation of 
the foundational idea which once legitimated natural law.70 In this way, natural law theory is 
to be understood as previous evolutionary stage of the legitimising purpose of human 
rights. Essentially, the validity of ideas established within this discourse is to be confirmed 
                                                            
68 For an excellent critical legal account of natural law theory see Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights: 
Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century (Hart Publishers 2000) 23-68. Here Douzinas explains that the 
origins of natural law can be traced back to the philosophers of ancient Greece (e.g. Aristotle) and Rome (e.g. 
Cicero), with this theory then subsequently developed further in medieval times (e.g. St. Thomas Aquinas) and 
again in early modernity (e.g. Thomas Hobbes, John Locke). In essence, the theory of natural law was based 
upon the understanding that certain universal truths were inherent in nature (originally understood to derive 
from a Divine design), and that this fact ensured that morally correct legal rules existed and could be accurately 
identified through the exercise of human reason. Moreover, this theory maintained that the validity of legal rules 
was not dependent exclusively on the determinations of sovereign states (e.g. what they held to be correct), but 
rather their conformity with this natural law. Whilst Douzinas confirms that there were different interpretations 
of natural law theory, the general foundation of this theory was the idea that ‘[n]ature became the source of a 
definite set of rules and norms, of a legal code …natural law was the expression of divine reason which 
pervaded the world and made human beings one of its aspects … The law, human institutions, rules and all 
worldly order proceeded from a single source, all-powerful nature … Nature commands, it is a moral precept 
which orders men to obey the sovereign logos which rules history’. Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights: 
Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century (Hart Publishers 2000) 50-1. 
69 Samuel Moyn provides an effective summary of how the proposed basis for making a correct determination 
regarding the sufficiency of law changed and evolved when natural law theory was replaced by that of natural 
rights. Ultimately, this is personified by replacing an external basis for making the correct determination (e.g. 
nature itself) with an internal one (e.g. humanity). As Moyn explains, ‘[n]atural law was originally one rule 
given from above, where natural rights came to be a list of separate items. Natural law was something objective, 
which individuals must obey because God made them part of the natural order he ordained: illegitimate 
practices were deemed contra naturam or “against nature”. But, natural rights were subjective entities “owned” 
by humanity as prerogatives’. Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Belknap Press 2012) 
21. 
70 Specifically, the idea established in natural law theory of ‘a common human nature that unites all people, 
irrespective of their individual characteristics and cultural or social determinations … [that] men share a 
common humanity which gives empirical men the same essential needs and characteristics …’. Costas 
Douzinas, The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century (Hart Publishers 2000) 
196. 
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within a contemporary context (drawing from modern legal scholarship) and the consideration 
of substantive human rights law. 
In effect, this thesis intends to address two propositions which are advanced in 
accordance with a critical jurisprudential approach to human rights. The first is that the concept 
of absolute, universal human rights has proven to be an impossibility. This position is made in 
the light of the aforementioned securitisation of the rights discourse and the apparent 
prioritisation of collective interests (e.g. national security) over individual liberties. The second 
is that – in addition to such protections being contextually contingent/relative (see point one) 
– the illegitimate expansion of the human rights discourse (where all desires can become 
claims) has resulted in a need to restrict the scope of ‘valid claims’ to various civil and political 
interests (e.g. first-generation rights). Ultimately, by establishing the right to health (or human 
healthiness) as a foundational protection, and the purpose of such rights as securing human 
subsistence, this thesis will argue that human rights are universal – and that the absoluteness 
of such protections relate to a permanence of purpose, rather than the practical enforcement of 
definitive accounts of these basic claims. As such, it will be suggested that the apparent conflict 
between collective and individual interests – centred on national security concerns – can be 
resolved in a manner which supports the idea of universal human rights. Namely, by accepting 
that such protections are simply a contemporary (imperfect) account of an enduring (and 
universal) ideal, and that interference with the enjoyment of such protections is therefore 
legitimate when such action is necessary to securing the continuation of this ideal.  
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2 A Critical Appraisal of the Concept of Universal Human 
Rights 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
It is no exaggeration to suggest that the concept of human rights has greatly influenced 
the development of modern human history. In contemporary times, the idea of human rights is 
pervasive and elicits responses of both condemnation and praise in seemingly equal measure. 
One of the most contentious issues of all appears to be the purported universal nature of the 
various claims included under the umbrella of ‘human rights’. Specifically, the idea that such 
rights are not only universally relevant, in the sense that they represent fundamental protections 
all human beings need regardless of their cultural background (and irrespective of whether 
various cultures acknowledge the legitimacy of this need), but that they are also universally 
applicable and ultimately realisable in a practical sense. Douzinas encapsulated this sentiment 
within the statement: 
The modern laws of nature are universal, immutable and eternal, a set of 
regularities or repeated patterns … a set of norms that both is and ought to be 
obeyed by people.71 
 
Irrespective of whether this was ever truly universally accepted, a tangible souring of 
attitudes towards this concept has been evidenced in recent years. Within the United Kingdom, 
for example, the promise of a desire to reduce both the scope and reliability of human rights is 
consistently utilised by politicians to various ends. This was most recently witnessed in the 
aftermath of the terrorist attack in London72 when Prime Minister Theresa May promised to 
                                                            
71 Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century (Hart 
Publishers 2000) 23-24. 
72 The attack took place on London Bridge and in London Borough Market on the evening of June 3rd 2017, and 
led to the death of eight individuals. It followed a terrorist attack in Manchester Arena on May 22nd 2017, which 
resulted in twenty-two deaths.  
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‘change’ human rights law which hindered national security efforts.73 A driving factor for this 
is, as many scholars have noted, undoubtedly the heightened sense of public panic which has 
emerged since the terrorist attacks of September the 11th (2001).74 This in turn has resulted in 
a growing sense that – due to their perceived inherent conflict with national security - human 
rights, as absolute protections, are untenable (and undesirable). On this point, Philip Ruddock 
suggests that is epitomized by the fact that ‘the debate on counter-terrorism issues has been 
dominated by traditional analysis of protecting either national security, or civil liberties …[this] 
implies that counter-terrorism legislation is inevitably at odds with the protection of 
fundamental human rights’.75  
2.1.1 Contemporary Challenges for the Idea of Universal Human Rights 
 
From this we can identify two direct challenges for modern proponents of the idea of 
universal human rights. The first is whether the concept of human rights, as absolute claims, 
can be justified (in theoretical terms). In order to effectively respond to this issue, it is 
imperative to establish precisely what human rights are (or, indeed, what they ought to be 
understood to be). This chapter will begin by looking to address this issue. Of course, this task 
could itself be the subject of a doctoral thesis. As such, it should be noted that the analysis 
conducted within this chapter will not be exhaustive. The primary purpose of this is to draw 
from prominent works on this issue as a means of identifying significant recurring 
                                                            
73 This position was expressed during the General Election campaign in a speech given on June 6th 2017. During 
this speech, the Prime Minister vowed to toughen counter-terrorist laws so as to make them more effective, and 
then declared ‘if human rights laws stop us from doing it, we will change those laws so we can do it’. For an 
insightful summary of public views surrounding this see Edward Dracott, ‘What the Public Have to Say About 
Theresa May’s Wish to Change Human Rights Laws to Fight Terror’ The Independent (London, 22 June 2017) 
<http://www.independent.ie/world-news/and-finally/what-the-public-have-to-say-about-theresa-mays-wish-to-
change-human-rights-laws-to-fight-terror-35798133.html> accessed 18 May 2018.   
74 On September 11th 2001, 19 individuals associated with Al-Qaeda hijacked commercial airliners and then 
used these aircraft to perpetrate terrorist attacks in the U.S. cities of Washington and New York. These attacks 
led to the deaths of approximately 2,750 people and subsequently prompted then President George W. Bush to 
declare a ‘War on Terror’. 
75 Philip Ruddock, ‘A New Framework: Counter-Terrorism and the Rule of Law’ (2004) 16 The Sydney Papers 
112, 117. 
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characteristics for the theoretical concept of human rights itself. These will then be utilised in 
order to provide a robust summary of the idea of human rights. 
The second issue concerns whether human rights claims are universally realisable. It 
has previously been established that a prominent critique of the human rights relates to the 
practical difficulties of securing the implementation of such protections. However, for our 
purposes, the investigation of the realisability of universal human rights will largely be 
restricted to the desirability of such implementation (as a more contextual issue). The 
desirability of universal/absolute claims has been increasingly challenged by the emergent 
national security narrative which personifies post 9/11 attitudes to balancing fundamental 
interests. The second issue will be tackled in greater detail in subsequent chapters of this thesis 
(namely chapters three and five). In responding to these issues, the key question that will guide 
our analysis will be ‘is the idea of universal human rights, in the contemporary context, 
justifiable?’ It should be acknowledged that for reasons mentioned above, an affirmative 
response will not be contingent upon the identification of a practically realisable framework 
for human rights (i.e. how to secure their universal implementation). Instead, the focus will be 
on looking to establish the theoretical integrity of the idea of universal human rights in modern 
times. It is suggested that this determination is a necessary pre-requisite before considerations 
are afforded to questions of practical implementation.  
However, it is also important to contextualise the purpose of this investigation by 
confirming that is relevance is heavily influenced by the fact that a practical framework of 
ensuring that human rights are reliably applied on a universal basis (or, indeed, even a regional 
one) has yet to be secured. To briefly respond to this point it is worth affirming that the maxim 
of ‘ought implies can’76 does not require that the ‘can’ in question needs to be immediately 
                                                            
76 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (Penguin Classics 2008) 473. 
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identifiable. Indeed, the fact that something may appear to be unobtainable in a certain time, 
and within specific historical contexts, does not conclusively prove this determination to be 
true (or that a specific position will always be accepted).77 For this reason, this thesis will 
propose that it is acceptable to prioritise the objective of providing a robust philosophical 
justification for human rights in the first instance, with the understanding that a practical means 
of enforcement (even if not immediately identifiable) may be developed in the future. As such, 
chapters two and three will attempt to provide a strong theoretical justificatory account of the 
idea of universal human rights. This account will look to establish a philosophically justifiable 
foundation which is ultimately universally realisable within the modern (national security 
dominated) context. 
2.1.2 Chapter Two Structure: Key Aims and Objectives 
 
As mentioned, the purpose of this chapter is to establish a clear understanding of the 
contemporary value of the idea of universal human rights. To do this, the chapter will be 
structured into several smaller examinations. Essentially, there are three key outcomes to be 
achieved:  
1. This chapter will begin by defining the concept of human rights. The starting point for 
this will be to contextualise rights as valid claims (before briefly considering the merits 
of will and interest theories of rights respectively). Next, this chapter will provide an 
examination of various prominent contemporary theoretical accounts of the concept of 
human rights itself. This will conclude by proposing that James Griffin’s approach – 
centred on actualising normative agency - is preferable to other accounts as it seeks to 
limit the scope of valid claims to only those things needed to secure a ‘functioning 
                                                            
77 History is full of relevant examples for this, such as the Women’s Suffrage movement which began in the 
nineteenth-century, and the U.S. Civil Rights movement of the mid-twentieth-century. In both cases, the positive 
achievements these initiatives secured were, at their commencement, viewed by many to be impossible. 
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human agent’,78 and as it also effectively encapsulates the justificatory purpose of 
universalisable human rights – to protect those things necessary for securing the 
‘capacity to choose and to pursue our conception of a worthwhile life’79 (2.2); 
2. To reinforce this point, this chapter will then consider the sufficiency of traditional 
conceptual foundations for grounding the universality of human rights - specifically 
with an examination of the concept of dignity. This examination will identify significant 
limitations with attempts to establish the universality of human rights based on dignity. 
Namely, the fact that the concept of dignity is contextually contingent (with some 
interpretations – such as those which see dignity as something which must be earned - 
seemingly counter-intuitive to the idea of universal rights). Due to inconsistencies 
which result from its evident relativeness (a point reinforced with reference to various 
judicial interpretations), it will be argued that the concept of dignity is sub-optimal for 
providing a universalisable foundation for human rights in contemporary times. Instead, 
it will be suggested that a more effective conceptual foundation for universal human 
rights is provided by its justificatory purpose (as addressed above) (2.3); 
3. Finally, this chapter will address the contemporary universality of the actual ‘subject’ 
of rights. Here it will be argued that subject of rights is itself multi-faceted and 
comprises of separate categories for those who are entitled to claim (e.g. humanity) and 
those who are actually capable of benefitting from claiming (e.g. political 
constructs/law-abiding citizens). This chapter will then consider means by which the 
modern process of determining the ‘legitimate’ holders of actionable claims is 
susceptible to abuse (namely in pursuit of national security initiatives) in a manner 
which unjustifiably limits the scope of such protections (and precludes the possibility 
                                                            
78 James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2008) 35. 
79 ibid 45. 
Daniel M Lowe                           Assessing the Universality of Human Rights in the Context of Health  
43 
 
of universal rights). This is arguably achieved by restricting the enjoyment of such 
rights through the exclusion of those who are perceived to be undeserving of protection 
(e.g. refugees/terrorist suspects). Ultimately, it will be established that the universality 
of human rights is actually represented by an absolute entitlement to claim such 
protections as well as the inherent potentiality of their fulfilment (2.4). 
2.2 Defining Human Rights 
 
To begin our examination, it is worth briefly establishing the value in providing a robust 
philosophical foundation for the concept of human rights. On this point, we will echo the 
argument provided by Joel Feinberg in the Nature and Value of Rights.80 Here, Feinberg 
explained that a theoretical foundation was important because, if protections are automatically 
afforded without acknowledgement of the justification behind the need for them (i.e. an 
indication of why they are important) individuals would have no guarantee of such protection 
because they would have no way of articulating the legitimacy of their claim to it.81 A robust 
philosophical foundation is therefore a necessary means by which the contextual legitimacy of 
accounts of human rights (in relation to the scope of individual protections as well as the 
concept itself) may be continually assessed and reaffirmed. As we have established, many of 
the controversies surrounding the idea of human rights stem from the issue of legitimacy. To 
contextualise the importance of philosophical foundations further we can illustrate two 
forcefully persuasive warnings about the nature of such accounts which personify opposite 
ends of the debate.  
                                                            
80 Joel Feinberg, ‘The Nature and Value of Rights’ in Joel Feinberg, Rights, Justice and the Bounds of Liberty, 
Essays in Social Philosophy (Princeton University Press 1980). 
81 ibid 145-150. 
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The first is the famous rebuttal to the idea of universal, inalienable rights provided by 
Jeremy Bentham.82 A more detailed examination of the value of this critique will be conducted 
in Chapter Three.83 It is useful to us here simply as means of demonstrating the reasoning 
behind a particularly critical school of thought. Specifically, this is personified by attempts to 
illustrate the excess of the idea of human rights. The second argument we will address is one 
provided by Costas Douzinas.84 This approach is much more contemporary, and critiques 
perceived limitations with the actual construct of human rights (seen as separating from the 
justifiable idea of such protections). In this way, this argument does not focus on the excess of 
rights, but instead warns about the dangers of reducing their ambition.  
Bentham’s account was based upon various logical assessments. In particular, the fact 
that meaningfulness of rights is first dependent upon there being some reliable manner in which 
they could be fulfilled. In practical terms, and within the context of nation states, this translates 
as the need for governing powers to both acknowledge the legitimacy of your claim, and also 
to possess the ability (and political will) to respond to it.85 The idea of rights which existed 
‘anterior’ to these conditions was regarded, by Bentham, as ‘nonsense upon stilts’.86 Instead he 
argued that any benefit that rights seek to secure is only obtainable if a state chooses to bestow 
it (and not because you have a ‘right’ to such results). For Bentham, the danger of the idea of 
inalienable, ‘natural; rights related to its capacity to promulgate dissent amongst a population 
and disrupt the rule of law - ultimately undermining the very interests they seek to protect.87 
                                                            
82 Jeremy Bentham, ‘Anarchical Fallacies’ in John Bowring (ed), The Works of Jeremy Bentham Vol. II 
(Edinburgh: William Tait 1843). 
83 See Chapter Three, section 3.2.2. 
84 Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century (Hart 
Publishers 2000). 
85 Jeremy Bentham, ‘Anarchical Fallacies’ in John Bowring (ed), The Works of Jeremy Bentham Vol. II 
(Edinburgh: William Tait 1843) 500-501. 
86 ibid 501. 
87 Jeremy Bentham described this as ‘the spirt of resistance to all laws – a spirit of insurrection against all 
governments …’. ibid.  
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From this analysis, we see that the excess of the philosophical foundation of human rights is 
represented in its impracticality. As an important aspect of its purpose is to articulate the 
legitimacy of various provisions (and protections), it encourages the adoption of language 
which conflates the resulting claims beyond what is actually possible. Its promise is utopian. 
Whilst this may make the idea of rights attractive, it does not assist the prospect of securing 
their application.   
In contrast, Costas Douzinas critiqued the restrictive nature of modern accounts of 
human rights which he argued had lost their ‘utopian end’.88 According to Douzinas, the 
‘utopian end’ reflects that which Bentham readily dismissed, the philosophical identity 
representative of the purpose of such protections. Douzinas saw the value of this purpose in its 
reflecting the reactionary, rebellious core of the human rights concept. This is the idea which 
attracts the support of those who suffer injustice at the hands of the state and compels them to 
take action as means of rectification. Historically, Douzinas suggests, this has provided the 
catalyst for the American Declaration of Independence (DOI 1776), the French Declaration of 
Rights of Man and of the Citizen (DRMC 1789) and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR 1948).89 However, Douzinas argues that the contemporary focus of the human 
rights movement has stagnated. Through the process of their widespread integration into 
national and international law their ‘revolutionary and dissident purposes …their end [has 
become] obscured in ever more declarations, treaties and diplomatic lunches’.90 Douzinas 
suggests that the growing acceptance of the idea of human rights, evidenced in their present 
integration in the global arena, results in insufficient attention to the means by which this 
integration is regulated. Specifically, those states who have ‘proclaimed the triumph of human 
                                                            
88 Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century (Hart 
Publishers 2000) 380. 
89 ibid 85-145. 
90 ibid 380. 
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rights’91 fail to ensure that such protections are reliably protected (within their own state or 
within the world at large). The idea of human rights has become banal. They are accepted, 
discussed, promoted and critiqued principally in accordance with how they are presently 
defined. Douzinas suggests that his approach is flawed, because it lacks ambition – in particular 
the ambition to continually renew itself through the identification of injustice within the status 
quo. Yet, through the process of their international integration, and as, Douzinas notes, their 
subsequent transformation into a modality of politics,92 human rights have become the status 
quo. Ultimately, Douzinas illustrates the inherent dangers with abandoning the ‘utopian’ ideals 
which represent their philosophical foundations.  
2.2.1 Conceptualising Rights: Will and Interest Theories 
 
Having contextualised conflicting ends of the discourse surrounding the philosophy of 
human rights, we can now move on to examine their form and functioning in greater detail. To 
begin, it is useful to conceptualise human rights as individual claims (although it should be 
noted that the terms claims, rights, and protections will be used throughout this thesis 
interchangeably). As we have already discussed with appreciation of the overarching 
legitimacy of the concept itself, the specific nature of human rights protections is also heavily 
debated. The starting point for this debate is recognition that, in practical terms, ‘all rights are 
claims.’93 In effect, this purports that rights are claims to certain provisions or protections 
(actions or inactions) to which individuals are held to possess an entitlement. The 
corresponding duty bearers are to be either the state itself, or simply other individual members 
of society. Whilst most rights theorists generally agree up to this point, an underlying 
disagreement defines the discourse and establishes the direction different approaches take. In 
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effect, this disagreement rests on the supposed purpose of these claims. If we accept that human 
rights are, as Feinberg hypothesised, ‘valid claims’,94 then we must address the source of their 
validity. There are two prominent schools of thought to this issue known as the ‘will theory’, 
and the ‘interest theory’ respectively. In accordance with the aim of establishing a robust 
theoretical foundation for further analysis on the concept of universal human rights, it is 
important to briefly address each account in turn. 
In essence, where ‘interest theorists’ argue that the legitimacy of human rights stems 
from recognition that they are claims to things instrumental to securing human well-being, ‘will 
theorists’ maintain that the source of their legitimacy is the fact that they are claims to things 
necessary for ensuring autonomous action in pursuit of a worthwhile life (as determined by 
each individual).95 Interest theorists hold that rights exist to serve the interests of the right 
holder, and, as such, only beings capable of having interests are potential right-holders.96 They 
are claims grounded in the objective of protecting fundamental interests (discernible as those 
which further enhance the well-being of the right holder). As prominent interest theorist Neil 
MacCormick asserts, ‘having a right is having one's interests protected in certain ways by the 
imposition of normative constraints on the acts and activities of other people with respect to 
the object of one's interests’.97 
 Whilst will theorists may also accept that all rights require an identifiable right-holder, 
they maintain that one must possess the power to waive or enforce the correlating duty to 
qualify.98 In addition, for such theorists, it is the autonomy of the individual which serves as 
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the justification for these rights, rather than the idea that claimants are simply ‘better off’ when 
certain things are protected.99 For will theorists, the possession of a right ultimately affords the 
right-holder an opportunity to make significant choices, in the sense that it allows them to 
pursue a worthwhile life.100 As H. L. A. Hart explains, in this way rights transform a right-
holder into ‘a small scale sovereign’.101 
Notable limitations with each approach are well documented. The will theory appears 
incapable of covering non-autonomous human beings (such as the infants and the disabled) or 
incapacitated normative agents (e.g. individuals in a coma).102 In contrast, the interest theory 
is seemingly too individualistic, with the underlying purpose simply to enhance the well-being 
of the individual right-holder specifically (rather than society as a whole).103 Furthermore, it 
also appears susceptible to justifying a conflation of claims to provisions grounded in 
identifiable interests but not actually consistent with legitimate needs.104 The concept of 
inalienable, unwaivable protections is also apparently inconsistent with the idea that rights are 
a means of affording right-holders the opportunity to choose how to live their own life (in 
accordance with their individual conceptions on the best way to do so) as will theorist’s purport. 
Indeed, MacCormick notes that a problem with this approach is that it excludes the ability to 
protect against voluntary enslavement or, indeed, the decision to accept employment in unsafe 
working conditions.105 For interest theorists, rights provide means of protecting individuals, 
and their fundamental interests, from all potential threats, including the actions of right-holders 
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themselves. Yet will theorists suggest that right-holders must possess the capacity to waive the 
protection rights afford them simply because the fundamental purpose of such claims is to 
protect the means of operating autonomously (and, as such, allow individuals to act in a manner 
which appears contradictory to their own self-interests). Will theorists regard this ability as the 
most fundamental interest of them all. In reflecting upon these differences, it would appear that 
will theory is better suited to providing a philosophical foundation for human rights which is 
compatible with the ‘utopian end’ proposed by Douzinas – as it is based on the value of 
individual autonomy. In developing this further, it is useful to consider several other influential 
theoretical accounts which can help us to develop a robust appreciation of the concept. 
2.2.2 Modern Theories of Human Rights 
 
As mentioned at the start of the chapter, there are two principal contextual issues 
pertaining to the concept of universal human rights; whether a robust theoretical justification 
is possible, and whether - either with or without such justification - they are universally 
realisable. A more detailed examination of the concept of human rights is required in order to 
effectively respond to each of these questions. The first thing to establish is what is, or ought, 
to be understood by the term human rights. On this, Douzinas suggests: 
Human rights are moral rights or claims by individuals, which may or may not 
be recognized by a particular legal system. They introduce certain minimum 
standards of treatment to which people are entitled and create a moral framework 
within which state policy, administration and the law should operate.106 
This definition is uncontroversial, and reflects the fact that the term ‘human rights’ is 
generally accepted to refer to individual claims which all human beings are held to possess 
simply by virtue of their humanity.107 In the modern world, and specifically in Western states, 
to have human rights is now, as Costas Douzinas suggests, increasingly ‘synonymous to being 
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human’.108 In accordance with such sentiments, Jack Donnelly argued that the universality of 
human rights is clearly self-evident, simply because ‘one either is or is not a human being, and 
therefore has the same human rights as everyone else (or none at all)’.109 Reviewing 
contemporary literature on human rights reveals that these approaches are far from uncommon. 
In fact, modern human rights theorists have consistently held that the legitimacy of rights (as 
well as their universal relevance) stems from aspects of human nature.110 These qualities will 
be expounded upon in more detail in subsequent sections of the chapter. For now, it is enough 
to acknowledge that justifications for human rights are frequently built upon the apparent moral 
significance of the nature of human beings. This position is perhaps best personified in Francis 
Fukuyama proclamation that, ‘when we strip all of a person’s contingent and accidental 
characteristics away, there remains some essential human quality underneath that is worthy of 
a certain minimal level of respect …’.111 
If the previous summary is relatively un-contentious, at least in relation to how human 
rights are commonly defined (claims human beings possess simply in virtue of being human), 
it is equally accurate to suggest that there is far less agreement in relation to what they ought 
to protect.112 This is to be distinguished from the question of why certain interests should be 
protected, as discussed in relation to the will and interest theory debate above (and as we will 
consider once again in relation to the theoretical account proposed by James Griffin at the end 
of this section). With regards to the question of what to protect, consensus appears to be 
restricted to acknowledgement that they are rights to the protection of interests or benefits all 
                                                            
108 Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century (Hart 
Publishers 2000) 255. 
109 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and in Practice (Cornell University Press 2002) 10. 
110 ‘Nature is the latest in a long line (which includes religion, reason and law) to tantalise us with a certainty 
that must forever remain impossible’. Costas Douzinas and Connor Gearty (eds), The Meanings of Rights: The 
Philosophy and Social Theory of Human Rights (Cambridge University Press 2014) 2. 
111 Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (Profile Books 
2003) 149. 
112 Marcus Arvan, ‘Reconceptualizing Human Rights’ (2012) 8 Journal of Global Ethics 91. 
Daniel M Lowe                           Assessing the Universality of Human Rights in the Context of Health  
51 
 
human beings are held to deserve (for one reason or another). Despite the existence of differing 
approaches to justifying the legitimacy of such claims, their universal applicability is 
consistently argued to stem from an understanding that all humans share a universal need for 
the protection or provision of certain things (whether this need requires securing an alleged 
benefit or, contrastingly, to simply permitting a choice to be made).113 Principally, the most 
obvious challenge resulting from this relates to determining what needs are inherently human. 
A relatively recent attempt to respond to this was formulated by William Talbott who, in Which 
Rights Should Be Universal? identified eight fundamental rights which he suggests exemplified 
necessary human interests.114 Broadly speaking, Talbott suggested that these rights seek to 
protect those interests crucial to autonomous living, self-determination, and equality. The 
determining factor for Talbott was that ‘human’ rights ought to be those which ‘constitute the 
social basis for autonomy’.115 For this reason, he argued that matters of physical security, 
physical subsistence, as well as freedoms of press, thought and association should be 
prioritised. Arguably, Talbott identified the rights which are inherently human by considering 
the interests that make possible the development and exercise of human subsistence 
(understood to be a quality of life ‘worthy’ of a human being).116 On this note, his guiding 
philosophy was as follows: 
What is the ground of basic human rights? I believe it is the capacity for making 
reliable judgments about one's own good. All normal human beings have this 
capacity. Basic human rights provide the background conditions that enable 
them to develop and exercise it.117 
Similarly, in his seminal work ‘Law of the Peoples’, John Rawls argued that human 
rights represent the basic elements required for individuals to be able to effectively engage in 
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social interaction.118 For this reason alone, he asserts, all societies are required to protect such 
interests. The underlying purpose of such claims is therefore to set a ‘necessary, though not 
sufficient, standard for the decency of domestic political and social institutions’.119 Rawls 
asserts that these claims are universal in the sense that ‘they are binding on all peoples and 
societies’.120 Indeed, their universal relevance seemingly disqualifies the apparent need to 
justify them with specific religious, philosophical or moral doctrines. Instead, Rawls suggests, 
it is sufficient to acknowledge that all may be capable of doing so.121 Like Talbott, Rawls 
stressed that human rights stem from a need to protect and ensure individual subsistence and 
security - as well a series of correlating freedoms and liberties necessary to effectively 
accomplish this task – (such as from slavery, or of conscience).122 For Rawls, as Wilfred Hinsch 
and Markus Stepanians have noted, the significance of human rights relates to their capacity to 
‘limit … a regime’s internal autonomy’,123 specifically so as to protect the means by which 
individual members of the state may actualise their own.  
Alan Gewirth provided another well-reasoned approach when declaring that the 
universal nature of human rights is legitimised by the fact that ‘all human beings, by virtue of 
their humanity, recognise in themselves and others rights to freedom and well-being’.124 This 
argument posits that all agents (i.e. potential right holders) possess certain inherent qualities 
and capabilities (such as the ability to reason and to operate autonomously) which allow them, 
not only to make claims for the protection of certain interests, but to recognise the relevance of 
the claims of other agents (or potential agents).125 In essence, Gewirth suggests that all agents 
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are capable of appreciating the importance of well-being, and of pursuing a life in accordance 
with whatever particular values or ideals they possess. If a person accepts that they, as an agent, 
have the right to pursue a worthwhile life, and to certain protections or provisions that will 
allow them to do so, logically, if they hold that facts of their agency legitimise these claims, 
they must also accept the claims of other agents to the same. Failing to do so, Gewirth argues, 
would ultimately result in them undermining the legitimacy of their own claims.126 Jeremy 
Waldron has articulated this argument slightly differently by asserting that as a direct result of 
the nature of human rights, any individual who claims one must logically recognise that the 
exact same claim could also be made by anyone else.127 In this way, he concludes, such rights 
are necessarily ‘universalistic and universalisable’.128 
In On Human Rights, James Griffin confirms that rights must, to some extent, logically 
correlate with concept of individual interests, but notes that it is the nature of the interest that 
legitimises a claim to its protection. Griffin accepts that there is a temptation to suggest that 
justifiable claims are those which are grounded in ‘basic human needs’.129 Such needs are 
defined as ‘what human beings need in order to avoid ailment, harm, or malfunction—or, to 
put it positively, what they need to function normally’.130 Whilst this would appear to be a 
reasonable starting point for the discussion, Griffin suggests that it lacks precision, and is 
susceptible to conflation. For this reason, he argued that it was better to proceed with the 
understanding that we possess human rights to ‘what is needed to function as a normative 
agent’.131 This was defined as those interests that all normative agents evidently require the 
protection or provision of in order to be able to live autonomously (in pursuit with a worthwhile 
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life). Notably, this approach attempts to limit the scope of interests capable of giving rise to a 
right. In effect, the task is presented as determining what needs (and therefore interests) are 
universally fundamental to human subsistence (rather than the more subjective question of 
what needs are inherently human), and then assigning corresponding rights capable of ensuring 
these interests are fulfilled. In promoting this position, Griffin suggested that human rights 
should be grounded in the concept of ‘personhood’132 as this would provide them with a more 
substantive foundation:  
Grounding human rights in personhood imposes an obvious constraint on their 
content: they are rights not to anything that promotes human good or flourishing, 
but merely to what is needed for human status. They are protections of that 
somewhat austere state, a characteristically human life, not of a good or happy 
or perfected or flourishing human life.133  
Due its capacity to refocus the discourse towards more objective (and thus universally 
defensible) means of determining and justifying legitimate human rights, it is proposed that 
Griffin’s approach is preferable when considering the universal realisability of human rights 
within the modern contexts. As such, the philosophical justification for human rights presented 
within this thesis acknowledges that legitimate rights are claims to the protection of interests 
which further the well-being of the right-holder, but, as Griffin suggests, they are to be 
understood only as those interests which enable ‘a functioning human agent’.134 Moreover, it 
is accepted that the most fundamental need (and interest) is the protection of autonomous 
agency (e.g. human subsistence). Whilst rights are arguably important simply because they 
protect fundamental interests (and provide means of enhancing the quality of living), they are 
primarily justifiable because of the nature of the claimants whose interests they protect (i.e. 
normative agents). The ultimate purpose of human rights is, therefore, to protect the vital 
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interests/needs which allow individuals to operate autonomously in pursuit of their conception 
of a worthwhile life. This position will be further developed in Chapter Four with the proposal 
that human health should be regarded as the foundational component of such agency.  
In summary of our examination of relevant theoretical accounts, it is clear that attempts 
to justify the universality of human rights are consistently based on the belief that there are 
numerous interests that are worth protecting, either for the benefit of society as a whole, or the 
well-being of the individual (or both). Acknowledging this fact logically leads us to consider 
how best to protect them. This in turn leads to the realisation that they cannot truly be protected, 
or guaranteed, unless individuals are able to hold states to account. As such, it could be argued 
that they must form the basis of various claims against the state (but which the state itself must 
fulfil), to both actions and inactions. At this point the legitimating process must shift to 
identifying universally relatable grounds which may be effective in communicating the validity 
of such needs. In contemporary times, this is often attempted through the concept of human 
dignity. This chapter will now move on to address the merits and limitations of this approach. 
2.3 The Foundation of Contemporary Rights: Human Dignity 
 
Dignity is immediately connected with the idea of rights - as the ground of 
rights, the content of certain rights, and perhaps even the form and structure 
of rights.135 
The idea of dignity is so appealing to this purpose precisely because of its apparent 
universal relevance. All cultures appear to understand the concept of dignity. However, 
ultimately, it restricts the idea of rights as embodiments of universal principles, because the 
idea of dignity is culturally specific. Further, the concept of ‘universal dignity’ is demonstrably 
limited in practice; as evidenced by various declarations of rights (in both past and present 
times). The aforementioned DOI and the DRMC proclaimed rights entitled to ‘all men’ and 
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‘all citizens’ respectively. Indeed, the term ‘all’ implies totality and suggests universality. As 
Douzinas notes, ‘the French Declaration of Rights started a trend by proclaiming (human) 
rights as “natural, inalienable and sacred”’.136 Yet to fully understand the intended scope of 
these declarations it is necessary to examine the contexts in which they were drafted.137 
It could be argued that the 'universal' aspect of such declarations was contextually 
contingent on the circumstances of those who proclaimed them. The universality of these rights 
pertained to contextualised interpretations of the concept itself, and not to the scope of its 
practical applicability. In this way, such rights were held to be ‘universally applicable’, but 
only to relevant individuals within a specific ‘universal’ sphere. This is demonstrated by 
intentional exclusivity with regards to who was held to be entitled to their protection. For 
example, in neither declaration was the issue of slavery effectively addressed.138 The 
implication of this is that ‘slaves’ were intentionally excluded from claiming the protection of 
such rights. Similarly, in the DRMC the rights were specifically proclaimed on behalf of all 
‘citizens’, a social status which, at that time, women were unable to possess.139 It is apparent 
that these rights were 'universal' only in the sense that they applied to all within certain 
circumstances. Principally, in both instances this was specifically all free white males.140 This 
highlights an apparent paradox with the use of dignity as a foundational component of attempts 
to legitimise the idea of universal rights. Indeed, as Waldron notes, ‘[d]efenders of natural 
rights would say that men are born free, but would then go on to complain in the name of rights 
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that so many were born into slavery’.141 Further to this, within initial declarations of rights the 
‘universal’ scope was also restricted to specific national experiences. In practical terms, they 
were intended to be applicable only to appropriate individuals within the nation making the 
proclamation. The primary purpose with each of these declarations was therefore to address 
how certain individuals ought to treat each other within a particular national sphere. In contrast, 
and partly out of recognition of the increasingly global scope of individual human experience, 
modern declarations of rights also planned to regulate how individuals treated each other on an 
international scale. 
2.3.1 The Use of Dignity in Modern Human Rights Treaties 
 
The first, and arguably most significant of these, was the UDHR.142 In combination 
with the Nuremberg trials which preceded it,143 the UDHR was a direct response to the 
atrocities committed during the Second World War.144 As Douzinas explains, the ‘international 
law of human rights was a response to Hitler and Stalin, to the atrocities and barbarities of the 
War, and to the Holocaust’.145 These were reactive measures which instilled the idea of human 
rights and human dignity as objective, legally enforceable standards. Moreover, they 
established precedent for holding authorities accountable for their actions on both national and 
international levels. In conjunction with the assertion that there are basic standards human 
beings are held to deserve by nature of their humanity, was the assertion that there are basic 
standards governments must adhere to in relation to how they treat their citizens, as well as 
citizens from other states they are effectively responsible for.146 Interestingly, however, it must 
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be mentioned that the ‘universal’ aspect of this new framework for holding leaders accountable 
for ‘crimes against humanity’ remained contextually relative in one important aspect: it was 
used as justification for prosecuting the defeated Axis powers exclusively, and did not address 
the commensurate atrocities perpetrated by the allies.147 As such, despite the fact that the scope 
of universal was intentionally expanded, in application it was still somewhat contextually 
contingent.  
In contrast, with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR 1950),148 the 
International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR 1966),149 and the International 
Covenant for Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR 1966),150 the scope was 
deliberately focused towards establishing universal standards of protection (at least in theory). 
With each of these modern declarations the concept of human dignity was utilised to ground 
the authenticity of their ‘universal’ applicability. Historically, as with the scope of human 
rights, the scope of dignity was itself a contextually contingent concept. As seen with the DOI 
and DRMC, individuals proclaimed the relevance of rights in the name of dignity; but a dignity 
initially afforded only to themselves (i.e. determined on factors such as sex, race, and social 
class).  
Starting with the UDHR, the scope of human dignity was purposefully expanded to 
provide a foundation which would allow all individuals to make legitimate claims for the 
protection of rights.  The concept of dignity was chosen because it is one which has universal 
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recognition (and was thus deemed appropriate for the universalising objective of human rights). 
Moreover, due to its inherent malleability, grounding rights in ‘dignity’ afforded the drafters 
of these declarations/treaties an opportunity to legitimise the universality of such protections 
without the need to produce a robust philosophical (or legal) justification. It was arguably an 
attempt to circumvent potential obstacles to the validity of the idea of fundamental human 
claims. In effect, it was also a deliberate attempt to avoid exposure to cultural relativist 
critiques, and thus increase the appeal of such protections.151  
However, a crucial limitation in relation to attempts to achieve the universal application 
of human rights stems from efforts to universalise the concept of dignity. Indeed, although the 
idea of human dignity is arguably relevant to all cultures and all peoples,152 it is important to 
note that there are many different interpretations of this concept and no interpretation is 
accepted universally.  As a direct result of the fact that the Western drafters of the UDHR 
mistakenly assumed that the meaning of ‘human dignity’ was self-evident, little attempt was 
made to consult on this with the representatives from non-Western states.153 Consequently, it 
was arguably a purely Western understanding of the concept of dignity that was proclaimed as 
the legitimising source for the universal relevance of the earliest modern accounts of human 
rights. Douzinas notes that this specific ‘Western’ interpretation was broadly based on Kantian 
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Latin American’. Adrienne Anderson, ‘On Dignity and Whether the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
Remains a Place of Refuge After 60 Years’ (2009) 25 American University International Law Review 115, 121. 
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philosophy.154 At the basis of this interpretation was the idea that all human beings have an 
innate right to ethical treatment by virtue of their being human. Thus, in practical terms, this 
understanding of dignity entitles all individuals to certain standards of living commensurate 
with a life worthy of a human being. This interpretation clearly influenced the UDHR, a fact 
which is reflected in the language used within the preamble and the content of the declaration 
itself. Indeed, the very first article looked to establish the universal legitimacy of this concept: 
‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason 
and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood’.155 
Subsequent declarations continued this practice with each firmly proclaiming that the 
universal relevance of rights derived specifically from an inherent dignity possessed by all 
human beings.156 However, in relation to efforts to universalise the application of human rights, 
there are two primary concerns worth highlighting here. The first of these relates to (i) the 
interpretation of the theory of human dignity and the second relates to the resulting (ii) legal 
implication of this interpretation. In effect, it is evidently difficult, for the reasons mentioned 
above, to universalise any theory of human dignity. The concept is open to interpretation and 
as such any system of legal protection which is based upon this concept is likely to have some 
element of cultural specificity at its core. For this reason, any given interpretation is unlikely 
to be applicable to all other states or allow for a consistent level of realisable universal 
protection. Indeed, this is demonstrated in practical terms by highlighting differing judicial 
interpretations of the concept.  
                                                            
154 See Immanuel Kant, the Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge University Press 1996) xviii. 
155 Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A (III) (UDHR) 
<http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a25> accessed 18 May 2018. 
156 See for example the Preamble of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) wherein it is 
stated ‘these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person’. International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) 
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2.3.2 The Relativeness of Human Dignity 
 
Whilst the concept of dignity is ‘universal’ in the sense that it has historically retained 
a certain degree of relevance within all cultures,157 it is important to note that many 
interpretations of this concept are completely disconnected from the idea of individual rights. 
This is crucial because in many non-Western cultures the implications of this concept would 
not always seem conducive to the notion of individual entitlements. Makau Mutua explains 
that in African states the traditional interpretation of human dignity is of something which must 
be earned.158 In this way, it is similar to the traditional Confucianist belief that ‘human dignity’ 
is something which individuals acquire through their personal conduct.159 With such an 
understanding dignity is not inherent, and is universal only in the sense that all have the 
opportunity to earn it. This interpretation is commensurate with that of many Islamic states 
where dignity has traditionally been understood to extend only to practicing Muslims. In 
Human Dignity in Islam, Mohammed Hashim Kamali explains that, historically, there have 
been two prominent Islamic schools of thought; the universalist and the communalist 
approach.160 As the name suggests, the former approach advocates that dignity ought to be 
afforded to all human beings regardless of race, sex, or religious creed. Conversely, the second 
purports that dignity be afforded only to practicing Muslims and cannot be extended to cover 
non-Muslims unless or until they embrace the teachings of Islam. Kamali notes that support 
for the universalist approach, which was once predominant, has steadily declined in the latter 
half of the twentieth century, and is conspicuously absent in the modern discourse of human 
                                                            
157 See Jack Donnelly, ‘Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-Western Conceptions 
of Human Rights’ (1982) 76 American Political Science Review 303. 
158 See Makau wa Mutua, ‘The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: An Evolution of the 
Language of Duties’ (1995) 35 Virginia Journal of International Law 339. 
159 See Qianfan Zhang, ‘The Idea of Human Dignity in Classical Chinese Philosophy: A Reconstruction of 
Confucianism’ (2000) 27 Journal of Chinese Philosophy 299. 
160 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, ‘Human Dignity in Islam’ (2012) International Institute of Advanced Islamic 
Studies <http://www.iais.org.my/e/index.php/publications-sp-1447159098/articles/item/36-human-dignity-in-
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rights in the Muslim world. He argues that colonialism, globalisation and the recent wars waged 
on Muslim soil have all contributed to this decline.161   
It is therefore clear that the understanding of ‘human dignity’ purported in the UDHR, 
and which necessitates a minimum level of respect for the individual, is unfamiliar to many 
cultures. In such communities, dignity is to be afforded only to those whose conduct warrants 
this benefit. Clearly such an interpretation would seem incapable of providing a framework for 
absolute, universal protections (although it would appear to be consistent with the pragmatic, 
populist approach to such rights that is emergent in many Western states in contemporary 
times). As such, Waldron was seemingly correct when suggesting that ‘[if] you glance quickly 
at the way in which "dignity" figures in the law, you will probably get the impression that it's 
usage is seriously confused’.162 Essentially, and despite the fact that the concept is universal in 
one important sense, it would seem that the contextual contingency of the theory of human 
dignity jeopardises its ability to provide a universally applicable foundation for human rights.  
This point has been further emphasised by Christopher McGrudden who asserts that 
‘the use of ‘dignity’ … does not provide a universalistic, principled basis for judicial decision-
making in the human rights context, in the sense that there is little common understanding of 
what dignity requires substantively within or across jurisdictions’163. In a similar manner to the 
contextually contingent approaches of Islamic states, McGrudden suggests that two judicial 
schools of thought dominate the West; the individualistic and the communitarian 
approaches.164 The defining characteristic of the individualistic approach to dignity is that it 
seeks to further individual autonomy above all else.165 A key aspect is advancing individual 
                                                            
161 ibid. 
162 Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rank, and Rights (Oxford University Press 2015) 15. 
163 Christopher McGrudden, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2008) 19 The 
European Journal of International Law 655, 655.  
164 ibid 699. 
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liberty based upon the choice of the individual. McGrudden explains that this approach is 
adopted by the US Supreme Court,166 the Canadian Supreme Court,167 and the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court. In stark contrast, the communitarian approach to dignity relates to respect 
within a specific social and political community. In this capacity, the concept of dignity is used, 
amongst other things, to hold the individual and the community to shared social values so as to 
maintain public order.168 Indeed, societies of this kind use dignity to explain shared social 
values. Naturally, different communities will have different understandings of dignity, but each 
will specifically relate to an understanding of what is valuable to their society. McGrudden 
highlights that this approach is adopted by the German Constitutional Court.169 The key aspect 
to this approach is finding a working balance between respect for dignity of the individual and 
respect for community. Indeed, with such an understanding respect for the individual cannot 
be unlimited. Instead, as Douzinas asserts, a communitarian approach ‘accepts human rights 
only to the extent that they help submerge the I into the We’.170 
2.3.3 Universalising Human Rights: Limitations with the Use of Dignity 
 
As mentioned, a fundamental issue with the concept of dignity is that it can be 
interpreted broadly and allow communities to determine for themselves what emphasis to 
attribute to this concept in different circumstances. In this way, they can adhere to dignity 
without having to accept a specific and universally applicable interpretation of the concept. 
The obvious appeal of this approach is that it appears to encourage universal participation 
regarding the protection of human rights (i.e. by allowing for variation in relation to how much 
protection any given state is required to provide). However, in practice, whilst this would 
                                                            
166 See Rice v Cayetano (98-818) 528 U.S. 495 (2000). 
167 See Gosselin v. Quebec (2002) SCC 84.  
168 Neomi Rao, ‘Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law’ (2011) 86 Notre Dame Law Review 183, 
223-224. 
169 See ‘Lifetime Imprisonment Case’ BVerfGE 45 187 (1977). 
170 Costas Douzinas, ‘The Paradoxes of Human Rights’ (2013) 20 Constellations 51, 59. 
Daniel M Lowe                           Assessing the Universality of Human Rights in the Context of Health  
64 
 
seemingly enhance their universal applicability, this approach cannot guarantee that human 
rights will be protected.171 This is particularly true in cases where the communitarian 
interpretation alone is adopted. The fundamental drawback of which relates to the fact that it 
appears to place significant emphasis on allowing states to democratically determine which 
interests ought to be protected.172 Such an approach is endorsed, at least to some extent, by 
many states under the jurisdiction of the ECHR. This seemingly allows for the infringement of 
supposedly inalienable protections, not only when such action is held to be necessary for 
national security reasons,173 but also when it is deemed to be in the wider ‘interests of the 
community’ at large.174 Indeed, as Laurence Lustgarten highlights, a fundamental aspect of the 
ECHR is that it actively promotes the need to consistently balance individual and social 
interests in a manner which amounts to ‘“balancing away” individual rights’.175 In order to 
consistently strike this balance, a communitarian approach must articulate the ‘need’ to set 
limitations on the enjoyment of rights in democratic or societal terms.176 Yet, as Douzinas 
highlights, ‘human’ rights by their very nature ought to be undemocratic – able to protect the 
interests of all and not favour the protection of the interests of the majority.177 These rights are 
                                                            
171 A pertinent example of this would be the decision to ban the use of the Islamic veil in France in the name of 
‘dignity’ as discussed by Sofie G. Syed, ‘Liberté, Egalité, Vie Privée: The Implications of France’s Anti-Veil 
Laws for Privacy and Autonomy’ (2017) 40:2 Harvard Journal of Law & Gender 301. 
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well placed to determine which interests ought to be protected (and which deserve more protection than others) 
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173 As example see A and Others v. the United Kingdom (2009) 49 EHRR 29. Whilst the ECtHR did ultimately 
find against the state in this case (holding that the interference with Article 5 was disproportionate), the Court 
did still reaffirm that member states of the ECHR have the right to interfere with Convention rights in times of 
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ECHR). See Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria (1994) 19 EHRR 34. 
175 Laurence Lustgarten, ‘National Security, Terrorism and Constitutional Balance’ (2004) 75 The Political 
Quarterly 4, 14. 
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flexibility and discretion when looking to fulfil their Convention obligations in a manner consistent with their 
own specific cultural/national values. For a more detailed examination of this concept see Chapter Three, 
section 3.3.1.   
177 Costas Douzinas, ‘What Are Human Rights?’ The Guardian (London, 18 March 2009) 
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supposed to be guaranteed protections to those vital human interests without which a human 
life cannot be enjoyed. As such, they surely need to be beyond arbitrary interference from those 
in power - indeed, they ought to be protections against them. A framework for universally 
applicable human rights grounded in a communitarian interpretation alone would not 
adequately be able to guarantee such protection. This is not to say that abuse of this system 
would itself be certain. It is simply to acknowledge that the capacity for such abuse exists and, 
indeed, is a necessary component of the communitarian model (i.e. this flexibility is part of its 
appeal).  
In contrast, the individualistic approach to dignity seeks to afford rights to individuals 
based purely on their inherent worth as human beings and not the designated value of their 
interests to society at large (at least in theory).178 The focus with such an understanding seems 
to be on maximising individual autonomy and self-determination in a manner which 
necessitates non-interference from the state. In this way, it would appear to be more consistent 
with a traditional philosophical interpretation of human rights; protections necessary to ensure 
deserved minimum standards needed for human subsistence. For this reason, the individualistic 
interpretation of dignity is arguably more appropriate for establishing a theoretical framework 
for the protection of human rights. Whilst on practical terms it would not appear to be as 
conducive to universal applicability than the communitarian approach - by denying flexibility 
and establishing stricter standards - it is seemingly the most likely of the two approaches to 
lead to guaranteed protection. Essentially, then, as McGrudden notes, the major distinction 
between the individualistic and communitarian approach appears to rest on the fact that, whilst 
the former relates specifically to individual dignity, the latter embodies collective dignity (e.g. 
of humankind):  
                                                            
178 ‘[D]ignity bestowed to a person on account of their humanity’. Costas Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: 
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[With] a communitarian approach … [T]he obligation on the state to 
protect human dignity may justify limiting the rights of the person whom 
the state seeks to protect, irrespective of the preferences of the 
individual.179  
Notably, however, the individualistic approach is itself open to robust critique which 
can be centred on its apparent abusability. For example, it may encourage states to adopt 
contextually relative justifications for such rights (which either limit the scope of protection, 
or deny the entitlement to claim). As witnessed with both the DOI and DRMC, an 
individualistic approach can result in the validation of ‘non-universal’ coverage based upon 
individual dignity. For Douzinas, this marks a fundamental flaw of individualism; it rejects the 
fact that ‘being in common is an integral part of being self’.180 From this analysis we see that 
the interpretability of dignity can be conceptualised as establishing two primary narratives – 
assessing the applicability of Western and non-Western interpretations of this concept 
respectively. As we have seen, a significant conclusion usually drawn from this is the 
suggestion that non-Western interpretations are incompatible with the idea of universal human 
rights. In contrast, Western interpretations of dignity are generally presented as being 
instrumental to attempts to actualise universal claims. In discussing the limitations of Western 
interpretations of dignity, focus is usually given to the apparent conflict existing between 
individualism and communitarianism (as addressed above). However, this approach is 
fundamentally flawed. In modern times, the concept of human rights has evolved to such an 
extent that these interpretations are inter-connected and inter-dependent.181 Rather, the 
limitation of Western interpretations of dignity arguably relates to the evidentiary impossibility 
of individualism as universalism (in that this concept now allows for the prioritisation of 
collective interests over individual liberties). This is witnessed in the gradation of human value 
                                                            
179 Christopher McGrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights (2008) 19 Journal of 
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and worth that leads to determining the beneficiaries of rights (e.g. lawful citizens) and the 
‘othering’ of undeserving claimants (criminals, suspected terrorists, refugees)182 – which we 
will shortly move on to address in more detail. It is therefore representative of an implicit (if 
not explicit) acceptance of the legitimacy of non-absolute (and non-Western) interpretations of 
human dignity – whereby it is acknowledged that dignity must be earned and is also ultimately 
forfeitable. It is, contradictorily, the appropriation of principles which are argued to be 
incompatible with absolute, universal rights as means of securing them. This position is 
untenable to the prospect of achieving universal protection of human rights claims. In looking 
to examine this further it is useful to consider the aforementioned process of determining the 
‘subject’ of human rights in the modern context. 
2.4 The ‘Subject’ of Human Rights 
 
On first inspection, the ‘subject’ of human rights would appear to be self-evident: 
human beings. However, as Douzinas explains, the issue of determining precisely who (and 
what) can be regarded as human has proven to be far from straightforward: 
The "man" of the "rights of man" has no concrete characteristics, except for free 
will, reason and soul ... Yet the empirical man who actually enjoyed legal rights 
was literally a man — a well-off, white, Christian, urban male. He condenses the 
abstract dignity of humanity and the privileges of the powerful.183 
The question of whom such exceptional protections ought to be bestowed upon is as old as the 
discourse of rights itself. The apparent synonymy of having human rights and being regarded 
as human in modern times has already been illustrated within this chapter.184 These protections 
are increasingly regarded, not only as an extension of our core humanity, but as a contributing 
factor to it. As Douzinas suggests, ‘[t]he greatest achievement of rights is ontological; rights 
                                                            
182 Costas Douzinas, ‘Human Rights for Martians’ (2016) Critical Legal Thinking 
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contribute to the creation of human identity’.185 Indeed, the referent subject of rights discourse 
has consistently been perceived (and presented) in this way; as a basic human entity, the moral 
significance of which legitimates corresponding protections. This entity is relatable to us as a 
manifestation of ourselves, as well as of those sufficiently similar (in relation to species 
membership).186 However, in practice, the subject of rights is evidently much more complex. 
Although this ‘subject’ has been interpreted and discussed in various forms, the two identified 
by Douzinas above are of special importance to our comprehension of this issue; (a) as an 
abstract concept; and (b) as a political construct. 
2.4.1 Two Types of Subject of Universal Human Rights: Abstract and Political 
 
The abstract concept is the embodiment of the utopia of human rights. From the genesis 
of these protections in the form of declarations of revolutionary individuals, through to their 
modern incarnation as international regulations on the conduct of states, this abstract concept 
of the subject of rights has grounded the discourse in a sense of shared commonality.187 As 
Douzinas suggests, the ‘man’ presented as the authenticating cause of these protections is non-
existent. ‘He’ is simply an idealised entity onto which the individual traits and characteristics 
of all peoples could be projected. The abstract man of these declarations is universal purely in 
the sense that he represents, to each of us individually, a reflection of our own selves. 
Historically, the purpose of this abstract concept was simply to provide a template with which 
to promote the legitimacy (and relevance) of certain political or legal aims.188 It is thus 
deliberately context-less; in the sense that it is designed to transcend historical relativism. In 
its abstract form, the subject of rights validates the possession of individual claims for all 
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human beings. However, the actionability of such claims is available only to a certain type of 
human subject; the political construct. 
If we accept that it is possible for rights to theoretically belong to all individuals, it must 
also be acknowledged that, if only in a practical sense, they evidently may only be claimed by 
a certain type; a citizen. The ‘subject’ of rights as a citizen is represented in the form of the 
political construct. The political construct represents ‘the end’ point of the abstract concept as 
the means by which the benefits of these claims are to be enjoyed. The result of which is to 
replace the universal abstract ‘man’ with one of absolute (and relative) specificity. The 
‘subject’ of rights as a political construct was comprehensively addressed by Jacques Ranciere 
in Who is the Subject of the Rights of Man? With this piece Ranciere discussed the 
philosophical approach of Hannah Arendt to the issue of human rights; which will later be 
useful to our attempt to determine a referent subject for the bestowment of certain universal 
claims. A significant contribution made by Ranciere was the confirmation that the ‘subject’ of 
rights is multifaceted. Crucially, this work highlighted an inherent duality with the concept of 
a ‘universal subject’:    
The Rights of Man are the rights of the demos, conceived as the generic 
name of the political subjects who enact—in specific scenes of dissensus 
the paradoxical qualification of this supplement.189  
This represents the view that the political construct is the human subject capable of making 
actionable claims. Specific claims, such as those of human rights, are held to be of such 
importance that they are regarded as being applicable to all subjects. Put simply, the 
significance of the interest that these rights seek to protect or guarantee to any individual can 
be used to extend their relevance beyond themselves. The collective appreciation of the validity 
of this position enables individuals to promote the legitimacy of these claims. Such promotion 
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can lead to violence if the validity of the collective entitlement to individual claims is not 
recognised by the state. Consequently, individual action taken to legitimise such claims results 
in the disqualification of the possibility of guaranteed protection. It was for similar reasons that 
Bentham famously denounced natural rights as ‘a bastard brood of monsters … anti-legal 
rights, the mortal enemies of law, the subverters of government, and the assassins of 
security’.190 For Ranciere, the practical subject of the rights of man was a political construct 
capable of making individual claims for the collective protection of universally relevant 
interests who, in the process of actualising these claims, could undermine the justification of 
their possession.191  
The impossibility of a ‘universal subject’ for the rights of man was perhaps most 
famously addressed in the works of Hannah Arendt (whom as mentioned above, Ranciere was 
responding to in his article). Writing in the context of the perception of one who is ‘stateless’, 
Arendt criticised the (in)accessibility of such rights for those who have insufficient means by 
which to action them.192 The process of actualising these protections was dependent upon a 
specific (restrictive) status; namely of being accepted as a citizen of an accepted (and 
acceptable) state.193 Their purported universality (whether defensible or not) is rendered 
redundant by this fact. The qualification of ‘man’ for the purposes of rights was, in a practical 
sense, to be determined purely by matters of bureaucracy. According to Arendt, the humanity 
of the declarations of the rights of man was, in actuality, not one grounded in a sense of shared 
commonality, but designated functionality. In essence, the purpose of the rights of man was to 
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protect those individuals who had a purpose for the state. The ‘subject’ of the enjoyment of 
rights was therefore wholly a political construct. The ability to depend upon the protection of 
rights was contingent upon having a status which was, in the view of the state, worthy of 
protecting (or of protecting against). 
In this sense, Arendt seems to suggest that the rights of man are distinctly alienable; 
obtained through a bureaucratic process - that of securing, by specific means (namely 
citizenship), a sufficient level of recognition. Ironically, the bureaucratisation of entitlement to 
such protections through this process results in the depiction of a ‘subject’ which is arguably 
more intangible and less relatable than the abstract concept of declarations. This is because the 
shared commonality of humankind is not represented by arbitrary definitions or the obtainment 
of lawful status – but through the perceived moral worth of the ‘human condition’ itself: 
For Arendt, the human condition is characterised by the distinctness and 
uniqueness of each individual (reflected in the love for distinction), the plurality 
within which the uniqueness always already finds itself (reflected in the love of 
equality), and the loneliness that ensues when plurality is replaced with radical 
isolation (reflected in impotent fear and the will to dominate).194 
In reflection, the ‘universal subject’ of human rights is effectively humanity; all human beings 
capable of making a claim (or having a claim made on their behalf) to certain special 
protections and considerations. However, the recipients of such protections are political 
constructs, those whose legitimacy to such claims is officially acknowledged and appreciated. 
Thus, for a significant number of human beings the rights of man remain a purely abstract 
concept (at least as it pertains to practical enjoyment). This represents an implicit (and 
paradoxical) gradation of humanity and human worth. Modern human rights declarations 
inform us that all human beings are entitled to certain fundamental protections. They possess 
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this ‘right to have rights’,195 as Arendt might call it, unconditionally and absolutely simply on 
account of being human. Yet, the mechanisms for enforcing such rights demonstrate that their 
protection is accessible only to those with sufficient recognition to have their claims heard.196  
2.4.2 Humanity as Subject: Human Rights in Contemporary Times 
 
This pursuit of gradation paradoxically stems from the universalising abstractness of 
the rights of man.197 All peoples can identify the subjects of such protections as a reflection of 
themselves. This provides the concept with universal relevance thus legitimating the idea of 
universal rights. However, it also results in the creation of an implicit gradation of worth (by 
encouraging individuals to interpret the subject of rights as precisely themselves and those like 
them (nationally, ethnically, religiously) excluding or rejecting those who fall outside of this 
self-reflective view. The abstract concept thus provides rights with a source of universal 
validity, in a theoretical sense, but restricts the practical enforcement of such rights to a specific, 
relative, definitive number of people (through the process of ‘othering’).198 Thus, the abstract 
nature of the rights of man is causative of their non-universal application. Declarations of rights 
encourage us to ground their legitimacy in the identification of various universal aspects of the 
human experience, which in turn, enables us to recognise a collective entitlement to these 
claims. However, having accepted these rights as universal, our human nature (the human 
condition) still compels us to interpret them as individuals. Put simply, although the 
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universality of rights is rooted in a perception of shared humanity, the nature of humanity 
precludes the possibility of a truly universal ‘subject’: 
(T)he ontological unreality of the abstract man of rights inexorably leads to their 
limited usefulness. Abstract rights are so removed from their place of application 
and the concrete circumstances of the persons who suffer and hurt that they are 
unable to match their real needs.199 
Indeed, a critical approach to this issue could conclude that the concept of humanity is 
transient and ungrounded because the concept of humankind is itself distinctly abstract. As 
Douzinas notes, ‘[h]umanity has no foundation and no end; it is the definition of 
groundlessness’.200 This abstractness ensures that the concept of humanity is consistently 
reimagined. Arendt and Douzinas both highlighted this when asserting that peoples have 
constructed their own definition of what it means to be human throughout history,201 with the 
term ‘human’ itself understood in terms of the highest form of civilisation.202 As such, we see 
that the task of determining a definitive ‘referent subject’ of human rights is practically 
unattainable. Humans, as ‘abstract subjects’, are represented as the universal entitlement to 
fundamental liberties. The possessors of justifiable claims – of the ‘right to have rights’. 
However, the ‘political subject’ of rights is the actual beneficiary of these claims. They 
represent the ‘highest form’ of humanity only in the sense that the possession of actionable 
claims provides them with elevated status and recognition. This status is obtainable only by 
those who are ‘subjectified’ in so much as they are ‘created in schools and workshops, factory 
floors and barracks in ways that serve the functional needs of … systems of power’.203 
                                                            
199 Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century (Hart 
Publishers 2000) 154. 
200 Costas Douzinas, ‘The Paradoxes of Human Rights’ (2013) 20 Constellations 51, 59. 
201 For example, with the concept of ‘legal humanism’ consistently utilised as a ‘discourse of exclusion’. Costas 
Douzinas, The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century (Hart Publishers 2000) 
211-2. 
202 Principally, this results in different peoples depicting themselves - the true reflection of humanity - as a 
‘superior race’. As discussed by Hannah Arendt, ‘Organized Guilt and Responsibility’ in Peg Birmingham, 
Hannah Arendt and Human Rights: The Predicament of Common Responsibility (Indiana University Press 
2006) 8. 
203 Costas Douzinas and Adam Gearey, Critical Jurisprudence (Hart Publishing 2005) 57. 
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Ultimately, as mentioned above, the ‘political subject’ is one whose possession of actionable 
claims is obtained through the construction of an individual identity with discernible worth to 
the collective interests of the state. Therefore, in effect, the function of the concept of humanity 
‘lies not in philosophical essence but in its non-essence, in the endless process of re-definition 
and the necessary but impossible attempt to escape external determination’.204 
Consequently, as with dignity, it appears as if the concept of humanity is incapable of 
providing a reliable foundation for the concept of universal rights. This is despite its obvious 
qualities in validating the universality of such claims (as discussed earlier in this section). 
Interestingly, both points appear to be the result of the malleability and transience of the 
concept of humanity itself. The temporality of the idea of humanity is an integral factor of its 
enduring appeal. This historical idea can be shaped to fit the purposes of present generations. 
As Douzinas explains, this is possible because ‘[t]he “human” in rights is a “floating signifier”, 
“human rights” is a thin, undetermined concept’.205 For philosopher Michel Foucault, the desire 
to shape the definition of ourselves in such a manner was a natural (and unavoidable) 
component of humankind. In seeking to validate ones’ own worth, we naturally identify the 
‘moral goodness’ of humanity from our own personal biases and perspectives. This process of 
shaping and reshaping understanding of human identity is interpreted as a progressive 
perfecting of humanity. A process which, per Foucault, humankind is destined to continue: 
[I]n the course of their history, men have never ceased to construct themselves, 
that is, to continually displace their subjectivity, to constitute themselves in an 
infinite, multiple series of different subjectivities that will never have an end and 
never bring us in the presence of something that would be ‘‘man.’’ Men are 
perpetually engaged in a process that, in constituting objects, at the same time 
displaces man, deforms, transforms, and transfigures him as a subject.206 
                                                            
204 Costas Douzinas, ‘The Paradoxes of Human Rights’ (2013) 20 Constellations 51, 59. 
205 Costas Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (Routledge 
Cavendish 2007) 7. 
206 Michel Foucault, ‘Interview with Michel Foucault’ in Robert Hurley et al (eds), Essential Works of Foucault 
(Vol 3, Power) (New Press 2001) 274. 
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Thus, a foundational aspect of the concept of humanity is the formative action of birth 
and rebirth of the definition of human identity. The power to reinterpret or redefine our 
understanding of what it means to be human is partnered with the desire to ensure that the 
present is represented, not only as a reflection of ourselves, but as a ‘progression’ on previous 
interpretations: ‘in history, values unravel inexorably towards their perfection in the future’.207 
In the context of universal rights this is ideally to be personified by an expansion of the scope 
of the definition of universal – ultimately bridging the gap between abstract and political 
subjects. However, in contemporary times this is arguably characterised by the modern 
preoccupation with ‘refocusing’ their referent subject as a specific form of human being – a 
law abiding citizen. Whilst this is clearly evolutionary, it is only of our understanding of the 
traditional ‘political construct’. A significant implication of this contemporary refocusing is 
the expansion of the process of ‘othering’, of disqualifying greater numbers of human beings 
from the protections regarded as fundamental to humankind. This incorporates the obvious 
distinction between ‘political subjects’ and those who presently lack this recognition, as well 
as with those who are seen to forfeit it (such as criminals).208 Such change of focus was itself 
arguably prompted by progress in the form of various scientific advancements which have 
enabled us to comprehensively conceptualise the human being as a physiological, biological 
construct.209 Indeed, in light of these developments it is now unproductive for peoples to 
attempt to draw moral distinctions between themselves and others based upon biological 
differences. Instead, these distinctions are to be made within the law. As Peter Cane explains, 
                                                            
207 Costas Douzinas and Adam Gearey, Critical Jurisprudence (Hart Publishing 2005) 54. 
208 Essentially, this idea is grounded in the belief that rights are conditional, and that their enjoyment is 
dependent upon appropriate conduct. Christopher Wellman explains that this theory purports that ‘human beings 
qualify for rights that can be forfeited by bad behaviour’. Christopher H Wellman, ‘The Rights Forfeiture 
Theory of Punishment’ (2012) 122 Ethics 371, 377. 
209 This is encapsulated with modern attempts to define the very nature of humanity in prescriptive terms. In 
accordance with this task, Francis Fukuyama suggests ‘human nature is the sum of the behaviour and 
characteristics that are typical of the human species, arising from genetic rather than environmental factors’. 
Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (Profile Books 
2003) 130. 
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‘[l]egal personality is an artefact of legal rules … all human beings are recognised by the law, 
[but] not all human beings have the same legal status, or the same legal rights and 
obligations’.210 
It has been mentioned several times within this thesis that to have human rights in 
modern times is synonymous with being human. Centring the gradation of worth of human 
beings within the context of the law – and more precisely lawful status – is consistent with the 
perpetuating practice of reinterpreting the human identity addressed by Foucault. It is 
representative of a supposed evolutionary approach to the political construct of humankind. 
The progressive development of knowledge and understanding has largely settled perceptions 
of our biological identity.211 By confirming a shared commonality of species membership, at 
least in a physiological sense, this knowledge has greatly reduced the feasibility of determining 
the moral worthiness of different members of our species through prejudicial distinctions 
within the species itself. Thus, the centring of worth within the law provides an alternative 
method for its eventual gradation. Although this too could be regarded as prejudicial (by 
valuing some individuals over others), it is perhaps more fatal to the possibility of absolute, 
universal protections due the enhanced legitimacy which is naturally afforded to determining 
criteria centred within the law. Indeed, the perceived objectivity of law ensures that any 
gradation of human worth based upon it is more likely to be accepted as valid (irrespective of 
whether it is truly defensible). Historical attempts to validate the gradation of human worth 
have been heavily influenced (and grounded) on perceptions of worthiness established by 
ethnic and/or cultural differences.212 They are thus easier to dismiss as being unjustifiable than 
differences established and legitimated exclusively within the law itself (as the language of law 
                                                            
210 Peter Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality (Hart Publishing 2003) 147. 
211 Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (Profile Books 
2003) 130. 
212 Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century (Hart 
Publishers 2000) 184-188. 
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provides validation). This is accomplished by ensuring that the process of gradation is not based 
on subjective factors stemming from our humanity. Indeed, it is now readily accepted that all 
human beings are entitled to, and ought to have, such protections.213 Instead, individual worth 
is determined in accordance with the practical value of others. Those who do not pose a 
significant threat to either the interests of others or of the state are seen as being more ‘valuable’ 
than those who do. This gradation can therefore be perceived as being more objective in that 
its operation ignores potential biological or physiological distinctions. The persuasiveness of 
an ostensible ‘shared humanity’ is irrelevant to its determinations. In this sense, the state is not 
denying lawful recognition, but suspending the protections this provides when our personal 
conduct (past or future) merits such a response. 
In the case of the ‘stateless’, the refugees, this ‘suspension’ of protection is justified by 
the state on the basis of lack of certainty in relation to this personal conduct. The potentiality 
for posing a threat to security is used to justify the devaluing of human worth (as it pertains to 
the political construct capable of enjoying rights). However, this suspension is not necessarily 
indefinite and should only last so long as such uncertainty persists. In contrast, in the case of 
criminals, the suspension is based on actual knowledge of the harm caused and the threat posed 
to the security of the interests of others as well as the state. In accordance with supposedly non-
Western accounts of dignity, this devaluation has therefore been ‘earned’ in that it is directly 
based upon personal conduct of individuals.214 It is in this way that, whether morally correct or 
not, the qualification of human worth within the law can be regarded as more damaging to the 
concept of universal/absolute rights – as it is one which individuals are more likely to be 
prepared to accept as justifiable. Indeed, as Douzinas reminds us, the ‘law’s main job is to 
                                                            
213 This is reflected in the fact that to have human rights is ‘synonymous to being human’. ibid 255. 
214 For more on this see Stephen Kershnar, ‘The Structure of Rights Forfeiture in the Context of Culpable 
Wrongdoing’ (2002) 29 Philosophia 57. 
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provide order not to support morality’.215 Ultimately, therefore, this apparent evolution of the 
concept of human worth is clearly open to abuse – providing scope for unjustifiable restrictions 
on access to such protections which will too readily accepted as being necessary. 
The classification of subjects would also appear to highlight a dichotomy at the centre 
of the concept of human rights: that whilst all human beings are entitled to such protections, 
only a few can actually make an actionable claim. This realisation seemingly undermines the 
universal nature of rights in any meaningful sense. In this context, meaningful can be 
understood as regarding reliable provision. On reflection, this is perhaps only true of historical 
attempts to qualify the entitlement to rights based on prejudicial determinations which are 
themselves inconsequential to the legitimacy of the idea behind such protections. However, 
gradations of worthiness to such protections based within the law may be justifiable. This is so 
because such deliberations would not seek to permanently deny affording such protections to 
specific individuals. Instead, they would aspire to regulate the enjoyment of rights within a 
framework which acknowledges variations of the idea of universality itself. For the ‘right to 
rights’, the abstract concept of man, this universality is represented in the idea of a universal 
entitlement; a right to make legitimate claims. For the political construct, the possessor of 
actionable claims, universality relates to the inherent potentiality of this status; that all 
individuals have the capacity to obtain such recognition. Indeed, this potentiality is reflected 
within the concept of human rights itself because, as Douzinas notes ‘the prime purpose of 
rights is to construct the individual person as a subject (of law)’.216 
                                                            
215 Costas Douzinas, ‘Human Rights for Martians’ (2016) Critical Legal Thinking 
<http://criticallegalthinking.com/2016/05/03/human-rights-for-martians/> accessed 18 May 2018.   
216 Costas Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (Routledge 
Cavendish 2007) 7. 
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If we accept that the purpose of human rights is to protect fundamental interests,217 then 
the subject of such rights is thus both universal and relative. It is universal in that the possession 
of fundamental claims is entitled to all of humankind, simply on account of our shared 
humanity. It is relative in that the actionability of such claims is contextually contingent, their 
validity dependent upon the possession of sufficient recognition. Crucially, the universality of 
the concept of human rights is not necessarily invalidated with this conclusion. Rather, it could 
be seen to be indicative of the sublimation of the idea of universal protections; tethering the 
justification for these claims to both humanity and the law. Specifically, by acknowledging 
that, in practical terms, an absolute entitlement to such protections may only represent the 
universal potentiality of their provision (and obtainment). Similarly, such sublimation could be 
demonstrated by highlighting that acknowledgement of the existence of this inherent 
potentiality (and the process of determining human worth within the law) makes universal 
application more likely by reducing the possibility of the acceptance of historically 
unjustifiable exclusions (e.g. based on ethnic, cultural, or biological differences). Put simply, 
if the concept of humanity, of the moral significance of shared experiences, provides us with a 
way of communicating the authenticity of the idea of universal rights, then the law can provide 
us with the practical means of legitimating it (e.g. by validating this idea through the act of 
codification).218 Whilst this might not immediately result in the universal application of such 
protections, this realisation cannot conclusively undermine their universality. They are 
universal, even if only conceptually, in the sense that all are held to possess an entitlement to 
such claims (as well as the capacity to obtain means of actualising them). The challenge for 
                                                            
217 This was succinctly explained by Louis Henkin with the proposition that ‘the human rights idea declares that 
every individual has legitimate claims upon his or her own society for certain freedoms and benefits’. Louis 
Henkin, ‘The Universality of the Concept of Human Rights’ (1989) 506 The Annals of the America Academy 
10, 11. 
218 In establishing the power of law (and legal language), Costas Douzinas expressed ‘[l]aw, the principle of the 
polis, prescribes what constitutes a reasonable order by accepting and validating some parts of collective life, 
while banning, excluding others, making them invisible’. Costas Douzinas, ‘The Paradoxes of Human Rights’ 
(2013) 20 Constellations 51, 66. 
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contemporary proponents of human rights is to ensure that development of this concept does 
not reduce its scope or meaning to unnecessary degrees. Whilst gradations of worth based 
within the law can be justifiable, this process is also open to abuse. Specifically, by 
empowering governing powers to interfere with fundamental protections in an overly 
aggressive or arbitrary manner (allegedly justified by pragmatic, results-based approaches to 
balancing interests).219 This potential scenario developing is made more likely in the 
contemporary international climate, where more states are prepared to suggest that security and 
individual liberties are competing objectives. In looking to address this issue, it is useful to 
consider various strengths and limitations of consequentialist or results-based approaches to 
defending the concept of universal human rights. This examination will take place in the 
following chapter. 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
In response to the questions established at the start of the chapter, it appears as if 
universal human rights can be justified if instead of focussing on establishing and promoting 
present interpretations as the definitive account, it is the foundational purpose behind them 
which is emphasised. Further, this task requires a reconsideration of how the universal nature 
of human rights is to be justified and defined. Through consideration of both will and interest 
theories, it has been suggested that rights may be conceptualised as individual claims to the 
protection of certain vital interests which, when fulfilled, ensure individual and societal 
conditions conducive to the development of autonomous agency. That is to say, their 
                                                            
219 Within the context of the U.K., a famous example of this can be seen in the case of A (FC) and others (FC) v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department; X (FC) and another (FC) v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2004] UKHL 56. This case concerned the legality of the indefinite detention of nine foreign 
nationals without trial, under the Anti-Terror Crime and Security Act 2001. As the provision in question 
(Section 23) only affected foreign nationals, the Court ultimately found it to be incompatible with the European 
Convention on Human Rights (1950). For an excellent summary of this see Mark Elliott, ‘United Kingdom: 
Detention Without Trial and the “War on Terror”’ (2006) 4 International Journal of Constitutional Law 553. 
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application should provide circumstances capable of providing all normative agents with the 
opportunity to live a worthwhile life as determined by their own individual standards. It has 
further been demonstrated that, historically, the purported universality of rights has been used 
to justify efforts at securing their universal implementation. This is achieved by using the image 
of an abstract humanity, one which is absolutely representative of all peoples in its abstractness, 
whilst remaining infinitely changeable (and restrictively atypical): 
The “man” of the rights of man appears without gender, colour, history, or 
tradition … he is an empty vessel united with all others through three abstract 
traits: free will, reason, and the soul (now the mind) — the universal elements of 
human essence.220 
The malleability of this foundation has facilitated efforts to justify the universal applicability 
of such protections as well as directly contributing to the creation of contradictory 
interpretations of the purpose of human rights claims. In response, the concept of dignity is 
widely utilised by contemporary proponents of rights to highlight the legitimacy of the 
universal relevance of such protections.221  The primary limitation with using any interpretation 
of dignity to highlight the universal relevance of human rights is that no definition is universally 
accepted. Moreover, the broadness of the scope of dignity invites the adoption of an overly 
restrictive communitarian approach by any given state (which cannot guarantee protection) and 
results in judicial inconsistency amongst those states where human rights protections are 
presently enforced.222 This ultimately undermines the legitimacy of the universal applicability 
of human rights as guaranteed protections of vital human interests. Thus, it is clear that the 
concept of dignity is sub-optimal to the objective of providing a universalisable foundation for 
human rights. Instead, it has been argued that it is preferable to maintain that the foundational 
                                                            
220 Costas Douzinas, ‘The Paradoxes of Human Rights’ (2013) 20 Constellations 51, 56. 
221 For an effective summary of this position see Marina Svensson who explains ‘notions of dignity, however 
defined, can be found in all societies, which saves the universalism of human rights’. Marina Svensson, 
Debating Human Rights in China: A Conceptual and Political History (Roman & Littlefield Publishers 2002) 
33. 
222 See Christopher McGrudden, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2008) 19 The 
European Journal of International Law 655. 
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principles of the individualistic approach to dignity are capable of validating the idea of 
universal human rights, whilst accepting that a pragmatic approach to balancing interests is 
necessary to afford the concept legitimacy in practical terms. This identifies a need to 
communicate these principles in a more accessible way than presented in existing international 
human rights treaties. This can most obviously be accomplished by focussing on the purpose 
of the protections they promote. As mentioned, this chapter has suggested that this purpose 
relates to actualising normative agency in accordance with the account proposed by James 
Griffin. This approach is argued to be preferable to alternative theoretical accounts as it looks 
to focus the discourse towards securing only those interests necessary for a ‘functioning human 
agent’,223 rather than seeking to enable ‘a good or happy or perfected or flourishing human 
life’.224 It has therefore been suggested that Griffin’s approach is more appropriate in terms of 
providing a realistically universalisable foundation for human rights (as it effectively 
encapsulates the justificatory purpose of such protections in a manner less prone to illegitimate 
rights inflation). In accordance with this, the pressing need for contemporary proponents of 
human rights is therefore to rearticulate the idea of human rights in a manner more capable of 
encapsulating the principles which justify their universal significance and applicability. That 
is, to formulate human rights as entitlements to specific vital interests; as claims to those things 
which are necessary to effectively enable or protect normative agency. As Waldron suggests, 
‘protecting rights vindicates our normative agency’.225 It is further suggested that this may be 
accomplished by reimagining human rights as foundational claims (as we will address in 
greater detail in subsequent chapters).  
It has also been determined that the ‘subject’ of rights is multifaceted, comprising two 
forms; those who are entitled to claim (the abstract concept) and those who are actually capable 
                                                            
223 James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2008) 35. 
224 ibid 34. 
225 Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rank, and Rights (Oxford University Press 2015) 20-21. 
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of doing so (the political construct). Whilst, historically, attempts to establish a gradation of 
human worth (and thus access to protections) was based on alleged racial, social, or biological 
distinctions, in modern contexts this gradation arguably takes place within the law (e.g. based 
on distinctions between law-abiding citizens and actual or suspected criminals). A security 
dominated discourse affords greater opportunity to sovereign powers to exclude individuals 
from having access to human rights protections (e.g. for those suspected to be involved in 
terrorist activity). It has therefore been suggested that gradations based within the law are 
arguably more fatal to the concept of universal rights (as they are more defensible than 
gradations based on the prejudicial distinctions of the past). However, it has been reasoned that 
the process of regulating access to human rights protections based on genuine security concerns 
is not incompatible with the idea of universal rights (a point which will be developed further 
in subsequent chapters). In defence of this conclusion in accordance with the purpose of this 
thesis (i.e. to defend the idea of universal human rights in contemporary contexts), it was 
suggested that the universality of rights actually refers to an absolute entitlement to claim, 
alongside the universal potentiality of their fulfilment.    
Having defined the concept of universal human rights - and as a means of reaffirming 
our conclusions - starting with the next chapter this thesis will consider how to construct a 
universally realisable account of human rights within the modern context.  
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3 Justifying Universal Rights: Historical and 
Contemporary Perspectives 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The preceding chapter examined general philosophy underpinning the idea of universal 
human rights. This concluded by suggesting that - in accordance with the concept of 
universality - it is appropriate to adopt the approach proposed by Griffin and interpret human 
rights as entitlements to the protection of those interests which enable ‘a functioning human 
agent’.226 These interests were themselves loosely defined as being those which seek to enable 
or ensure autonomous human agency. In building on this analysis, Chapter Three explores the 
evolution of the practical implementation of the concept of human rights in greater detail. As 
noted previously, the modern era is defined by a perceived conflict between universal rights 
and national security. Contextual circumstances relating to this development have rendered a 
theoretical or philosophical defence of the idea of absolute claims increasingly difficult. Of 
paramount significance is the challenge of identifying a ‘universalising’ foundation for such 
claims which elevates them beyond other individual/state needs or interests. Primarily, as we 
discussed in the previous chapter, many of these efforts have focused on the idea of a universal 
human dignity (the limitations of which have previously been addressed). As consequence of 
these developments, Marina Svensson notes:  
Many scholars have thus abandoned the search for a foundation to human rights 
since they believe that a satisfactory justification is impossible and that one can 
do quite nicely without it.227  
Instead, modern proponents of human rights can attempt to justify the legitimacy of 
this concept purely on the practical results of their implementation (and thus abandon their 
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philosophical/theoretical roots). An additional advantage of adopting a result based approach is 
that it is, by definition, pragmatic. There is therefore greater scope for reducing the 
implementation of fundamental protections as well as providing greater means of interfering 
with them in the event that they are seen to conflict with other fundamental national interests 
(such as security).228  
3.1.1 Chapter Three Structure: Key Aims and Objectives 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider potential means of avoiding the adoption of 
such an overly restrictive approach to implementing human rights. Once again, this will be 
structured into several smaller investigations. Ultimately, there are four key outcomes to be 
achieved in this chapter: 
1. This chapter will begin by contextualising two prominent theoretical justifications for 
the concept of human rights known as deontological and consequentialist approaches 
respectively. Through this investigation this chapter will consider various limitations 
with each approach and argue that reliance on either one exclusively inhibits the 
prospect of universalisable human rights. The conclusions of this analysis will 
establish that, whilst a consequentialist approach may be more practical – in the sense 
that it is easier to support – it provides no guarantee of protection for human rights in 
practice (as a results-based approach can be used to prioritise the interests of the state 
exclusively). In contrast, it will be seen that, whilst a deontological approach is more 
appropriate for the purpose of justifying human rights as universal claims, it is less 
capable of ensuring commitment to achieving their practical application (as it does not 
need to actually address the issue of their effective implementation). To reinforce these 
                                                            
228 See Philip Ruddock, ‘A New Framework: Counter-Terrorism and the Rule of Law’ (2004) 16 The Sydney 
Papers 112. 
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conclusions, this chapter will next examine the famous rebuttal to the idea of 
inalienable rights by assessing the critique of Jeremy Bentham (3.2); 
2. In looking to address these limitations and critiques with the objective of providing a 
more optimal justification for the idea of universal rights, this chapter will then 
consider the proposed ‘perfectibility of law’ with reference to some of the important 
philosophical works of Ronald Dworkin. In effect, this section will use Dworkin’s 
proposal of objective moral truths229 in order to establish a basis for accepting the 
perfectibility of the idea of human rights. Here it will be suggested that this idea is 
represented by accepting that law is evolutive, non-definitive, and contextually 
relevant. As such, the correct approach to legal issues is susceptible to change. It will 
be proposed that legitimate changes are those which conform to the underlying purpose 
of the law – that which Dworkin terms the ‘general principles that underlie and justify 
the settled law …’.230 In the context of human rights – and in accordance with the 
account of James Griffin addressed in Chapter Two – it is suggested that this purpose 
is reflected in attempts to actualise normative agency. Potential practical benefits of 
adopting this approach will then be considered in the context of the jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR. In essence, this section will determine that the legitimacy of the idea of 
human rights cannot be definitively disqualified (due to the contextual contingency of 
any prevailing interpretation). Moreover, this concept is also understood to be open to 
                                                            
229 This is based upon Dworkin’s ‘right answer’ hypothesis which suggests that there are objectively right 
answers to legal problems. In determining the nature of the ‘objective answer’ Dworkin maintained that the 
judiciary ‘should try to identify general principles that underlie and justify the settled law … and then apply 
those principles …’. Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (Harvard University Press 2006) 143. The concept of 
legitimating principles will be used to justify the validity of prevailing interpretations of legal norms (including 
human rights) which are based upon sufficient contextual knowledge/understanding. Moreover, as this concept 
implies that ‘right answers’ may be contextually contingent, it acknowledges a need to continually assess the 
legitimacy of current interpretations/accounts, and thus the perfectibility of such norms. 
230 ibid. 
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further evolution and development in accordance with seeking more optimal fulfilment 
of its justificatory purpose (3.3); 
3. To reinforce the benefits of this alternative approach, this chapter will then examine 
the history of human rights and the apparent acceptance of the definitiveness of 
prevailing interpretations of this concept (as well as the anticipated inevitability of the 
universal application of such protections). The dangers of adopting such a historicist 
outlook (where the eventual fulfilment of human rights is presupposed) will then be 
considered in the context of contemporary developments (centred on failed 
revolutions). These findings will be strengthened with an examination of Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s proposed ‘abuse of history’.231 This denotes the idea that history is 
consistently utilised by present generations in order to further contextual objectives of 
the time (but in a manner which crucially distorts or misapprehends the contexts in 
which historical achievements were actually secured). This chapter will propose that 
the ‘abuse of history’, in the context of human rights, is represented by an 
oversimplification of the historical development of this concept as well as general 
acceptance of the definitiveness of contemporary accounts (as represented in relevant 
international treaties). In accordance with the theory of Nietzsche, this chapter will 
propose that ensuring the continuing relevance and sufficiency of the concept of 
human rights (as it pertains to universal realisability) is contingent upon adopting a 
‘critical’ appraisal of the sufficiency of prevailing interpretations (in accordance with 
the justificatory purpose of this concept) (3.4); 
4. This chapter will conclude by proposing that human rights are best understood as 
foundational claims (open to evolution and legitimate interpretations). In accordance 
                                                            
231 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History (Macmillan for the Library of Liberal Arts 1957). 
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with the results of our investigation of the works of Dworkin, it will be proposed that 
no account of human rights may be regarded as definitive, and that legitimate evolution 
of this concept is dependent upon ensuring that any changes conform to the underlying 
justificatory purpose. Finally, and in accordance with the theory of Friedrich 
Nietzsche, it will be proposed that this legitimate evolution can also be ensured by 
consistently adopting a critical approach to assessing developments relating to 
changing interpretations of the concept of human rights itself (3.5).  
3.2 Justificatory Foundations for Human Rights 
 
Having outlined the concept of human rights in general terms with the preceding 
chapter, it is next important to address the issue of their purported universality in greater detail. 
Here, once again, it is notable that the idea of universal is multifaceted. This can take many 
different forms, covering issues as diverse as entitlement, substance, and application. When 
speaking of the universality of human rights, however, one is generally discussing their 
potential scope (which incorporates their entitlement and application).232 The issue of a 
universality of substance (as it pertains to the substantive content of human rights) is in some 
sense underappreciated. Indeed, there appears to be a supposed obviousness in relation to this 
matter. Rights, once defined, are expected to mean the same thing for all peoples (and in all 
jurisdictions).233 The practicalities of this are then brought into question when considering 
socio-economic protections (such as the right to education or to health) – as we will address in 
Chapter Four. The apparent unfeasibility of universally consistent application with regard to 
the standard of afforded protection can be appreciated with only a rudimentary understanding 
                                                            
232 Jack Donnelly provides an effective summary of this approach when noting that human rights are understood 
to be ‘held “universally” by all human beings … [with] near-universal applicability in contemporary society’. 
Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and in Practice (Cornell University Press 2002) 1-2. 
233 ‘Human rights are equal rights … [everybody] has the same human rights as everyone else …’. ibid 10. 
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of the economic (and technological) differences that exist between states.234 A common 
conclusion from such analysis is to question the legitimacy of these protections as fundamental 
human rights. Or, indeed, is to adopt an approach similar to that of Talbott’s, where the idea of 
‘fundamental human needs’ is conceptualised in narrower terms (and where seemingly 
impossible/unfeasible claims – such as health – are rejected or ignored).235  
 The most essential objective for every account of human rights (or indeed natural 
rights) is to provide a sufficient justification for the universal entitlement attached to such 
protections (as addressed in Chapter Two). As example, the belief that human rights belong to 
all human beings equally by virtue of their being human.236 However, in modern times this 
discussion has progressed to the consideration of more practical concerns. Namely, the 
question of how we are to secure the implementation of universal claims which are now largely 
accepted as being legitimate.237 It is clear that for modern proponents of human rights it is no 
longer sufficient for the legitimacy of the concept to be acknowledged internationally. There is 
a further (superior) need of ensuring that such recognition is followed with firm commitments 
to protect these claims. Yet, the starting point still rests with supposing the legitimacy of the 
justificatory foundation of these protections.  
3.2.1 Deontological and Consequentialist Accounts of Human Rights 
 
Contemporarily, there appears to be two principal forms that a defence of the universal 
legitimacy of human rights may be expressed. Through either (a) deontological or; (b) 
consequentialist means respectively. Deontological accounts simply relate to many of the 
                                                            
234 Jonathan Wolff, The Human Right to Health (W. W. Norton & Company 2013) 13-14. 
235 William J Talbott, Which Rights Should Be Universal? (Oxford University Press 2005) 135. 
236 Jack Donnelly articulates this point persuasively when he explains that human rights ‘are universal rights in 
the sense that today we consider all members of the species Homo sapiens “human beings”, and thus holders of 
rights’. Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and in Practice (Cornell University Press 2002) 10. 
237 ‘Human rights are universal in another sense: they are almost universally accepted, at least in word, or as 
ideal standards’. ibid 1. 
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theoretical/philosophical arguments we have previously examined within this thesis. It is fairly 
safe to suggest that amongst self-regarded human rights proponents the deontological approach 
has historically been the more frequently adopted of the two (a point reflected in the language 
of human rights treaties).238 In contrast, the emerging influence (and attractiveness) of 
consequentialist accounts is a relatively recent development – and a reflection of the difficulties 
encountered with traditional deontological explanations. Notably, proponents of the 
consequentialist account do not need to support the concept of inalienable universal protections 
at all (or, indeed, recognise any underlying justification for their provision beyond their 
practical benefits). Instead, they simply have to acknowledge that individuals are better off 
when certain conditions are protected.239 The merits (and limitations) with each approach will 
now be assessed in greater detail so as to determine their sufficiency in providing the concept 
of human rights with a robust philosophical foundation in modern times.  We will begin by 
establishing the fundamental differences that exist between each approach:  
i) A typical deontological (non-consequentialist) approach would assert that the universal 
applicability of rights can be philosophically justified, regardless of whether various 
cultures disagree with this assessment.240 It would maintain that cultural disagreements 
are not justifiable, and cannot override the underlying legitimacy of the concept of 
universal rights, because they are intended to authenticate (and perpetuate) cultural, 
societal, and economical inequalities beneficial to those who make them.241 Further it 
would hold that human rights represent morally objective claims, and refusal to 
acknowledge this fact is to deny self-evident truths. Ultimately, it would conclude that 
                                                            
238 For a detailed account of this see Micheline Ishay, The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the 
Globalisation Era (University of California Press 2008).  
239 Willian J Talbott, Which Rights Should Be Universal? (Oxford University Press 2005) 16. 
240 ‘[I]f we have good grounds or ascribing certain rights to human beings indifferently, there is no reason why 
we should forfeit or modify our commitment to those rights merely because others do not share it’. Peter Jones, 
Rights (Issues in Political Theory) (Palgrave Macmillan Press 1994) 28. 
241 Abdullah Ahmed An-Na'im, ‘Human Rights in the Muslim World’ in Patrick Hayden (ed), The Philosophy of 
Human Rights: Readings in Human Rights (Paragon House Publishers 2001) 327. 
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the universal applicability of human rights should be acknowledged as a worthwhile 
objective, irrespective of various objections to this position, because of the intellectual 
and moral integrity of their cause.  
ii) Contrastingly, a typical consequentialist approach would assert that, irrespective of the 
effectiveness of philosophical justifications for human rights, they are legitimised 
simply due to the fact that individuals (and societies) are evidently better off when they 
are protected.242 They would propose that discernible practical benefits of enforcement 
justify efforts to expand coverage, and would not need to accept or promote a particular 
list of rights as inalienable or philosophically justifiable protections. Instead, this 
account would be based on the assertion that certain interests, when protected, provide 
tangible benefits to both individuals and the state.243 In this way, the content of 
protections is not fixed, in a definitive sense, but is instead adaptable to change 
dependent on the will of the state at any given time. Ultimately, proponents of this 
approach maintain that human rights are contextually valuable purely because they have 
practical benefits, and that no deontological justification is required.  
 
Upon reflecting on this discourse, Richard Arneson suggested that a consequentialist 
approach is superior to philosophical accounts that are based on ‘absolute’ protections, not only 
because they are more practical, but because they provide greater protection to the interests of 
individuals:  
The proper doctrine that takes rights seriously would be a consequentialism of 
rights, not a deontology … as a consequentialist position assigns everyone the 
status of unignorability, meaning that when one is a potential beneficiary of an 
                                                            
242 As Andrew Heard explains, for a consequentialist ‘human rights are needed because they … prevent the 
awful repercussions of having no limits on the manner in which governments or groups may treat other human 
beings’. Andrew Heard, ‘Human Rights: Chimeras in Sheep’s Clothing’ (1997) Simon Fraser University 
<https://www.sfu.ca/~aheard/intro.html> accessed 18 May 2018.   
243 Willian J Talbott, Which Rights Should Be Universal? (Oxford University Press 2005) 16. 
Daniel M Lowe                           Assessing the Universality of Human Rights in the Context of Health  
92 
 
infringement of a right, one’s interest may not be ignored in the moral calculation 
that determines what ought to be done all things considered.244  
Indeed, a primary strength of a consequentialist approach is that it is seemingly easier 
to justify the worth of human rights when the legitimacy of such claims is founded on the 
tangible beneficial consequences of their application (or non-application). In practice, 
consequentialists identify a particular objective (e.g. a benefit they aim to secure) and work 
backwards to determine the best means of producing the desired outcome. When looking to 
balance competing interests, priority is generally to be afforded to those rights which will 
produce the greatest benefit. Thus, this position is influenced heavily by John Stuart Mills245 
and his seminal work Utilitarianism. As William Talbott confirms, for a consequentialist ‘the 
reason that human rights should be universally protected is that a society in which human rights 
are guaranteed will do a better job of promoting well-being’.246 
A negative implication of this stance is that, as addressed, the rigour of rights protection 
is determined by the level of benefit which results from their protection. As such it is possible 
that this protection will be restricted if and when greater benefit can be generated elsewhere. 
That is to say, if it is identified that protecting right X would generate a greater level of benefit 
than right Y, then efforts to protect right Y could be reduced. Indeed, the focus with this 
approach is to identify desired results, prioritise those which would produce the greatest level 
of benefit, and then distribute resources accordingly in order to provide the required 
protection.247 An obvious critique here relates to the apparent vulnerability of rights protection 
that a purely consequentialist approach could provide. For example, a results-based approach 
would not seem to provide any guaranteed protection. Under such a model the commitment to 
                                                            
244 Richard J Arneson, ‘Against Rights’ (2001) 11 Philosophical Issues 7, 19. 
245 John Stuart Mills, Utilitarianism (Hacket Publishing 2003). 
246 Willian J Talbott, Which Rights Should Be Universal? (Oxford University Press 2005) 16. 
247 A. J. Thomas classifies this as ‘welfare consequentialism’ and explains that such an approach is based on the 
‘differential distributions of scarce socio economic goods …’. A. J. Thomas, ‘Deontology, Consequentialism 
and Moral Realism’ (2005) 19 Minerva – An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 1, 17. 
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any given right must be impermanent to accommodate potential changes required by economic, 
political, or social developments. With limited resources, it would surely be the political 
climate of any given time – rather than the merits of the individual interests themselves – which 
would determine what benefits (and as such rights) are given precedence over others. Thus, as 
Douzinas might suggest, with this approach we essentially make ‘the universal the handmaiden 
of the particular’.248 The principal limitation of a consequentialist approach appears to be that 
when the legitimacy and applicability of an idea is determined solely by its practical benefits, 
it risks abandonment when these benefits are harder to identify, or become politically 
inconvenient to support.  
Moreover, the decision to suspend rights will not necessarily be based upon 
appreciation of the wider interests of the right-holder, but, instead, can be justified in reference 
to the benefits such action provides to the governing powers of the state. Consequently, these 
protections would represent the purpose of human rights only superficially. Not only would the 
content of such claims be susceptible to alteration, but the commitment to enforce them would 
be entirely dependent upon the political will of the state. They would be open to democratic 
interference in the sense that particular rights could be suspended for political gain. Yet, as 
established in the preceding chapter, human rights, by definition, ought to be un-democratic in 
nature.249 They are a means by which to keep state action from unjustifiably interfering with 
agency of individual members of society. They are not intended to provide a method of 
protecting certain interests only when it is politically convenient to do so. But rather, they 
                                                            
248 Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century (Hart 
Publishers 2000) 138. 
249 Costas Douzinas, ‘What Are Human Rights?’ The Guardian (London, 18 March 2009) 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/libertycentral/2009/mar/18/human-rights-asylum> accessed 18 May 
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represent a means of ensuring such interests are protected even when doing so is 
inconvenient.250  
There is the further question of what the primary criteria for determining which rights 
ought to be prioritised should be. If right X provides direct benefit to more people than right Y 
but the level of benefit is greater with the latter, which of these would take precedence? For 
example, in the event of a conflict between freedom from torture and a right to health either 
one could seemingly be prioritised on the basis of greatest benefit. Whilst the former appears 
to represent a more serious protection - namely as a stalwart against tyranny251 - it is arguably 
only relevant (in a purely practical sense) to a limited number of individuals in any given state 
(who are at risk of its violation). In contrast, whilst a right to health would have wide reaching 
implications and could provide some level of benefit to all individuals within the state, it is less 
cost effective and therefore arguably less practically realisable.252 Therefore, with a 
consequentialist approach there appears to be continual (and uncertain) balancing act between 
the level of interest, the scope of benefit, and the cost of implementation. Consequently, this 
approach would seem to be inconsistent with the idea of universal human rights as guaranteed 
protections. 
Conversely, a deontological (or non-consequentialist) position is one based on the 
belief that certain human features (such as autonomy, moral agency, and rationality) legitimise 
the universal relevance of rights.253 A recurring critique of this approach relates to its inability 
                                                            
250 ibid. 
251 Jeremy Waldron asserts that ‘[t]orture is seen as characteristic not of free, but of tyrannical governments … 
Torture may be something that happens elsewhere in the world, but not in a free country …’. Jeremy Waldron, 
Torture, Terror and Trade-Offs: Philosophy for the White House (Oxford University Press 2012) 224.  
252 In summarising this position Jonathan Wolff explained ‘[i]t does not seem plausible to think that every 
human being has the right to call on every other human to provide everything set out in the ICESCR, such as the 
right to education, or, indeed, the right to health [as] … most of these duties will fall on the state, and ultimately 
on the burdened tax payer’. Jonathan Wolff, The Human Right to Health (W. W. Norton & Company 2013) 13-
14. 
253 James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2008) 88. 
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to effectively limit the scope of the discourse. This, itself, results from the manner in which a 
deontological account attempts to justify human rights; personified by impressive, grandiose 
rhetoric and absolute claims. As Costas Douzinas and Conor Gearty explain:  
[The] ideological power of human rights lies largely in their ambiguity, the 
oscillation between real and ideal … [viewed] in this way, human rights are 
idealist, parts of a philosophy and practice of emancipation, the last great utopia 
of our age.254 
By maintaining that certain aspects of humanity or human nature are, in and of 
themselves, capable of validating universal rights, deontological accounts seemingly discount 
the potential significance of the practical realisability of the resulting claims. Indeed, the 
immediate applicability of individual rights can have little relevance on the strength of a 
deontological approach. The merits of such a position are determined primarily by the veracity 
of the claims it makes in relation to the existence of universally relevant human traits or 
justificatory norms.255 Therefore, the strength of a deontological position is compromised to 
the extent that, whilst proponents of this position will not necessarily ignore the significance 
that resulting benefits of the application of human rights could have on the legitimacy of the 
concept itself, they are not required to establish a practical means of achieving it. The relevance 
of rights would not be held to depend upon whether or not it is feasible to apply them – either 
with regard to economic or political concerns – but simply on whether the interest itself is 
legitimate and deserving of protection. As a result, a deontological account will not be 
invalidated simply by highlighting present incompatibilities with the concept of universal (or 
indeed regional) application. In this way, it is arguably easier to dismiss because it does not 
                                                            
254 Costas Douzinas and Connor Gearty (eds), The Meanings of Rights: The Philosophy and Social Theory of 
Human Rights (Cambridge University Press 2014) 4-5.  
255 This is represented with the idea that all human beings have an equal entitlement to human rights simply on 
account of being equally human. See Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Cornell 
University Press 2002) 10. 
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need to directly address practical obstacles which prevent the implementation of individual 
claims.  
3.2.2 Limitations with Theoretical Foundations: Rights as ‘Nonsense Upon Stilts’ 
 
To develop this further it is useful to return to the work of Jeremy Bentham - a renowned 
utilitarian and sceptic of the concept of natural rights. In Anarchical Fallacies,256 a direct 
response to the DRMC, Bentham attacked the idea of inalienable protections which could exist 
in the absence of a state. To his mind these rights were ‘dangerous nonsense’, because the 
ability to fulfil them (and protect the corresponding interests) was entirely dependent upon the 
commitment of state action.257 Furthermore, and irrespective of this fact, as they were held to 
be inviolable (and as such no deviation from their enforcement was to be justifiable) they 
undermined the legitimacy of the idea that certain interests are worthy of protection by 
preventing the state from acting in times of emergency or war (thus risking the protection of 
all interests – universal or otherwise):  
And of these rights, whatever they are, there is not, it seems, any one of which 
any government can, upon any occasion whatever, abrogate the smallest 
particle.258 
Bentham saw the idea of natural rights as a logical fallacy. Not only were they 
impossible in a practical sense – as their fulfilment was dependent upon both the existence of 
a state and a permanent commitment to enforce them (which itself was not desirable and could 
not be guaranteed in any event) – but they were contradictory. They made impractical demands 
                                                            
256 Jeremy Bentham, ‘Anarchical Fallacies’ in John Bowring (ed), The Works of Jeremy Bentham Vol. II 
(Edinburgh: William Tait 1843) 489-534. 
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for the protection of vital freedoms in an attempt to prevent the state from acting freely (even 
if doing so was actually in the interests of the population at large).259  
Notably, Bentham’s critique of natural rights specifically related to the concept of 
inalienable, universal protections as defined within the DRMC. The legitimacy of the idea that 
certain interests ought to be protected was not directly criticised. Rather, it was a specific means 
of attempting to realise their protection that was rejected. Bentham maintained that the 
language adopted within declarations of natural rights deprived them of legitimacy by 
expanding their scope beyond the possibility (or desirability) of fulfilment. As he suggests, this 
results from ‘[u]sing, instead of ought and ought not, the words is or is not – can or can not’.260 
Furthermore, Bentham explained that the identification of a significant need does not 
automatically give rise to a means of ensuring it is provided for: ‘want is not supply - hunger 
is not bread’.261 He saw the language of natural rights as being useful only in the sense that it 
could articulate desired actions (or inactions). It could identify social inequalities deserving of 
attention.262 However, it could not, in Bentham’s view, realistically represent legally 
enforceable moral claims. This is true simply because the law acts in accordance with the 
governing powers of the state. It was for this reason that Bentham concluded ‘[r]ight, the 
substantive right, is the child of law: from real laws come real rights …’.263 Whilst it may be 
reasonable to suggest that governing powers ought to act in the interests of the state – including, 
but not entirely determined by, the well-being of the population, it is important to realise that 
the capacity of these powers to fully realise this well-being is restricted by various social, 
                                                            
259 Bentham persuasively articulated this argument as follows: ‘That in proportion as it is right or proper, i.e. 
advantageous to the society in question, that this or that right – a right to this or that effect – should be 
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abolished’. ibid. 
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economic, and political limitations. As such, even in accepting a responsibility to redress 
starvation, such powers will not necessarily be capable of doing so. Identifying that all people 
need food to survive, and then declaring a right for all to such food on this basis (demanding 
the state provide it), cannot affect the realisability of this claim (as this is determined by 
political, social, and economic interests beyond their control). This would remain true 
regardless of whether the state was prepared to accept the legitimacy of this claim as a ‘right’ 
or not.  
For Bentham, the fallacy of rights relates to the wilful ignorance accepting them 
demands with regard to the practical realities of securing their objectives.264 They are demands 
to all and everything with no appreciation of how they are to be enabled. Moreover, as they are 
purely demands to things human beings are held to ‘need’, they instil in the hearts and minds 
of the impoverished, disenfranchised masses a desire to force change and revolt when their 
desires are not met (irrespective of whether a state is willing to accept a responsibility to meet 
them, but is incapable of immediately doing so due to a variety of other factors).265 The 
contemporary significance of this critique can be appreciated when considering the ethereal, 
indefinable character of human rights in the context of the ‘abstract subject’. They are, for many 
peoples, literally no more than claims to a hypothetical – an enhanced quality of life – which, 
even when accepted as a legitimate, cannot be guaranteed. In this way, as Douzinas explains: 
Human rights statements are therefore prescriptions: people are not free and 
equal but they ought to become so; people do not have a right to life, they ought 
to be granted the necessary means for their survival. Their success depends on 
political will and the social conditions within which the equality and life 
maxims are to be fought for. Equality is a call for action not a description of a 
state of affairs.266 
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In summary, Bentham claimed that natural rights encourage impossible demands, 
which, when unrealised, cultivate a desire to enact violent upheaval toward these ends. The 
ultimate irony is that in encouraging the removal of state governance natural rights ultimately 
undermine the very interests they aim to protect. As mentioned, the protection of all interests, 
universal or otherwise, requires the existence of a stable government committed to the aim of 
protecting them. After a revolution, it cannot be certain that the new governing forces will 
accept such responsibility. Yet the interests of many individuals are certain to be violated 
during the conflict itself (including those of the revolutionaries).267 In support of this, it is 
interesting to note that the French Revolution, purposed on the supposed legitimacy of natural 
rights, ultimately resulted in facilitating the transformation of France into an imperialistic state 
under the governance of Napoleon Bonaparte.268 Natural rights as the manifestation of liberté, 
égalité, and fraternité had inadvertently helped to displace the Aristocracy only to replace it 
with an Emperor. Costas Douzinas suggests that this dichotomy was exemplified by the fact 
that ‘imperialism in the Napoleonic wars, in which the French nation claimed to be the 
expression of humanity and to spread through conquest and occupation its civilising 
mission’.269 Thus, a revolution which was premised on securing rights of individuals, indirectly 
made possible the conquest of other European states (with wanton disregard for the interests 
of the populations of these states). 
 
                                                            
267 Jeremy Bentham famously suggested that idea of natural rights leads individuals to violence even ‘against the 
government they themselves were pretending to establish – even that, as soon as their own reign should be at an 
end … Our will shall consequently reign without control …’. Jeremy Bentham, ‘Anarchical Fallacies’ in John 
Bowring (ed), The Works of Jeremy Bentham Vol. II (Edinburgh: William Tait 1843)) 501. 
268 It is also interesting to note that it was in the aftermath of the French Revolution that the concept of 
‘terrorism’ first emerged. During the so called ‘Reign of Terror’, Maximillian Robespierre famously exclaimed 
that ‘[t]error is nothing but justice, prompt, severe and inflexible; it is therefore an emancipation of virtue’. For 
an excellent account on evolution of the concept of terrorism see Michael Dunning, M, ‘Terrorism and 
Civilisation: the Case for a Relational Approach’ (2016) 28 Belvedere Meridionale 39.  
269 Costas Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (Routledge 
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3.3 Dworkin & the Proposed Perfectibility of Law 
 
In considering alternative means of supporting the idea of the universality of human 
rights without the need to restrict the discussion to purely consequentialist or deontological 
approaches, it is helpful to examine the work of Ronald Dworkin. For our purposes, we are 
interested in an implication stemming from what is known as Dworkin’s ‘right answer’ 
approach (discussed below) that legal knowledge is inherently perfectible. Principally, this 
approach discourages regarding the law as an objective instrument which is inherently moral. 
Instead, Dworkin proposes that laws moral goodness – and sufficiency - is contingent upon 
consistent application which reflects ‘general principles that underlie and justify the settled law 
…’.270 As legal knowledge and understanding are continually evolving, it is suggested within 
this section that these general principles may provide means by which the legitimacy of such 
progression can be determined. It is further suggested that legitimate progression/evolution can 
be seen to represent the ‘perfectibility’ of legal norms (and ideals). Ultimately, this section will 
argue that identifying the perfectible nature of legal norms allows us to insulate them from the 
possibility of complete disqualification. It will be shown that this insulation is a logical result 
of the contextual contingency of legal knowledge and social standards.  In support of this 
position we will draw from another significant philosophical construct of Dworkin – ‘Judge 
Hercules’, which represents the idea of the perfect adjudicator. Judge Hercules was defined by 
Dworkin as ‘a lawyer of superhuman skill, learning, patience and acumen’.271 In effect, Judge 
Hercules can be seen to represent the judicial manifestation of the contextual perfectibility of 
law. He is wise and knowledgeable and, as he ‘accepts the main uncontroversial constitutive 
and regulative rules of law in his jurisdiction’,272 it should also be understood that he has 
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comprehensive appreciation of the moral and jurisprudential approaches of the present time. In 
addition, as his jurisprudential approach to deciding difficult or novel cases is to be based on 
‘refining the constitutional theory he has already used’,273 it is proposed that he must also have 
considerable appreciation for jurisprudential approaches of the past (in order to understand how 
the law has already evolved and is thus capable of being developed further).  
In this way, his decisions may be interpreted as being objectively justifiable – in the 
sense that they are reflective of ‘superhuman’ knowledge and understanding, and as such 
represent the most optimal appreciation of the law (and its legitimate uses) possible at any 
given time. As previously established, when deliberating on any legal issues, Judge Hercules 
will seek to resolve them in a manner which is consistent with a contextually optimal level of 
understanding of accepted legal precedents/statutes (so far as it relates to conformity with 
established legal norms determined to be sufficient). His decisions would also entirely 
appropriate given the specific circumstances of the case. This is reflected in the fact that:  
Hercules does not first find the limits of law and then deploy his own political 
convictions to supplement what the law requires. He uses his own judgement to 
determine what legal rights the parties before him have, and when that judgement 
is made nothing remains to submit to either his own or the public’s 
convictions.274 
 Finally, it should be noted that, whilst he would not be unduly influenced by popular 
public opinion when reaching his verdicts,275 his decisions will reflect appreciation of the 
(evolving) social standards of the time. This is because, as Dworkin confirms, ‘when Hercules 
fixes legal rights he has already taken the community’s moral traditions into account’.276 
In effect, comprehensive appreciation of the evolution of law (and legal principles), as 
well as of accepted social and political standards of the age, allows Judge Hercules to reach the 
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‘right’ solution, even in difficult cases. It is reasonable to regard these decisions as being ‘right’ 
simply because, as we have seen, they will be based upon the most complete level of 
knowledge, skill, and understanding possible within the specific contexts with which they are 
made. This reflective approach is predicated on the presumption that there are no legal 
questions which cannot be answered in a satisfactory manner. As Dworkin attests, [f]or all 
practical purposes, there will always be a right answer in the seamless web of our law’.277 Law 
is thus perfectible in the sense that it is open to evolution. This is evidenced through the creation 
of ‘new’ solutions or changing appreciation of known legal concepts. The legitimacy of these 
developments may be determined by assessing their conformity with the aforementioned 
principles that ‘underlie and justify the settled law’.278 Ultimately, this process contributes to 
the continual completion of law as it pertains to its sufficiency at responding to legal issues.  
3.3.1 The Perfectibility of Law in Practice: Examining Approaches of the ECtHR 
 
As an example of this approach within human rights law, and as way of further 
evidencing its relevance to this thesis, we can reference the evolution of the substantive scope 
and meaning of specific human rights claims. For our objectives, this will relate to a brief 
examination of Article 8 (Right to Respect for Private and Family Life)279 in conjunction with 
Article 14 (Prohibition of Discrimination)280 of the ECHR, in relation to the issue of 
homosexual adoption.  
In Fretté v. France (2002),281 the court determined that no violation of the 
aforementioned convention rights had occurred by France denying the claimant, who was a 
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Clarendon Press 1977) 84. 
278 Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (Harvard University Press 2006) 143. 
279 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as Amended by Protocols No.11 
and No.14 (opened for signature 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) CETS No. 005 
(ECHR) art 8 <http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf> accessed 18 May 2018.   
280 ibid art 14.  
281 (2002) 38 EHRR 438. 
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single homosexual man, the ability to adopt. This is because the determination had been made 
in accordance with weighing the interests of the adoptable children (and thus a legitimate 
aim),282 and reflective of the accepted views at the time (as it pertained to lack of consensus 
from psychiatrists and psychologists on the risks posed to children by this course of action).283 
However, in E.B. v. France (2008),284 the court found that disallowing a homosexual woman 
who was living with another woman from adopting, when single heterosexuals were able to do 
so, did represent unjustifiable interference with the enjoyment of the claimant’s convention 
rights. In reaching this decision, the court noted the fact that the claimant’s sexual orientation 
had been the decisive determining factor in the denial of the opportunity to adopt, and that this 
therefore rendered the decision incompatible with the convention.285  
Despite obvious factual differences between these cases, it is evident that changing 
social attitudes had also influenced the contrasting verdicts of the court (as evidenced by their 
referral to the ‘living instrument’ principle – which we will examine below). Importantly, as 
both decisions were reflective of accepted understanding of the law when they were delivered, 
according to the approach of Judge Hercules, it is reasonable to regard them as representing 
the ‘right’ solution. Indeed, the apparent development of law embodied with E.B. does not 
invalidate the legitimacy of the decision in Fretté. This is because, as we have established, the 
                                                            
282 This relates to the concept of proportionality and the matter of permissible interference with convention 
based protections. In essence, this holds that any interference must be prescribed by law, in pursuit of a 
legitimate objective (e.g. protection of public morals/the rights of others), and necessary in a democratic society 
(e.g. proportionate). An effective summary of this has been provided by Yukata Arai-Takahash who confirms 
that ‘[the] Strasbourg organs have consistently held that the principle of proportionality is inherent in evaluating 
the right of an individual person and the general public interest of society. This means that a fair and reasonable 
balance must be attained between those two countervailing interests’.  Yukata Arai-Takahash, The Margin of 
Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR (Intersentia 2002) 
14. 
283 ‘It must be observed that the scientific community – particularly experts on childhood, psychiatrists and 
psychologists – is divided over the possible consequences of a child being adopted by one or more homosexual 
parents …’. Fretté v. France (2002) 38 EHRR 438 [42].  
284 (2008) 47 EHRR 509. 
285 ‘[T]he Court cannot but observe that, in rejecting the applicant's application for authorisation to adopt, the 
domestic authorities made a distinction based on considerations regarding her sexual orientation, a distinction 
which is not acceptable under the Convention …’. ibid [96].  
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law, and legal understanding, are perfectible and evolutive. Furthermore, this perfectibility is 
contextually contingent – allowing for the ‘correct’ interpretation of law to be continually 
determined by identifying its conformity with accepted understanding of legal rules and 
precedents of the time (as well as with their underlying justificatory principles). In the context 
of human rights law, this is encapsulated within the ‘living instrument’ principle which was 
demonstrated in the aforementioned cases. Indeed, in reaching their verdict in E.B., the court 
reiterated the importance of this principle by confirming that ‘the convention is a living 
instrument which must be interpreted in light of present day conditions’.286 The implication of 
this is that the ‘right’ answer to any legal issue will be relative (and non-definitive). Crucially, 
however, this apparent relativity will not undermine the legitimacy or significance of past 
‘right’ answers. This is because, theoretically at least, these answers would themselves have 
been based upon the sublimation of accepted legal understanding which preceded them (e.g. 
commensurate with Hercules ‘refining’ of the law). As such, they would have provided 
validation of the process through which contemporary approaches are developed (e.g. by 
building upon established legal knowledge). 
From our brief examination of the abovementioned cases, we see that acceptance of the 
idea of rights which retain the capacity to evolve in relation to their substantive content is 
clearly reflected in jurisprudence of the ECtHR. The legitimacy of such evolution, as well as 
of the corresponding obligations placed on states regarding the scope of protection these rights 
require, is also governed by various techniques developed by this same court. This is perhaps 
most notably represented by the concept of subsidiarity – specifically in accordance with the 
                                                            
286 ibid [92]. The ‘living instrument’ principle was first established in the case of Tyrer v. the United Kingdom 
(1978) 2 EHRR 1. 
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margin of appreciation doctrine.287 Principally, subsidiarity provides that the authority to secure 
convention rights (as well as to decide what should rightfully constitute the substantive scope 
of such rights) rests, in the first instance, with each individual member state (allowing the 
ECtHR to intervene only when member states demonstrate an inability to secure a sufficient 
level of protection on their own). Similarly, the margin of appreciation doctrine denotes the 
level of deference provided to member states by the ECtHR when interpreting and applying 
Convention rights (which can be either wide or narrow depending on the relevant issue).288 
Thus, these concepts are of particular importance for controversial matters whereby the 
adoption of an ‘absolutist’ approach by the ECtHR - that is to say one which could look to 
establish a universal standard of protection on matters where no universal consensus exists - is 
likely to undermine the integrity of the ECHR itself.289 
In theory, effective usage of these concepts will allow for varying degrees of protection 
amongst member states which is reflective of their own specific values, whilst still conforming 
with a basic (universally shared) standard of substantive protection. In practice, the ECtHR’s 
attempts to regulate the sufficiency of differing interpretations of rights (particularly in relation 
to the potential scope of such protections) have heavily relied upon various accounts of what 
is known as ‘consensus analysis’. Such analysis generally represents the view that legitimate 
                                                            
287 For an authoritative examination of the effectiveness of these techniques within the context of same-sex 
partnerships see Helen Fenwick, ‘Same Sex Unions at the Strasbourg Court in a Divided Europe: Driving 
Forward Reform or Protecting the Court’s Authority via Consensus Analysis?’ (2016) 3 European Human 
Rights Law Review 249. 
288 This concept, now integral to the workings of the ECtHR, was first considered in The Cyprus Case (Greece v 
The United Kingdom) (1958-59) 2 Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights, 172-197. 
289 Specifically, by refusing to endorse interpretations of rights which are unlikely to be adopted by certain 
member states (for example, such as in relation to matters concerning same-sex couples). On this matter, 
Fenwick notes that the fact that the ECtHR is reliant on member states voluntarily choosing to abide by its 
judgments is reflected in its jurisprudential approach which ‘encapsulates its struggle to maintain a balance 
between preserving its legitimacy as on one hand the guardian of core Convention values, and on the other, in 
positivist terms, as a credible and authoritative Court whose judgments are not disregarded’. Helen Fenwick, 
‘Same Sex Unions at the Strasbourg Court in a Divided Europe: Driving Forward Reform or Protecting the 
Court’s Authority via Consensus Analysis?’ (2016) 3 European Human Rights Law Review 249, 271. 
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interpretations of Convention rights relate to those which are shared by other member states.290 
As Helen Fenwick has observed, this process has historically been represented by a choice 
‘between relying on a restrictive model of the consensus, based on identifying a clear majority 
of states in favour of a particular practice, enshrined in their laws, or on a more liberal one, 
based on identifying a trend …’.291 Crucially, the rigour of the consensus analysis adopted by 
the ECtHR will have significant implications for the margin of appreciation subsequently 
afforded to affected member states, and thus clearly impact upon the standard of protection 
they will be expected/obligated to provide. For example, the adoption of a liberal approach 
affords member states a wide margin of appreciation, whereby it is easier for them to justify 
non-compliance with more expansive interpretations of rights (when, for example, and in 
accordance with the ‘living instrument’ principle, the scope of protection is seen to have 
extended beyond that which was originally envisioned).292 Conversely, by adopting a more 
strict approach, the ECtHR significantly reduces the margin of appreciation afforded to 
member states, and therefore requires affected states to provide stronger justification for non-
compliance with emerging standards/norms.293    
Ostensibly, allowing for variations of consensus analysis should provide the ECtHR 
with optimal means of regulating the evolution of the substantive content of rights; specifically 
by affording them opportunity to draw upon whichever account is most likely to provide the 
                                                            
290 It is important to note that there are different means by which the ECtHR can look to establish the existence 
of consensus. Initially, as reflected in the judgment of Handyside v. the United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737, 
the Strasbourg Court restricted itself to the concept of European consensus (e.g. pertaining to identifying 
consensus within the geographical region of the member states of the ECHR themselves). However, as 
personified by the judgment delivered in Goodwin v. the United Kingdom (1996) 22 EHRR 123, the Court has 
subsequently embraced a wider approach which incorporates the idea of international or global consensus (e.g. 
making use of established/emerging trends in other parts of the world). More recently, as seen in the case of 
Oliari and Others v. Italy [2015] ECHR 21, the ECtHR may now also make use of the idea of ‘internal’ 
consensus – which simply looks to establish whether a consensus of opinion is held within a specific state. 
291 Helen Fenwick, ‘Same Sex Unions at the Strasbourg Court in a Divided Europe: Driving Forward Reform or 
Protecting the Court’s Authority via Consensus Analysis?’ (2016) 3 European Human Rights Law Review 249, 
252. 
292 See Rees v. the United Kingdom (1987) 9 EHRR 56.  
293 See Vallianatos v. Greece (2014) 59 EHRR 12. 
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greatest level of protection in any given case. However, as Fenwick duly notes, in practical 
terms this also effectively provides the Strasbourg Court means by which to recuse themselves 
from demanding a greater standard of protection from member states – even if such demands 
are justified - on matters relating to controversial issues (wherein there can presently be no 
realistic expectation of cooperation from certain parties).294 This outcome can result from the 
adoption of whichever approach happens to provide the greatest level of deference to the 
member states themselves on the relevant issue (and as such require the least amount of judicial 
scrutiny to their justifications for non-compliance with established/emerging norms).  
Despite evident limitations with their current utilisation, we may still usefully highlight 
these techniques in support of the argument that the correct interpretation of the protective 
scope of human rights is contextually contingent – open to evolution - and thus non-definitive 
in nature (a position which, as we have now seen, is arguably accepted by the ECtHR itself). 
Moreover, critical consideration of these techniques provides an alternative means by which 
we may examine the practical significance of the idea of the ‘perfectibility’ of law. Specifically, 
by providing an additional method for assessing the sufficiency of the ECtHR’s approach to 
securing Convention based rights. As mentioned in previous sections of this chapter, under a 
Dworkinian approach the ‘right answer’ to a legal question (e.g. the correct judgment in a case) 
will be one which reflects the ‘general principles that underlie and justify the settled law …’.295 
Therefore, once a particular evolution/interpretation has been accepted as valid (as evidenced 
by judgments in case law), any deviation from this standard of protection - which is itself not 
based on a subsequent development/evolution of understanding (for instance, as witnessed E.B. 
                                                            
294 Fenwick concludes that this is ultimately reflected in the fact that ‘[t]he Court’s manipulation of the 
consensus doctrine is being deployed at present to seek to avoid confrontations’ with certain member states. 
Helen Fenwick, ‘Same Sex Unions at the Strasbourg Court in a Divided Europe: Driving Forward Reform or 
Protecting the Court’s Authority via Consensus Analysis?’ (2016) 3 European Human Rights Law Review 249, 
270.  
295 Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (Harvard University Press 2006) 143. 
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v. France) - cannot be seen to be justifiable. In this context, it is possible for us to question the 
adequacy of the ECtHR’s approach to regulating the evolution of the scope of Convention 
based rights (as reflected by its use of the aforementioned subsidiarity-related mechanisms). 
This is because, in practice, the criteria developed by the Strasbourg Court for the purposes of 
determining legitimate evolution in relation to the substantive content of rights has not been 
restricted to the merits of each claim (e.g. reflective of Dworkin’s ‘right answer’ approach), 
but has instead also been influenced by pragmatic considerations pertaining to the nature of 
the ECHR itself (e.g. the general reliance on voluntary participation from member states/lack 
of consensus on certain controversial issues). Thus, whilst the ECtHR’s desire to protect against 
rights absolutism is laudable, the manner in which this is currently achieved is arguably 
deserving of improvement and/or revision.296 
To consider this further, it is useful to briefly examine two additional ECHR cases 
relating to the question of legitimate interference with Article 10 of the ECHR (Freedom of 
Expression). The cases are those of Müller and Others v. Switzerland (1988)297and Otto-
Preminger-Institut v. Austria (1994).298 The former regards the confiscation of provocative 
artwork depicting human beings (primarily men) engaged in various sexual acts – action 
prompted inter alia by complaints received from the father of a minor who reacted ‘violently’ 
to exposure to the artwork when on public display.299 In its judgement, the Strasbourg Court 
noted that:  
[T]he general public had free access to [the paintings], as the organisers had not 
imposed any admission charge or any age-limit. Indeed, the paintings were 
                                                            
296 Fenwick ultimately reaches a similar conclusion in advocating for ‘a more courageous stance from the Court’ 
in future cases (whereby it approaches justifications for non-compliance with emerging - or firmly established - 
norms with a greater degree of scrutiny). Helen Fenwick, ‘Same Sex Unions at the Strasbourg Court in a 
Divided Europe: Driving Forward Reform or Protecting the Court’s Authority via Consensus Analysis?’ (2016) 
3 European Human Rights Law Review 249, 271. 
297 (1988) 13 EHRR 212. 
298 (1994) 19 EHRR 34. 
299 (1988) 13 EHRR 212 [12]. 
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displayed in an exhibition which was unrestrictedly open to - and sought to 
attract - the public at large.300 
 These facts were influential in the Court ultimately finding in favour of the state (and 
acknowledging that there had been no breach of Article 10). Essentially, it was observed that 
the claimants had not acted sufficiently in accordance with the ‘duties and responsibilities’ 
required for the legitimate enjoyment of this Convention right.301 Specifically, they had not 
taken sufficient action to minimise the possibility of causing unnecessary offence (by, for 
example, imposing an age restriction or charging an entrance fee). 
In contrast, the latter case subsequently involved the confiscation of a satirical movie - 
entitled Das Liebeskonzil - which depicted various Christian figures (such as God, Jesus Christ, 
and the Virgin Mary)302 in a manner regarded by the Catholic Church as blasphemous.303 
Crucially, as various restrictions had been in put in place to protect against the possibility of 
causing offence, the claimants in this case could seemingly satisfy the same criteria the Court 
relied upon in Müller when finding in favour of the state. For example, the movie was to be 
shown late at night, only to those over the age of 17,304 and who were prepared to pay an 
entrance fee.305 Consequently, it would appear that sufficient consideration had been given to 
the aforementioned ‘duties and responsibilities’ enshrined in Article 10 (as defined in Müller). 
Despite this, the Court still found in favour of the defendant state, concluding that there had 
been no violation of this protection. In justifying this outcome, the Court noted that  
Although access to the cinema to see the film itself was subject to payment of an 
admission fee and an age-limit, the film was widely advertised. There was 
sufficient public knowledge of the subject-matter and basic contents of the film 
to give a clear indication of its nature; for these reasons, the proposed screening 
                                                            
300 ibid [36]. 
301 ibid [34]. 
302 (1994) 19 EHRR 34 [16]. 
303 ibid [11]. 
304 ibid [10].  
305 ibid [9]. 
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of the film must be considered to have been an expression sufficiently "public" 
to cause offence.306  
As with Müller, the court ultimately afforded the Austrian authorities a wide margin of 
appreciation on this issue, despite obvious differences with the merits of each case. In doing 
so, they arguably acted in manner which is inconsistent with the ‘right answer’ approach 
discussed above. Indeed, it would appear that the decision in Otto-Preminger-Institut 
contradicted the justification for the earlier judgment. It is clear from the explanation provided 
for the later decision that the Court was reluctant to risk offending the member state in 
question.307 Thus, in comparison with the approach of Judge Hercules, this decision was not 
truly ‘objective’ – that is to say, it does not appear to be representative of an optimal 
appreciation of the ‘settled law’ (e.g. the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court itself). Instead, 
this judgment reflects an apparent misuse of the margin of appreciation doctrine – wherein the 
determination of the required adoption of either a wide or narrow margin is not restricted to the 
relevant issues (or facts) of each case - and therefore highlights limitations with the current 
approach to securing a sufficient level of protection/enjoyment of Convention rights. 
3.3.2 Implications of the Perfectibility of Law for Idea of Universal Human Rights 
 
In reflecting on this analysis, there are arguably two principal aspects of Dworkin’s 
interpretation of law which are most significant to this thesis. The first is the potentiality of 
definitive, justificatory legal principles. This is represented in the idea that there are absolute, 
objective, and discoverable moral truths which may be used to determine the validity of the 
development of law. Here, the legitimate development of law should always be in accordance 
                                                            
306 ibid [54]. 
307 This is clearly evidenced by the Courts assertion that ‘national authorities … are better placed than the 
international judge’ to assess the need for restrictions with the enjoyment of Convention rights. ibid [56]. 
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with these truths.308 A potential limitation with attempting to establish the validity of norms 
and ideals on the basis of a determinate ‘truth’ was addressed by Douzinas when he suggested 
that the concept of ‘truth’ implies permanence – the acceptance of definitive, fixed 
interpretations:  
Truth's obsession with a stable, fixed world, without conflict and contradiction 
reveals a moral prejudice. Truth as 'the one', the coherent, the fixed, is also 
conceived as the good. In this sense knowledge becomes law.309 
 
Truth, by definition, must be resistant to change. Yet, the idea of the perfectibility of law is 
rooted in its apparent capacity to evolve. Moreover, the objectivity of any historical account of 
morality will be contextually contingent: predicated on an acceptance of knowledge and 
understanding which is susceptible to change (as addressed above in relation to the relevant 
ECHR cases). Consequently, the enduring perfectibility of law, and human society, must 
logically result in the diminishment of the moral worth of knowledge which is accepted at any 
given time. At best, such knowledge can only ever be regarded as reflecting an imperfect ‘truth’ 
– representing a relatively sufficient appreciation of relevant concepts. However, the 
importance of seeking to identify underlying justificatory principles relates to their ability to 
determine the legitimacy of developments of the law. These principles represent ‘truths’ only 
to the extent by which they are capable of articulating the overarching purpose of the law (and 
laws). Whilst understanding of these purposes cannot be definitive (as such understanding is 
itself susceptible to progression/development), they represent the potentiality of a ‘complete’ 
interpretation of legal concepts and ideals. This will be developed further in subsequent 
                                                            
308 An excellent summary of the logic behind this position was provided by Hugh Baxter who explained that 
Dworkin ‘sees morality as a “veto over law”, in the sense that if a purported addition to law is morally 
outrageous, it cannot count as valid law’. Hugh Baxter, ‘Dworkin’s One System Conception of Law and 
Morality’ (2010) 90 Boston University Law Review 857, 858.     
309 Costas Douzinas and Adam Gearey, Critical Jurisprudence (Hart Publishing 2005) 51. 
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sections of this chapter in an attempt sublimate justificatory accounts of the universality of 
human rights.  
The second significant aspect of Dworkin’s approach worthy of further discussion 
relates to the importance of the contextual contingency of ideals (represented here in the form 
of morality and law). For any proposed legal solution, recognition of its validity will be 
dependent upon it being accepted as legitimate within existing law (and legal precedent). Yet, 
as noted, such acceptance is transitional in nature. The ‘accepted’ legal approaches of a 
particular age are formed, in part, by sublimating the approaches of those that preceded it. 
Furthermore, as society and jurisprudence continue to develop, these approaches will 
themselves continue to change. Under Dworkin’s approach - if consistent with the underlying 
justificatory principles of law - these changes may be interpreted as representing a progressive 
‘perfecting’ of the law (as well as of our understanding of this law) – in that they contribute to 
the continuing enhancement of laws sufficiency.310 As we have established, Judge Hercules 
himself is seen to represent the ideal that judicial decisions should be based upon complete 
appreciation of the appropriate application of established legal rules. This is to be achieved 
through consistent application of known solutions, or the creation of novel ones (based upon 
new appreciation of the law).311 Judge Hercules thus retains the power to develop these rules 
through the process of enhancing understanding of their effectual usage. As such, the value and 
meaning of these legal rules are not definitively set, but instead possess an inherent potential 
to evolve (as evidenced in practical terms in our brief examination of ECHR case law in the 
previous section).    
                                                            
310 This is to be understood as representing its capacity to effectively resolve legal issues and develop new 
solutions to emergent legal problems. 
311 That which allows Judge Hercules to refine or ‘fix’ the law. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 
(Harvard University Press 1978) 153. 
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There are several beneficial implications of this analysis for the human rights discourse. 
Notably, as mentioned at the start of this section, it potentially provides us with an opportunity 
to insulate the idea of universal human rights from complete disqualification. In contemporary 
times, attempts to achieve such disqualification are grounded in - amongst other things - 
references to the lack of secured universal implementation.312 However, the concept of the 
progressive perfectibility of law suggests that a ‘true’ interpretation of any legal norm is 
potentially unknowable (in the sense that it possesses an inherent capacity to evolve in order to 
mirror societal progression). In the context of human rights law, it is proposed that ‘true’ is to 
be interpreted as representing an account which is universally acceptable, and which is capable 
of providing the foundation for continual universal implementation of robust human rights 
protections. Whilst it is reasonable to acknowledge that such an account is presently unknown, 
this fact, in and of itself, does not automatically invalidate the concept (or indeed the possibility 
of its eventual creation). This is because, as we have established, the legitimacy of legal 
knowledge is contextually contingent. The vital aspect of this for proponents of human rights 
relates to the fact that, despite the contextual contingency of ideas (and the relativity of ‘true’ 
interpretations of law), it is possible for us to imagine the existence of an objectively ‘true’ 
account (as described above) - even if only hypothetically. This is most clearly exemplified in 
the utopian ideal of human rights which we discussed in Chapter Two, and which appears to 
legitimate (and re-legitimate) continual affirmation in the inevitability of the practical 
applicability of such protections.313 As discussed, this ideal reflects an enduring faith in the 
validity of the concept of universal human rights which has allowed (and allows) proponents 
of human rights to imagine (and strive to secure) universal implementation (and the alleviation 
of injustices). In this way, it uses knowledge of a possible future to justify action taken in the 
                                                            
312 See for example Michael Ignatieff, ‘Human Rights: The Midlife Crisis’ (1999) 46 The New York Review of 
Books 58. 
313 As discussed in Chapter Two regarding the ‘utopian end’ of human rights. Costas Douzinas, The End of 
Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century (Hart Publishers 2000) 380. 
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present. It for this reason, as Douzinas remarks, that ‘utopia can be defined as remembrance of 
the future’.314 
Consequently, because the ‘true’ account is presently unknown (if not unknowable), 
the idea of universally realisable human rights cannot be definitively rejected (as contextual 
rejections may reflect an imperfect understanding of the law). To be precise, this position is 
based upon the recognition that presently accepted interpretations of the concept of human 
rights may ultimately be incompatible with a potential ‘true’ justificatory account. This 
conclusion logically follows the fact that the substantive composition of the hypothetical 
account is unknowable (for obvious reasons). It is therefore impossible to ascertain whether 
current accepted interpretations are consistent with its fundamental principles or not. 
Consequently, any effective critique of a proposed defence of universal human rights can only 
truly be held to invalidate a specific historically contextual account of the idea upon which 
modern human rights are based (e.g. protecting vital human needs). Yet it cannot objectively 
undermine the concept of universal human rights itself.  
Following this, it is reasonable to conclude that any interpretation of human rights 
which is consistent with the ‘accepted’ approaches of the time (and thus reflective of legitimate 
appreciation of the law) is defensible. In summation, this argument would be structured as 
follows: 
1. If Dworkin’s theory is correct, then we can accept that there are objective, discoverable 
moral truths (e.g. underlying justificatory principles) which facilitate the development 
of legal solutions (and represent the perfectibility of law). The idea of the perfectibility 
                                                            
314 ibid 180. 
Daniel M Lowe                           Assessing the Universality of Human Rights in the Context of Health  
115 
 
of legal concepts (and understanding) may be used to support the concept of an 
evolutive justificatory account of universal human rights.  
2. As we cannot know whether current justificatory accounts are incompatible with a 
‘true’ interpretation of human rights, and as we do know that such an interpretation 
may exist (even if only hypothetically), it is reasonable to continue to support 
prevailing accounts of universal human rights so long as it can be determined that they 
accurately reflect contemporary appreciation of the purpose of this law (and thus 
represent contextually optimal justificatory accounts). 
3. Furthermore, as we know that appreciation of the law will continue to develop, we 
must also accept that prevailing accounts, however convincing they may appear to be, 
may not be definitive. Yet, the continued support of such accounts should remain until 
the appreciation of law, morality, and social standards evolves to a point whereby a 
stronger, more convincing account can be constructed. This process is to continue 
indefinitely until the formulation of ‘true’ interpretation (even if this eventuality never 
occurs). 
One of the most significant implications of this is that a successful justificatory account 
of human rights does not necessarily have to establish an immediately workable framework for 
universal application. Rather, it suggests that it would be sufficient to simply present the most 
robust case possible (given the contextual circumstances of the time) and allow this to be 
perfected and refined by future generations. In such a scenario, as modern accounts of human 
rights represent significant advances over earlier accounts, the present inability to actualise a 
universalisable framework for human rights protections (or indeed to conceptualise how such 
a framework may be practically possible) would not characterise failure. Instead, and in 
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reflection of the advances made on earlier attempts, modern accounts would be seen to embody 
a successful incremental step towards the ultimate objective (e.g. the ‘true’ account).  
In support of this approach we can examine the evolution of existing international 
human rights treaties, beginning with the UDHR.315 Reflecting upon the significance of the 
UDHR on its 50th anniversary, Mary Glendon remarked that it was clear that the ‘aims of its 
framers [were] unrealistic’.316 Its language was too imprecise and its scope overly broad. 
However, it could be maintained that the primary purpose for the creation of this declaration 
was not to define rights in detail, but was simply to highlight areas worthy of consideration. 
Arguably the most significant achievement of the UDHR was the legitimation of the idea of 
universal rights as normative claims.  This is ultimately reflected in the fact that as a result of 
its success in this regard, the UDHR has ‘achieved the status of holy writ within the human 
rights movement’.317 Having accomplished its principal objective, future focus could then be 
transferred to more substantive concerns regarding the process of defining and implementing 
such rights (as evidenced with the ICCPR and ICESCR). The lack of prescriptive definitions 
for the rights contained within the UDHR clearly precluded the possibility of practical 
implementation (and regulation) of these claims.318 In addition, the soft law nature of the 
UDHR ensured that signatory states were not obligated to apply the rights that it contained 
(many of which were deliberately expansive for this reason).319 Yet, it would be an 
                                                            
315 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A (III) (UDHR) 
<http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a25> accessed 18 May 2018.   
316 Mary Ann Glendon, ‘Knowing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (1998) 73 Notre Dame Law 
1153, 1155. 
317 ibid 1153. 
318 We will address this point in more detail in Chapter Four with an examination of the right to health. Within 
the Article 25 of the UDHR, this right was held to be a protection to ‘the health and well-being of himself and of 
his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services’. Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A (III) (UDHR) 
<http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a25> accessed 18 May 2018.  
319 As Mary Glendon explains, ‘[o]ne of the first decisions made by the Commission on Human Rights was that 
the “international bill of rights” it had been asked to prepare should be in the form of a declaration rather than a 
legally binding treaty or covenant’. Mary Ann Glendon, ‘Knowing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ 
(1998) 73 Notre Dame Law 1153, 1164. 
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oversimplification to conclude from this that the declaration was unsuccessful. This is because 
it was able to validate the idea of universal rights in a modern context (and thus ensure 
continuation of commitment to this idea). 
Following this approach, and in reflection of ECHR case law, the fulfilment of any 
specific individual right would also appear to be an evolving, deliberative process:  
i) In the initial stage, an injustice is identified; a significant harm which is worthy of 
being addressed or basic interest which is deserving of being provided for.  
ii) In contemporary contexts, this is then articulated in the language of rights: ‘All human 
beings, by nature of their humanity, and with concern for the equal consideration for 
the well-being of others, deserve not to suffer the injustice’.  
iii) Based upon the accepted legitimacy of this claim (determined by the significance of 
the vital interests which are protected through its eventual fulfilment) the state will 
then be obligated to implement measures capable of enabling it. 
iv) The successfulness of these measures will be dependent upon social, political, and 
economic factors (as previously addressed). If the right is adopted, the judiciary will 
then interpret cases relating to it in accordance with accepted understanding of the 
claim. As social and moral standards develop, this accepted understanding will be 
open to expansion and a more robust reading of the protection. 
v) Thus, ‘true’ fulfilment of individual rights is never truly achieved. These protections 
are constantly evolving. However, they can be said to be successfully enabled (and 
thus satisfactorily enjoyed) if they are applied in accordance with present 
jurisprudential interpretations of the purpose of each claim. 
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An apparent limitation with this approach is that it seemingly endorses varying degrees 
of protection of individual rights consistent with differing cultural practices. How can human 
rights be inalienable and universal as well as contextually contingent? In responding to this it 
is worth reiterating that the history of human rights is not a history of definitive, fixed moral 
standards. In contrast, it is a history of evolving ideas (and ideals) based on similar purposes 
(e.g. to protect fundamental interests). As such, human rights should be understood to epitomise 
an effective means of articulating the legitimacy of this purpose – but it should also be 
acknowledged that the legitimacy of this purpose is not restricted to the idea of human rights. 
Therefore, whilst it may be proved that contemporary accounts lack the capacity to secure 
universal implementation, this will not undermine the universality of the purpose such accounts 
represent. This is because, as Arendt suggests, ‘the validity of a principle is always universal 
and is not bound to any particular person or any particular group’.320 Under such an 
interpretation, the legitimacy of the idea should ensure that jurisprudential interpretations of it 
will continue to evolve as legal understanding, knowledge and society develops. The key 
objective for proponents of human rights is to ensure that such evolution conforms with the 
purpose of such protections in a manner more likely to lead to universal fulfilment. 
3.4 Human Rights and Historicism 
 
In order to determine a ‘true’ interpretation of either morality or human rights, if this is 
even possible, we are required to acknowledge the historical development of the ideas at the 
heart of these concepts (as means of determining their developmental scope). With regard to 
human rights this is readily achieved by drawing reference to the creation of significant right 
based documents. As noted, the DOI, DRMC and UDHR, are used to highlight the continuation 
                                                            
320 Peg Birmingham, Hannah Arendt and Human Rights: The Predicament of Common Responsibility (Indiana 
University Press 2006) 15. 
Daniel M Lowe                           Assessing the Universality of Human Rights in the Context of Health  
119 
 
of the idea of inalienable protections.321 This is relevant to Dworkin’s approach in the sense 
that it can also be utilised to demonstrate the ‘perfecting’ of the concept of universal human 
rights (in the form of an expansion of coverage in terms of both people and interests) as 
previously discussed. In relation to the potential perfectibility of human rights, it is pertinent 
to note that many contemporary proponents of this concept have proclaimed their continual 
expansion and progression as a matter of certainty. This is perhaps most famously reflected in 
Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man. Here Fukuyama confidently 
predicted that the global adoption of liberal democracy and human rights was inevitable 
because, as populations become more educated, more would choose to adopt a form of 
democratic government that would be capable of providing them.322 The rationale with this 
approach is clear to see. It would seem apparent that human rights are protected in more parts 
of the world in this generation than the previous one (with the same being true for the one that 
preceded it). Alison Brysk encapsulated this purported development when she claimed that in 
the present ‘human rights standards, movements, and mechanisms have extended to embrace a 
majority of the world’s population and almost every aspect of the human condition …’.323 As 
such, proponents of this approach assume that this pattern will logically continue until universal 
protection has been achieved.  
An alternative account that could be provided here would reflect the concept of a ‘true’ 
interpretation of human rights. Specifically, this would maintain that the historical expansion 
of the protection of human rights is simply a logical consequence of the process of ‘perfecting’ 
the idea itself. For example, it could be suggested that this generation has a more ‘complete’ 
understanding of the concept of human rights than the last because it is built on a greater level 
                                                            
321 Micheline Ishay, The History of Human Rights (University of California Press 2003) 3. 
322 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (Free Press 2006) 328-339. 
323 Alison Brysk (ed) and Michael Stohl (ed), Expanding Human Rights: 21st Century Norms and Governance 
(Edward Elgar Publishing 2017) 3-4. 
Daniel M Lowe                           Assessing the Universality of Human Rights in the Context of Health  
120 
 
of knowledge. Ultimately this proposal is based on the assumption that present generations are 
capable of continually refining ideas of the past. In the context of human rights, this process 
would culminate in more robust interpretations of individual rights as well as a greater scope 
of protection.324 In this way, the development of human rights towards a definitive 
interpretation becomes an inherently historical process. History is to be used to justify both the 
idea of human rights (in the form of inalienable protections of vital interests) by referencing 
theoretical accounts of the past, as well as to legitimise the idea that universal protection is 
realisable (by suggesting that this will be a natural consequence of perfecting the idea of the 
concept itself).  
The image which is promoted by such proponents of rights through the utilisation of 
history is one of linear progression – with humanity continually perfecting itself with each 
generation. Progress is determined by referencing the expansion of liberal democracy, 
globalisation, and the acceptance of fundamental liberties. Thus, ‘[h]istory is presented as the 
forward march of all conquering reason, which erases mistakes and combats prejudices’.325 
The appeal of this approach is self-evident, not least as a means of re-affirming the moral and 
intellectual legitimacy of contemporary efforts to actualise human rights. There is obvious 
satisfaction in proclaiming that the future history of human rights is pre-determined, 
represented by an unquestionable evolution towards a destined eventuality; the universal 
application of these protections.326 This view is a representation of historicism; of interpreting 
the conditions of the present day favourably by considering their differences with those which 
have gone before. Douzinas suggests that ‘historicism is a type of evolutionary progressivism: 
                                                            
324 Within the context of the European Convention on Human Rights (1950), this is personified with the 
principle that the convention is a ‘living instrument’, as discussed earlier in this chapter. This has allowed the 
scope and meaning of convention based principles to change through case law over time. For more on this see 
George Letsas, The ECHR as a Living Instrument: it’s Meaning and its Legitimacy (University College London 
2012) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2021836> accessed 18 May 2018.   
325 Costas Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (Routledge 
Cavendish 2007) 26. 
326 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (Free Press 2006) 328-339. 
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the present is always and necessarily superior over the past’.327 Yet, it should be noted that 
there are inherent risks with adopting such an approach. Indeed, if Judge Hercules embodies 
the culmination of historical advancement in relation to legal knowledge and understanding, 
his continuing validity is dependent upon the legitimacy of these advances. This, in turn, is 
contingent upon conformity with the objective moral truths. The importance of this is that it 
signifies that a certain type of change – as it pertains to advances in knowledge and 
understanding – can represent a legitimate, justifiable evolution of specific concepts. However, 
this approach would not automatically accept all change as justifiable progress, or indeed the 
expansion of ideas as evolution. To do so would be to encourage a historicist outlook which 
fails to examine the merits of advances, but which instead accepts all change as being morally 
justifiable. The need for a more objective, critical approach will be reinforced through an 
examination of the work of Fredric Nietzsche in a subsequent section of this chapter.328 
 For now, it is important to note that history is not necessarily bound to progression - 
as evidenced by the aforementioned decline in support of the idea of human rights. Indeed, 
Michael Ignatieff famously predicted that ‘[in] the next fifty years we can expect to see the 
moral consensus that sustained the UHDR in 1948 splintering still further …as the distance 
between the West and the Rest may also increase’.329 Whilst notable advancements in 
technology, medicine and cultural appreciation – via globalisation – have undoubtedly 
contributed to the expansion of human prosperity, they have also arguably facilitated the 
insulation of existing hegemonies. Specifically, where once it was feasible for public protest 
and resistance to overthrow the governing powers of states, such measures appear to have 
relatively muted effectiveness in contemporary times. It has previously been established that 
the idea of an entitlement to basic standards, fundamental human interests, is repeatedly 
                                                            
327 Costas Douzinas, and Adam Gearey, Critical Jurisprudence (Hart Publishing 2005) 53. 
328 See Chapter Three, section 3.4.1. 
329 Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry (Princeton University Press 2001) 93. 
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legitimised in the context of human rights. Historically, these claims were used to justify 
violence inflicted upon governing powers as means of securing necessary ‘corrections’ in 
relation to the law. As Douzinas asserts, ‘[t]he rights of man started as normative marks of 
revolutionary change’.330 The validity of such action derived from the fact that it represented 
the last available recourse to redress injustice ‘for those who experience the law … as victims 
of the exercise of power’.331 
However, in modern contexts, general populations appear to have a decreased capacity 
to instigate such change through protest, violent uprising, or, indeed, revolution. From the 
Occupy Wall Street movement332 following the financial crash of 2008, to the Arab Spring of 
2010-12,333 modern public resistance has appeared to consistently struggle to effect 
meaningful, long lasting change. Douzinas claims that ‘revolutions start only after people have 
taken to the streets, stay there and challenge the established order’. 334 Yet, recent examples 
seem to question the endurability of resistance in contemporary times in comparison to 
historical examples. Reflecting on the Occupy Wall Street movement, John L. Hammond 
remarked that though it ‘claimed to represent the 99% … most people cannot participate in 
political activity of this sort … at a minimum, because of time constraints …’.335 A conclusion 
we can reasonably draw from this is that the prospect of resistance/revolution as method of 
directly securing change, has seemingly been replaced with public protest – a way of 
challenging perceived injustices of the established order in the hope of ensuring change occurs 
                                                            
330 Costas Douzinas, Philosophy and Resistance in the Crisis (Polity Press 2013) 83. 
331 Costas Douzinas and Adam Gearey, Critical Jurisprudence (Hart Publishing 2005) 138. 
332 John L. Hammond has produced an excellent account of this. He concludes that, whilst this movement (or 
‘moment’ as he terms it) did not produce direct results, it did re-legitimate public protest as a means of 
attempting to instigate positive change. John L. Hammond, ‘The Anarchism of Occupy Wall Street’ (2015) 79 
Science and Society 287, 311. 
333 For an insightful summary of this see Lisa Anderson, ‘Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the 
Differences Between Tunisia, Egypt and Libya’ (2011) 90 Foreign Affairs 2 
334 Costas Douzinas, Philosophy and Resistance in the Crisis (Polity Press 2013) 9. 
335 John L. Hammond, ‘The Anarchism of Occupy Wall Street’ (2015) 79 Science and Society 287. 
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through political means.336 A detailed examination of potential causes of this perceived change 
are beyond the scope of this thesis. However, one possible influencing cause in particular is 
worthy of consideration. Namely, the disparity which now exists between established 
governing powers and general populations – between rulers and ruled – specifically with regard 
to certain technological advancements (and advantages).  
For example, in contrast to historical examples, modern nation states possess 
sophisticated surveillance measures which afford governing powers a greater opportunity to 
avert the prospect of change effecting revolution.337 Moreover, such tools provide these powers 
with means of effectively containing, if not disarming, this prospect even when a legitimate 
threat does emerge. As example of this we only need to look to the failed Turkish coup of 
2016.338 This is especially significant because it highlights another apparent consequence of 
the diminishing prospect of revolution: the perception of the possibility of such a threat, 
however real, is utilised to justify interference with fundamental liberties and rights. Where 
such rights/interests were once used to authenticate violence enacted against the state (e.g. 
French Revolution, American War of Independence) as a reversal of the operations of state 
power,339 they are now utilised by state powers as means of securing their own survival. 
Principally, this is reflected in the fact that ‘human rights are given in order to avoid 
revolution’.340 Furthermore, the provision of such rights is made contingent, by governing 
                                                            
336 Douzinas concludes that modern public resistances (that which he terms ‘the squares’ – in reference to Tahir 
square, which is seen to symbolise these movements) represent the ‘repoliticising [of] politics and introducing 
the ethos of the collective into all aspects of public life … Deepening democracy and making it the form of 
every type of activity and life is the main lesson of the squares’. Costas Douzinas, Philosophy and Resistance in 
the Crisis (Polity Press 2013) 197. 
337 See Neil M. Richards, The ‘Dangers of Surveillance’ (2013) 126 Harvard Law Review 1934. 
338 For an informative overview see Gonenc Uysal ‘The Failed Coup in Turkey: Prolonged Conflict in State 
Apparatus’ (2016) E-International Relations <http://www.e-ir.info/2016/09/21/the-failed-coup-in-turkey-
prolonged-conflict-in-the-state-apparatus/> accessed 18 May 2018.   
339 Within the context of the French Revolution, this is represented by violent resistance as means of preventing 
the imposition of inhuman, degrading laws (such as torture). Reflecting on this, Lynn Hunt remarks that after 
the revolution, and as a direct response to the ‘absurd ferocity’ of previous laws, the penal system of the future 
was to be based upon ‘rehabilitation through work rather than sacrificial retribution through pain’. Lynn Hunt, 
Inventing Human Rights (W. W. Norton & Company Inc 2008) 139. 
340 Costas Douzinas, Philosophy and Resistance in the Crisis (Polity Press 2013) 83. 
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powers themselves, upon their being afforded an exceptional right to suppress them (e.g. 
whenever the state is threatened). Indeed, the resulting academic and political purge witnessed 
in Turkey following the failed coup appear to illustrate this further. As Yildirim and Lynch 
explain: 
The night of July 15, 2016 marked a distinct moment in Turkish democratic 
history as hundreds of thousands of Turks took to the streets to defy a coup 
attempt. Yet only a few months later … tens of thousands of academics, 
journalists and civil society activists have been purged from their jobs, with 
many imprisoned.341 
This example can be used to cast doubt on the perception of the trajectory of human 
history as one of pre-determined progress (with progress here understood as the expansion and 
application of such protections). In developing this point further, we may briefly look to 
dystopian literature, which is useful precisely because it directly challenges this perception of 
progress. In texts such as George Orwell’s 1984 and Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, 
progressive human advancement is represented, not in the emancipation of rights and peoples, 
but instead in their eventual subjugation: ‘[i]f you want a picture of the future, imagine a boot 
stamping on a human face – forever’.342 Here the verification of the ‘perfectibility’ of human 
knowledge, or, indeed, the human character - through scientific and technological development 
- affords the respective authorities the opportunity to exert absolute power over their 
populations and confirm uncontested control of the state. The only ‘rights’ which exist belong 
to the state – represented by the governing power itself - specifically regarding its right to be 
preserved. Individuals, in turn, possess only a duty to protect the state (by preserving the 
governing power). In 1984 this is accomplished through near omnipresent, omnipotent 
surveillance and a manufactured adoration for ‘Big Brother’.343 In Brave New World this is 
                                                            
341 A. Kadir Yildirim and Marc Lynch, ‘Is There Still Hope for Turkish Democracy?’ (2016) Contemporary 
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342 George Orwell, 1984 (Penguin Classics 2013) 280. 
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depicted by the utilisation and creation of the drug Soma, and the establishment of accepted 
gradations of worth based on manufactured physiological differences.344  
In both instances, these eventualities are presented as the direct results of human 
progress; of human history. These texts can thus be interpreted as being instructional of the 
dangers of presupposing the destination of human progress (and the inevitability of universal 
rights). Indeed, reflecting upon recent human history allows alternative patterns to be identified 
than the one which advocates for Fukuyama’s democratic utopia. For example, it could be 
suggested that historical advancements led to an expansion of the enjoyment of fundamental 
liberties by creating opportunities to resist hegemonic power which superseded the states’ 
ability to suppress them. As proponents of human rights have suggested, this can be seen with 
various rights based revolutions already highlighted within this thesis. With these examples, 
relative parity existed between the revolutionaries and the state in terms of technological or 
military capability. These conflicts were fought with rudimentary weaponry which was 
comparable in nature between the affected parties. Within the context of the French Revolution, 
Pëtr Kropotkin notes that both the soldiers and the revolutionaries fought with ‘muskets and 
cannon’.345 Crucially, the state did not possess a significant technological advantage over the 
revolutionaries in this regard. The governing powers of these states were therefore more 
susceptible to being disposed and replaced. These examples are, as Douzinas suggests, truly 
indicative of the effectiveness of legitimacy of the ‘utopian end’ of human rights which 
instigates resistance in an attempt to establish meaningful change.346 
                                                            
344 ‘The world's stable now. People are happy; they get what they want, and they never want what they can't get. 
They're well off; they're safe; they're never ill; they're not afraid of death; they're blissfully ignorant of passion 
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345 Pëtr Kropotkinp, The Great French Revolution 1789-1793 (N. F. Dryhurst tr, New York: Vanguard Printings 
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In contrast, it could also be maintained that at a specific point in history (arguably at 
the midpoint of the twentieth century) this process was reversed: when such technological 
advancements provided governing powers with an ability to suppress effectual resistance which 
superseded the available means of resisting. Douzinas himself remarked that, as a consequence 
of fear of possible resistance, modern states pre-emptively adopt ‘increased police powers and 
surveillance mechanisms, justified as necessary …’.347 The aforementioned examples of the 
Arab Spring and the failed Turkish coup could also be used in support of this claim. In these 
examples, technological advancements – such as enhanced surveillance and intelligence 
gathering, together with the effective use of state media – provided state authorities with 
significant advantages over the would-be revolutionaries which greatly reduced the possibility 
of their displacement. Additionally, we see that the successfulness of contemporary forms of 
resistance to established hegemonic powers is seemingly contingent upon the support of 
alternative pre-existing powers. The intervention by the Egyptian army during the civilian 
uprising of 2011 can be referenced to support this claim.348 Indeed, it has been noted that 
without this intervention the revolution was unlikely to succeed in dislodging President 
Mubarak.349 Similarly, it is evident that without NATO led military intervention (by way of 
airstrikes) in Libya, the burgeoning revolution would likely have been emphatically defeated 
by Gaddafi’s own military forces.350 Alternatively, with the failed Turkish coup of 2016 we 
see a ‘revolution’ which, from the outset, sought to replace once established power – President 
Erdogan – with another, comprising of high ranking members of the Turkish military. The 
struggle was effectively presented, by both Erdogan and the media, as an unjustifiable, Western 
                                                            
347 Costas Douzinas, Philosophy and Resistance in the Crisis (Polity Press 2013) 29. 
348 Lisa Anderson suggests that the ‘the army’s carefully calibrated intervention … assumed control of Egypt 
after Mubarak’s downfall …’. Lisa Anderson, ‘Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences Between 
Tunisia, Egypt and Libya’ (2011) 90 Foreign Affairs 2, 4. 
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supported interference with democracy.351 This included encouraging the civilian population 
of Turkey to ‘resist’ the would-be coup, as if its successfulness would significantly damage 
their own interests. In effect, interests of the state – in the form of the survival of the existing 
government – was articulated as being commensurate to the individual interests of the 
population of Turkey itself.  
Finally, it is worth reiterating, that further to the practicality of securing the application 
of such protections, the trajectory of public perception of the moral value of human rights, 
understood as fundamental claims, has itself become more difficult to reliably ascertain. As 
previously touched upon, the apparent acceptance of the recent ‘othering’ of criminals, 
suspected terrorists and those regarded as being ‘undesirable’ to a particular state – such as 
Syrian refugees352 – arguably evidences a diminishment in the value of such protections to 
entire civilian populations. Here, once again, we see that historical progress – in the form of 
the supposed increasing desirability of human rights - is no guarantee of further continuation 
of similar advancements.  
3.4.1 Assessing the Dangers of Historicism: Nietzsche and the ‘Abuse of History’ 
 
It is clear, based on this analysis, that the limitations of an historicist usage of human 
history are worthy of greater consideration. To this end, it is useful to consider some of the 
ideas of nihilistic philosopher Fredric Nietzsche – himself a vehement anti-historicist. With the 
Use and Abuse of History, Nietzsche sought to criticise the attempted sublimation of historical 
study.353 According to Nietzsche, the process of ‘perfecting’ human knowledge and 
                                                            
351 Kimberly Guiler notes that after the failed coup, and in an attempt to reconsolidate his power, President 
Erdogan accused the West of ‘supporting terrorism and taking sides with coups’. Guiler suggests that the media 
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understanding had led to the distortion of history.354 This had occurred by ensuring that 
important historical events were to be examined only as means of identifying their potential 
functionality to present and future generations. In this way, history had effectively been 
subjugated; its function reduced to serving the misguided purposes of those in the present. 
Thus, this process allowed for future actions or initiatives to be justified with the creation of 
historical narratives.355 For Nietzsche, scientific, technological, and social developments had 
rendered humankind arrogant and disconnected from the formative struggles of survival. This 
arrogance, in turn, enabled (if not encouraged) the exploitation of all available resources, 
including history – regarded as the rightful property of man. In effect, Nietzsche suggested that 
the (mis)appreciation of history had led humankind to mistakenly regard itself as its 
completion: 
The historical imagination has never flown so far, even in a dream; for now the 
history of man is merely the continuation of that of the animals and plants; the 
universal historian finds traces of himself even in the utter depths of the sea, in 
the living slime. He stands astounded in the face of the enormous way that man 
has run, and his gaze quivers before the mightier wonder, the modern man who 
can see all this way! He stands proudly on the pyramid of the world-process; 
and while he lays the final stone of his knowledge, he seems to cry aloud to 
listening Nature; "We are at the top, we are the top; we are the completion of 
Nature!”356  
This ‘completion of nature’ is arguably represented by the reshaping of human identity within 
different periods of history touched upon in Chapter Two. Here it was shown that acceptance 
of the moral worthiness of particular ethnicities was eventually replaced, at least in Western 
states, with general acknowledgement of the moral significance of the human race - now 
reflected within the law (specifically in the language of rights). History provided a means by 
which this could be accomplished by presenting a reference point for human progress. This 
                                                            
354 This view is reflected in Nietzsche’s assertion that ‘[w]e do need history, but quite different from the jaded 
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progress, in turn, was used to validate the perceived superiority of present generations over 
previous ones and legitimate the path that humanity had taken to reach this point. Costas 
Douzinas defined this approach as the embodiment of the belief that ‘[h]istory moves one way, 
values unravel inexorably towards their perfection in a linear process of gradual disclosure of 
essences and values, like freedom, equality or rights’.357 
The ‘abuse’ of history is relevant to this study in several other ways. Specifically, it is 
worth addressing three methods identified by Nietzsche of utilising and interpreting the past to 
shape or influence present day objectives: defined as the ‘monumental’, ‘antiquarian’ and 
‘critical’ methods respectively. Firstly, as way of introduction, it is important to contextualise 
these positions within the theoretical framework of the work itself. With this text, Nietzsche 
begins by describing the historical nature of humankind, which he then differentiates from what 
he calls super-historical and unhistorical beings. Humans are historical creatures simply 
because they have the ability to remember.358 This allows them to formulate present and future 
plans, but also burdens them with the knowledge of what has gone before them (as well as what 
is ultimately to come – namely death)359. The capacity to recognise the significance of past 
achievements also necessitates the acknowledgement of past failures. Nietzsche suggests that 
it is because humans cannot escape their history that they attempt to utilise it to their own 
specific ends.360 
To fully appreciate the significance of ‘historical creatures’ it is important to distinguish 
them from the proposed alternatives. As noted, Nietzsche defined two further categories for 
this task. The first, and easiest to draw practical comparisons to, is the unhistorical creature. To 
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Nietzsche, this was represented by the ‘beasts’ of nature; the animal kingdom.361 These 
creatures are unhistorical simply because they lack the characteristic which separates them 
from man: the ability to remember – of awareness of the history of their species.362 
Consequently, Nietzsche argues, they are not burdened, either by memories of what has gone 
before them, or indeed, by knowledge of their own mortality. Unhistorical creatures thus 
arguably live beyond the constraints of history.363 For this reason, Nietzsche regarded them as 
the envy of humankind, who are unable to forget, or therefore truly capable of living in the 
present.364  
The final category proposed by Nietzsche is known as the super-historical being. Of the 
three accounts, this is the only one without direct contemporary comparisons in nature. To live 
super-historically is to transcend the influences of the past.365 A super-historical being is one 
with complete understanding and appreciation of what has gone before; for ‘super-historical 
man … the world is complete and fulfils its aim in every moment’.366 As such, they are able to 
liberate themselves from the need to justify future conduct with reference to historical events. 
Instead, the super-historical being lives entirely in the present. Nietzsche asserts that a super-
historical being would be wise and cynical. Their actions would be entirely their own as they 
would be devoid of historical dependency. It could be argued that, due to their contextual 
perfectibility (in that they possess the most complete understanding possible at all times) super-
historical beings are commensurate with the concept of Judge Hercules. Indeed, as discussed, 
Judge Hercules appears to embody complete knowledge and appreciation of an objective 
‘present’. This is because he retains the capacity to develop and evolve legal knowledge and 
                                                            
361 ibid. 5. 
362 ibid 5-6. 
363 ibid. 
364 In establishing this point Nietzsche states ‘[c]onsider the herds that are feeding yonder, they know not the 
meaning of yesterday or today …Man cannot see them without regret, for even in the pride of his humanity he 
looks enviously at the beast’s happiness’. ibid 5. 
365 ibid 9-11. 
366 ibid 10. 
Daniel M Lowe                           Assessing the Universality of Human Rights in the Context of Health  
131 
 
understanding in order to consistently reflect the values of the present. Despite their evident 
advantages, Nietzsche ultimately questioned the desirability of a super-historical existence. 
This was because he believed that possession of such superior knowledge would diminish the 
impetus for action (in that, through past experiences, a super-historical being would claim that 
the outcome of such action will already be known -  and is therefore not worth attempting).367  
As man cannot live unhistorically, without having to sacrifice his humanity, and a 
super-historical life would be unrewarding (and banal), Nietzsche saw a historical existence as 
the most desirable state of being. For this allows humankind to acknowledge and learn from 
their history, but, through its effective study – also a ‘fruitful’ future, and thus the opportunity 
to escape it.368 Yet, he is critical of the fact that humankind continues to live a particular kind 
of historical existence; once which attempts to utilise history for the construction of narratives 
which only serve contextual purposes of the age (with no consideration of the future). The 
relevance of this to the idea of universal human rights can be highlighted by examining three 
particular forms of historical narrative mentioned at the start of this section. The first is 
described by Nietzsche as the ‘monumental’ method. Proponents of this approach attempt to 
draw inspiration from history and legitimise the realisibility of present day objectives by 
referencing significant achievements of the past. This is defined by ‘the knowledge that [a] 
great thing existed and was therefore possible, and so may be possible again’.369 History is 
‘monumentalised’ in the sense that it is used to directly shape future conduct towards various 
objectives.370 However, in Nietzsche’s view, the process with which this is to be achieved 
ultimately results in the nullification of the value of the present: 
                                                            
367 Nietzsche summarised this position by declaring that ‘[w]e would gladly grant the super-historical people 
their superior wisdom, so long as we are sure of having more life than they …’. ibid 11. 
368 ibid 12. 
369 ibid 14. 
370 ibid 12-15. 
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Monumental history is the cloak under which … hatred of present power and 
greatness masquerades as an extreme admiration of the past. The real meaning 
of this way of viewing history is disguised as its opposite; whether they wish 
it or no, they are acting as though their motto were: “Let the dead bury the-
living”.371 
 Nietzsche was sceptical of this approach because of its willingness to focus on the 
outcome of historical events whilst ignoring the contexts in which they were achieved.372 This 
culminates in a distortion of history because it creates a mythical, unrealistic account of the 
past. Consequently, the process is reductive to the importance of history. That is to say, by 
failing to understand, or take into account, the means by which they were made possible, this 
method ultimately undermines the very ideals/achievements which are intended to be 
monumentalised.  
The second form of history is defined as the ‘antiquarian’ method. In contrast to the 
monumental approach, the aim here is not simply to monumentalise history, but rather to live 
as an extension of it. In this way, elements of history are referenced so as to highlight failings 
of the present and with the hope of instigating change. However, the purpose is not to inspire 
evolution, but to encourage the adoption or continuation of past methods which are held to be 
superior.373  
The antiquarian sense of a man, a city, or a nation has always a very limited 
field … history’s service to the past life is to undermine a further and higher 
life … [as such] the historical sense no longer preserves life, but mummifies 
it.374 
 Nietzsche was critical of this approach because, like the monumental method, it is built 
upon a desire to idealise the past. Here, all peoples are understood to have an unbreakable 
                                                            
371 ibid 17. 
372 Nietzsche maintained that this resulted in ‘the individuality of the past forced into a general formula and all 
the sharp angles broken off …’. ibid 14-15. 
373 ibid 18-19. 
374 ibid 19-20. 
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connection with their history, represented in the form of customs and traditions.375 Ownership 
of these customs is regarded as being inherently transitional as it is to be continually passed on 
to following generations. As such, the antiquarian approach reflects a desire to preserve history 
(and historical life). However, as Nietzsche suggests, in attempting to shape society through 
this process of preservation, humankind ultimately obstructs (and suffocates) the possibility of 
future progress. An antiquarian ‘only understands how to preserve life, not to create it; and thus 
always undervalues the present growth …’.376 
The third and final form of history was defined as the ‘critical’ method, and was 
regarded by Nietzsche himself as the most effective of the three.377 This is because it adopts an 
irreverent style to the study of history. It is irreverent in the sense that it does not seek to 
preserve or elevate elements of history for a particular purpose (as with the monumental and 
antiquarian approaches), but rather seeks to ascertain the benefits of doing so. By exposing 
history to rigorous examination, humankind is able to reject elements of history which serve 
no purpose to the construction of a better future. In characterising this approach Nietzsche 
stated:   
Man must have the strength to break up the past, and apply it, too, in order to 
live. He must bring the past to the bar of judgement, interrogate it 
remorselessly, and finally condemn it.378 
Principally, the advantage of a critical appraisal of history is that it is not restricted to a specific 
historical narrative. The purpose behind the study of history is to determine means by which 
an honest appraisal of it may be useful for human progress, but not a specific form of progress 
                                                            
375 As Nietzsche noted, this was represented by ‘the amount of reverence paid to … a custom, a religious creed 
or a political principle …’. ibid 20. 
376 ibid. 
377 Nietzsche defined this as a ‘necessary … third way at looking at the past … in the service of life’. ibid 20. 
378 ibid 21. 
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(e.g. in accordance with either monumental or antiquarian interpretations). As such, its 
conclusions may be accepted as being more objective.  
3.4.2 The ‘Abuse of History’ in the Context of Human Rights 
 
With regard to the idea of universal human rights, all three methods have the capacity 
to be influential. With the monumental method this influence is seemingly represented in the 
general willingness to romanticise significant events in the history of the concept as means of 
legitimating present-day objectives. For example, with the DOI and the DRMC, contemporary 
narratives primarily focus on what both were effectively able to achieve (at the time and also 
in terms of laying the foundation for future progress) with the historical contexts of these 
declarations largely ignored. In support of this we can refer to Micheline Ishay who, when 
discussing the DRMC, simply asserts that they represented the ‘triumph of reason associated 
with the Enlightenment …[and] would be recognised in the twentieth century as fundamental 
human rights proclaimed in the first clause of the UN Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 
…’.379  
Indeed, these declarations are often read with modern interpretations in mind. The term 
‘all men’ is seen as a definitive universal statement with ‘men’ understood to mean 
‘humankind’. Yet, as previously addressed, the universal scope of the DOI was not intended to 
cover slaves (who were seen as property). Similarly, with the DRMC ‘all citizens’ did not truly 
mean all people, as women at the time were unable to obtain citizenship.380 It is therefore clear 
that these historical accounts are not completely compatible with accepted modern 
                                                            
379 Micheline Ishay, The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalisation Era (University of 
California Press 2008) 83-84. 
380 Addressing this issue at the time, Marquis de Condorcet asked whether the drafters of the DRMC had 
‘violated the principle of the equality of rights in tranquilly depriving one-half of the human race of the right of 
taking part in the formation of laws by the exclusion of women from the rights of citizenship?’ De Condorcet, 
M., “On the Admission of Women to the Rights of Citizenship” A. D. Vickery, The First Essay on the Political 
Rights of Women: A Translation of Condorcet’s Essay on “Sur l’admission des femmes aux droits de Cité” 
(Garden City Press 1912) 5. 
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interpretations of the concept of human rights – and as such it is unhelpful to afford them a 
status which they do not deserve.381 A further problem with a monumental approach, which 
can be identified here, relates to the manner in which it validates the idea that human beings 
possess an inherent entitlement to the fulfilment of their needs (e.g. by drawing inspiration 
from historical accounts of rights which were largely aspirational/utopian in nature). This in 
turn contributes to devaluing the significance of human rights by encouraging all individual 
needs to be expressed as claims. The danger here, as Douzinas attests, is that ‘when everything 
becomes actually or potentially a right, nothing attracts the full or special protection of a 
superior or absolute right’.382 
The relevance of the antiquarian method would appear to relate to the apparent 
‘idolatry’ of contemporary accounts of universal human rights.383 This is represented by the 
elevated level of recognition afforded to such accounts by academics and politicians in modern 
times. As noted, these efforts have been useful in facilitating the legitimation of the idea of 
universal human rights. However, they have also enabled current accounts to be presented as 
if they are definitive. This allows the idea of universal human rights to be reduced to 
understanding of how they are presently defined.384 For an antiquarian, the overarching aim is 
seemingly to facilitate the continuation of post-war commitment to the objective of securing 
universal human rights. Yet, this objective is undermined by the apparent need to perpetuate 
specific historical accounts of the concept itself. Most notably those defined within existing 
international treaties such as the UDHR, ICCPR, and ICESCR. Therefore, an antiquarian seeks 
                                                            
381 ‘The concept of rights, including natural rights, stretches back centuries … But those droits de l’homme et du 
citoyen meant something different from todays “human rights”’. Samuel Moyn, Human Rights and the Uses of 
History (Verso 2014) 69.  
382 Costas Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (Routledge 
Cavendish 2007) 60. 
383 For more on this see Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry (Princeton University Press 
2001). 
384 Particularly, this looks to focus the discourse on definitions contained within pre-existing international 
treaties and instruments. The significance of this is that, as addressed, such accounts have so far proved 
incapable of securing either universal support, or, indeed, appeared likely to secure universal implementation.  
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to promote advancement through a contradictory process of preserving what is presently known 
and accepted. The principal limitation with this approach relates to the reduced possibility of 
legitimate evolution and progression. Indeed, with an antiquarian approach the legitimacy of 
the concept of universal rights is to be centred entirely on the effectiveness of contemporary 
accounts. This approach ignores the historical contingency of these positions and thus provides 
opponents with an easy means by which the concept of universal rights may be dismissed 
(through the identification of contextual limitations). For example, by arguing that as these 
instruments are constructed with a Western bias, they cannot be universal, but instead represent 
a form of cultural imperialism.385 
We see therefore that neither a purely monumental or antiquarian method is suitable for 
justifying the legitimacy of the idea of universal human rights or the ultimate realisibility of 
universal protection. Indeed, as with Nietzsche, it would appear that identifying positive 
historical trends so as to substantiate a defence of the concept of human rights is only valuable 
if it reflects an objective appreciation of such issues (e.g. a critical approach). Yet, the apparent 
‘historicism’ of the contemporary human rights discourse leaves it vulnerable to 
misapplication. In effect, without critical appraisal of the sufficiency of existing accounts, the 
purported absoluteness of these justifications (along with the supposed inevitability of 
universal rights) only serves to further undermine the human rights movement (in relation to 
its inability to secure robust universal application). To return briefly to Fukuyama, if, as he 
suggests, modern history is evidence of an expansion of liberal democracy (and corresponding 
rights),386 it is equally true, as Douzinas notes, that it represents the greatest systemic violation 
of such protections.387 As he observes, ‘our era has witnessed more violations (of the principles 
                                                            
385 See Boaventura de Sousa Santos, ‘Toward a Multicultural Conception of Human Rights’ in Berta 
Hernández-Truyol (ed), Moral Imperialism: A Critical Anthology (New York University Press, 2002) 54. 
386 Francis Fukuyama, F, The End of History and the Last Man (Free Press 2006) 328-339. 
387 Costas Douzinas, ‘The Paradoxes of Human Rights’ (2013) 20 Constellations 51, 51. 
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of human rights) than any previous, less ‘enlightened’ one’.388 If the commitment to human 
rights is evidently greater in contemporary times it is because, Douzinas argues, they have 
effectively become a ‘modality’ of governance.389 The language of human rights is now the 
language of politics. They provide a platform for international discussion, a way of ‘conducting 
politics according to ethical norms’.390  
As such, the rise in commitment to the ‘idea’ of human rights in modern history is not 
necessarily synonymous with a commitment to the principles of the concept of universal 
protections. Rather it is perhaps only evidence of a deliberate attempt to refocus the discourse 
toward political ends (which Douzinas saw as resulting in the loss of their ‘utopian end’). If 
human rights are universal entitlements to the protection of vital human interests, then modern 
history arguably questions the claim that acknowledgement of this fact is steadily increasing. 
Instead, it can reasonably be held that all it demonstrates is that there has been a rise in 
commitment to an idea of human rights which is capable of providing a framework for the 
conduction of international politics. This is a commitment which is primarily pragmatic and 
rooted in practical consequences – both in relation to the aforementioned political benefits, and 
also with regard to a desire to enforce individual rights.391 When the practical benefits cease, 
or are themselves outweighed by other considerations, then the commitment (and thus 
protection) to human rights is prone to end (as we are arguably witnessing in contemporary 
times with regard to the rights/security debate). This analysis appears to highlight the inherent 
limitations with attempting to use an historicist account of history to provide justification for 
the realisablity of universal human rights.  
                                                            
388 ibid. 
389 ibid. 
390 ibid. 
391 This represents the argument previously discussed that, in addition to validating both governments and states 
through their provision, ‘human rights are given in order to avoid revolution’. Costas Douzinas, Philosophy and 
Resistance in the Crisis (Polity Press 2013) 83. 
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Nevertheless, it is evident that history is useful in contextualising the significance and 
value of present and future action. Knowledge of historical progress can be utilised to justify 
the claim that there is permanence to certain ideas – such as with the concept of human rights. 
However, as we have established, the value of history is seemingly contingent upon its effective 
usage. Referencing great achievements of the past in support of contemporary initiatives is 
only constructive if we take into account the contexts in which they were achieved.392 Our 
ability to successfully use historical events to justify future commitments is not dependent upon 
conflating past accomplishments, but of understanding their limitations. For example, the DOI 
does not need to be presented as an eighteenth-century version of the UDHR. Attempting to do 
so, and failing to acknowledge the contextual contingency of the universal applicability of this 
document (by excluding slaves), is to risk undermining the legitimacy of contemporary 
justificatory accounts.393 Furthermore, it diminishes the significance of the subsequent progress 
which enabled the creation of modern declarations of rights, by ignoring the circumstances that 
made such evolution possible. The UDHR was itself a product of history in that it was a direct 
response to atrocities that were committed in the years directly preceding its creation.394 Indeed, 
the horrors of the holocaust were an important causative factor in the re-emergence of the idea 
of universal rights in modernity. As Fagan suggests, ‘[t]he modern human rights regime 
emerged out of mountains of human corpses’.395  
                                                            
392 In an insightful commentary on the creation of the UDHR (1948), James Spickard highlighted the apparent 
misuse of history in relation to justifying the development of human rights and suggested that the ‘focus on the 
recounted history on the West and the picture of human rights progressively emerging out of darkness is just 
that: pictures, not reality’. James Spickard, The Origins of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(University of Redlands 1999) 13.  
393 Samuel Moyn makes a similar argument when he states that ‘[b]eyond the myth, the true history of human 
rights matters most of all so that we can confront their prospects today’. Samuel Moyn, Human Rights and the 
Uses of History (Verso 2014) 83.  
394 ‘[The] holocaust made the declaration possible’. Michael Ignatieff, ‘Human Rights: The Midlife Crisis’ 
(1999) 46 The New York Review of Books 58, 58. 
395 Andrew Fagan, ‘Paradoxical Bedfellows: Nihilism and Human Rights’ (2005) 6 Human Rights Review 80, 
93. 
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 Instead of conflating history, it is preferable to note that the DOI demonstrates a 
commitment to an idea which is comprehensible to us in modern times as human rights. Whilst 
it might not truly be human rights – as we now appreciate them - this does not negate its 
potential usefulness in instructing us about the importance and legitimacy of this concept. 
Consequently, and in accordance with the critical approach proposed by Nietzsche, an effective 
use of history would appear to be dependent upon the aggressive examination and subsequent 
objective utilisation of ideas. This, in turn, requires recognition of the precise contexts of all 
historical progress which has been made, as well as appreciation that this progress was not 
inevitable. For the purposes of this thesis, it is argued that this process is represented in the 
‘perfecting’ of the idea of inalienable entitlements to basic protections; itself not contingent 
upon the concept of human rights. As previously discussed, this proposition is based on the 
understanding that contemporary accounts of human rights represent a specific vehicle for 
advancing a transcendent, foundational purpose. 
In relation to the question of the universality of human rights, the benefit of adopting a 
critical approach is that it prompts reappraisal of the sufficiency of contemporary accounts 
(both deontological and consequentialist in nature). It enables us to identify and condemn 
limitations with the human rights movement as means of preserving the ideal of such 
protections. This is made possible by refocusing the discourse towards the purpose (e.g. 
underlying justificatory principles) of these exceptional protections/claims. In doing so, it 
allows us to suggest that sufficiency of contemporary accounts of human rights is dependent 
upon satisfactory fulfilment of this purpose. The overarching aim is not to discredit human 
rights instruments for the sake of invalidating the ideal of universal protections, but in order to 
preserve it. In effect, it is a process of (continual) demystification which enables evolution 
through rebirth. It therefore mirrors the continual reshaping of human identity discussed in 
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Chapter Two.396 Echoing the philosophical outlook of Nietzsche himself, such an approach 
could be held to be nihilistic in nature. As Douzinas explains, ‘[n]ihilism is an open and plural 
concept, both a condition of degeneration and decadence and a joyful affirmation of life; the 
possibility of re-evaluation and regeneration of values’.397 Indeed, if we are ever to be able to 
construct a ‘true’ account of human rights we need to be prepared to reject interpretations of 
the concept of which, through robust examination, are shown to be insufficient. In developing 
this point further, it is necessary to now consider the composition of the foundational purpose 
of such protections which determines their sufficiency in greater detail. 
3.5 The Case for a Foundational Purpose 
 
Throughout human history, the process of protecting certain interests for some 
individuals has, as we have established, simultaneously resulted in the ‘othering’ of those 
determined to be undeserving of protection. Douzinas notes that this process has repeatedly 
been utilised as means of perpetuating a supposed superiority of status within societies. In this 
way, ‘humanity is created against the figure of the non-human’.398 For the conceptual 
predecessors of rights, such as religion, natural law, and political philosophy, this was 
accomplished by establishing criteria from which entitlement to specific privileges could be 
deduced (e.g. based on faith, ethnicity, or social class). As we have seen, the influence of 
various contextual contingencies of any given time could result in the practical implementation 
of purportedly ‘universal’ ideals having a rather limited scope (see, for example, the ‘all men’ 
of the DOI). Ultimately, this created opportunity to justify interference with the fundamental 
interests of those who are determined to be undeserving of their protection. In modernity, as 
Douzinas identifies, this is reflected in the fact ‘the inmates of the German, Cambodian, 
                                                            
396 See Chapter Two, section 2.3.3. 
397 Costas Douzinas and Adam Gearey, Critical Jurisprudence (Hart Publishing 2005) 49. 
398 Costas Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (Routledge 
Cavendish 2007) 118. 
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Rwandan or Serbian concentration camps were constructed as non-human vermin, as beings 
so inferior and dangerous to the fully humans that their extermination was a natural 
necessity’.399 
Commentators have consistently suggested that the concept of human rights represents 
the amalgamation of philosophical, religious, and legal considerations. These claims are 
supposedly legitimised on the apparent permanence of similar concerns - loosely based around 
the importance of protecting or providing for those individuals who are regarded as being 
vulnerable. Connor Gearty notes that this transcendent purpose of protecting individuals from 
unnecessary harm is concretised in modern times in the form of law (and specifically the 
language of law).400 The legitimating purpose of protecting the vulnerable appears to provide 
the concept of human rights with contextual relevance and significance (in the sense that it 
replaces religious and spiritual justifications for such protection advanced in the past). 
Douzinas articulates this point effectively when he paraphrases Nietzsche to suggest that ‘if 
God, the source of natural law, is dead, he has been replaced by international law’.401 It would 
certainly appear reasonable to accept that the foundation of the historical significance of human 
rights, like the religious doctrines which preceded it – and which allowed for hierarchisation 
of interests based on individual worth - is rooted in the process of eradicating human 
vulnerabilities. However, as established in Chapter Two, this thesis does not aim to ground the 
legitimacy of the idea of fundamental human claims (e.g. human rights) on a justificatory 
account based purely upon this position. Instead, it suggests that the overarching purpose of 
                                                            
399 Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century (Hart 
Publishers 2000) 372. 
400 Conor Gearty, ‘Human Rights: The Necessary Quest for Foundations’ in Costas Douzinas and Conor Gearty 
(eds), The Meaning of Rights: The Philosophy of Social Theory and Human Rights (Cambridge University Press 
2014) 21-38. 
401 Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century (Hart 
Publishers 2000) 116. 
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the idea of human rights – namely to actualise individual autonomy402- distinguishes this 
concept from other historical accounts, and provides it with a foundation which is universally 
applicable. This proposition is based on the observation that all peoples/states can recognise 
the validity of agency (even if disagreement persists regarding what is required to enable it).403 
In reflection of analysis conducted within this chapter, it is further proposed that this purpose 
amounts to the ‘underlying justificatory principles’404 described by Dworkin, in relation to the 
concept of universal human rights itself. Similarly, in accordance with Nietzsche’s proposed 
critical appraisal of ideas,405 it is suggested that it is the legitimating purpose of human rights 
which is universal (and universalising), and that the value of the human rights discourse simply 
relates the manner in which it continues to optimally reflect and communicate this purpose (in 
reflection of the judicial approach of Judge Hercules).406  
Consistent critical appraisals of the communication of this purpose in the context of 
rights is necessary in order to determine the sufficiency of existing/prevailing accounts. The 
necessity of this process is premised on the realisation that optimal communication is 
contextually contingent, and thus will continue to evolve. As such, the concept of human rights 
cannot reasonably be regarded as definitive – in relation to either the existence of claims or, 
indeed, the scope of existing claims. Ultimately, this approach looks to refocus consideration 
of the legitimacy of the universality (and absoluteness) of human rights away from the potential 
validity of contextual claims, and towards the purpose of such protections (e.g. to actualise 
human agency). 
                                                            
402 This is represented in the process of protecting our ‘personhood’; understood as the ability to function as 
autonomous agents. See James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2008) 215-220. 
403 Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality (University of Chicago Press 1992) 3-8 
404 ‘[G]eneral principles which underlie and justify the settled law …’. Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes 
(Harvard University Press 2006) 143. 
405 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History (Macmillan for the Library of Liberal Arts 1957) 20. 
406 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press 1978) 132-153. 
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3.5.1 Advantages with Foundational Protections and the Perfectibility of Law 
 
As we have seen, the application of this approach could also result in practical benefits 
for contemporary human rights securing mechanisms – such as the ECHR (specifically, by 
providing an alternative means by which to examine the sufficiency of prevailing efforts to 
secure Convention based protections). For example, it is evident that an approach which is 
consistent with the 'right answer' (e.g. perfectibility of law) theory would require the ECtHR to 
display a greater level of consistency when determining the legitimacy of the scope of 
Convention based rights. In the first instance, this would call for more robust/consistent 
application of the objective criteria already established with their own jurisprudence across the 
jurisdiction of the ECHR. This would represent criteria which is based on practical 
understanding of the nature of convention rights themselves (as well as of legitimate 
circumstances in which their enjoyment may be restricted) – e.g. Müller407 - and which should 
therefore not be overly susceptible to arbitrary interpretation or manipulation (as acceptance of 
their validity is not contingent upon specific national/cultural values). Similarly, it would also 
require a more disciplined approach to determining the appropriate form of consensus analysis 
the Court is to adopt in future cases - a decision which should be based exclusively on securing 
the strongest level of protection for Convention rights.408 In accordance with the idea of the 
‘perfectibility of law’, grounding the justification for this determination on the purpose of such 
                                                            
407 Müller and Others v. Switzerland (1988) 13 EHRR 212. 
408 With controversial cases relating to issues of a moral nature (e.g. same-sex marriage), the revised approach 
could perhaps require some form of overwhelming consensus - either amongst other member states of the 
ECHR, or more broadly reflected by global developments, or instead the national opinion of a particular state 
(whichever is most likely to secure the strongest level of protection) - before seeking to legitimately hold 
affected parties to a higher standard of protection. The key thing to note is that with a 'right answer' approach, 
once an interpretation of Convention rights which effectively evolves the substantive content of protection is 
accepted by the ECtHR in relation to one jurisdiction, the expectation must be that all other member states will 
eventually conform with this new (legitimate) interpretation. Moreover, any subsequent variation with the 
application of this right may only be justified in the absence of a form of overwhelming consensus - that is to 
say, whilst alternative interpretations of the legitimate scope of this protection may still be regarded as 
defensible or valid. For a detailed examination of the possibility of reform regarding the ECtHR usage of 
consensus analysis see Helen Fenwick, ‘Same Sex Unions at the Strasbourg Court in a Divided Europe: Driving 
Forward Reform or Protecting the Court’s Authority via Consensus Analysis?’ (2016) 3 European Human 
Rights Law Review 249. 
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protections - to actualise normative agency - could therefore provide the ECtHR with a more 
optimal means of avoiding an unjustifiably absolutist approach (e.g. avoiding the promotion of 
specific, non-consensus driven interpretations of rights as being definitive), whilst holding 
member states to a higher level of accountability (by expecting eventual conformity with 
interpretations already determined to be valid). 
This approach would also appear to be useful in considering possible resolution of 
perhaps the most pertinent challenge of the human rights movement – the purported conflict 
which exists between human rights and national security.409 In contemporary times, this is 
exemplified by the debate surrounding the quantification of deserving claimants – principally 
in the context of suspected terrorist agents.410 Populations of states within the international 
community are increasingly being asked to consider whether the fundamental interests of these 
individuals should be afforded the same level of protection as the ‘innocent’ people their 
actions invariably undermine. If such protections are justified due to their ability to safeguard 
fundamental interests all human beings possess simply because of their shared humanity, and 
are legitimised through the acknowledgment of this fact, then how, they are asked, can they 
protect individuals whose actions demonstrably disregard appreciation of this justification? 
The purpose of such questioning is seemingly to consider whether violent criminals and 
suspected terrorists, in depreciating the interests of others through their personal conduct, 
qualify as the class of human deserving of the protection of human rights law. It therefore 
appears to be based upon acceptance of the non-absoluteness of rights, in that it is 
acknowledged that they may be effectively ‘forfeited’ in certain circumstances. Specifically, 
as Stephen Kershnar explains, this approach embodies the belief that ‘[if] a person infringes or 
                                                            
409 Philip Ruddock, ‘A New Framework: Counter-Terrorism and the Rule of Law’ (2004) 16 The Sydney Papers 
112, 117. 
410 See for example the political and public debate regarding the case of Othman (Abu Qatada) v United 
Kingdom (2012) 55 EHRR 1. 
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threatens to infringe upon the moral right of another, then in all contexts she forfeits her right 
to liberty or a right contained within it’.411 
Yet, the basis of the contemporary concept of human rights appears to be the 
understanding that all possible claimants deserve to have their fundamental interests 
protected,412 and that certain protections are absolute (such as the prohibition of torture). In this 
way, by accepting the validity of prioritising national security over fundamental liberties, we 
effectively acknowledge the illegitimacy of the idea of practically enforceable (and desirable) 
human rights. However, as this chapter has established, the legitimacy of universal rights 
cannot be made contingent upon accepting certain claims as absolute. This is because, to do 
so, we would have to acknowledge the definitiveness of particular accounts of human rights. 
Developments of the last century alone evidence the fact that the content, meaning and scope 
of such claims can evolve.413 It would therefore be mistaken to interpret (or promote) the 
accepted content of such protections at any given time as being definitive. Similarly, the 
practical application of any specific right must also be accepted as non-absolute on this basis. 
Notwithstanding the merits of the critiques suggested by Bentham (and discussed earlier in this 
chapter), it is clear that rights can be justifiably interfered with if such action represents the 
optimal means by which autonomous agency may be actualised. Specifically, this would relate 
to exceptional circumstances wherein continual provision of the relevant protection would 
significantly endanger the survivability of the state. This point will be examined in more detail 
in Chapter Five.414 
                                                            
411 Stephen Kershnar, ‘The Structure of Rights Forfeiture in the Context of Culpable Wrongdoing’ (2002) 29 
Philosophia 57, 73. 
412 Indeed, as Michael Freemen explains ‘all human beings are equal in right’. Michael Freeman, M, Human 
Rights: An Interdisciplinary Approach (Polity Press 2002) 107. 
413 This was demonstrated earlier in this chapter in the context of ECHR case law. Specifically, by considering 
the evolving scope of Article 8 of the ECHR evidenced between Fretté v. France (2002) 38 EHRR 438, and 
E.B. v. France (2008) 47 EHRR 509. 
414 See Chapter Five, section 5.3. 
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 As we have seen, there are evident strengths and limitations with both consequentialist 
and deontological approaches. Upon reflection, it is to be noted that the philosophical 
framework of this thesis will not be based on the complete adoption of either approach. Instead, 
it will argue that neither is capable of providing a sufficient, realisable justificatory account for 
human rights on their own. This thesis will propose that a preferable alternative would be to 
construct a model which accentuates some of the strongest aspects of each approach. 
Specifically, this will be comprised of two parts. Firstly, it will suggest that the purpose of 
human rights is absolute and universal. Secondly, it will propose that, in contrast, individual 
protections are non-definitive, and non-absolute (for reasons discussed in this chapter). 
Therefore, whilst the purpose behind such protections cannot be unjustifiably disregarded, it is 
accepted that this purpose is not contingent upon absolute fulfilment of contextual 
interpretations of human rights claims.  
This position accepts that the language of human rights is persistently powerful and 
effective because it is a practical manifestation of a very specific purpose.415 It is suggested 
that it is this purpose that is universalising, and which gives rise to universally relevant claims. 
Yet, as mentioned, these claims cannot be regarded as definitive. In this way, the language of 
rights should be understood simply as a vehicle through which this purpose is advanced. It 
provides a means of articulating the legitimacy of this purpose. Yet, it is not, necessarily, the 
only means by which it is possible to do so. This approach accepts that the content of rights is 
changeable, in that it will logically evolve over time. The inalienable aspect of rights should 
simply be seen relate to the purpose behind the protections, and not the content of individual 
claims themselves. In essence, this approach suggests that we should promote the 
universalising idea behind the concept of rights, but acknowledge that current, or historical, 
                                                            
415 Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century (Hart 
Publishers 2000) 1-109. 
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interpretations cannot be regarded as the only possible means, and should therefore not be 
presented as such. Instead, it should be accepted that the concept of human rights articulates 
(with varying degrees of success) universally relevant principles. Moreover, it argues that these 
principles correlate with certain fundamental interests that all normative agents (a) have the 
capacity to recognise the significance of (b) and need to have protected in order to ensure a 
satisfactory standard of living.  
It is important to briefly distinguish this approach from a traditional consequentialist 
account of human rights. It is proposed that the distinction rests upon the inherent non-
subjectivity of the universalising idea. There is, at least theoretically, consistency in relation to 
the criteria upon which choices should be made. Under a traditional consequentialist decision-
making system there will be no requirement to secure any benefit for rights based interests. In 
contrast, with the approach proposed in this chapter, the decision to act (or not to act) as it 
pertains to interference with human rights is to be made entirely upon the basis of human rights 
based interests (and the purpose of actualising normative agency). Where a traditional 
consequentialist approach can lead to interference with fundamental protections which is not 
predicated on the perceived benefits such action may have to these interests, the alternative 
approach proposed within this thesis would only allow such interference to occur when these 
interests are themselves better served by their temporary violation.    
Similarly, with this approach the distinguishing characteristic adopted from 
deontological accounts relates to the specific purpose of seeking to protect certain individual 
interests. This reflects the intent to protect the actualisation of individual human agency as 
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proposed by James Griffin.416 As such, it is seemingly based upon a universality largely 
resistant to the influences of contextual contingencies. This is because all those who qualify as 
human beings, as well as all ostensible agents (those who evidently retain the capacity to 
develop normative agency – such as children) are entitled to the protections afforded by human 
rights claims.417 In this way, the universality of human rights arguably relates to the 
foundational purpose behind the justification to such protections.  
3.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter began by examining consequentialist and deontological approaches to 
justifying the concept of human rights. Through this investigation it was ultimately determined 
that adopting either approach exclusively undermines the possibility of universalisable human 
rights. This conclusion was based on evident limitations relating to each approach respectively. 
In the case of consequentialist accounts, these limitations were noted to relate to the lack of 
certainty of protection of human rights norms (e.g. as a results-based approach may legitimately 
justify prioritising other benefits – such as state security – over individual rights). Conversely, 
with deontological accounts the limitations were seen to relate to lack of certainty of action (as 
it pertains to identifying practical means of securing such protections). It was further suggested 
that a preferable alternative to the adoption of either a purely deontological or consequentialist 
account may be found in the work of Ronald Dworkin. Specifically, this was argued to relate 
to the concept of the ‘perfectibility of law’ as represented in Dworkin’s ‘right answer 
approach’, and reflected in the jurisprudential methodology of Judge Hercules. Essentially, it 
was argued that correct answers to legal solutions are contextually relevant, and are determined 
                                                            
416 This represents that which James Griffin termed ‘normative agency’. Griffin maintained that human rights 
are fundamental to a meaningful human life because ‘human rights are protections of our normative agency’. 
James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2008) 149. Ultimately, Griffin affirmed that the 
importance of such agency is that it represents the ‘capacity to choose and to pursue our conception of a 
worthwhile life’. ibid 45. 
417 See for example Shaun Pattinson and Deryck Beyleveld, ‘Defending Moral Precaution as a Solution to the 
Problem of Other Minds: a reply to Holm and Coggon’ (2012) 23 Ratio Juris 258. 
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by establishing conformity with the ‘general principles that underlie and justify the settled law 
…’.418 In the context of human rights, it has been suggested that these general principles are 
represented by the underlying justificatory purpose of such protections (e.g. to actualise 
normative agency). As such, legitimate interpretation (and application) of human rights norms 
requires conformity with this purpose (in a manner which reflects general acceptance of the 
most optimal means by which it is to be fulfilled). Thus it has been established that the content 
of human rights is non-definitive, as it is open to legitimate evolution and expansion in 
accordance with the underlying purpose of such protections. 
However, it was also noted that modern accounts of human rights generally attempt to 
restrict interpretations of this concept to those already defined in existing international 
instruments and declarations. Yet these accounts are products of history. Whilst they are 
representative of significant advancements in the human rights movement, it has been 
suggested that they should not be regarded as definitive. This is because the historical contexts 
in which their creation was made possible (and necessary) have changed. The challenges of the 
human rights movement in the present day are not commensurate to those of the era in which 
these existing instruments were constructed. For example, where the principal challenge was 
once to legitimate the idea of human rights (as accomplished with the UDHR), in modern 
contexts this challenge arguably pertains to securing the universal implementation of such 
protections. Moreover, in recent years, pragmatic efforts aimed at resolving the question of the 
universality of human rights (in relation to practical implementation) have sought to reduce the 
scope of such protections. Whilst this may enhance the universal applicability of human rights, 
it is unclear if it is ultimately consistent with the purpose of these claims. As previously noted, 
this chapter has suggested that the concept of human rights is perfectible, in the sense that it is 
capable of evolving; of changing in order to meet the needs of the contextual age. The 
                                                            
418 Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (Harvard University Press 2006) 143. 
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potentiality of further evolution is dependent upon proponents of the idea of universal rights 
being prepared to question the sufficiency of prevailing accounts (in order to determine whether 
they represent genuine/optimal appreciation of the purpose of such protections). This chapter 
has suggested that, in accordance with Friedrich Nietzsche, the adoption of a ‘critical’ approach 
to the study of human rights may usefully clarify the sufficiency of contemporary accounts of 
these protections. As noted, a ‘critical’ approach requires the rejection of presuppositions with 
regard to the definitiveness/sufficiency of predominant interpretations of ideals/concepts. It 
essentially requires the careful study of the implementation of such ideals/concepts in a manner 
which is capable of determining the merits of continuing with prevailing approaches. In the 
context of human rights, it has been suggested that such merits are to be determined by 
establishing the sufficiency of prevailing interpretations of the concept within the context of 
the fulfilling the justificatory purpose of such claims.  
Similarly, it would also appear to depend upon the willingness to resist the conflation 
of history in pursuit of the construction of specific historical narratives. Although it is clear that 
the idea of fundamental human needs and interests existed long before the creation of the 
UDHR (and are famously represented in the DOI and DRMC), it is equally apparent that 
universal rights, as presently understood, did not exist prior to the Twentieth century. As 
Samuel Moyn suggests: 
One thing is for sure: the lesson of the actual history of human rights is that they 
are not so much a timeless or ancient inheritance to preserve as a recent invention 
to remake ...419 
A legitimate ‘remaking’ of human rights would represent developments of the 
interpretation of such protections (in relation to scope/substance) in a manner which more 
accurately/optimally reflects their underlying purpose. This thesis has argued that this purpose 
                                                            
419 Samuel Moyn, Human Rights and the Uses of History (Verso 2014) 86. 
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is best understood as the objective of actualising normative agency. It has been further 
suggested that the foundational ideal of actualising human agency provides a preferable basis 
for justifying the universality of human rights as it transcends historical contingencies in a way 
that other justificatory accounts cannot (e.g. dignity). This is because its appropriateness in 
providing a universalisable foundation for human rights is not dependent upon the eventual 
acceptance of one specific interpretation of this concept (e.g. such as a Western account of 
dignity), but only on the continual presence of normative agents (capable of recognising the 
significance of their agency).  For this reason, it is suggested that future development of the 
concept of human rights should be made in accordance with this ideal. Whilst historically such 
development has been personified with the expansion of protections (in relation to the scope 
of individual claims, as well as general coverage), it is important to note that this too is not 
definitive. Indeed, legitimate evolution can be seen to relate to the effective re-imaging of the 
idea of human rights in a manner which allows it to more sufficiently fulfil the overarching 
purpose behind such protections. This process begins with the realisation that all claims are 
foundational (in the sense that they cannot be regarded as definitive – due to the historical 
contingency of accepted interpretations). The thesis will now move on to consider the 
foundational nature of rights in more detail through the examination of a specific claim – the 
right to health. 
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4 Human Rights as Foundational Claims:  
Re-Conceptualising the Right to Health as a Right to 
Healthiness 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will consider two methods of articulating the legitimacy of the human right 
to health. The first draws from the various declarations within which this right is contained to 
argue that it is a valid concept simply because we have afforded it legitimacy by 
conceptualising it. The second approach suggests that there is a wider philosophical, theoretical 
understanding of the right to health which transcends the current legislative and normative 
accounts - which are themselves only capable of representing certain important aspects of the 
underlying right. The significance with this approach is the idea that the purpose of the right to 
health has yet to be satisfactorily defined or fully articulated. This chapter argues that this 
purpose must be clearly identified before we can begin meaningful discussion on the normative 
content of a universalisable claim. This chapter employs both of the aforementioned methods 
in order to present a robust theoretical account of the right to health. Although the primary 
focus will be on significant academic writings, an initial examination of the historical evolution 
of the concept in major international treaties will provide the foundation for further theoretical 
analysis and help to establish that development within this area has been both shaped and 
restricted by various legislative interpretations (based on contextually contingent 
understanding). In essence, this chapter argues that a clear, robust theoretical account of the 
human right to health can enhance the realisability of this protection by reconceptualising it as 
a foundational claim. Furthermore, it proposes that approaching this task from the perspective 
of acknowledging the perfectibility of law, as well as the need for the continual assessment and 
reaffirmation of ideas (as discussed in Chapter Three), is useful in determining the contextual 
legitimacy of this claim.  
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4.1.1 Chapter Four Structure: Key Aims and Objectives 
 
In order to accomplish this objective, the chapter will be structured into several 
corresponding sections with three key outcomes to be achieved:  
1. The focus of this chapter will be on providing a detailed examination of prominent 
academic accounts of the right to health. Through an examination of these 
contemporary perspectives, this chapter will address important issues relating to the 
task of actualising the right to health (such as how it is to be accurately defined). 
Essentially, this section will provide some clarification in relation to the objective of 
more effectively conceptualising the right to health in robust theoretical terms by 
identifying recurring characteristics of prominent theoretical accounts of this 
protection. Specifically, it will be seen that the inter-connected principles of ‘necessity’ 
and ‘subsistence’ are consistently argued to be integral to the underlying purpose of this 
claim – to secure a sufficient level of healthiness. This examination of relevant 
academic works will ultimately establish that the concept of healthiness extends beyond 
issue of physiological health (4.2); 
2. In order to build on these results, this chapter will next consider necessary requirements 
for the fulfilment of the right to health in context of differing levels of subsistence: 
understood as (i) bare, (ii) adequate, and (iii) maximum, respectively. Here it will be 
suggested that bare subsistence constitutes basic physiological survival, whilst adequate 
subsistence denotes a satisfactory level of human functioning. Conversely, maximum 
subsistence relates to the most optimal means of healthiness. In the context of the right 
to health, it is further proposed that bare subsistence accounts for basic physiological 
elements (such as perquisites for health, like safe food and clean water), whereas 
adequate subsistence accounts for sufficient access to all relevant components 
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(comprising of physiological, psychological, and social elements of health). Finally, 
maximum subsistence is seen to represent the highest attainable standard of health 
possible. This section will demonstrate that, in reference to Griffin’s account of human 
rights, an accurate and universally realisable account of the right to health must be 
rooted in the concept of protecting only those things necessary for securing a 
‘functioning human agent’. As such, it is to be argued that the right to health ought to 
be understood to be an entitlement to the fundamental universal elements of human 
healthiness which allow individuals the opportunity to live a life worthy of a human 
being. Accordingly, it will be established that, in practical terms, the right to health is 
realistically only a claim to adequate subsistence but, and in reflection of the 
justificatory purpose of such protections (e.g. in reference to the perfectibility of law), 
with a corresponding underlying objective of continually striving for the obtainment of 
maximum health (4.3); 
3. To reinforce these conclusions, this chapter will next examine the three relevant 
components of human healthiness: physiological (e.g. diagnostic and curative 
treatments), psychological (e.g. free consent/ability to make a choice) and social (e.g. 
education, housing) respectively. This examination will establish that these 
components, whilst focusing on separate elements of healthiness, are ultimately inter-
connected and reciprocally dependent. The purpose of this investigation is not to 
present a wholly new interpretation of the right to health, but rather is to utilise existing 
academic approaches in order to articulate a more ‘complete’ theoretical account of this 
concept. In effect, this chapter intends to demonstrate the perfectibility of legal 
knowledge (in accordance with Dworkin’s theoretical approach) in the context of the 
right to health - argued to be represented by the concept of progressive realisation. 
Moreover, it aims to reinforce the practical benefits of a critical approach to appraising 
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the sufficiency of ideas as proposed by Nietzsche (specifically as means of ensuring 
future progress conforms to the underlying purpose of the law). Ultimately, this chapter 
will conclude with the contention that, due to necessary relativeness of its content (as 
well as its inherent perfectibility), the right to health is actually better understood as a 
foundational right to human healthiness which seeks to secure the enablement of human 
agency (4.4). 
4.2 Defining a Human Right to Health 
 
Before addressing additional aspects of the academic debate, it is useful to briefly 
explore the right to health in the context of international treaties. This analysis is important as 
it establishes the historical context in which the academic discourse has evolved. As has been 
noted by John Tobin,420 this evolution stretches from the UDHR and the corresponding creation 
of the World Health Organisation (WHO 1948) the same year, to the creation of the UN Special 
Rapporteur for the Right to Health in 2002. In between these events the validity of the right to 
health was advanced by the International Covenant on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights 
in (ICSECR) 1966 and the UN General Comment 14 in 2000. 
At the start of this process, the right to health was broadly defined in Article 25 of the 
UDHR as an individual entitlement to ‘a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and 
necessary social services’.421 As previously addressed, in relation to the general significance of 
the UDHR, Costas Douzinas suggests that the primary aim of this declaration was to articulate 
                                                            
420 John Tobin, The Right to Health in International Law (Oxford University Press 2012) 14-30. 
421 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A (III) (UDHR) 
<http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a25> accessed 18 May 2018.   
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the validity of certain rights claims in the aftermath of an unprecedented global conflict.422 
Consequently, it is not surprising to discover that the normative content of this entitlement was 
left largely unspecified. The general purpose was not to define the right in explicit terms, but 
simply to provide the concept with a sense of legitimacy. It is also important to highlight that 
the notion of human healthiness was not restricted to purely physiological elements. Indeed, 
Article 25 clearly identifies other social factors integral to a ‘healthy human life’. Therefore, it 
is apparent that the idea of a ‘human healthiness’ which transcends physiological health was 
present even at the earliest stages of conceptualisation.   
Similarly, the preamble of the Constitution of the WHO identified that the right to 
health did not relate exclusively to a right to be healthy in a purely physiological sense when it 
declared that: 
Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not 
merely the absence of disease or infirmity. The enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human 
being without distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or social 
condition.423  
It is here for the first time that the language of a ‘right to health’ is directly utilised in 
the form of a proposed entitlement to the highest attainable standard of health. This preamble 
also provided the origins of several recurring themes pertaining to the right to health such as 
non-discrimination and equality. As we will come to discover, these terms have consistently 
been utilised within the discourse to reaffirm the universal applicability of this entitlement. It 
could be argued that such efforts stem from a determination to redress the supposed aspirational 
                                                            
422 ‘Indeed, the signing of the Universal Declaration, on 10 December 1948, and the execution of the seven 
defendants condemned to death by the Tokyo war crime tribunals, on 23 December, brought the two parts of the 
post-war project together … The trials gave an account of the past, while the Declarations and Conventions 
aspired to regulate the future’. Costas Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of 
Cosmopolitanism (Routledge Cavendish 2007) 28. See also Michael Ignatieff, ‘Human Rights: The Midlife 
Crisis’ (1999) 46 The New York Review of Books 58, where he asserts that ‘the holocaust made the declaration 
possible’. 
423 Constitution of the World Health Organisation (adopted July 22 1946, entered into force 7 April 1948) 14 
UNTS 185 <http://www.who.int/governance/eb/who_constitution_en.pdf> accessed 18 May 2018. 
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quality of this right in the context of other fundamental protections. Indeed, the applicability 
of this particular right appears contingent on specific social or economic realities in a manner 
that so called ‘basic’ or ‘priority rights’ do not.424 
The right to health was further defined in Article 12 of the ICSECR where once again 
it was articulated in terms of an entitlement to ‘the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard 
of health’.425 The purpose here was largely two-fold; to crystalise the definition of the right and 
to identify specific areas for appropriate application. In contrast to the largely un-quantified 
scope of this entitlement in preceding documents, the focus of this application was primarily 
physiological. The specific examples of infant mortality rates or possible global pandemics 
were used to simultaneously highlight what the right to health could endeavour to remedy, as 
well as reinforce understanding of why the right was required.426 As such, Article 12 attempted 
to ‘solidify’ the concept by quantifying the scope and purpose of the entitlement in more 
specific terms.  
However, it is important to note that the willingness to refocus on primarily 
physiological aspects of human healthiness arguably had the unintentional consequence of 
limiting the right as a justifiable universal claim (by selectively restricting the fundamental 
purpose). Here focus was placed on articulating the need to alleviate certain conditions which 
contributed to the perpetuation of physiological un-healthiness of disadvantaged individuals.427 
As such, the immediate applicability of the right to health was deliberately limited to particular 
                                                            
424 For example, Samuel Moyn explains that human rights cannot be everything to everyone and must instead 
pertain exclusively to certain fundamental or ‘priority’ claims. On this point he notes that ‘human rights call to 
mind a few core values that demand protection, they cannot be all things to all people’. Samuel Moyn, The Last 
Utopia: Human Rights in History (Belknap Press 2012) 227. 
425 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into 
force January 3 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR) <http://www.un-documents.net/icescr.htm> accessed 18 May 
2018.   
426 ibid. 
427 For example, we see this reflected in section 2(a) ‘reduction of the stillbirth-rate …’ and also in 2(b) 
‘industrial hygiene’. Whilst these are both highly important issues, it is reasonable to suggest that their 
prevalence is felt in some parts of the world (e.g. developing world) more than others (e.g. developed). ibid. 
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sections of humanity. Whilst it is certainly true that these accounted for hundreds of millions 
of individuals, this practice arguably prevented the right from becoming truly universally 
relevant during this time. That is to say, justification for this entitlement was linked to states of 
physiological un-healthiness primarily relevant to specific parts of the world. Consequently, 
the process of strengthening the underlying legitimacy of the right to health did not necessarily 
correspond with the successful articulation of the validity of its universal scope.  
General Comment 14428 on the right to the highest attainable standard of health sought 
to build upon the preceding declarations and reaffirm the universal applicability of the right to 
health by further defining practical methods for ensuring its fulfilment. Although the duty to 
provide an adequate health care system was discussed, the scope of the entitlement accounted 
for similar provisions as those contained in Article 25 of the aspirational UDHR. The 
recognition that the implementation of the right to health was actually dependent on the 
realisation of a broad selection of other rights – ranging from food, housing, work, education, 
as well as some traditionally negative rights such as life, prohibition against torture, and privacy 
– was highly significant.429 The purpose of this broad approach was to reaffirm the essential 
nature of the right to health and establish that ‘[h]ealth is a fundamental human right 
indispensable for the exercise of other human rights’.430 It was by articulating the expansive 
scope of the right that General Comment 14 endeavoured to confirm that all human rights are 
inextricably linked.  
                                                            
428 CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health’ (ICESCR art. 
12) (11 August 2000) E/C.12/2000/4 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/English/bodies/crc/docs/GC/CRC_C_GC_14_ENG.pdf> accessed 18 May 2018.   
429 In reflecting upon the importance of General Comment 14 Jonathan Wolff suggested that ‘[t]he right to 
health seems to stand somewhere between the right to health care and the right to be healthy’. Jonathan Wolff, 
The Human Right to Health (W. W. Norton & Company 2013) 27. 
430 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 14: The Right to 
the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12 of the Covenant), 11 August 2000 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/English/bodies/crc/docs/GC/CRC_C_GC_14_ENG.pdf> accessed 18 May 2018.     
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In addition, General Comment 14 also identified specific conditions required to 
effectively implement the right to health in practical terms. As with other social or economic 
rights, these relate to the duty to respect, protect, and fulfil.431 The former simply regards the 
duty to refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of the protection, either directly or 
indirectly. The second follows on from this and obligates states to prevent third parties from 
interfering with the enjoyment of the right. Finally, the latter concerns the duty to initiate 
procedures conducive to the fulfilment of the protection, specifically in the form of legislative, 
judicial, or economic measures.432 This comment goes on to detail that these duties can be 
satisfied most easily by ensuring equality of access to health services as well as adopting and 
promoting a national health policy. However, perhaps the most important aspect of General 
Comment 14 precedes the sections on state obligations and pertains to the idea of ‘progressive 
realisation’. This concept relates to an important pragmatic concession on behalf of the right to 
health (and arguably the concept of universalisable rights itself) with respect to appropriate 
methods of implementation.  
In essence, this involves recognising that a combination of economic, environmental, 
and social realities may prevent certain states from fulfilling their right to health obligations in 
a commensurate manner to more developed or less disadvantaged ones. Crucially, as Jonathan 
Wolff notes, this principle represents acknowledgement that:  
[T]here can be legitimate reasons why a state may not be able to fully realise the 
right to health … that a country must take planned and targeted steps toward full 
realisation, but cannot be criticised for not immediately achieving the highest 
standard of health for its people if it is not attainable.433  
Thus, progressive realisability affords such states some flexibility relating to their 
efforts to actualise the right to health in accordance with their contextual limitations. However, 
                                                            
431 Scott Leckie, Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: A Legal Resource Guide (University of Pennsylvania 
Press 2006) 20-23. 
432 ibid. 
433 Jonathan Wolff, The Human Right to Health (W. W. Norton & Company 2013) 10-11. 
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as General Comment 14 consistently emphasises, this concept does exempt states from their 
obligations indefinitely, but rather, the purpose of progressive realisation is to ensure that all 
states continue to develop the normative content of the right to health in a manner which 
provides an increasingly greater level of protection to individuals. In this way, it attempts to 
confirm that whilst the right to health is aspirational in nature, it can be practically realised, 
and is fundamentally realisable (and continually evolving in relation to content and scope). It 
is worth noting that the concept of progressive realisation is seemingly commensurate with the 
approach adopted by Judge Hercules, in that it reflects the view that the ‘right’ answer may be 
both contextually contingent and inherently perfectible.434 
This understanding was subsequently reinforced in 2002 by the creation of the Special 
Rapporteur for the Right to Health.435 The aim of this position was to give further effect to the 
right to health by fulfilling three correlating objectives. These were, as inaugural Special 
Rapporteur Paul Hunt duly noted:  
[T]o promote and encourage others to promote the right to health as a 
fundamental human right; to clarify the content and contours of the right to 
health; and to identify good practices for operationalizing the right to health at 
the community, national and international levels – and the ways they should be 
approached.436  
Essentially, the aim of the Special Rapporteur was to facilitate actualising the universal 
application of the right to health by guiding the discourse and shaping understanding of the 
entitlement. The hope was to accomplish these objectives through a series of reports on various 
aspects which either impacted on, or indeed impaired, human healthiness; such as sexual health 
                                                            
434 For a detailed examination of this see Chapter Three, section 3.3. 
435 John Tobin, The Right to Health in International Law (Oxford University Press 2012) 1-2. 
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and poverty,437 mental health issues,438 and equity of access to the highest attainable standard 
of health.439 The creation of this position appears to mark the culmination of the evolution of 
legislative interpretations of the right to health. Whereas once the objective was simply to 
afford legitimacy to the idea of this right, there is now a corresponding aim to substantiate the 
relevance of the right by identifying either specific content or particular situations in which an 
operational claim is required.  
It is thus comparable to the historical development of the modern concept of human 
rights in general (as represented in various international instruments).440 Whilst this discussion 
has led to tangible disagreement in relation to both of these factors, it is perhaps most 
profoundly demonstrated with regards to the content of the entitlement itself. Indeed, the 
‘evolution’ of the discourse has not necessarily resulted in progressing the understanding of 
the right in practical terms. This is significant because a recurring criticism of the role of 
Special Rapporteur is that it has failed to bring resolution to this disagreement by specifying 
precisely what the right to health should be.441 Ultimately, this chapter proposes that a ‘critical’ 
appraisal of the concept of the right to health (in accordance with the Nietzschean approach 
discussed in Chapter Three)442 provides us with a useful means of clarifying the purpose (and 
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thus the composition) of this fundamental claim. This approach is based on the desire to 
determine the sufficiency of existing historical accounts – through robust, aggressive 
examination - so as to establish the effectual usage, or identify required developments, of these 
ideas/concepts.443  
4.2.1 Academic Accounts of the Right to Health: A Right to What? 
 
This examination will commence by addressing some predominant theoretical 
perspectives on the right to health. To begin it is worth noting that of all purported universal 
human rights the right to health is perhaps the most contentious.444 Indeed, as Jonathan notes: 
On the one hand the state of global health provides an apparently compelling 
case for a universal human right to health. On the other hand, especially 
considering the resource implications, the idea of such a right seems utterly 
unrealistic.445 
This controversy is represented within the debate itself in the form of recurring 
disagreement pertaining to the necessary scope and content of the entitlement. The purpose of 
this section is to develop potential means of resolving this disagreement by identifying 
consistent elements within academic attempts to define and substantiate the theory of the right 
to health. Through this analysis it will become apparent that academic approaches are 
frequently based on individual conceptualisations of the same purpose, and that disagreements 
generally relate to the specific scope of the entitlement itself. Thus, it could be argued that, 
within the academic community the validity of the concept of the right to health is 
simultaneously undisputed and unresolved. Whilst the idea behind the legitimacy of this claim 
is consistently reaffirmed by legal academics, no consensus has been achieved regarding the 
required definition of the entitlement in prescriptive terms. Consequently, the focus of the 
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discussion is strikingly divided between attempting to justify the theoretical legitimacy of the 
protection, and debating how best to qualify and actualise the un-quantified right in a practical 
sense. In this way, the progression of the discourse is seemingly hindered by an inability to 
provide a unifying theoretical account of the right to health. This section will establish whether 
it is possible to articulate a more ‘complete’ (e.g. ‘true’) definition by clarifying the required 
scope and focus of the entitlement based on determining factors which incorporate consistent 
elements from various important theoretical accounts (in an attempt to bridge the gap between 
theory and practice).  
As mentioned, there are seemingly two fundamental objectives with regards to the 
academic approach which concern either; (i) definition or (ii) application. The first, and 
arguably most contentious, focusses on the challenge of defining the right to health in specific 
terms. An important aim of this theoretical approach is to attempt to justify the underlying 
philosophical legitimacy of the entitlement. In contrast, the primary aim of the second aspect 
is to establish practical means of actualising the right to health. With this approach 
understanding of the claim is often restricted to ‘a right to health care’ in an attempt to enhance 
its universal applicability.446 However, it is important to note that the capacity to apply the right 
to health in a meaningful manner is contingent upon understanding exactly what it entitles, and 
as such what is required for it to be effectively fulfilled. In this sense, the right to health 
arguably represents an appropriate reflection of the general state of the contemporary human 
rights discourse itself (defined by persistent conflict between theory and result). For this reason, 
the remainder of this chapter will focus primarily on the task of providing a robust theoretical 
definition. 
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In this regard, it could be maintained that previous attempts to define the right to health 
have focussed on one of three areas. The most basic is the historical approach, which was 
considered in the preceding section, and simply seeks to demonstrate the evolution of the 
concept and contextualise traditional interpretations within this framework. Two additional 
alternatives look to address contemporary interpretations of the right to health – or what the 
right is currently understood to be - and aspirational accounts – or what the right should be 
understood to be. Whilst this chapter will address each of these alternatives to some extent, the 
major focus will be on aspirational interpretations. This decision is based on the understanding 
that, as the ideological core of the entitlement, these should be most representative of its ‘true’ 
nature and purpose (e.g. reflecting the ‘general principles that underlie and justify the settled 
law …’).447 Indeed, as mentioned, the task of securing the human right to health is seemingly 
dependent on the ability to accurately define it. Essentially, it is suggested that this definition 
must be founded on the fundamental purpose of the right, which it maintains a robust 
aspirational account can identify, if it is to substantiate the justifiable ‘need’ for corresponding 
action.  
When discussing the right to health, Paul Hunt suggests that it should be regarded as an 
irreducible concept which cannot be quantified in complete or definitive terms.448 This 
argument is based on the idea that the right is an entitlement to more than access to adequate 
health services and that the ability to live a healthy human life is seen to depend on securing 
various additional social elements. Moreover, this view maintains that our understanding of 
these elements can and should continue to evolve as our comprehension of ‘healthiness’ 
develops. For this reason, Hunt maintains that attempting to focus the content of the right on a 
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‘complete’ list of obligations ultimately risks fragmenting and undermining the primary 
purpose and justification behind the claim.449 Whilst he acknowledges a need to adopt practical 
language to draft universally applicable legislation, he emphasises that ‘at the same time, the 
empowering, transformative message of human rights must not be sacrificed’.450 In order to 
protect the transcendent nature of this right we must refrain from unnecessarily narrowing the 
scope of the entitlement simply as a means of translating it into a realisable normative construct. 
In accordance with various legislative accounts, this interpretation arguably presents the right 
to health as a developing social objective covering a variety of corresponding individual 
entitlements. 
According to this position, the fundamental aim should be to promote the continuous 
development of social and environmental factors integral to the enhancement of human 
healthiness.451 Although physiological aspects of health may take precedence, they should not 
be accepted as the exclusive focus of the claim. Indeed, as Hunt goes on to suggest, a fully 
established health care system could ‘still not serve human rights’ if it did not also provide fair 
access to all.452 The underlying principles of equity and non-discrimination in relation to access 
and distribution are seen as the key to the effective fulfilment of the right to health. In this way, 
the decision to focus the application of the right to areas of notable impoverishment (as 
represented in various international treaties) actually represents an effort to equalise the balance 
of healthiness, and not a desire to over-restrict the relative scope of the entitlement in practical 
terms. Consequently, if one accepts this position, the universality of the right to health should 
be understood to relate to recognition of the inherent need for the entitlement. Moreover, the 
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legitimacy of this claim should not be undermined by the present inability to construct a 
legislative framework capable of immediate application to a universal standard. 
Another influential approach to defining the right was adopted by Steven Jamar, who 
suggested that there are two helpful ways in which to conceptualise this entitlement; (i) as a 
broad and aspirational claim or; (ii) as a narrow ‘core’ human right.453 With the former the 
focus is simply on promoting the general development of health and the adoption of practical 
measures capable of realising this objective (beyond simple health care coverage). This 
effectively attempts to provide justification for the necessity of the entitlement.454  Conversely, 
the latter addresses specific methods of actualising a narrowly defined, legislatively 
enforceable interpretation of the right to health.455 Jamar argues that a fulfillable definition 
would impose upon the state obligations of both a negative and positive nature.456 Particularly, 
the state would have a negative duty to refrain from acting in a manner which could negatively 
impact the health of the population. As example, ‘to refrain from barring access to health-related 
information, and the duty of states not to take health-harming actions’.457 With the 
corresponding positive obligation, and so much as budgetary restrictions allow, all states would 
be required to make practical efforts to ‘reduce or address serious threats to the health of 
individuals’.458 Jamar asserts that with this, states should also be expected to educate the 
population, and to promote the enhancement of the contingencies of health. An example of an 
‘affirmative duty’ would be to ‘promote safe and sufficient food and nutrition … to maximise 
the population’s chances for health’.459 
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An inherent problem with proceeding with an expansive definition of the right to health 
was addressed by James Griffin who maintained that an unwillingness, or inability, to narrow 
the scope of the entitlement and proceed with a quantified account actually undermines, not 
only the capacity to promote the right as a normative construct, but also as ‘a useful social 
claim’.460 Under this interpretation, the attempt to secure the transcendent nature of the right 
by refusing to focus on specific obligations necessarily results in its very legitimacy being 
called into question. This is because, in a purely practical sense, all rights have to be a right to 
something determinate, and not just to the idea of something. Significantly however, and 
seemingly contradictory to his dismissal of an expansive approach, Griffin acknowledged that 
understanding of the claim should not be restricted to it being viewed simply as ‘a right just to 
healthcare’.461 Despite this, a cornerstone of Griffin’s argument is belief in the need to 
demystify the concept of the right to health by reconsidering the realistic scope of a fulfillable 
claim.  
Once again, the primary purpose is not to identify any form of definitive normative 
content, but simply to reaffirm the need to focus the discourse towards this end. Crucially, 
however, Griffin did provide guidance in relation to the necessary limitations of any 
determining criteria regarding the nature of this content. Indeed, he highlights that whilst the 
entitlement is often conceptualised as a claim ‘to “a satisfactory” standard of living … the 
obvious trouble with relying on the word “satisfactory” is its tendency to change with time and 
place’.462 However, it could be suggested that the apparent relativity of the value of 
‘satisfactory’ does not invalidate its meaningfulness as it relates to determining the required 
focus of fundamental claims. In support of this position we could once again reference Judge 
Hercules and the idea of the perfectibility of law. Whilst ‘satisfactory’ may be contextually 
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contingent, this contingency does not preclude the possibility of its fulfilment (so long as it is 
consistently interpreted in accordance with the accepted meaning of any given time – or place). 
Indeed, the applicability of the right to health seems inextricably linked to the sufficiency of 
language used to articulate its purpose, scope, and limitations. Thus, following this line of 
thinking, the objective of securing the universal application of the right to health is actually 
reducible to the challenge of prioritising its aims and encapsulating them in specific normative 
language (which accurately reflects contextual understanding of this concept). 
Another alternative approach worthy of discussion was developed by Upendra Baxi.463 
Three of the most significant aspects of his argument relate to concepts of necessity, 
universality, and realisability. In a similar manner to other distinguished legal scholars, Baxi 
suggests that the ‘need’ and corresponding legitimacy of the right to health are primarily self-
evident.464 Additionally, he maintains that this would remain true even if the right was held 
simply to be a claim to adequate health care. This position is founded on the understanding that 
‘a minimum of health remains necessary in order to have and enjoy … other related human 
rights’.465 As such, Baxi’s account arguably presents the right to health as an ‘enabling right’ 
which retains the capacity to assist the fulfilment of corresponding claims. In this way, it could 
be conceptualised as a ‘priority right’ in a similar manner to so called non-derogable 
entitlements, such as the prohibition of torture.466 It can be regarded as a priority right in the 
sense that the meaningfulness of other protections is critically undermined in the absence of its 
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provision. This point will be expanded upon in greater detail in later sections of this chapter 
(and once again in Chapter Five). 
Having addressed the essential purpose of the right to health, Baxi attempts to further 
establish the universal relevance of this fundamental claim. Here, once again, reference to 
physiological health is utilised to substantiate the position. Specifically, Baxi maintains that in 
the age of globalisation, deadly diseases can spread transnationally in an extremely short period 
of time.467 Consequently, he suggests, we live under the constant threat of a potential global 
pandemic. Indeed, despite continuous development in the medical industry, this threat is 
becoming more and not less tangible due to the rise of certain anti-biotic resistant bacteria.468 
Baxi notes that ‘transboundary’ health risks such as these would ‘respect no territorial or 
ideological frontiers; (and) affect the human health of all of us in various ways’.469 Therefore, 
he concludes, the universal relevance of certain health related issues is clearly demonstrable.  
To expand upon this point further, Baxi examines two forms of human life he classifies 
as; (i) bare and (ii) good.470 The former is argued to be commensurate with ‘a living death’,471 
and is primarily, but not exclusively, represented in third world countries where potential 
impoverishment, starvation, or subjection to atrocities have reduced the quality of life to its 
lowest sustainable level.472 This is ‘life’ purely in the form of physiological survival. Naturally, 
this is incompatible with the notion of ‘a life worthy of a human being’ and as such ‘securing’ 
this standard of living could not adequately satisfy the purpose or need of the right to health. 
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Conversely, the concept of ‘a good life’ appears to have clear correlation with this underlying 
purpose. Yet, it is important to note here that this is arguably because the concept of ‘a good 
life’ is extremely ambiguous - it is an un-quantified and unrestricted standard with seemingly 
infinite scope. The obvious problem with this term is that it is a standard that can be easily met 
by the inclusion of provisions we don’t actually need (and thus contributes to the conflation of 
rights). Moreover, as Baxi duly highlights, the term is highly contentious and provides no fixed 
guidance in relation to what is actually required of a fully realised right to health. Indeed, he 
suggests that it could be used to justify medical care beyond human survival up to and including 
‘a nascent right to choose termination of an individual life … the right to a dignified death’.473 
Thus, we see once again the fundamental importance of adopted language. In the following 
section, this chapter will develop this to argue that that there must be a middle ground between 
‘bare’ and ‘good’ which, once clearly defined, ought to provide the determining criteria for the 
required normative content of the entitlement.  
Lisa Foreman argues that all social rights have minimum essential levels and the 
capacity to effectively apply them is dependent on ensuring that the conditions of these levels 
are satisfied.474 In essence, these ‘minimum levels’ provide the ‘core’ of such entitlements. 
Foreman suggests that this core can represent both the philosophical foundation of social rights 
as well the basic obligations that are required to enable application.475 As such, this position 
attempts to further legitimise the relevance of the right to health by reinforcing the theoretical 
justification behind its purported necessity, whilst underscoring its universal applicability by 
providing guidance in relation to its practical scope. Theoretical justification is reaffirmed with 
the identification of basic ‘minimum’ provisions that all human beings require. Thus, according 
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to this position, it is the demonstrable universality of basic provisions that validates the need 
for this entitlement. 
Moreover, the concept of ‘subsistence’ is used to reinforce the fundamental nature of 
the right to health. Indeed, a traditional hierarchical approach to the gradation of the 
significance of rights would emphasise certain negative, or ‘priority rights’, above so called 
‘developmental’ ones – such as the right to health. This justification would be constructed on 
the understanding that ‘priority rights’, such as the right to life, prohibition of torture, or 
freedom of expression, are superior because they are the means by which ‘liberty’ or 
‘autonomy’ are protected against interference from the state.476 However, as Foreman explains, 
‘one cannot be concerned about freedom without being concerned with subsistence …’.477 The 
purpose of this observation is to highlight the intrinsic inter-dependency of all human rights. 
The relevance of ‘priority’ rights is clearly undermined if an individual lacks a sufficient level 
of ‘health’ to enjoy them. Or, to put it another way, the ability to enable or protect autonomy 
and liberty is seemingly contingent on firstly securing subsistence. The nature of the concept 
of subsistence in relation to the right to health will be addressed in more detail in the subsequent 
section of this chapter (as well as in Chapter Five).478 For now, it is adequate to note that, 
according to Foreman’s interpretation, the right to health is itself arguably a priority claim.  
There are several other significant aspects of this theoretical account worth exploring. 
Firstly, Foreman reaffirms the importance of equity and non-discrimination.479 Indeed, these 
principles provide the framework by which she attempts to specify the normative content of 
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the ‘core obligations’. These basic provisions take the shape of ‘non-discriminatory access to 
health care, and housing, and services … as well as equitable distribution of these things’.480 
The right to health is again presented as a construct of over-lapping social claims. Whilst only 
access to housing and undefined ‘services’ are mentioned, it is evident that the entitlement is 
understood to be more than a claim to adequate health services. The foundational concept is 
seemingly ‘human healthiness’, and not simply ‘physiological health’, which merely plays a 
part.  
In this regard, it is apparent that there is a willingness amongst theoretical approaches 
to reaffirm the trans-physiological aspect of the entitlement, and yet an inability to articulate 
this in detailed or determinative language. Whenever the scope is narrowed, it is only to the 
extent by which ambiguous terms such as ‘good life’, ‘minimum core’, or ‘subsistence’, are 
capable of providing clear guidance to the task of constructing a practically realisable right to 
health. Further, as Foreman goes on to prove, the universal relevance of the entitlement is 
consistently anchored to the identification of contextually specific conditions, such as the 
reduced quality of life in poor countries.481 Furthermore, where efforts are made to demonstrate 
the relevance of the protection to Western states the focus is still on the most disadvantaged 
members of society (such as children or the poor).482 The reason for this appears to relate to 
the concept of the ‘minimum core’ and the principles of equity and non-discrimination at its 
heart. As Foreman suggest, ‘the minimum core concept reflects the fundamental human rights 
idea that certain individual interests, including the basic health needs of the poor, should be 
prioritised at any cost’.483 Indeed, proponents of this position argue that utilising the language 
                                                            
480 ibid 68. 
481 Foreman notes that the negative consequences of such an inferior quality of health evidences the legitimacy 
of the right to health as it is needed to ‘assist those without access to the basic necessities required to live 
autonomous and dignified lives …’. ibid. 
482 ibid. 
483 ibid 62. 
Daniel M Lowe                           Assessing the Universality of Human Rights in the Context of Health  
173 
 
of the right to health to promote the universal equalisation of ‘human healthiness’ actually 
enhances the opportunity of all individuals to live lives worthy of human beings. 
Aoife Nolan has attempted to clarify the purpose and required scope of this entitlement 
still further.484 Specifically, Nolan suggests that there are two substantive aspects of the right 
to health. The first simply relates to ‘the right to health care or health services (… generally 
understood as the provision of preventative, curative, and rehabilitative medical services)’.485 
This represents the most obvious element of the entitlement and, as such, there is a temptation 
to restrict understanding of the claim to these specific terms. Indeed, the challenge of 
actualising the right to health seems contingent upon clearly establishing how much 
physiological health (and as such corresponding health care) we can be entitled to. However, 
as Nolan confirms, in actuality this question is not restricted to determining the required level 
of access to health services, but rather extends to cover pre-requisites of healthiness upon which 
the relevance of such access depends. This understanding denotes the second substantive 
element of the right to health which Nolan defines as ‘the right to the underlying preconditions 
for health, including access to safe and potable water, adequate supplies of safe food, access to 
health-related education and information’.486 Similarly to Foreman’s assertion that the 
relevance of other human rights is dependent on securing ‘subsistence’, Nolan suggests that 
the task of maintaining ‘subsistence’ in the form of access to health care is contingent upon 
firstly providing the means by which such access can be appreciated and enjoyed. The ‘pre-
requisites’ of human healthiness are simply the foundational elements of such subsistence. 
Moreover, the duty to fulfil them correlates with both the ‘minimum core’ of obligations and 
the basic universal provisions which purportedly legitimise the entitlement. 
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Nolan goes on to reaffirm the ‘immediacy’ of the minimum core but concludes that the 
right to health is ultimately progressively realisable and limited by a state’s maximum available 
resources.487 Writing specifically within the context of the child’s right to health, Nolan 
develops this position further when reflecting upon the implications of the duties to ‘respect, 
protect and fulfil’. Notably, Nolan suggests that there is a clear hierarchical framework to the 
right to accomplishing these objectives. Whilst there are immediately realisable aspects of all 
three – ‘for fulfil’, as mentioned, this is seen to relate to ‘minimum core’ obligations – the 
scope of coverage and protection is intended to progress (and expand).488 Nolan maintains that 
the prioritisation of the focus of efforts to fully actualise the right should begin with the most 
immediate concerns. That is to say, although there are many significant factors which must be 
included within an accurate conceptualisation of the entitlement, the validity of individual 
factors is contingent on the implementation of others. For example, the relevance of ‘Y’ is 
dependent on firstly securing ‘X’ and ‘Z’ upon ‘Y’ and so on. As such, it appears to suggest 
that it is actually unhelpful to weigh the discussion in favour of the apparent importance of 
issues (e.g. health care), and instead proposes that the focus should be on establishing the 
contextual relevance of various elements. Regarding the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC 1989),489 Nolan demonstrates this, along with the potential scope of health-based 
protections, when she explains that:  
[F]ull implementation of this right includes taking measures to reduce infant and 
child mortality; to ensure the provision of the necessary medical assistance and 
healthcare to all children … to combat disease and malnutrition … to ensure 
appropriate pre-natal and post-natal healthcare to mothers … to develop 
preventative healthcare …and family planning education and services.490 
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 The ‘prioritisation’ template is useful because it can be used to conceptualise the right 
to health as a blue print with foundational, intermediate, and upper level objectives. 
Specifically, following Nolan’s description of the CRC, the upper levels would seemingly 
pertain to access to the highest attainable levels of medical care, intermediate to universal 
access to necessary basic medical care, and foundational to the prerequisites of healthiness (e.g. 
food, water)491 and the corresponding aim of equalising access to the protection. The evident 
significance of this account is that it could provide a clearer framework for determining the 
normative content of a practically realisable right to health. In practice, the determining criteria 
should relate to the concept of ‘necessity’ - understood as representing those things all human 
beings require (with the most universally relevant ‘needs’ taking priority over others) - as this 
retains the capacity to establish the legitimacy of the entitlement based on suggested un-
contentious factors of human healthiness. Naturally, these are largely physiological, but Nolan 
also attempts to demonstrate a clear correlation with other elements of health – such as access 
to water, or health education. In effect, therefore, and similar to Baxi’s approach, this 
interpretation arguably presents the right to health as a foundational claim which is capable of 
providing means to give effect to others.   
One final theoretical account worthy of consideration is that of J. P. Ruger. The 
importance of this account relates to its persuasiveness in rejecting attempts to reduce the 
debate to a deliberation on adequate health services.  Here, Ruger explains that: 
 [T]he focus on health care (mistakenly) suggest(s) that the major inequity in 
domestic international health is differential access to care, not differences in 
health. This emphasis has left scholars unspoken on the philosophical 
foundations of health and its distribution.492 
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 In order to counter this Ruger attempts to provide a ‘philosophical justification for the right to 
health’,493 and ultimately concludes that this entitlement should be understood as ‘an ethical 
demand for equity in health’.494 As with previous accounts, this interpretation incorporates the 
work of various legal scholars.  Indeed, it is through an examination of alternative efforts to 
qualify and quantify the right to health in normative terms that Ruger attempts to demonstrate 
the existence of unifying characteristics within the theoretical discourse. Essentially, she argues 
that these characteristics represent the core universalisable aspects of the right to health. In 
accordance with the aforementioned aim, Ruger advocates for the adoption of an interpretation 
of human healthiness which incorporates both ‘potential health and actual health’.495 This, she 
suggests, would provide clearer representation of ‘individuals practical opportunities for 
optimal health’.496 Whilst Ruger does not expand upon these terms in great detail, potential 
health would presumably concern the maximum possible health obtainable by each person – 
influenced by developing societal, environmental and technological factors, as well as 
‘preexisting illness’497 – with actual health representing the standard of health presently 
enjoyed. Although securing optimal health is the objective, due to the progressive nature of the 
protection - in accordance with continuing medical development and economic growth – it is 
possible that it will never be completely, definitively realised. In this sense, the objective is 
seemingly to strive to actualise the highest attainable potential health possible at any time (and 
consistent with contextual restrictions). Furthermore, it should be noted that the relative 
distance between these categories will be different for each individual. As such, determining 
this distance for an entire population can potentially provide means by which the medical needs 
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of certain individuals can be justifiably prioritised over others (as advocated by scholars 
previously discussed).  
Following previous approaches, Ruger maintains that an accurate definition of the right 
to health would transcend physiological factors and incorporate ‘additional health’ elements 
Ultimately, this definition ‘rests on the understanding that humans are biological organisms 
living in social environments. It thus concerns both physical and mental states and recognises 
that humans interact as social organisms …’.498 Crucially, Ruger explains that ‘an expanded 
model of health, which does not go all the way to include everything that is quality of life, can 
define the central features of human health at a practical (if not epistemological level)’.499 The 
key, therefore, is to recognise that this right cannot be an entitlement to access to all aspects of 
optimal healthiness, nor indeed purely to basic physiological health, but rather should be 
understood to be an entitlement to necessary (universally relevant) levels of healthiness. It is 
also worth noting that the concept of ‘central features’ appears commensurate to the ‘minimum 
core’ discussed by Foreman and the potential middle ground conceptualised by Baxi in 
previous accounts. 
Indeed, of particular significance is Ruger’s definition of these central features which 
she maintains ‘represent universally shared elements of health’.500 The idea of identifiable 
universally relevant aspects of health is used, in a similar manner to Nolan, to suggest that there 
are basic common denominators which all individuals require to enjoy a ‘human life’, or of a 
life worthy of a human being. In addition to previously established features, such as basic 
health, education, and access to safe water, Ruger draws from the preamble of the WHO, 
alongside academic commentary, to assert that healthiness is also dependent on various 
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‘psychosocial’ aspects.501 Recognition of this fact is seemingly significant because it appears 
to clarify the importance of social health components. That is to say, if psychosocial health 
impacts upon physiological health then it follows that additional social factors are pivotal to 
the concept of human healthiness, simply because psychosocial health is clearly contingent 
upon additional social factors, such as access to housing and employment.  
Additionally, Ruger maintains that the primary purpose of the right to health is not to 
provide means to a ‘good life’, as Baxi notably critiqued, but rather to ensure access to basic 
provisions which ‘promote the good life’.502 In articulating this point she reaffirmed the 
significance of the corresponding principles of ‘prevention and treatment’ in relation to the 
objective of enabling longevity (as well as quality) of life. In addition, similarly to various other 
accounts, Ruger suggests that the initial or immediate focus of the right should favour ‘those 
most deprived in health and at risk of health deprivation’.503 This, once again, relates to the 
proposed equalising aspect of the right to health. The ‘need’ to prioritise the interests of certain 
disadvantaged individuals stems from an understanding that the foundational aspect of this 
claim is to improve the general standard of living to a commensurate level with the less dis-
advantaged (and ultimately un-disadvantaged) members of any given state. The concept of 
progressive realisability would account for temporary contextual contingencies in relation to 
this standard. It is also, once again, reflective of the adopted method of Judge Hercules and the 
proposition that the ‘right’ answer, or approach, can mean different things depending on 
contextual circumstances. In addition, and as we briefly addressed in relation to ECHR case 
law in Chapter Three, it establishes that the existence of different approaches (or answers) does 
not invalidate the relevance (or legitimacy) of any specific approach, so long as it is consistent 
with the accepted legal knowledge and understanding of the place (and time) wherein it was 
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reached.504 Arguably, however, the most important aspect of Ruger’s account is the idea that 
the right to health should ‘emphasise individual agency and support efforts to improve health 
to equip individuals with the mental and physical ability required for agency’.505 Thus, a 
realisable right to health is presented as a necessary mechanism for securing ‘human 
subsistence’. As such, according to this interpretation, it must be an entitlement to more than 
adequate health care or access to the prerequisites for the sustainment of physiological health. 
Indeed, it is fundamentally a right to ‘human healthiness’, and includes corresponding 
entitlements to additional health factors upon which this depends. 
4.2.2 Constructing a Right to Health: Recurring Characteristics 
 
It is possible to identify several recurring underlying principles with regards to the 
theoretical debate on the right to health. Particularly, it is important to note that, even amongst 
those who argue against limiting the scope of the entitlement simply as a means of raising its 
universal applicability, there is a firm belief in the ‘necessity’ of certain provisions. In addition, 
it is evident that at the heart of each interpretation is an understanding that the successful 
fulfilment of the entitlement is actually dependent upon providing or securing access to ‘health 
provisions’ which are deemed necessary for individual subsistence. Indeed, academic 
disagreement regarding these provisions relates specifically to the nature of what is actually 
required and not to the legitimacy of the requirement itself. In this way, the foundational aspects 
of the theory of the right to health could be categorised as comprising two separate, but 
interconnected (and multifaceted) components:  
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(1) Necessity: reflecting the universal relevance of the claim - incorporating the 
need for equitable and non-discriminatory access to protection;  
(2) Subsistence: incorporating the specific interests needed to subsist as a human 
being/normative agent.  
Or, as it were, the belief that certain provisions are required to secure a standard of 
‘healthiness’ worthy of a human being. If we accept this definition then it follows, theoretically 
at least, that constructing a realisable right to health is simply dependent upon identifying what 
provisions (physiological, psychological, and social) are actually necessary to enable human 
healthiness. That is to say, the focus of the discourse should be on attempting to qualify what 
standard of living is commensurate with 'human subsistence' in specific terms. It is this task 
that the next section of this chapter will address. In doing so, and building upon Upendra Baxi, 
it will distinguish between different potential interpretations of the concept of subsistence; (i) 
bare, (ii) adequate, and (iii) maximum. Furthermore, it will argue that ‘human subsistence’ 
should ultimately be understood as the capacity to secure the enablement of individual 
agency.506 
4.3 The Right to Health and ‘Human Subsistence’ 
 
As established, this section of the chapter will examine the concept and justifiable scope 
of individual subsistence. Whilst this is a recurring foundational aspect of conceptions of 
universal human rights in general, this section will specifically address subsistence in the 
context of the right to health. In this regard three aspects of ‘human subsistence’ will be 
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explored; (i) bare, (ii) adequate and (iii) maximum. In practical terms, it will be established that 
each provides a significant contribution to our understanding of the right to health.  
To begin it is useful to briefly expand upon the definition of each form of human 
subsistence. In the context of the right to health, the ‘lowest’ form of subsistence should be 
regarded as ‘bare’, and generally accounts for the purely physiological aspect of the right to 
health. The ‘middle’ form of subsistence is ‘adequate’. This is bare subsistence plus some 
additional social elements (e.g. education, welfare). Finally, the ‘highest’ form of subsistence 
is termed ‘maximum’. This is bare subsistence plus all possible additional social elements plus 
optimal access and distribution of medicines and treatments.  
4.3.1 A Right to Health in the Context of Bare Subsistence 
 
It is proposed that bare subsistence can be satisfied simply by keeping the human body 
alive. With this approach, the quality of life is not important, merely the presence of it. Of 
course, the physiological element of healthiness is naturally a foundational aspect of the right 
to health. However, it is evident that a ‘fulfilled’ right cannot be satisfied simply by securing 
this requirement. Whilst the idea of bare subsistence has influenced the work of several legal 
scholars it is perhaps most notably represented in the writings of Upendra Baxi507 as previously 
addressed. With his accounts, the language ‘a living death’ is used to give meaning to this 
concept. Baxi explains that in many third world countries, such as sub-Saharan African nations, 
a combination of mass starvation, dehydration and lack of sanitation, has severely reduced the 
quality of life of the population at large.508 As such this is representative of bare subsistence in 
its most basic form – of the human body surviving, purely physiologically, in extreme 
                                                            
507 Upendra Baxi, ‘The Place of the Human Right to Health and Contemporary Approaches to Global Justice: 
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circumstances. This form of ‘a living death’ is commensurate to human life clearly unworthy 
of human beings. 
In assessing the practical implications of this further, we may briefly consider a 
theoretical account of bare subsistence by referencing the work of Michel Foucault. In ‘The 
Birth of the Clinic’, Foucault set out to explain how the evolution of medical knowledge in 
France during the nineteenth century was highly dependent on the exploitation of lower social 
classes.509 In this way, those who ‘volunteered’ for medical experimentation were themselves 
enduring a ‘living death’ not so dissimilar in context from the ones envisioned by Baxi in 
contemporary times. It is important to note that Foucault’s philosophical perspective was 
greatly influenced by the idea of ‘biopower’. This represents a process of continual subjugation 
which allows states to maintain dominion over their populations by establishing control over 
human bodies.510 In the context of health, it is embodied in what Foucault termed the ‘Medical 
Gaze’. The purpose of this ‘Gaze’ is not simply to observe the human body, to understand it, 
but to use this knowledge as means of establishing control: ‘The sovereignty of the gaze 
gradually establishes itself – the eye that knows and decides – the eye that governs’.511 Foucault 
argued that this allows medical observation to transpose the human being from a potential 
patient (and a source of knowledge) into a body through which state power may be imposed.  
Crucial to Foucault’s account on accessing medical care is the belief that all human 
beings are ‘sovereigns’ of their own body in the sense that the decision to seek treatment should 
be based upon ‘free consent’.512 This represents the idea that each individual has the authority 
to govern how their body is treated, and, within limitations, to determine what their body is 
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exposed to. It is thus a true manifestation of autonomy and embodies, as Isiah Berlin might 
suggest, acknowledgement that ‘the essence of human beings (is) to be able to choose how to 
live’.513 Yet, it is clear that such consent is conspicuously absent in states of bare subsistence. 
To this end, Foucault maintained that a pivotal point in French history occurred with formation 
of a mutual compromise agreed upon by the different social classes. Specifically, this resulted 
in the wealthy agreeing to finance the experimental treatment of the poor, who, as recompense, 
voluntarily allowed such means to be conducted in order to enhance the understanding of their 
condition and of the human body in general. As Foucault asserts, under these circumstances: 
 [T]here emerges for the rich man the utility of offering help to the hospitalised 
poor: by paying them to be treated, he is, by the same token, making possible a 
greater knowledge of the illness with which he himself may be affected; what is 
benevolence towards the poor is transformed into knowledge that is applicable 
to the rich ...514  
In theory, this arrangement benefited all parties as it would allow the sick access to 
much needed treatments which in turn, through their successful or unsuccessful administration, 
would enable greater understanding of the affliction. Though this compromise was seemingly 
logical in practical terms, there was, as Foucault expressed, a critical moral dilemma at the 
heart of this plan; ‘by what right can one transform into an object of clinical observation a 
patient whose poverty has compelled him to seek assistance at the hospital?’515  
Indeed, it was precisely the personal circumstances of these individuals that resulted in 
their subjection to potentially dangerous treatments as their only means by which to gain 
assistance.516 In the process of this, the possibility of ‘free consent’ is undermined. By making 
the availability of necessary medical treatment contingent upon agreement to the proposed 
terms, and in the absence of alternative means of obtaining such access, the decision to become 
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a patient was not based on choice. Furthermore, this exposed vulnerable individuals (in terms 
of both poverty and sickness) to the possibility of medical experimentation. From the 
standpoint of the doctor, Foucault characterised the belief that ‘[in] the hospital he is not 
fettered ... and his genius may express itself in a new way … patients are, for several reasons, 
the most suitable subjects for an experimental course …’.517 In addition to the lack of certainty 
of curative treatment with this, there was the added risk of it leading to the creation some other 
ailment (or indeed their death).  
This example is demonstrative of the fact that bare subsistence is insufficient because 
it lacks the ability to secure autonomous agency. Such agency is an integral component of the 
human identity, regardless of individual circumstances (e.g. whether they are healthy or 
unhealthy members of society). As Foucault notes, ‘a sick man does not cease to be a 
citizen’.518 As established in previous chapters, universal human rights are envisioned as 
essential tools for enabling human agency.519 If this is correct, then the right to health needs to 
do more than offer the sustainment of physical health (as this can take many forms, some of 
which, as we have seen, are incompatible with human subsistence). However, there is some 
practical significance with this concept regarding the affirmation that the right to health needs 
to begin with concerns of a physiological nature. 
4.3.2 A Right to Health in the Context of Adequate Subsistence 
 
If ‘bare subsistence’ relates purely to certain physiological elements all human beings 
must have to retain the capacity to enable their own agency, then adequate subsistence accounts 
for the additional elements of health all human beings need to actualise this process of 
enablement. As discussed in previous chapters, there has been a tendency among many legal 
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scholars to attempt to link the legitimacy of human rights to the concept of shared humanity.520 
This argument asserts that because we are all ‘equally human’, in the sense that we all share 
certain basic characteristics – such as moral agency and vulnerability - we are all entitled to 
certain provisions or protections which allow us to exercise our humanity (or afford us the 
opportunity to make autonomous choices regarding how best to live).521 Whilst the concept of 
‘necessity’ is integral to this approach, the focus is on emphasising the universality of basic 
human characteristics in order to legitimise the relevance and applicability of certain 
determined entitlements.  
However, Costas Douzinas has argued that it is actually unhelpful to ground the 
legitimacy of human rights in concepts of shared humanity because ‘[t]he idea of “humanity” 
has no fixed meaning and cannot act as the source of moral or legal rules’.522 As discussed in 
Chapter Two, the term has many historical connotations unrelated, or indeed directly opposed, 
to notions of equality and non-discrimination which are fundamental to the concept of universal 
rights (and specifically the right to health).523 Indeed, in many communities the term 
‘humanity’ has been used to define a hierarchy of existence based on a perceived gradation of 
‘worth’. For this reason, Douzians concludes that the word is incapable of affording legitimacy 
to a concept of purported moral and universal validity. Instead, he suggests that the legitimacy 
of rights is truly grounded in their capacity to articulate claims to basic needs: ‘Rights allow us 
to express our needs in language by formulating them as a demand’.524 
This approach recognises the potential validity of certain inherent human characteristics 
but suggests that basic human needs are easier to determine, less contentious, and consequently 
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provide a stronger foundation for universal claims. The significance of the needs themselves 
would be dependent on the scope of their relevance in relation to other individuals. The greater 
this scope, the stronger the claim for entitlements to corresponding action. Ultimately, this 
position is based on the understanding that human life, in a physiological sense, in and of itself 
has no moral significance. That is to say, the process of living, of surviving, is an incomplete 
universal need (see for example bare subsistence). What matters is the quality of life – of living 
a life worthy of a human being – and not of ensuring simply that you are able to live (or survive 
physiologically). Similarly, the ability to live a life of maximum possible quality is un-relatable 
as a basic need, due to the fact that perceptions of what this represents are unavoidably relative 
and contextually contingent. Briget C. A. Toebes summarised this effectively when she 
explained: 
 [T]he term ‘right to health’ is awkward since it suggests that people have a right 
to something that cannot be guaranteed, namely ‘perfect health’ or ‘to be 
healthy’. It has been suggested that health is such a highly subjective matter, 
varying from person to person and also from country to country.525  
For example, what constitutes maximum quality in developing states is unlikely to 
qualify as such in Western Europe. It is for this reason that, as Griffin suggests, the starting 
focus for universal rights should be on accounting for those things ‘grounded in basic human 
needs’.526 With regards to the right to health, this would incorporate bare subsistence in the 
form of basic physiological health as well as some additional factors of social wellness required 
to enable ‘human healthiness’. The discussion on what these should relate to in more specific 
terms will be addressed in greater detail with the subsequent section of this chapter. For now, 
the key confirmation is that human healthiness is not merely physiological and that other social 
rights impact upon the effectiveness of the right to health.  
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4.3.3 A Right to Health in the Context of Maximum Subsistence 
 
The concept of maximum subsistence correlates with the objective of securing the 
highest attainable standard of health. This would pertain to providing equal access to the best 
possible medical care of the time, as well as accounting for all additional elements of social 
wellness; education, welfare, employment, and housing. Thus, this form of subsistence is 
arguably representative of the desired ‘end’ of the right to health,527 that which the right 
ultimately aims to achieve. Consequently, it appears unrealisable as fundamental claim. That 
is to say, if the right to health is to be understood purely as an entitlement to maximum 
subsistence, then it cannot be quantifiable in practical terms or, therefore, truly universally 
applicable. For example, it would appear as if such a claim could only define general duties, 
such as the promotion of the advancement of health, and not specific obligations regarding 
precisely what states must do to give effect to this entitlement.  
The difficulty with such an approach, as Onora O’Neill explains, is that, for purely 
pragmatic reasons, rights need corresponding duties; definable obligations which can be 
imposed upon a specific state or the international community at large.528 Accordingly, for any 
right to be regarded as valid it must be able to articulate what is required for it to be fulfilled in 
precise terms. An inability to do so undermines the legitimacy of the right itself (as it effectively 
represents acknowledgement that the claim is unrealisable in a practical sense).529 O’Neill’s 
position thus reaffirms Griffin’s assertion that we cannot have rights to an idea, but only to 
tangible things which we can practically claim based on identifiable universal needs. Indeed, 
these protections are validated, not only by the demonstration of this need, but by the inherent 
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potentiality of securing their implementation (which is dependent upon their being sufficiently 
defined). 
This is particularly relevant in relation to the concept of maximum subsistence because, 
as discussed, Paul Hunt - as Special Rapporteur for Health - consistently refused to specify 
what exact normative content is required for a universalisable right to health. He maintained 
that the duty of the Special Rapporteur is to adjudicate the evolving discourse and facilitate the 
development of the conversation and not to provide conclusive commentary regarding what 
the right to health should be in definitive terms.530 The problem with this approach is that it 
runs the risk of conflating the claim. Indeed, by refusing to limit the focus of the discussion 
there is a danger that the scope of the entitlement cannot correlate with practical realities (and 
is therefore easily dismissed).  
To further emphasise this point, it is worth referencing Aryeh Neier who, in ‘Social and 
Economic Rights: A Critique’, suggests that a broad approach to the question of determining 
the content of such entitlements is incapable of satisfactorily resolving the issue. This, he 
argues, is due to the fact that ‘not everybody can have everything’ with such claims, and as 
such ‘certain decisions and choices’ have to be made ‘when one comes to the question of 
benefits’.531 In other words, the realisability of social rights is contingent on prioritising certain 
objectives over others and placing commensurate focus on the corresponding methods which 
are required to secure their practical implementation. To confirm, the ‘highest attainable 
standard of health’ is not a practically or universally realisable claim.532 The choice Neier 
mentions must surely relate to determining what standard of protections and entitlements 
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human beings need, and not what, in theoretical terms, they may be held to deserve for one 
reason or another. This is primarily due to the fact that conceptions of what individuals 
‘deserve’ are themselves contextually and culturally contingent. For example, in developed 
states an individual could argue that they deserve coffee breaks at work or paid vacations based 
on their specific working conditions. Yet this claim would have no practical relevance to the 
millions of impoverished individuals who are starving throughout the world. Whilst Article 24 
of the UDHR does recognise that ‘Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including … 
periodic holidays with pay’,533 Elisabeth Reichert questions whether ‘paid vacation [would] 
have the same human rights status in less economically developed countries that may not be 
able to pay for vacations?’534 In responding to this she concludes that the idea is too ‘Western 
oriented and lofty in its realisation even if the concept has merit’.535 
It is worth noting, however, that there is an alternative way of conceptualising 
maximum subsistence. Namely, as the philosophical (aspirational) core of the entitlement that 
ensures that the normative content continues to match up to real world situations and, as such, 
that the quality of the protection, access, and treatment continues to progressively improve (e.g. 
representative of the ‘general principles which underlie and justify the settled law’536 in relation 
to the right to health that allow us to determine the legitimacy of interpretations/evolutions of 
this concept). 
4.3.4 Focusing the Right to Health: Assessing Achievable Subsistence 
 
It is possible to draw several conclusions from this analysis. Firstly, it appears as if the 
right to health would offer inadequate protection if it focussed purely on bare subsistence. 
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Similarly, it also cannot be an entitlement to maximum subsistence due to the prevalence of 
contextual limitations (for example, economic and/or social disparities between different 
states). Indeed, the principles of equity and non-discriminatory in relation to access clearly 
cannot be met if the right is held to be an entitlement to maximum subsistence. Instead, it seems 
preferable to understand the claim as an entitlement to adequate subsistence, but which imposes 
a corresponding duty to continually strive for the maximum achievable standard. The core of 
this approach is certainty of a demonstrable need for such a protection. In acknowledging the 
universal legitimacy of this need, the crucial question then becomes – what level of 
‘healthiness’ is required for human subsistence – understood as the ability to live a life worthy 
of a human being? 
It has been suggested that the concept of universal human rights is justifiable only when 
it translates to entitlements to those things necessary for human subsistence, not simply those 
that would benefit or enhance it.537 In this way, Samuel Moyn’s noted ‘need’ to refocus the 
discourse and limit the scope of rights,538 specifically in relation to the right to health, actually 
translates as a requirement to focus the discussion of its normative content within this 
framework. 
This chapter suggests that performing this task for the right to health can potentially 
provide a template for all other rights by conceptualising the right to health as a foundational 
claim. Indeed, reconceptualising rights with the aim of assisting the objective of securing their 
universal application should incorporate two stages; (i) define the normative content of these 
entitlements in terms of human subsistence; (ii) address the specifics of practical application 
(e.g. on both the legislative and judicial level). 
                                                            
537 As represented in Griffin’s account of the ‘functioning human agent’. James Griffin, On Human Rights 
(Oxford University Press, 2008) 35. 
538 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Belknap Press 2012) 226-227. 
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In conclusion, this thesis will proceed with the understanding that ‘adequate 
subsistence’ accounts for the necessary normative content of the right to health in the specific 
contexts of each state (e.g. securing the elements of healthiness required to enable a 
‘functioning human agent’), with this standard continually developing, universally, in 
accordance with the concept of ‘maximum subsistence’ (representative of the most optimal 
means by which the purpose of human rights may be fulfilled).  
4.4 A Normative Account of the Right to Health as a Right to Human 
Healthiness 
 
The basic human rights are the rights necessary for the development and 
exercise of autonomy.539 
In previous sections it was suggested that the human right to health should be 
understood as an entitlement to the basic level of human healthiness required to enable 
individual agency (that which Griffin termed normative agency).540 Individual agency is 
defined here as the combination of two basic human characteristics; (i) autonomy and (ii) 
liberty. In explaining the relationship between these concepts Griffin states that: 
Normative agency consists not only in deciding for oneself what is worth doing, 
but also in doing it. We attach great value not only to the autonomy of our 
decisions but also to our accomplishing something with our lives by carrying out 
our decisions … That is, we also value our liberty.541  
As such, actualised agency simply denotes the ability for individuals to make informed 
choices in the pursuit of their own perception of the ‘worthwhile life’.542 The final section of 
this chapter will expand upon this further and consider the required normative content of the 
interpretation of the right to health as a right to human healthiness. As mentioned, the 
enablement of individual agency represents the process of providing the means to develop and 
                                                            
539 William Talbott, Which Rights Should Be Universal? (Oxford University Press 2005) 113. 
540 James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2008) 33. 
541 ibid. 151-152. 
542 ibid 45. 
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exercise autonomy and self-determination. The right to health is presented as an enabling right 
for this reason because a necessary level of human healthiness must be provided and secured 
for other rights to take effect. Right’s to life, privacy, and freedom of expression, for example, 
provide the means by which to protect only individual agencies that have already been enabled, 
and are thus able to appreciate the significance of such protections.  This chapter argues that 
an individual must first enjoy a level of human healthiness, defined as a combination of 
physiological, psychological, and social elements, for this agency to be enabled (or even 
possible).   
There are seemingly two corresponding questions stemming from this premise which 
must be addressed before proceeding. Firstly, if this assertion is correct, then how have rights 
remained relevant in those states where human rights are already legally enforced – such as 
ECHR member states - where no right to health is applied? Surely this fact refutes the notion 
that a fully realised right to health is necessary to secure the enablement of individual agency? 
Secondly, even if this suggestion is correct, how would we determine which elements of 
healthiness should meet the definition of providing the means to enable individual agency? It 
is worth briefly tackling these concerns, starting with the former. It could be argued that in 
states where human rights are already implemented, a sufficient level of human healthiness is 
already provided despite the absence of a legally enforced right to health.543 However, this 
observation does not invalidate the suggestion that a sufficient level of human healthiness is 
required to give effect to other human rights. It simply highlights that this has, to date, been 
capable without an actualised right to health. Yet, this fact does not provide any guarantee that 
this will continue indefinitely. The argument advanced with this chapter has been that an 
actualised right to health is required to guarantee and sustain the capacity to enable individual 
                                                            
543 For example, within the context of the U.K. despite the fact that the European Convention on Human Rights 
(1950) does not bestow a ‘right to health’, U.K. citizens (as well as all those residing in the U.K.) have free 
access to the National Health Service. 
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agency, not that it is impossible to provide this capacity without a realised entitlement.544 This 
position can be strengthened further by drawing reference to those states where human rights 
protections, of any meaningful kind, have yet to be secured.545 In such states, a sufficient level 
of human healthiness is often strikingly absent, which would seem to reinforce our argument, 
if anything. 
The second concern is perhaps most pertinent to this chapter. The process of 
determining what specific elements of human healthiness are required to secure the enabling 
capacity is obviously of paramount importance. As suggested in the previous section, this 
should correlate with the task of securing adequate human subsistence – those healthiness 
elements that all human beings need to enjoy a level of health worthy of a human life – 
understood as that which provides the means to enable individual agency.546 Analysis of the 
academic approach to providing a theoretical account of the right to health identified a 
recurring perception that human health is composed of physiological, psychological, and social 
elements. This chapter concludes by briefly addressing each of these categories in turn in an 
attempt to establish some justifiable normative content based on the established definition of 
the fundamental purpose of this claim. 
4.4.1 Physiological Components of Healthiness 
 
The first category is perhaps simultaneously the most obvious component of human 
healthiness and also the most contentious. This dichotomy is due to the fact that it must, by 
definition, prescriptively relate to health care provisions. A spectrum of problems stem from 
                                                            
544 This is of course true of all human rights and does not specifically relate to the right to health. For example, 
the absence of a fully realised right to freedom of expression would not dictate that a state would be incapable of 
protecting it, only that it would be unable to guarantee the sustainment of such protection.  
545 For example, states such as Liberia. See Katharine Derderian and Helene Lorinquer and Stéphan 
Goetghebuer, ‘Post-War Liberia: Healthcare in the Balance’ (2007) 28 Forced Migration Review 19.  
546 That which James Griffin defines as ‘a functioning human agent’. James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford 
University Press 2008) 88. 
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this but the most important pertain to issues of financing and scope.547  How much health care 
are we, as human beings, entitled to by default? Further, how are we to justify this component 
as a universal claim when its relevance is seemingly contingent on the presence of certain social 
and economic conditions? In brief, if the realisation that the capacity to live a ‘human life’ is 
dependent on enjoying a basic level of physiological health is seemingly self-evident, the 
ability to define a realisable means of providing it in specific terms is much more complex.548 
The purpose of this section is to offer some clarification in pursuit of this end. Drawing from 
analysis conducted within this chapter (in relation to both existing international treaties and 
academic opinion), it is possible to suggest some basic aspects of this component of human 
healthiness. For example: 
• Pre-requisites of physiological health; access to safe water and safe food.  
• Preventative treatments (including basic health education – such as sex education). 
• Diagnostic & Curative treatments (including mental health). 
As touched on earlier in the chapter, the prerequisites of physiological health appear to 
represent the most basic elements of human healthiness. It is un-contentious to assert that the 
human body cannot survive without vital nourishments in the form of water and food.549 Thus, 
it is logical to regard access to these factors as the most fundamental aspect of the claim.  
                                                            
547 When explaining the controversy surrounding economic and social rights, like the rights to health and 
education, Brigit C. A. Toebes suggested that the nature of the protection itself (and what is understood to be 
required for it to be satisfactorily fulfilled) ‘creates fear on the part of States for financial commitments once 
they guarantee these rights’. Briget C. A. Toebes, The Right to Health as a Human Right in International Law 
(Intersentia Publishers 1999) 6. 
548 Jennifer Prah Ruger, ‘Toward a Theory of a Right to Health: Capability and Incompletely Theorized 
Agreements’ (2006) 18 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 273, 317. 
549 On this see Peter Gleick who maintains ‘an absolute “minimum water requirement” for humans, independent 
of lifestyle and culture, can be defined only for maintaining human survival’. Peter H. Gleick, ‘Basic Water 
Requirements for Human Activities’ (1996) 21 Water International 83, 83-84  
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In relation to medical treatments, there are arguably two separate but correlating 
categories. The first can be termed ‘Preventative Treatments’, and relates, in its most basic 
form, to health education – such as access to information on sexual health and 
contraceptives.550 It would also cover basic inoculations as well as education aimed at 
preventing the development of (and thus need to treat) certain ailments in later life. Within a 
Western context this could seek to tackle what Elbe termed ‘non-communicable “lifestyle 
afflictions” such as smoking, obesity and alcoholism …’.551 
By far the most contentious form of medical care, in relation to the task of constructing 
a universally applicable right to health, relates to ‘Diagnostic & Curative’ treatments. These 
would cover all physiological aspects of health, biological (in the form of diseases), physical 
injuries, and also mental illness. Indeed, as will be explained later in the section, this chapter 
makes an important distinction between mental health (which is essentially interpreted as an 
extension of physical health) and psychological health (which is presented as the culmination 
of all aspects of human healthiness). For this reason, it is vital to acknowledge that mental 
health related issues must be accounted for in a commensurate manner to physical or biological 
elements. Following the established guidance regarding how to determine the required 
inclusion of content, it seems that a crucial distinction should be between ‘life saving’ and ‘life-
enhancing’ treatments.552 Undoubtedly, this is itself far from conclusive. Indeed, what 
represents ‘life saving’ in highly developed Western states is still likely to do so in third world 
states presently lacking the means to provide access to such care. For example, medicines 
capable of effectively treating HIV/AIDS. Jonathan Wolff explains that efforts at combating 
                                                            
550 Jonathan Wolff explains that such access is important in preventing the spread of various deadly diseases 
(including HIV/AIDS). On this point he notes that ‘[c]ondom use is clearly a very important strategy, and has 
further benefits in contraception and prevention of other sexually transmitted diseases’. Jonathan Wolff, The 
Human Right to Health (W. W. Norton & Company 2013) 84. 
551 Stefan Elbe, Security and Global Health: Toward the Medicalisation of Insecurity (Polity Press 2010) 132. 
552 Unless, of course, this ‘enhancing’ treatment would provide means of correcting a pre-existing inequality in 
relation to the standard of health an individual enjoyed. 
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the disease have been largely defined by ‘restricted access to very expensive patented 
medicines …’.553 Surely this observation invalidates the notion that the right to health is 
universally applicable as a consistent claim?  Yet the key to this principle is the idea that all 
states have a duty to ensure that access to basic ‘life saving’ saving treatments are afforded, 
and not that all possible life saving treatments must be provided.554 What constitutes ‘basic’ 
would logically be contextually contingent to a large extent. It would take account of certain 
contextual limitations but would also, through the promotion of progressive realisability, 
attempt to ensure that the quality of care provided continued to improve indefinitely. For 
example, the formula should be; what constitutes life-saving in state X – in the context of both 
social and technological expectations? Naturally, a third world country would not be required 
to provide certain highly expensive procedures in the same manner as more developed ones 
might. This is not to say they would fail their obligation (e.g. reflective of Judge Hercules) to 
enforce the right to health by such inability. Rather, the satisfactory fulfilment of this obligation 
would be dependent on providing for those treatments which are realistically deliverable within 
the contextual circumstances of the individual state. This process would therefore appear to be 
representative of the perfectibility of rights once again.  In essence, this stage ensures that the 
human body is able to subsist in physiological terms. 
Having discussed the most apparent aspects of physiological health, it is worth briefly 
considering additional components of physical (i.e. biological) healthiness unrelated, or 
transcendent, to physiological which are nevertheless crucial to the capacity of enabling 
individual agency. As previously addressed, when considering the required focus of a right to 
health, Jennifer Ruger referenced academic research which identified certain factors beyond 
                                                            
553 Jonathan Wolff, The Human Right to Health (W. W. Norton & Company 2013) 39. 
554 That is to say, simply because something has been developed somewhere in the world which has been 
identified as having the capacity to treat a particular illness, this fact cannot realistically be held to entitle all 
peoples to its provision. Instead, it is suggested that this should operate in accordance with the principle of 
‘progressive realisation’ discussed earlier in this chapter. 
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physical needs relevant to human health. Ruger explained that these had been termed 
‘psychosocial’ and that research indicated that they are ‘strongly related to depression and other 
mental illness.’555 For our purposes, it is helpful to now consider the composition of necessary 
‘psychosocial’ elements by tackling them in two separate categories: (i) psychological issues 
and (ii) social issues, respectively. 
4.4.2 Psychological Components of Healthiness 
 
The first, and perhaps most obvious extension to physical health, can broadly be termed 
‘psychological’. Although, as mentioned, this is principally understood to relate to issues of 
‘mental health’, it is possible to provide a more expansive definition. Specifically, by 
interpreting psychological health as representing the culmination of all other aspects of human 
healthiness. In support of this position we can reference the pre-requisites of health, as well as 
physical health, which are generally regarded as being more important (as they must be present 
before psychological health can become meaningful). As such, psychological healthiness is 
seemingly dependent upon enjoying an adequate level of physiological health. Psychological 
health therefore represents the ‘free consent’ envisioned by Foucault, as it essentially denotes 
the ability to make fully realised choices in relation to health (e.g. the sovereignty of the body), 
up to and including choosing to pursue experimental treatments or indeed to decline medical 
assistance. Interestingly, this would also seem to legitimise the notion of ‘a right to die’, as 
discussed by Baxi,556 so long as the decision is autonomous. This is because, as Albert Bandura 
highlights, ‘agency thus involves not only the deliberative ability to make choices and action 
                                                            
555 Jennifer Prah Ruger, ‘Toward a Theory of a Right to Health: Capability and Incompletely Theorized 
Agreements’ (2006) 18 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 273, 315. 
556 Baxi discussed this in relation to ‘physician-assisted suicide’. Upendra Baxi, ‘The Place of the Human Right 
to Health and Contemporary Approaches to Global Justice: Some Impertinent Interrogations’ in John Harrington 
(ed) and Maria Stuttaford (ed), Global Health & Human Rights: Legal and Philosophical Perspectives 
(Routledge Press, 2012) 14. 
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plans, but also the ability to construct appropriate courses of action and to motivate and regulate 
their execution’.557 
Hypothetically, therefore, any individual who had been provided access to all preceding 
necessary components of human healthiness and decides to voluntarily relinquish their life 
should be allowed to do so – as it fulfils the actualisation of their agency.558 This would 
seemingly remain true even if the rationale behind the decision was not based on, or indeed 
influenced by, physiological health matters. That is to say, if the legitimacy of the claim is 
based upon its conformity with normative agency, then this ‘right to choose’ in relation to the 
right to die should not be restricted to situations where the physiological quality of life is 
significantly impaired.559 The presence of such impairment is not a necessary condition for 
justifying the capacity to give effect to this right. This is because, as we have seen, human 
healthiness is not a purely physiological concept. An individual who has grown weary of living 
and, in anticipation of the eventual development of physical impairments (either mental or 
physiological), decides to forgo the opportunity to continue their life should surely have this 
decision respected. 
Certainly this area is tremendously controversial, as evidenced by case law on the 
issue.560 In order to protect against potential misuse, the general principle should be that, so 
                                                            
557 Albert Bandura, ‘Toward a Psychology of Human Agency’ (2006) 1 Perspectives on Psychological Science 
164,165. 
558 ‘Respect for personhood would require respect for its very existence. But respect for personhood would 
require respect also for its exercise—for example, in reaching a judgement that suicide in certain conditions is 
rational’. James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2008) 217. 
559 For a relevant case law example on this relating to the U.K. see Nicklinson and Lamb v United Kingdom 
[2015] ECHR 783. Although Tony Nicklinson was suffering from ‘locked-in syndrome’, having been left 
severely paralysed after a stroke (and as such unable to take his own life), his claim for being afforded a right to 
die – via assisted death (which would normally constitute a criminal offence under U.K. law) under Article 8 of 
the ECHR (Respect for Private and Family Life) was ultimately unsuccessful. For an insightful review of this 
see Elizabeth Wicks, ‘Nicklinson and Lamb V United Kingdom: Strasbourg Fails to Assist on Assisted Dying in 
the UK’ (2016) 24 Medical Law Review 63.  
560 See Stephen Hoffman, ‘Symposium: Jurisprudence and the Body: Taking the Pulse of Health Law: 
Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Comparison of E.U and U.S Law’ (2013) 63 Syracuse Law 
Review 383. 
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long as other areas of healthiness have been accounted for - and as such the decision is 
verifiably based on a fully actualised agency - then it ought to be honoured (and the choice to 
relinquish normative agency through suicide protected). However, in the event that all 
additional elements have not been accounted for, then the initial obligation ought to be to secure 
the means of providing them. This is to ensure that the decision consistently represents a truly 
autonomous choice (one based on all necessary factors), and does not result from temporary, 
or beneficially alterable, conditions of healthiness (unless, as mentioned, access to such means 
is already available and has been rejected by the individual in question).    
4.4.3 Social Components of Healthiness 
 
The social aspects of the concept of human healthiness simply pertain to certain vital 
non-physical components. As example, this chapter argues that enjoyment of the right to health, 
as a right to human healthiness, is contingent upon access to housing and an adequate level of 
education. The former is significant primarily because it provides shelter in the form of an 
environment capable of cultivating individual development.561 Indeed, the concept of 
‘physiological health’, as well as the wider notion of human healthiness, surely necessitates the 
provision of basic conditions in which its sustainment can be safely secured. Similarly, a 
sufficient level of education is required in order to afford individuals a means of earning 
financial (and as such physiological) subsistence.562 To further emphasise this point, it is worth 
referencing Costas Douzinas who argues that an important (and largely undervalued) aspect of 
being human is the ability to recognise that ‘every person is a world and comes into existence 
in common with others, that we are all in community’.563 The social aspects of healthiness 
                                                            
561 As represented in Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), and the genesis of the 
modern right to health, which states that the right includes entitlements to adequate ‘housing … and necessary 
social services’. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A (III) 
(UDHR) <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a25> accessed 18 May 2018.   
562 William J. Talbott, Which Rights Should Be Universal? (Oxford University Press 2005) 163. 
563 Costas Douzinas, ‘The Paradoxes of Human Rights’ (2013) 20 Constellations 59, 59. 
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relate to the idea that our individuality – and as such capacity to develop and exercise our own 
autonomy - is dependent upon the interaction and acknowledgement of other human beings.564 
That is to say, our appreciation of health, in a purely physiological sense, is influenced by 
recognition of its value in relation to what possessing an adequate level of it allows us to do in 
social terms. On a fundamental level, it provides us with an opportunity to attain subsistence 
in accordance with the pursuit of our own interpretation of the ‘good life’. In this way, it is 
possible to regard social health as certain foundational components which are necessary for 
developing the enablement of agency.  
4.4.4 Hierarchy of Normative Components of the Right to Health 
 
Having briefly considered some of the required content of the right to health, it is worth 
attempting to reconceptualise the process of prioritising relevant components. Significantly, 
and in accordance with the perfectibility of law (e.g. the idea that the correct answer is relative, 
representing optimal appreciation of the issue within specific contexts), this process need not 
be structured in an absolute manner (i.e. with one complete category taking definitive 
precedence universally). Instead, different elements of each category should be given 
precedence over others (in a manner that most optimally fulfils the purpose of the right within 
each individual state).565 Despite this, it is still possible to conceptualise a basic template for 
actualising the right to health which could have universal relevance. For example, the pre-
requisites of health would generally be understood as the most fundamental components for 
                                                            
564 This position has also been used to validate the universal applicability of human rights in general. Most 
notably Shaun Pattinson and Deryck Blelyveld have developed the theoretical approach initially proposed by 
Alan Gewirth to suggest that ‘all agents (beings with the capacity to pursue purposes voluntarily that they treat 
as reasons for their actions) must grant ―generic rights (rights to conditions that are necessary for 
action/successful action regardless of the purposes involved) to all agents on pain of contradicting that they 
themselves are agents’. Shaun Pattinson and Deryck Beyleveld, ‘Defending Moral Precaution as a Solution to 
the Problem of Other Minds: a reply to Holm and Coggon’ (2012) 23 Ratio Juris 258, 259. 
565 Thus, reflecting the model proposed by Aoife Nolan which was discussed earlier in the chapter. See Aoife 
Nolan, ‘The Childs Right to Health and the Courts’ in John Harrington (ed) and Maria Stuttaford (ed), Global 
Health & Human Rights: Legal and Philosophical Perspectives (Routledge Press, 2012). 140. 
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the reasons previously addressed. Following this would be some basic social elements, then 
health care aspects, before psychological components. 
Under this interpretation, psychological aspects are considered to be the highest form 
of human healthiness, because they are seen to represent fully enabled individual agency. 
However, they cannot take precedence over other elements upon which their own enjoyment 
depends. For example, it is evident that psychological health as defined here cannot be fully 
realised without the fulfilment of both social and physiological elements. In contrast, both 
social and physiological health can be satisfied to some extent without firstly accounting for 
psychological health. Consequently, as it represents actualised normative agency – the ability 
to make actionable autonomous choices - the ultimate purpose of the right to health is arguably 
to secure psychological health. To clarify, the hierarchical structure of components of the right 
to health would be as follows: 
1. Pre-requisites of health; access to food and water. 
2. Housing; access to shelter as non-physiological pre-requisite. 
3. Preventative Treatments; health education/contraceptives. 
4. Diagnostic & Curative Treatments; contextually determined. 
5. Education (Formal); introduction to social interaction/community. 
6. Psychological components; representative of actualised normative agency. 
These components can arguably be broken down even further to identify a three-stage 
process to the objective of fulfilling the right to health. In this way, the first two components 
provide the basic platform and account for a form of ‘bare subsistence’ with regards to the 
concept of human healthiness. They represent the foundational aspects of individual agency; 
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those things upon which the ability to provide and then protect the exercise of such agency 
depends. The second stage relates to the middle two components, and, together with the first 
stage, represents the fundamental aspects necessary to secure an adequate level of physiological 
health. The third stage incorporates the final two components and denotes the capacity to give 
effect to the optimal enablement of individual agency. This represents the ultimate fulfilment 
of the process and the actualisation of the right to health as an entitlement to human healthiness. 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined the theoretical approach to the right to health in an attempt 
to reaffirm it as a justifiable universal claim. In the process, it has established that this right is 
not simply an entitlement to an adequate level of health care. Indeed, by drawing on various 
important academic approaches, it has been seen that the concept of ‘healthiness’, as it pertains 
to human beings, is more than physiological, but also social and ultimately psychological. As 
such, this chapter has argued that a normative account of the right to health must incorporate 
all elements of human healthiness if it is to retain the capacity to successfully fulfil the 
legitimising purpose of the claim (e.g. to enable normative agency). This chapter has attempted 
to provide some further clarification in relation to the required content of a universally 
applicable normative account by examining the concept of ‘human subsistence’. Such analysis 
resulted in the conclusion that the right to health, as an enabler of individual agency, should be 
understood as a right to human healthiness. Indeed, if Costas Douzinas is correct and ‘human 
rights construct humans’,566 it is simply because they provide individuals with either the 
opportunity to enable, exercise, or protect their own agency.  
                                                            
566 Costas Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (Routledge 
Cavendish 2007) 57. 
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To reinforce these conclusions, and as means of identifying the required scope of the 
right to health, this chapter examined various forms of human subsistence – namely (i) bare, 
(ii) adequate, and (iii) maximum, respectively. Here, it was determined that bare subsistence 
relates to mere physiological survival. In the context of the right to health, this would be 
represented by the provision of basic pre-requisites of healthiness (such as safe food, shelter, 
and clean drinking water). Alternatively, adequate subsistence was seen to relate to a 
satisfactory standard of human functioning. In the context of the right to health, it was argued 
that this would therefore be represented by the provision of a sufficient level of protection for 
the different aspects of human healthiness (physiological, psychological, and social). Finally, 
maximum subsistence was defined as the most optimal level of healthiness possible. Thus, in 
the context of the right to health it was suggested that this is arguably reflected in the objective 
of obtaining the ‘highest attainable’ standard of health.  
In building on this analysis, this chapter next attempted to provide some guidance in 
relation to specific content required to account for physiological, social, and psychological 
healthiness. Whilst the task of securing each category in accordance with the concept of 
adequate subsistence was discussed, it was suggested that a realisable normative account must 
take various contextual limitations into consideration, particularly with regards to ‘medical 
treatments’. The key component of this interpretation is to afford an element of flexibility in 
relation to the means of securing the right to health, and not the actual purpose or required 
scope of the entitlement. Additionally, any accommodations provided must be temporary in 
nature and offered with the understanding that, in accordance with the notion of progressive 
realisability, contextual circumstances will develop towards improvement and the ultimate 
alleviation of potential limitations. In this way, the right to health, as a right to human 
healthiness, could represent a universal foundational right to human rights. The quality of 
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protection could and should continue to improve, universally, although potentially at different 
rates in places, in line with societal, economical, and technological advances.  
As such, it was ultimately held that the right to health is, in the first instance, 
realistically a right to adequate subsistence (e.g. protecting those things necessary to enable a 
‘functioning human agent’). This is understood to relate to the provision of a satisfactory level 
of access to the relevant components of human healthiness (e.g. physiological, psychological, 
and social) in manner which accurately reflects optimal means of fulfilment within each 
specific state. It was further suggested that the inherent progressive realisability of the right to 
health requires continuing development/evolution with regard to the standard of protection 
provided (in accordance with the ‘perfectibility of law’ approach addressed in previous 
chapters). 
It is suggested that the most important conclusion from this analysis, in accordance with 
the central aim of the thesis, it that it establishes the right to health as a necessary claim for the 
enablement of human agency. It therefore validates its legitimacy as a universal right 
(irrespective of contextual concerns which appear to undermine it – such as those relating to 
economic issues). Furthermore, it is proposed that the integration of the concept of progressive 
realisation into the human rights discourse represents acknowledgement of the non-
definitiveness/absoluteness of such protections, as well as evidences the inherent perfectibility 
of human rights/fundamental protections. In doing so, it confirms that the universality of rights 
cannot be made contingent upon the feasibility or strength of accepted contextual 
interpretations. Finally, this investigation has demonstrated that, due to the inherent 
perfectibility of their substantive content (as well as the means by which means by which they 
may optimally be fulfilled), universal human rights are best understood as foundational claims 
(open to legitimate evolution and development). 
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5 Health, Security, and Subsistence: Assessing the 
Absoluteness of Universal Human Rights 
5.1 Introduction 
 
With the previous chapter we assessed the theoretical scope of the concept of the human 
right to health. This concluded with the suggestion that the right to health is best understood as 
a foundational claim. Foundational, in this sense, is to be understood as representing several 
significant ideas. Firstly, as evidenced by the adoption of the concept of progressive realisation 
by both academics and member states of relevant international treaties, fulfilment of this 
protection is not necessarily contingent upon the consistent implementation of specific 
normative content. Indeed, non-consistent application – as it pertains to composition – does not 
appear to invalidate the universal significance or relevance of this right. As Fuukuda-Parr notes, 
‘[a]lthough rights are universal, the level of enjoyment spans a significant range that is difficult 
to capture with the same indicator for low and high-income countries’.567 
 Secondly, it is foundational in the sense that its focus covers interrelated issues of 
human healthiness, and thus provides a foundation upon which other fundamental protections 
can become meaningful. Put simply, a prerequisite for the enjoyment of all human rights is 
clearly the presence of a satisfactory level of health. This conclusion logically follows the 
acknowledgement that, for any individual, the significance of rights is undermined if they lack 
the physical capacity to claim them.568 As discussed, the concept of human healthiness is not 
limited to concerns of physiological health, but also incorporates psychological and social 
                                                            
567 Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and Terra Lawson-Remer and Susan Randolph, ‘Measuring the Progressive Realisation 
of Progressive Rights Obligations: An Index of Economic and Social Rights Fulfilment’ (2008) University of 
Connecticut (Working Paper 8) 1, 10. 
568 This is to be distinguished with the practical capacity to claim them as represented by the ‘political subject’ 
of human rights as discussed in Chapter Two. For a detailed account of the ‘abstract’ and ‘political’ subject of 
human rights, see Chapter Two, section 2.4. 
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components.569 Yet physiological health – as the prerequisite for human subsistence (in both a 
practical biological sense as well as that of autonomous agency) – should rightly be regarded 
as the foundational element of human healthiness. With this final chapter, this point will be 
developed further by suggesting that the idea of subsistence connects the concept of 
universal/absolute rights – represented here by the right to health - and state security (generally 
regarded as a competing interest) by evidencing a complimentary purpose which exists 
between them: namely protecting/securing ‘human’ survival – understood in either theoretical 
or practical terms.  
As mentioned in Chapter Three, the precise practical composition of the right to health 
is itself deserving of further study and analysis. For the purposes of this thesis, the importance 
of conceptualising the right to health as a right to human healthiness is to validate the idea of 
human rights as foundational claims – open to progression, evolution and (re)interpretation. 
Once this is acknowledged, and in accordance with Dworkin’s implied perfectibility of ideas, 
the relevance and potential applicability of human rights cannot be conclusively undermined 
through the identification of practical difficulties pertaining to universal acceptance or 
implementation.570 This is because these difficulties would be contingent upon contextual 
circumstances and thus themselves susceptible to change. Indeed, as they must be 
representative of (generally) accepted positions within a specific time in history, any arguments 
which appear to invalidate the relevance of a specific human right – or indeed the concept of 
rights itself – can only objectively be said to do so on a temporary basis. As social and political 
attitudes have changed (and continue to change), the integrity of arguments seeking to either 
validate or delegitimise rights have faced rejection or adaptation in accordance with 
                                                            
569 These include the pre-requisites of health - such as safe food, clean water, and shelter - as well as access to 
various means of enabling autonomous agency (e.g. communal/societal integration; work, education).  
570 For example, as Briget C. A. Toebes addresses, the idea that the right to health is too expensive. Briget C. A. 
Toebes, The Right to Health as a Human Right in International Law (Intersentia Publishers 1999) 6. 
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developments of the time.571 In this sense, the apparent unfeasibility of a universal right to 
health in modern times does not, in itself, undermine its potential fulfilment (or, therefore, call 
into question the purpose of current efforts to secure it). The most significant conclusions from 
this are as follows:     
1. There are many separate but interconnected fundamental interests which construct the 
right to human healthiness.  
2. The effective fulfilment of these claims enables the implementation of the right to 
healthiness. 
3. This right is a foundational claim, both in terms of substantive content as well as 
practical significance - it provides a platform upon which all other protections can 
themselves be enabled and given meaning.  
4. As it is a foundational claim, in relation to its normative content, its legitimacy is not 
contingent upon the implementation of a consistent universal standard (with regards 
to any of the core interests which construct it).   
5. The right to human healthiness can be regarded as inalienable in the sense that human 
subsistence is dependent upon its direct or indirect fulfilment (intentionally or simply 
resulting from ensuring other protections).  
6. Finally, in the context of fundamental claims, the right to human healthiness is 
absolute in that the universalising idea/purpose behind the concept of rights – to 
protect foundational interests – is rendered meaningless in its absence.  
In building upon this analysis this will chapter look to consider the contemporary 
practicality of absolute claims. As noted, robust critique of the idea of inviolable rights has 
                                                            
571 As example, an effective critique of the specific form of relative universality embodied within the DOI or 
DRMC would not sufficiently challenge the composition of the UDHR, ICCPR. This is because the 
circumstances which enabled such relative universality to emerge (e.g. tolerance of slavery) no longer exist to 
the same extent (if at all).  
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accompanied the promotion of such claims throughout their history. Historically, this is 
perhaps best (if not most famously) personified by the work of Jeremy Bentham that we 
addressed in Chapters Two and Three.572 In modern contexts, the universality of rights is 
scrutinised with regard to the practical applicability of existing human rights instruments and 
claims. Andrew Fagan suggests that this highlights the principal paradox of human rights. 
These instruments were created in reflection of atrocities with the purpose of preventing the 
possibility of their future occurrence.573 For many proponents of human rights, the legitimacy 
of the concept is predicated on this position. Yet, as Fagan explains, atrocities and genocides 
still occur.574 The human rights movement is based on the value of human life, but this is 
consistently undermined by the actions of human beings. Fagan proposes that the paradox of 
human rights is signified in the following question: ‘Why is it that the ultimate justification and 
application of the doctrine is frustrated by members of the very species upon which the doctrine 
is based?’575 
Despite the emergence of these critiques, it is clear that the idea of an inherent 
entitlement to universal, absolute protections has greatly facilitated the persistence and 
progression of human rights (particularly in relation to the developments of the 20th century). 
In the contemporary United Nations (UN 1945) era specifically, this has been aided through 
Western advocacy of human rights.576 A defining characteristic of modern international law 
has been the prevalence of human rights initiatives and the promotion (by word if not by 
                                                            
572 Jeremy Bentham, ‘Anarchical Fallacies’ in John Bowring (ed), The Works of Jeremy Bentham Vol. II 
(Edinburgh: William Tait 1843). 
573 Andrew Fagan, ‘Paradoxical Bedfellows: Nihilism and Human Rights’ (2005) 6 Human Rights Review 93. 
574 ibid. 
575 ibid. 
576 An insightful examination of the effectiveness of some of these efforts is provided by Andrew Moravcsik 
who proposed that they generally fall within one of three different categories: ‘Sanctions’, ‘Shaming’ and 
‘Cooptation’. Ultimately, Moravcsik concluded that the successfulness of such measures will largely depend 
upon the extent to which respect for the concept of human rights is already ingrained within states (and reflected 
in domestic policies). Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Explaining International Human Rights Regimes: Liberal Theory 
and Western Europe’ (1995) 1 European Journal of International Relations 157. 
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action)577 of the idea of inherent, fundamental human interests. Most recently, however, the 
focus of member states has shifted toward internal affairs in contrast to the external, collective, 
international initiatives which generally personified the emergence of the UN. Douzinas 
attributes this to the fact that ‘after the 9/11 attacks … security became the main concern of the 
great powers’.578 Given this change, the utopian idea of human rights as universal, absolute 
protections appears to be under threat. This chapter will look to examine the legitimacy of the 
contemporary representation of human rights as an inhibitor of state security.  
As has been shown, human history is replete with differing accounts of the concept of 
human rights. Crucially, despite differences relating to the identification of an appropriate 
justificatory foundation, none of these accounts have seriously contested the need for a subject 
upon which these protections could be bestowed. Regardless of the differing means by which 
specific generations or cultures attempt to justify the basis and content for such protections, the 
capacity to claim is accepted as being necessary in all of them.579 It has been demonstrated that, 
in practical terms, the ability, not only to make such a claim, but to appreciate its significance, 
is dependent upon a basic amount of physical, psychological, and social subsistence. Whilst 
the content of the specific protection being claimed is likely to be substantively different 
depending on the historical contingencies of the subject making it (although loosely based on 
the same general purpose), the validity of fundamental protections is clearly not restricted to 
the conceptual origins of a specific, universalising idea. Indeed, the perception of validity is 
also heavily influenced by the practicality of enabling such protections. It is for this reason that 
Jonathan Wolff, when speaking within the context of the right to health, maintained that ‘the 
                                                            
577 For example, in the context of U.S. authorities, this is reflected in intentional diminishment of the scope of 
human rights protections for actual (or suspected) enemy combatants in the War on Terror (e.g. the prison 
complex at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base). See David Luban, ‘The War on Terrorism and the End of Human 
Rights’ (2002) 22 Philosophy & Public Policy Quarterly 14. 
578 Costas Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (Routledge 
Cavendish 2007) 139. 
579 See for example the concept of ‘normative agency’. James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford University 
Press 2008) 149. 
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right to health is not the right to be healthy, for no one could have that right’.580 In contemporary 
contexts, this practicality is seemingly determined by weighing pragmatic considerations 
relating to economic and social concerns (e.g. balancing of individual interests), alongside 
determining the desirability of prioritising individual liberties over certain collective interests 
(such as state security).581  
For the purposes of this thesis, the relevance of security to human healthiness and the 
concept of absolute rights is twofold. Firstly, in reflection of the fact that human rights have 
been consistently undermined through various forms of securitisation (framed as competing 
objectives), health is representative of a concept which has been recently securitised.582 
Secondly, we can further reinforce the foundational aspect of the right to health (as an 
enablement of human agency) through an examination of the securitisation discourse by 
presenting health – of subsistence (in relation to both individuals and the state) - as the 
foundation of security. 
5.1.1 Chapter Five Structure: Key Aims and Objectives 
 
Having briefly summarised the relevant findings from previous chapters, we can now 
advance to an examination of the contemporary potentiality of the concept of universal human 
rights within the context of security considerations (specifically centred upon health). 
Essentially, there are four key objectives to be achieved with this final chapter: 
                                                            
580 Jonathan Wolff, The Human Right to Health (W. W. Norton & Company 2013) 27. 
581 In relation to counter-terrorist initiatives, as discussed, Ben Golder explains that there is a general acceptance 
that ‘the demands of national security and the protection of human rights are opposed’. Ben Golder and George 
Williams, ‘Balancing National Security and Human Rights: Assessing the Response of Common Law Nations 
to the Threat of Terrorism’ (2006) 8 Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis 43, 50. 
582 For an example of this see United Nations Security Council, ‘On the Outbreak of the Ebola Virus in, and its 
Impact on, West Africa’ (18 September 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2177 (UNSCR 2177) 
<http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2177%20(2014)> accessed 18 May 2018.   
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1. To begin, we will contextualise the national security paradigm and its historical 
implications for the idea of human rights. Specifically, this will consider the legitimacy 
of claims that human rights and security are competing aims (with one ultimately 
needing to be given priority over the other – usually understood to be security). Drawing 
from prominent academic works on this issue, this section will examine the sufficiency 
of prevailing approaches to balancing these interests (centred on an examination of the 
derogation powers of the ECHR). Here it will be demonstrated that the ECtHR has been 
complicit in facilitating acceptance of perceptions that security concerns legitimately 
trump human rights by failing to effectively establish the presence of a genuine 
emergency in affected states (and therefore the need for derogations). Essentially, this 
section will conclude by suggesting that human rights and security are not in actuality 
competing objectives (5.2); 
2. In order to reinforce these conclusions, this chapter will next consider the potential 
absoluteness of rights within the context of health based threats to security (e.g. 
pandemics). Through an examination of a hypothetical Public Health Emergency of 
International Concern (PHEIC),583 this chapter will demonstrate that the purpose of 
such human rights (e.g. actualising normative agency) may be best fulfilled through 
interference/violation in exceptional circumstances. Namely, when non-interference 
with such protections is more fatal to the continuation of agency (and therefore the 
ability to appreciate the enjoyment of rights). As this examination suggests that the 
absolute application of rights would jeopardise fulfilment of the purpose of such 
protections, it will be argued that all rights must be derogable (but with varying degrees 
of derogability – e.g. with certain protections harder to justify interfering with than 
others). Finally, this section will draw from this analysis in order to make proposals for 
                                                            
583 WHO, ‘Revision of the International Health Regulations’ (23 May 2005) WHA Res 58.3 [IHR 2005]. 
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reform regarding existing derogation machinery (e.g. the approach of the ECtHR). 
Specifically, this will suggest the adoption of a stricter approach to scrutinising the 
existence of emergencies (and thus the need to derogate) as well as acceptance of the 
derogability of all human rights protections (in order to both enhance the credibility of 
the concept itself as well as to more optimally provide for the potential fulfilment of the 
purpose of such protections) (5.3); 
3. In building on these conclusions, this chapter will next assess the so-called 
securitisation of rights within the context of health. Specifically, this section will 
consider the ‘referent object’ of human rights. ‘Referent objects’ refer to ideals which 
face direct threats to their continuation (and which therefore must be protected if the 
fulfilment of a relevant concept is to be secured). It will be demonstrated that the 
‘referent object’ of universal rights comprises of two components – namely (i) human 
security (representing the ideal of protecting individual interests) and (ii) national 
security (representing the ideal of protecting the physical integrity of the state). With 
the former, it will be suggested that the ideal is threatened by non-
fulfilment/interference of/with human rights norms (e.g. where the sovereign power 
chooses to interfere), whereas the latter is held to be threatened by the absolute 
implementation of such protections (e.g. when the sovereign power is prevented from 
taking necessary defensive measures). This study will therefore reinforce the inter-
connectedness between the fulfilment of human rights and the obtainment of state 
security by establishing that the realisation of each aim is dependent upon securing the 
continuance of various forms of subsistence (e.g. human and state subsistence). Here it 
will ultimately be argued that a sufficient level of national security is contingent upon 
appropriate consideration being given to matters of human security (specifically in 
relation to the fulfilment of the purpose of human rights) (5.4);  
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4. This chapter will finally consider potential implications for the universal realisability 
of human rights stemming from the concept of state sovereignty (reflected in the 
‘referent object’ of human rights previously discussed). By referencing the derogation 
machinery of ECHR once again, it will be established that sovereignty has traditionally 
been regarded as a potential inhibitor of the implementation of human rights. 
Specifically, this will be seen to relate to the fact that the application of human rights is 
largely dependent upon the consent of governing powers of member states (who also 
have the authority/right to choose to derogate from such protections in times of 
emergency). By drawing from contemporary developments in the global arena (e.g. 
humanitarian intervention), this chapter will demonstrate the non-absoluteness of 
sovereignty in the context of securing effective protection of human rights norms. 
Moreover, as these contemporary developments evidence general acceptance of the fact 
that concerns based on matters of ‘human security’ may be utilised to justifiably 
interfere with the sovereignty of member states, this chapter will argue that sovereignty 
is therefore ultimately non-fatal to the potentiality of the fulfilment of universal human 
rights. To reinforce these points, this chapter will next examine different interpretations 
of sovereignty within the context of health: namely (i) national, (ii) international, and 
(iii) human, respectively. This chapter will conclude by suggesting that human rights 
are both universal and absolute, but that the absoluteness of these rights is actually 
represented by a permanence of purpose, rather than by practical application (5.5). 
5.2 Contextualising the Security Paradigm: Two Types of Security 
 
Human rights are part of a long and honourable tradition of dissent, resistance 
and rebellion against the oppression of power and the injustice of law.584 
                                                            
584 Costas Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (Routledge 
Cavendish 2007) 13. 
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As Douzinas duly notes here, the idea of human rights has historically been utilised to 
provide justification for destabilising the security of sovereign powers so as to better secure 
individual interests/liberties. In modern contexts, the relationship between human rights and 
security is arguably reversed, perhaps most clearly represented by the fact that the objective of 
preserving national security is increasingly utilised so as to diminish the effectiveness of human 
rights norms. As previously alluded to, recent developments in the international arena (such as 
the ‘War on Terror’) have prompted a reassessment of the concept of security – and, as 
consequence, the place of human rights within this context. For much of the twentieth century 
the security paradigm was predicated on an understanding that there could be no higher priority 
than the preservation (and perseverance) of the state itself – and that this practical preservation 
was a justifiable purpose on its own merits (irrespective of any other subsequent or incidental 
benefit - such as the protection of individual rights). Specifically, this was conceptualised as a 
need to protect states from external threats and acts of aggression.585 By framing the idea of 
security in this way, international actors intentionally restricted the interpretability of 
developing and future threats.  The security paradigm assessed the legitimacy of emerging 
dangers through an historical lens – by attempting to establish their compatibility with known 
threats of that time. Whilst this approach could be held to have had validity at the dawn of 
modern international law and a context in which the realities of international conflict were 
directly felt by member states (e.g. in the aftermath of WW1 & WW2), its relevance naturally 
                                                            
585 Divya Srikanth attests to this when he states that, prior to very recent developments, it was generally 
accepted that ‘the gravest security threats that a nation-state faced were invariably the armies of other states’. 
Divya Srikanth, Non-Traditional Security Threats in the 21st Century: A Review (2014) 4 International Journal 
of Development and Conflict 60, 60.  
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diminished the farther the international community advanced from this point in history (and as 
the concept of warfare itself began to change).586  
During the 1950’s and 1960’s, the spectre of a nuclear war developing between the two 
dominant powers of the time – the United States of America and the Soviet Union – did much 
to prolong the significance of this interpretation of security.587 However, as the Cold War and 
the twentieth-century itself came to an end, so too did the relevance of a purely traditional 
conceptualisation of the security paradigm. Indeed, in the twenty-first century, it is becoming 
increasingly evident that the security of states does not purely rest upon the ability to defend 
against known (or anticipated) external threats – but will also the power to respond to internal 
ones.588 These internal threats can adopt different forms with the most obvious being 
commensurate with traditional security considerations. In contemporary contexts, for instance, 
with the image of ‘home grown’ terrorist attacks.589 The compatibility of such threats with the 
historical idea of security is immediately apparent. It is perhaps for this reason that they are 
seemingly prioritised over the emergent internal security concern which is most relevant to this 
chapter – human security.590  
The UN ‘Human Development Report’ of 1994, was integral to the emergence of the 
concept of ‘human security’. In describing this concept, the report confirmed that ‘[there] have 
always been two major components of human security: freedom from fear and freedom from 
                                                            
586 As example, the controversial concept of the ‘moving battlefield’ which the US presently adopts to justify 
the targeting of enemy combatants by way of drone strike throughout the world. Melina Sterio described this as 
the proposition that ‘members of al-Qaeda forces may be targeted anywhere in the world: that the battlefield 
follows those individuals who have been designated as enemies …’. Milena Sterio, ‘The United States’ Use of 
Drone Strikes in the War on Terror: The (Il)legality of Targeted Killings Under International Law’ (2012) 45 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 196, 199. 
587 See David Baldwin, ‘Security Studies and the End of the Cold War’ (1995) 48 World Politics 117. 
588 Divya Srikanth, Non-Traditional Security Threats in the 21st Century: A Review (2014) 4 International 
Journal of Development and Conflict 60. 
589 For example, the attacks that took place on London Bridge and in London Borough Market on the evening of 
3 June 2017, and the attack on Manchester Arena on the 22 May 2017. 
590 See Sabina Alkire, ‘A Conceptual Framework for Human Security’ (2007) 22 Praxis 5. 
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want’.591 In essence, the idea of human security (much like the right to health itself) incorporates 
a myriad of independent but interconnected needs – covering issues deemed integral to 
individual (and thus collective) personal security. This concept is based on the understanding 
that the fulfilment of these basic needs will provide populations with adequate protection from 
various vulnerabilities stemming from the threat (or fear) of violence. In addition to physical 
security, through the provision of a secure space (in both physical and social forms), the 
alleviation of poverty is to be a made priority under such an approach. Kwasi Nsiah-Gybaah 
explains that the reason poverty reduction is so important is because ‘widespread, chronic and 
crushing poverty and underdevelopment negatively impact human security … The hope for 
human security lies in a balanced development approach based on poverty reduction, global 
peace, and cooperation’.592 Essentially, this idea represents the stability of persons as additional 
means of ensuring the preservation of the state.593 In effect, human security represents the 
integrity (and moral worthiness) of the survivability of human beings. It incorporates direct and 
indirect causative factors reductive to human survival. With regards to human healthiness, 
direct factors are understood as the results of specific health based conditions – such as diseases 
– whilst indirect relates to more general socio-economic conditions, such as poverty, which can 
provide environments within which direct factors can develop (and proliferate). 
Due to its obvious philosophical influences and relatively recent emergence, it is fair to 
suggest that the idea of human security is more controversial than traditional interpretations of 
the security paradigm. In addition, even when accepted by member states, there is a tendency 
to restrict its conceptualisation to historically accepted security norms, by considering the 
                                                            
591 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report (Oxford University Press 1994) 24.   
592 Kwasi Nsiah-Gybaah, ‘Human Security as a Prerequisite for Development’ in Richard A. Matthew et al 
(eds), Global Environmental Change and Human Security (MIT Press 2009) 255. 
593 This is personified within the UN Human Development Report of 1994 with the declaration that ‘[the] battle 
of peace has to be fought on two fronts. The first is the security front where victory spells freedom from fear. 
The second is the economic and social front where victory means freedom from want. Only victory on both 
fronts can assure the world of an enduring peace …’. United Nations Development Programme, Human 
Development Report (Oxford University Press 1994) 3. 
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significance of the basic needs of human security in traditional security contexts; internal or 
external acts of aggression. As example, ‘the possibility of an infectious disease being 
intentionally released for hostile political purposes’.594 Yet the results of this is arguably to 
diminish the relevance (and effectiveness) of the concept of human security itself. This is 
because the importance of human security, as it pertains to the security paradigm, conceivably 
rests on its ability to establish a significance of personal security beyond intentional acts of 
violence (specifically between state actors).  
The notion that national security is dependent only on the actions of states has, in recent 
years, proven to be outdated.595 Instead, it is evident that the security of these states is now 
contingent upon dangers which are difficult to anticipate and/or largely independent of (or 
indifferent to) human actions – such as environmental changes or pandemics. As Catherine Lo 
Yuk-Ping and Nicholas Thomas confirm, in present times, ‘pandemics, emerging diseases and 
bioterrorism are readily understood as direct threats to national and global security’.596 
Therefore, when assessing the relevance of universal human rights in the contemporary context 
of security – in particular, the feasibility of balancing seemingly competing interests - it is 
worthwhile to do so through the lens of health. Specifically, by examining various health-based 
threats to security - incorporating both national and human elements - and their potential impact 
on determining the absoluteness of these foundational protections. 
However, before proceeding further with this analysis, it is useful to firstly give some 
additional consideration to the concept of security within a more topical context (e.g. the threat 
                                                            
594 Stefan Elbe, Security and Global Health: Toward the Medicalisation of Insecurity (Polity Press 2010) 66. 
595A topical example for this is the concept of ‘cyberwarfare’. Srikanth provides an excellent summary of the 
increasing danger posed by such threats, ultimately defining them as ‘the new threats to a state’s security … 
[as during] a cyber-conflict, there are no clear lines between the civilian and military, as civilian computer 
systems may be used to launch offensive cyber-war against an “enemy” state’. Divya Srikanth, Non-Traditional 
Security Threats in the 21st Century: A Review (2014) 4 International Journal of Development and Conflict 60, 
66.  
596 Catherine Lo Yuk-Ping and Nicholas Thomas, ‘How is Health a Security Issue? Politics, Responses and 
Issues’ (2010) 25 Health Policy Plan 447, 449. 
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of terrorist attacks) by drawing from some significant academic contributions to this issue. For 
our purposes, this will focus on a brief examination of the academic assessment of the manner 
in which human rights mechanisms (such as the ECHR) have attempted to strike an effective 
balance between national security and the enjoyment of human rights. Helen Fenwick has 
recently addressed this issue within the context of the United Kingdom (specifically in 
accordance with various counter-terrorist initiatives which have been introduced under the 
framework of the Human Rights Act 1998).597 Fenwick establishes the backdrop for this 
analysis as the intent to examine the reasonableness of fears that government efforts to secure 
such balance risks the adoption of counter-terrorist measures representative of ‘defensive 
democracy’ (something which Fenwick ultimately determines to have been effectively avoided 
in the United Kingdom to date).598 For the purposes of this examination, the concept of 
‘defensive democracy’ is defined as: 
Semi-permanent limitations of rights in a democracy entailed by adopting 
disproportionately preventive measures in the face of terrorism, to defend itself 
against those seeking to subvert it by acts of violence directed or inspired by 
powerful external groups.599 
The anticipated danger with such an outcome is that it may lead to the abandonment of 
a requisite level of commitment to human rights norms, simply as consequence of stronger 
efforts to minimise the prospect of future terrorist attacks.600 This interpretation of the concept 
of ‘defensive democracy’ can therefore be seen as representative of a general acceptance of the 
plausibility of governments choosing to sacrifice human rights in the pursuit of security. It thus 
provides further evidence of the existence of an apparent hierarchisation of interests/objectives, 
whereby human rights and security are not only perceived to be in conflict, but where one 
                                                            
597 Helen Fenwick, ‘Terrorism and the Control Orders/TPIMs Saga: A Vindication of the Human Rights Act or 
a Manifestation of ‘Defensive Democracy’?’ (2017) 4 Public Law 609. 
598 ibid 626. 
599 ibid 609. 
600 See Amnesty International, Europe: Dangerously Disproportionate: The Ever-Expanding National Security 
State in Europe (London: Amnesty International 2017) 8. 
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interest (security) is clearly acknowledged (even if only tacitly) as being of superior concern to 
the other (human rights).  
In practice, previous attempts to strike an effective balance – understood as one which 
provides sufficient protection to human rights norms whilst also affording relevant public 
authorities adequate scope to interfere in response to genuine security threats - have also been 
marked with difficulty. In the context of the United Kingdom, for example, Fenwick notes that 
this is represented by the various initiatives which have so far been introduced being attacked 
as either overly intrusive (e.g. resulting in unjustifiable interference with the enjoyment of 
Convention rights)601 or largely ineffective (e.g. making no real difference in practical terms).602 
This clearly demonstrates the obvious difficulties governments face when attempting to strike 
a successful balance between ostensibly conflicting aims. Moreover, a heightened sense of 
insecurity, prompted inter alia by recent terrorist attacks,603 as well as the impending collapse 
of ISIS and the anticipated return of nationals presently fighting in Syria,604 seemingly 
strengthen the argument that more aggressive/intrusive counter-terrorist measures are 
required.605 This in turn reinforces the perception that a necessary level of security may 
legitimately be achieved at the cost of a sufficient level of consideration for human rights norms. 
If this narrative were ultimately to be accepted by the general populations of member states, it 
                                                            
601 This is represented by the Control Orders scheme, first introduced in 2005, which looked to prevent the 
possibility of future terrorist attacks by allowing for the restriction of the enjoyment of Convention rights for 
those suspected to be engaged in terrorist activities. On the use of Control Orders, Fenwick remarks that they 
‘handed the executive apparently unlimited power to impose restrictions on [terrorist] suspects, with minimal 
judicial supervision’. Helen Fenwick, ‘Terrorism and the Control Orders/TPIMs Saga: A Vindication of the 
Human Rights Act or a Manifestation of ‘Defensive Democracy’?’ (2017) 4 Public Law 609, 613. 
602 For example, as reflected in the initial use of the Terrorism Preventative and Investigative Measures (TPIMs) 
introduced in 2011 as a replacement for Control Orders (with the aim of making preventative measures more 
consistent with human rights norms). Fenwick notes that by 2014 these measures were regarded as being ‘under-
used’, ultimately cultivating ‘the perception of their inefficacy’. ibid 618. 
603  
604 Fenwick notes that this fear is personified by the fact that ‘the expected eventual military destruction of the 
‘caliphate’ is likely to lead to an increase in the number of returnees who have experienced weapons and 
explosives training …’. Helen Fenwick, ‘Terrorism and the Control Orders/TPIMs Saga: A Vindication of the 
Human Rights Act or a Manifestation of ‘Defensive Democracy’?’ (2017) 4 Public Law 609, 610. 
605 Fenwick observes that this is reflected in the “striking recent increase in the securitisation of Europe.” ibid 
611. 
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would effectively represent the provision of their consent to the adoption of increasingly 
disproportionate counter terrorist laws which could arguably seek to ignore the concept of 
balance all together. Ironically, as Fenwick persuasively explains, rather than provide a greater 
level of security, the introduction of such laws ‘would be more likely to have the effects that 
[the terrorist] attacks themselves have had—to increase fear and divisiveness’.606  
From this analysis we have seen that presenting the debate surrounding this issue as a 
choice between the prioritisation of security or, by demanding stricter adherence to human 
rights norms, acceptance of the unavoidability of insecurity, does little to increase the likelihood 
of creating a viable solution. This chapter proposes that a preferable alternative is to refocus the 
search for an effective solution in a manner which accepts that, in actuality, security and human 
rights are not in fact competing aims. It will now begin to develop this argument in more detail 
by moving on to examine the concept of security within the context of health. 
5.2.1 Examining Security and Human Rights as Conflicting Aims 
 
As discussed, there are various points of contention in relation to the place of human 
rights in the contemporary world. These questions are relevant not only in states who have, for 
various reasons, resisted previous efforts to establish an effective basis of human rights 
protection on the international level, but also to those states who have championed such 
attempts. Reflecting on these challenges, in relation to securing the widespread implementation 
of human rights, Stephen Hopgood remarked that ‘[at] a time of declining Western power, 
more push back against hypocrisy … [and] authoritarian backlash … there is little to suggest 
that further progress is on the horizon in the manner to which we have become accustomed’.607 
                                                            
606 Helen Fenwick, ‘Probing Theresa May’s Response to the Recent Terror Attacks’ (2017) (4) European 
Human Rights Law Review 341, 350. 
607 Stephen Hopgood, ‘Challenges to the Global Human Rights Regime: Are Human Rights Still an Effective 
Language for Social Change?’ (2014) 11 SUR – International Journal on Human Rights 67, 73. 
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Indeed, in some ways the most significant tests to the concept of human rights are being 
experienced within such ‘Western’ states. A pertinent example would be the increasing 
unpopularity of the idea of human rights within various populations in the European Union.608 
Whilst the idea of protecting fundamental interests endures, the political focus of such 
protections has shifted away from true universal coverage (of the ‘abstract concept’) back 
towards a universality of contextual contingency (and the ‘political construct’). The issue of 
global terrorism has resulted in the perception of these protections becoming distorted. Rather 
than protecting the fundamental interests of society they are instead increasingly understood - 
aided greatly by depictions in the media - as protecting the interests of those individuals who 
wish to undermine or harm it.609  
In this sense, this change is perhaps an implicit antiquarian use of history610 - an attempt 
to revert the focus of contemporary human rights to their original scope (as exemplified with 
the DOI where ‘all men are born free and equal’ did not extend to cover slaves). The 
significance of this change, in accordance with the Nietzschean approach discussed in Chapter 
Three,611 is that it representative of an ‘abuse of history’ – an attempt to effectively respond to 
present day issues with an idealised understanding of successes of the past. The consequences 
of such change, however, are not necessarily conducive to the objective behind the need for 
such protections. Seemingly, if it does not completely undermine the notion of absolute 
protections (for example by justifying the arbitrary suspension of various rights in pursuit of 
‘collective interests’), it risks distorting them to such an extent that the aim of achieving 
                                                            
608 Katja S. Ziegler and Elisabeth Wicks and Loveday Hodson, The UK and European Human Rights: A 
Strained Relationship? (Hart Publishing 2015) 475-478. 
609 See for example the political response (and corresponding media coverage) to the case of Othman (Abu 
Qatada) v United Kingdom (2012) 55 EHRR 1. 
610 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History (Macmillan for the Library of Liberal Arts 1957) 18-19. 
611 ibid. 
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universal application ceases to be meaningful (when access to such protections is held to be 
contingent upon fixed gradations of worth).612 
As we addressed in the previous section of this chapter, an underlying cause of changing 
perceptions of the concept of rights is the ever-present nature of possible terrorist threats. In 
recent years, this has quickly become a primary concern for member states in the international 
arena - and one which is consistently utilised to justify interference with rights and liberties. In 
‘Speaking Law to Power’, Joan Fitzpatrick highlights the scope of the challenge facing modern 
proponents of human rights when she suggests that, in direct response to al-Qaeda and the 
anticipated threat posed by international terrorism, ‘[governments] that style themselves as 
champions of the rule of law against the absolutism or nihilism of terrorists have, at least 
temporarily, constructed “rights-free zones”’.613 An unavoidable consequence of this change is 
the marginalisation of the purported inalienability of these protections. Indeed, if the 
international community is closer to an agreement on the justifiable scope of such protections 
it is arguably with regards to the need for further restriction.614 The rationale behind such moves 
are rooted in the same justificatory purposes of the concept of human rights itself - the need to 
protect fundamental interests. In this context, the interests relate to the survivability of these 
very states (e.g. state subsistence). Despite the fundamental importance of various individual 
interests, the legitimacy of claims to their protection are argued to be rendered meaningless in 
the absence of a means by which they can be enforced.615 Therefore, the continuance of the 
                                                            
612 More specifically, by promulgating that such protections should only be afforded to ‘lawful citizens’. For 
more on this see Anthea Roberts, ‘Righting Wrongs or Wronging Rights? The United States and Human Rights 
Post-September 11’ (2004) 15 European Journal of International Law 721. 
613 Joan Fitzpatrick, ‘Speaking Law to Power: The War Against Terrorism and Human Rights’ (2003) 14 
European Journal of International Law 241. 
614 See for example measures passed by French, German, and Dutch governments in recent years in response to 
purported terrorists threats. For more on this see Christophe Paulussen, ‘Repressing the Foreign Fighters 
Phenomenon and Terrorism in Western Europe: Towards an Effective Response Based on Human Rights’ 
(2016) 7:10 The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague 1. 
615 As Bentham notes, ‘[that] which has no existence cannot be destroyed – that which cannot be destroyed 
cannot require anything to preserve it from destruction’. Jeremy Bentham, ‘Anarchical Fallacies’ in John 
Bowring (ed), The Works of Jeremy Bentham Vol. II (Edinburgh: William Tait 1843) 500. 
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state, understood as the capacity to ensure secure governance, is surely a prerequisite for all 
other individual concerns? It can be presented as the foundational interest. Phillip Ruddock 
develops this position further to suggest that interferences with fundamental protections can be 
a necessary means of ensuring their continuing fulfilment. In this way, he argues that ‘national 
security can in fact promote civil liberties (by preserving a society in which rights and freedoms 
can be exercised) …’.616 Writing in the context of seeking to effectively balance security and 
human rights, Ruddock concludes that ‘the extent to which we can continue to enjoy our civil 
liberties rests upon the effectiveness of our counter-terrorist laws’.617 Whilst Ruddock 
maintains that this approach does not suggest that ‘counter-terrorism legislation should not be 
scrutinised’,618 it is ultimately susceptible to doing just that – by inserting ‘state security’ into 
the lexicon of human rights law and affording it superior status. As we will address later in this 
chapter, the survivability of states is, like human subsistence itself, not purely a matter of 
physical security – but also incorporates additional aspects that help construct its ‘identity’ 
(such as civil liberties and the rule of law). In this way, whilst it is true that the physical 
security/subsistence of states is necessary for human rights to be effectual, the means by which 
such subsistence is ensured – particularly in relation to these fundamental protections – is 
important in determining the legitimacy of such action.    
A dichotomy at the heart of modern human rights however evidently exists. The 
legitimising purpose upon which the need for such rights is based can also be utilised to justify 
limiting their application or nullifying their effectiveness. Thus, when considering both the 
contemporary and conceptual universal applicability of human rights protections, it is 
important to examine them within the modern national security paradigm. To begin it is worth 
                                                            
616 Philip Ruddock, ‘A New Framework: Counter-Terrorism and the Rule of Law’ (2004) 16 The Sydney Papers 
112, 117. 
617 ibid. 
618 ibid.  
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re-establishing the apparent incompatibility which exists between the two competing interests 
– protecting the state at all costs and guaranteeing fundamental individual protections for all 
peoples (within a specific jurisdiction). Indeed, a traditional account would arguably interpret 
the apparent conflict as undermining the concept of universal protections, or instead critique 
the legitimacy of interferences with rights based upon pursuing other interests (such as the 
continuance of the state).619 However, an alternative critical approach could suggest that certain 
interferences can be justified when they are truly conducive to the aim of protecting 
fundamental interests - both directly as it pertains to the governance of the state, and indirectly 
in relation to providing a space within which individual interests can continue to be secured. 
In this sense, the inalienability of human rights would not necessarily require absolute 
application, but would rather be dependent upon accepting derogations consistent with the 
purpose of such protections.  
Crucially, under this theoretical approach, the scope for justifiable interference would 
need to be extremely narrow. Whilst exceptional circumstances could legitimate the process of 
derogating from human rights protections, it could only do so when such measures are 
necessary to perpetuating the relevance of these fundamental interests (e.g. representing the 
most efficient means of enabling normative agency). Arbitrary interference, understood as that 
which is premised on action conducive to the continuance of the state but which is not evidently 
necessary for it, would not be acceptable. The integrity of the purpose behind the interference 
would therefore determine the legitimacy of the derogation (irrespective of the perceived 
lawfulness of the conduct itself).  
 
                                                            
619 In the sense that, in pursuing such action, states have the potential to over-react and act disproportionately, to 
the detriment of fundamental human rights. See Joan Fitzpatrick, ‘Speaking Law to Power: The War Against 
Terrorism and Human Rights’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law 241. 
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5.2.2 Balancing Security and Human Rights in Practice 
 
There have, of course, been previous efforts within the human rights movement to 
account for national security concerns. Perhaps the most significant of these is represented by 
the derogation powers contained within Article 15 of the ECHR.620 The purpose of this 
provision is multifaceted. Ostensibly the fundamental aim is to provide adequate flexibility to 
the governing entities of member states to effectively respond to existential threats – generally 
envisioned to be restricted to times of war or other emergency situations.621 However, for the 
drafters of the ECHR itself, an additional motivation for the inclusion of Article 15 pertained 
to more practical considerations in relation to membership – to encourage states to voluntarily 
participate. Frederick Cowell defines this as a ‘realist’ approach and explains ‘there is often a 
strong pressure for derogation clauses to accommodate the needs of states in order to preserve 
the implicit bargain states enter into when entering international organisations’.622 At the heart 
of both purposes was the intent to balance the fundamental interests of human rights with the 
duties and responsibilities of member states regarding various national security considerations. 
However, this approach differs from the one offered within this chapter with regard to 
the justifying purpose behind the act of derogating from fundamental protections. Whereas a 
traditional approach – encapsulated within Article 15 of the ECHR – is predicated on the need 
to balance between separate fundamental objectives (security and rights), our alternative 
                                                            
620 ‘In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may 
take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under 
international law’. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as Amended by 
Protocols No.11 and No.14 (opened for signature 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) 
CETS No. 005 (ECHR) art 15 <http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf> accessed 18 May 
2018.   
621 As Helen Fenwick explains, ‘a valid derogation requires the state in question to show that there is a state of 
war or other public emergency and, in order to determine the validity of this claim, two questions should be 
asked. First, is there an actual or imminent exceptional crisis threatening the organised life of the state? Second, 
is it really necessary to adopt measures requiring derogating from the articles in question?’ Helen Fenwick, 
Fenwick on Civil Liberties and Human Rights (Routledge 2016) 99. 
622 Frederick Cowell, ‘Sovereignty and the Question of Derogation: An Analysis of Article 15 of the ECHR and 
the Absence of a Derogation Clause in the ACHPR’ (2013) 1 Birkbeck Law Review 135, 141. 
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approach does not automatically establish a need to distinguish between these objectives, but 
is instead based upon the premise that they are interrelated, and that derogations can themselves 
be consistent with the aim of protecting fundamental interests. There are conceivable benefits 
of choosing to adopt this alternative approach. Most importantly it appears to provide greater 
opportunity at providing a more robust framework for regulating the legitimacy of derogations 
(and thus afford the concept of universal rights enhanced credibility). Indeed, a recurring 
critique of the operation of Article 15 is that it has failed to adequately ensure that it is only 
utilised in appropriate situations. In support of this claim, Helen Fenwick affirmed that ‘the 
court has not been very consistent as regards the margin allowed to the state in relation to 
derogations’.623 This inconsistency ultimately led Alan Greene to conclude that:  
[The] threshold that a phenomenon must cross in order to justify a declaration is 
set extremely low, and the level of scrutiny the ECtHR applies when assessing 
this question renders the first limb of Article 15 merely a procedural hurdle to 
be crossed, rather than an effective line of demarcation between normalcy and 
emergency.624  
Consequently, provisions which were intended to provide temporary relief to member 
states in exceptional circumstances, have been increasingly utilised in a manner which arguably 
undermines the legitimacy of the derogatory machinery and questions the credibility of the 
ECHR itself.625 
We may reinforce this point further by drawing from some contemporary developments 
within member states of the ECHR, specifically in relation to their use of this existing 
derogation machinery. For example, by examining the recent (and controversial) derogations 
                                                            
623 Helen Fenwick, Fenwick on Civil Liberties and Human Rights (Routledge 2016) 99. 
624 Alan Greene, ‘Separating Normalcy from Emergency: The Jurisprudence of Article 15 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights’ (2011) 12 German Law Journal 1764, 1766. 
625 That is to say, through the Court’s failure to provide an adequate level of protection for fundamental 
interests, or to secure these protections against the possibility of state over-reach with regard to the use of 
derogations. As Greene notes, ‘[by] deferring to national authorities, namely the executive, on the existence of a 
state of emergency, the phrase “threat to the life of the nation” is stretched to the point whereby it becomes 
useless in controlling a state’s actions’. ibid 1782. 
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initiated by France and Turkey over the past few years. In the case of the former, Article 15 
was engaged in the aftermath of several deadly terrorist attacks.626 In the case of the latter, 
derogations were initiated as consequence of a failed military coup.627 In both instances, the 
objective of safeguarding a necessary level of security was used to justify the apparent non-
temporary nature of the derogations. They were non-temporary in the sense that neither state 
provided clear indication of when the need for the use of emergency powers was expected to 
end. It subsequently resulted that France would engage Article 15 for almost two years – from 
November 2015 to November 2017 – whilst in April 2018, Turkey decided to extend its state 
of emergency - originally initiated in July 2016 - for a further three-month period. Despite 
receiving heavy criticism from international organisations, such as Amnesty International, for 
the use of such derogations,628 in neither case has the derogating state subsequently been held 
accountable for this apparent misuse of the derogating powers (e.g. the non-temporary nature 
of their engagement). Instead, the ECtHR have sought to hold the affected parties responsible 
only for interferences with Convention rights themselves during the respective period of 
                                                            
626 A series of coordinated ISIS backed attacks targeting several public spaces – including the Bataclan Theatre 
and the Stade de France - were conducted in Paris on the 13th of November 2015. These terrorist acts 
incorporated suicide bombers and mass shootings ultimately resulting in the deaths of 130 people (and injuring 
over 400 others). President Hollande subsequently declared a state of emergency as means of derogating from 
the ECHR on national security grounds. For an insightful analysis of how these attacks contributed to an 
alteration the public perception of security within France, see Christian Lequesne, ‘French Foreign and Security 
Challenges After the Paris Terrorist Attacks’ (2016) 37:2 Contemporary Security Policy 306. 
627 The failed coup d'état was initiated by sections of the Turkish military on the 15th July 2016 with the stated 
aim of ‘protecting democracy’ (e.g. safeguarding secularism, securing human rights). By the time the coup had 
been successfully supressed, over 300 were estimated to have been killed with more than 2000 others reportedly 
injured. In response, President Erdogan declared a state of emergency which subsequently enabled wide ranging 
interferences with human rights protections. On the matter of determining the justifiable scope of derogation 
from human rights norms in response to an attempted coup, Ignatius Yordan Nugraha ultimately concludes that 
‘[e]ven if it has been determined that a certain coup amounts to a threat to the life of a nation or public security, 
the invoking power must keep an eye on the situation. When the threat has been eradicated or has diminished 
significantly, the suspension or derogation clause is no longer applicable’. Ignatius Yordan Nugraha, ‘Human 
Rights Derogation During Coup Situations’ (2018) 22:2 The International Journal of Human Rights 194, 203. 
628 For an effective critique of France’s use of derogation powers see Amnesty International, Europe: 
Dangerously Disproportionate: The Ever-Expanding National Security State in Europe (London: Amnesty 
International 2017) 14-16. Similarly, for a detailed critique of Turkey’s use of emergency powers see Amnesty 
International, Amnesty International Report 2017/8: The State of the World’s Human Rights (London: Amnesty 
International 2018) 367-72. 
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derogation.629 This once again reflects an excessively deferential approach to regulating the 
conduct of sovereign states on matters of national security. Significantly, this approach does 
not appear to be restricted to specific/topical anticipated threats (such as terrorist attacks), but 
instead seems to demonstrate a general acceptance of the superiority of security over human 
rights norms. The apparent pervasiveness of this perception may be reinforced by drawing from 
additional recent developments, both within the jurisdiction of the ECHR and also 
internationally.  
Looking once again to France, first of all, it is notable that in October 2017 their 
controversial use of derogation powers was replaced with the adoption of more robust domestic 
counter-terrorist measures – ultimately creating what has been termed by some as a ‘permanent 
state of emergency’.630 In writing on the potential dangers of this new measures, Fionnuala Ní 
Aoláin observed that they provide ‘vague definitions of terrorism and threats to national 
security exacerbating concerns that the powers may be used in an arbitrary manner … [and] 
write exceptional, emergency practices into normal criminal and administrative law’.631 By 
diminishing the role of judicial oversight, Ní Aoláin also explained that these measures would 
appear to reflect the normalisation of unquestioned interference with human rights norms in 
face of security threats (whether they are actually occurring, have recently occurred, or are 
merely anticipated to (re)occur in the future).632 Indeed, other commentators have noted that 
                                                            
629 See Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey [2018] ECHR 251 and Sahin Alpay v. Turkey [2018] ECHR 253. In 
addressing the significance of these cases for the regulation of the use of derogation powers, Dilek Kurban 
explains that, ‘in Alpay/Altan, the ECtHR did not question the necessity of continued emergency rule 20 months 
after the failed coup …’. Dilek Kurban, ‘A Love Letter from Strasbourg to the Turkish Constitutional Court’ 
(Verfassungsblog, 27 March 2018) <https://verfassungsblog.de/a-love-letter-from-strasbourg-to-the-turkish-
constitutional-court/> accessed 18 May 2018. 
630 On this point, Marco Perolini explained that ‘the new law will embed the essence of [ECHR] emergency 
measures – intended as a temporary and exceptional response to a heightened risk – into a permanent feature of 
French domestic law’. Marco Perolini, ‘France’s Permanent State of Emergency’ (2017) Amnesty International 
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/09/a-permanent-state-of-emergency-in-france/> accessed 18 
May 2018. 
631 Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, ‘France: The Dangers of Emergency Legislation’ (2017) Just Security 
<https://www.justsecurity.org/45263/france-dangers-permanent-emergency-legislation/> accessed 18 May 
2018. 
632 ibid. 
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the new measures, which were defended by French President Macron as a necessary response 
to an ever present threat of terrorist attacks, would not so long ago have been widely accepted 
as overly-intrusive.633 A significant conclusion we can draw from this analysis is that the 
current global climate surrounding the issue of national security – particularly in relation to 
terrorism – has seemingly enabled governments to justify minimising their commitment to 
human rights in a manner which does not provide sufficient scrutiny of the need for them to do 
so.   
Such developments are of course not restricted to member states of the ECHR, but are 
also reflected in other international jurisdictions. For example, in June 2017, Japan 
controversially passed tougher domestic counter-terrorist measures ostensibly designed to 
combat organised crime.634 Significantly, these measures afford public authorities a much 
greater amount of discretion when choosing to undertake preventative action designed to avert 
the prospect of terrorist attacks (including at the ‘preparation’ stage of the offence). These 
measures have been heavily criticised since being adopted, perhaps most significantly for 
lacking clarity regarding the circumstances wherein they can be legitimately/lawfully 
engaged.635 The ambiguity surrounding this specific issue has led to fear that these measures 
may be deployed arbitrarily, resulting in unjustifiable interferences with human rights norms. 
Joseph Cannataci, The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy, responded 
to the anticipated passage of these measures by stating that he was ‘concerned by the risks of 
                                                            
633 As Alisa J. Rubin and Elian Peltier explained in the New York Times, ‘[t]he legislation, approved by a wide 
margin … codifies measures like search and seize and house arrest without judicial review – steps once 
considered exceptional – and effectively institutionalises a trade-off between security and personal liberty’. 
Alisa J. Rubin and Elian Peltier, New York Times (Paris, 3 October 2017) 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/03/world/europe/france-terrorism-law.html> accessed 18 May 2018. 
634 See Colin P.A. Jones, ‘Japan’s New Conspiracy Law Expands Police Power’ (2017) 15:16 The Asia-Pacific 
Journal 1 <https://apjjf.org/2017/16/Jones.html> accessed 18 May 2018. 
635 Consequently, as Jones notes, ‘[b]y vastly expanding the universe of possible crimes, the ability of law 
enforcement to conduct surveillance of “suspects” will also be enhanced… The broad scope of conspiracy 
crimes means the bar for starting investigations and conducting less intrusive surveillance activities will also be 
effectively lowered’. ibid 3-4. 
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arbitrary application of this legislation given the vague definition of what would constitute the 
‘planning’ and ‘prepatory actions’ given the inclusion of an overbroad range of crimes … 
which are apparently unrelated to terrorism and organized crime’.636 In defence of the bill, the 
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe drew from general arguments regarding the prevalence 
of terrorist attacks which had occurred in recent years, alongside the need to ensure effective 
counter-terrorist measures are in place prior to the upcoming Olympic and Paralympic Games 
hosted in Tokyo.637 Crucially, however, it is worth noting that Abe also justified the 
implementation of such measures as representing the necessary fulfilment of international law 
obligations – specifically the United Nations Transnational Crime Convention.638 Thus, the 
justification for effectively diminishing the significance (and reliability) of human rights 
protections was not limited to issues concerning the national security of Japan, but was also 
argued to reflect conformance with a hierarchisation of objectives/norms established within the 
mechanisms of international law itself (a point subsequently rejected by various human rights 
organisations).639   
Historically, as we have seen, efforts at balancing the practical implementation of 
human rights with foundational concerns of security have generally resulted in preferential 
consideration being afforded to security. This eventuality is made possible precisely because 
of the justificatory reasoning used to establish the need for derogations. Specifically, such 
                                                            
636 OHCHR, ‘Letter to the Japanese Government by the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy’ (2017) OL 
JPN 3/2017 <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Privacy/OL_JPN.pdf> accessed 18 May 2018. 
637 This argument was justified on the basis that the passage of these new measures represented an ‘underlying 
intent to support counterterrorism efforts to ensure national security for Japanese citizens and international 
visitors’. Brandon Marc Higa, ‘Japan’s Anti-Conspiracy Law: Relinquishing Japan’s Civil Liberties in the Name 
of Global Counterterrorism Efforts’ (2018) 19:1 Asian-Pacific Law and Policy Journal 202, 212. 
638Indeed, as Higa explains, ‘Abe testified [that] … he needed the anti-conspiracy bill as a necessary means to 
fulfil Japan’s diplomatic obligations as a signatory to a U.N. Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
(UNCTOC) …’. ibid 207. 
639 ‘While the government argues that passage of the bill is required to implement the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the convention itself was never intended to prevent 
terrorism. Instead, its aim is to prevent crimes by transnational organized criminal groups’. Human Rights Now, 
‘Japan: Concerns with the “Crime of Preparation for Terrorism and Other Acts” Bill’ (2017) A/HRC/35/NGO/4 
<http://hrn.or.jp/wpHN/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/f4e232eff719afe99b762a795f47c98b.pdf> accessed 18 
May 2018. 
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arguments are based upon a presumption that they must be regarded as competing aims. As 
Douzinas suggests, in contemporary times it is consistently demonstrated that ‘security trumps 
human rights … civil liberties are the first victims of governmental fears and public anxiety’.640 
However, as proposed in Chapter Three, by reimagining the concept of human rights as 
foundational claims – based upon the universalising idea of the protection of fundamental 
interests – it is possible to demonstrate the inherent compatibility of these objectives. To do so 
we should assess the concept of derogation within the context of hypothetical national 
emergencies. This analysis will enable us to consider the practical scope of legitimate 
interference in accordance with national security initiatives. Moreover, it will seek to 
underscore inherent limitations with the traditional approach to balancing these objectives 
personified with Article 15 of the ECHR.  
5.3 Reimagining Security in the Context of Health 
 
When looking to assess the legitimate use of derogations (as well as to question the 
practicality of absolute human rights) within a theoretical scenario, such considerations will 
usually be conceptualised in the context of a hypothetical terrorist attack – specifically relating 
to purported justifications for torture of terrorist suspects.641 However, it is perhaps more useful 
to conduct this assessment by considering a less pervasive (but potentially more likely) 
contemporary scenario pertaining to health based risks. Specifically, the increasingly 
significant threat posed by the potential outbreak of a Public Health Emergency of International 
Concern (PHEIC),642 exemplified by diseases such as AIDS, SARS and the Ebola virus. 
                                                            
640 Costas Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (Routledge 
Cavendish 2007) 6. 
641 This is perhaps most famously represented in the ‘ticking time bomb’ scenario. Here, certainty of a 
catastrophic outcome if drastic action – in the form of torture (as a last resort) – is not taken is used to justify 
such measures. For more on this see Joseph Spino and Denise D. Cummins, ‘The Ticking Time Bomb: When 
the Use of Torture Is and Is Not Endorsed’ (2014) 5 Review of Philosophy and Psychology 543.  
642 WHO, ‘Revision of the International Health Regulations’ (23 May 2005) WHA Res 58.3 [IHR 2005] 
<http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/43883/9789241580410_eng.pdf;jsessionid=5EEF289965B568
17D79E1A37ED2ED4FE?sequence=1> accessed 18 May 2018. 
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Indeed, changes in relation to the international response to such emerging threats are 
themselves demonstrative of the value of reassessing traditional conceptualisations, as well as 
representative of the validation of the concept of human security. The results of such an 
approach, represented in UNSCR 2177 (September 2014)643, is to establish a more effective 
means of addressing significant international and inter-connected concerns: 
[Resolution] 2177 represents the symbolic culmination of an increasing 
process of securitisation of health, whereby the risk of international spread 
of infectious diseases is seen not so much as a public health problem to be 
dealt with by civilian authorities but a security threat to be addressed 
primarily by security, military and intelligence authorities at the national 
and international levels.644 
 The most important change resulting from this resolution was to conceptualise public 
health emergencies of international concern as ‘threats to international peace and security’.645 
As discussed, prior to this such threats were principally understood in militaristic terms – of 
actual or imminent conflicts – or, in the case of health, by the weaponization of health and 
disease.646 Historically, in the form of chemical weapons, both before and after they were 
prohibited,647 as well as the dangers posed by radioactive fallout648 from the anticipated use of 
nuclear weapons.649 Crucially, as they were expected to result from deliberate acts, it was 
                                                            
643 United Nations Security Council, ‘On the Outbreak of the Ebola Virus in, and its Impact on, West Africa’ 
(18 September 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2177 (UNSCR 2177) 
<http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2177%20(2014)> accessed 18 May 2018.  
644 Gian Luca Burci, ‘Ebola, the Security Council and the Securitization of Public Health’ (2014) 10 QIL 27, 33. 
645 ibid 27. 
646 See for example Larry Lutwick and Suzanne Lutwick (eds), Beyond Anthrax: The Weaponisation of 
Infectious Diseases (Humana Press 2009). 
647 In the modern context, prohibition of the use of chemical weapons is most famously represented within the 
Geneva Protocol (1925). Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or 
other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, 17 June 1925 (1925) 94 LNTS 65 
<https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/bio/1925-geneva-protocol/> accessed 18 May 2018. 
648 See the dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry in the ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat 
or Use of Nuclear Weapons (1996) where he stated that nuclear weapons ‘produce instantaneous radiation, in 
addition to which there is also radioactive fallout’. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory 
Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 2 <http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/95/095-19960708-ADV-01-12-EN.pdf> 18 
May 2018. 
649 David Holloway explains that during the Cold War ‘both American and Russian military planners appear to 
have assumed that a future war would be a replay of World War II, with the addition of nuclear weapons’. 
David Holloway, ‘Nuclear Weapons and the Cold War in Europe’ in Mark Kramer and Vit Smetana (eds), 
Imposing, Maintaining, and Tearing Open the Iron Curtain: The Cold War and East Central Europe, 1939-1945 
(Lexington Books 2013) 439. 
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anticipated that all such threats allowed for the possibility of peaceful and diplomatic 
conclusion (by restricting the lawfulness of military force and encouraging the pacific 
resolution of disputes).650 Legitimising the perception of public health emergencies of 
international concern within the scope of threats to international peace and security is 
significant precisely because the nature of these threats is different. As noted when referencing 
Upendra Baxi in Chapter Four, transboundary health risks ‘respect no territorial or ideological 
frontiers’.651  
Indeed, public health emergencies of international concern are unanticipated and 
unpredictable, and cannot therefore be resolved purely with diplomacy, nor can they be 
effectively controlled without a truly international (inter-connected) response. As Burci notes, 
‘the language, if not the use, of Chapter VII is presented as an important symbolism of the need 
for unprecedented mobilization by the international community’.652 Potential limitations with 
the focus of this reconceptualisation – for example the implicit endorsement of the 
amalgamation of human security within traditional national security narratives – will be 
addressed later in this chapter. Yet it is the nature of the threat posed by public health 
emergencies of international concern that makes them an interesting and relevant area for 
examination as it pertains to their potential impact on human rights protections. As we have 
seen, attempts to justify interference with the rights of criminals (including suspected terrorists) 
are increasingly based upon prioritising the interests of a perceived innocent collective over 
those of individuals adjudged to have harmed (or who have the potential/intent to harm) such 
                                                            
650 This is represented within the UN Charter (1945). Specifically, within Article 2(4) denoting the general 
prohibition of the use of force - bar certain exceptional circumstances (e.g. Article 51 self-defence) - as well as 
the ‘international peace and security’ enforcement powers contained within CHVI (Pacific Settlement of 
Disputes) and CHVII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace). Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 
1945, 1 UNTS XVI <http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/> accessed 18 May 2018.   
651 Upendra Baxi, ‘The Place of the Human Right to Health and Contemporary Approaches to Global Justice: 
Some Impertinent Interrogations’ in John Harrington (ed) and Maria Stuttaford (ed), Global Health & Human 
Rights: Legal and Philosophical Perspectives (Routledge Press, 2012) 23. 
652 Gian Luca Burci, ‘Ebola, the Security Council and the Securitization of Public Health’ (2014) 10 QIL 27, 30. 
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interests. However, in relation to a PHEIC, attempts to justify various interferences would 
instead be based upon prioritising the interests of an innocent collective over other innocent 
people (e.g. those who are infected/carrying the relevant disease/pathogen) as the threat they 
are determined to pose to society will not necessarily (if at all) be based upon an intent to harm. 
This distinction could result in justifying interferences that could logically be viewed as being 
more morally difficult to condone.653 In the hypothetical terrorist attack scenario, the absolute 
nature of rights is, in a sense (and in the view of the state), deemed to have been forfeited by 
those who demonstrate an intent (or capacity) to harm the collective interests of the state. 
Interference is justified, in this context, not only because of the nature of the specific threat, 
but due to its direct correlation with the actions of certain individuals. In the context of the War 
on Terror, Douzinas highlights, it is generally accepted that ‘Guantanamo Bay prisoners have 
no rights because they are evil murderers, and a threat to Western security’.654 Yet with regards 
to a PHEIC, there is no need to for a direct link between individual actions and the realities of 
the specific threat.  Interference could thus be justified purely on the grounds of the possibility 
for greater harm and irrespective of establishing clear intent.  
A PHEIC is, by definition, generally an unexpected development. The absence of 
anticipation can result in lack of preparation as it pertains to providing an effective response to 
emerging threats.655 They are truly exceptional concerns that necessitate a prompt and focused 
                                                            
653 In the sense that the harm (or threat of harm) posed is not the result of a choice. Likewise to Michel 
Foucault’s questioning of the right to use circumstances beyond an individual’s control (namely poverty) to 
justify exposing them to a course of action argued to be of interest to the state (e.g. enhancement of medical 
knowledge), how is it fair to interfere with the fundamental protections of individuals deemed to pose a threat to 
the state, if the threat in question is ‘unconsented’, in that it isn’t based on a deliberate act or choice? Michel 
Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic (Routledge 2003) 101. 
654 Costas Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (Routledge 
Cavendish 2007) 59. 
655 In reflecting on this in the context of the Ebola outbreak of 2014, Gian Luca Burci explained that the ‘main 
rationale behind the increasing securitisation of health is the perception that highly pathogenic infectious 
diseases spreading internationally may undermine the political, economic and social bases for a state’s security, 
plunge it into chaos and possibly lead to massive population displacement: this in turn would reverberate 
regionally and cause further instability and conflict that could also affect the security perception of third states 
with interest in the affected region’. Gian Luca Burci, ‘Ebola, the Security Council and the Securitization of 
Public Health’ (2014) 10 QIL 27, 35. 
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international response once they have been identified. However, the scope of justifiable action 
as it pertains to interference with human rights protections within such contexts is far from 
clear. In the hypothetical terrorist attack scenario failure to act (i.e. justify interference) could 
lead to disastrous consequence for the affected state (and potentially by extension neighbouring 
states). In contrast, with a significant PHEIC, failure to act could arguably undermine the 
collective interests of all states (in the event that it resulted in the eventual spread of a pandemic 
level disease).656 There is therefore paradoxically both greater and lesser justification for 
interfering with rights in response to health based threats than traditional national security 
scenarios – such as terrorist attacks. In order for it to be consistent with the purpose of human 
rights, the determining criteria for legitimising interference should once again be based upon 
its consistency with the underlying purpose of such protections. Yet, the issue is arguably much 
more ambiguous when it comes to a PHEIC due, in a large part, to the reason they are now 
conceptualised as threats to international peace and security – the unexpected, unpredictable 
nature of their development. The WHO itself, per the International Health Regulations (IHR 
2005), have defined a PHEIC as ‘an extraordinary event which is determined to constitute a 
public health risk to other States through the international spread of disease and to potentially 
require a coordinated international response’.657 Indeed, due to events in recent history, 
initiating with the attacks of the September the 11th 2001, threats posed by terrorist acts are 
more clearly understood by the public than those of a potential PHEIC. There is an element of 
certainty in relation to the perceived need for interference on these grounds because the 
consequences of inaction are readily accepted by populations (whether a particular threat is 
legitimate or not). In contrast, public health emergencies of international concern are 
unpredictable threats. There is an obvious lack of certainty stemming from incomplete 
                                                            
656 ibid. 
657 WHO, ‘Revision of the International Health Regulations’ (23 May 2005) WHA Res 58.3 [IHR 2005] 
<http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/43883/9789241580410_eng.pdf;jsessionid=5EEF289965B568
17D79E1A37ED2ED4FE?sequence=1> accessed 18 May 2018.   
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knowledge/understanding of the disease itself. Even in the case of the Ebola outbreak of 2014 
- which, as noted, impelled the UNSC to acknowledge that a PHEIC could constitute a threat 
to international peace and security - the ultimate scope of the threat proved to be largely 
restricted (both geographically and in terms of aggressiveness of the infection).658 To what 
extent can states justifiably authorise interference with human rights in the absence of certainty 
regarding the necessity of such action? An overly restrictive approach could lead to failure to 
prevent the rapid spread of a deadly disease. However, a more flexible approach would risk 
justifying arbitrary interference. The key question would therefore appear to be: is the 
possibility of an exceptional threat enough to legitimate interference with certain fundamental 
individual interests?  
5.3.1 Assessing the Absoluteness of Absolute Rights 
 
Reimagining the Ebola outbreak as a hypothetically more severe PHEIC (e.g. extinction 
level threat) can assist the process of effectively responding to this question. If a similar Ebola 
like virus was to emerge in the United Kingdom (or another ECHR member state), but with 
significantly enhanced levels of aggression, infectiousness, and international transferability, 
would interference with any and all human rights be justifiable as means of effectively 
combating it? If so, would such justification be dependent upon a proportionate approach to 
the issue (with less intrusive measures attempted before more aggressive measures are 
considered)? As demonstrated in the example of a suspected terrorist attack, an approach 
founded upon prioritising human rights interests above all others would surely claim that 
justifiable interferences should be limited (and legitimised by a proportional response). The 
reasoning behind such a position would be that interferences can only be condoned when they 
                                                            
658 For a more detailed account of this outbreak see Tiaji Salaam-Blyther, ‘US and International Health 
Responses to the Ebola Outbreak in West Africa’ (2014) Congressional Research Service 
<https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43697.pdf> accessed 18 May 2018.   
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are unavoidable, and even then, only when the negative consequences of inaction exceed those 
of the chosen response. In contrast, approaches based on the prioritisation of collective interests 
(namely state security), would, hypothetically at least, seemingly allow for a greater level of 
interference once a threat has been identified. In support of this we can draw reference to the 
insightful study completed by Joseph Spino and Denise D. Cummins. Here, through the 
conduction of a research experiment on public perception of the justifiability of torture, it was 
found that:  
[T]he more weight people place on expected consequences, the more likely they 
were to endorse torture as a means of information extraction, the less likely they 
were to find torture morally wrong, and the more likely they were to agree that 
it is obligatory.659 
 However, proponents of human rights interests would generally be incapable of 
endorsing this approach – at least as it pertains to ‘ticking time bomb’ style terrorist scenario. 
Such objections would be based upon the presumption that certain interests are absolute and 
inalienable; and that the costs of interference – as it pertains to undermining the survivability 
of the identity of the state - can never be exceeded by the consequences of failing to take action.  
Specifically, this would relate to the values and ideals (e.g. democracy, civil liberties) 
that shape the identity of the social consciousness of states. Within the context of the U. K. a 
relevant example of this can be found in the dissenting opinion of Lord Hoffman in A (FC) and 
others (FC) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department; X (FC) and another (FC) v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56. Here, Lord Hoffman maintained 
that:  
[The] “nation” is a social organism, living in its territory (in this case, the United 
Kingdom) under its own form of government and subject to a system of laws 
which expresses its own political and moral values ... This is a nation which has 
been tested in adversity, which has survived physical destruction and 
                                                            
659 Joseph Spino and Denise D. Cummins, ‘The Ticking Time Bomb: When the Use of Torture Is and Is Not 
Endorsed’ (2014) 5 Review of Philosophy and Psychology 543, 551. 
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catastrophic loss of life. I do not underestimate the ability of fanatical groups of 
terrorists to kill and destroy, but they do not threaten the life of the nation.660  
The implication of this, it is suggested, is that whilst the actions of terrorists may not 
directly threaten the ‘life of the nation’, action condoned by the governing powers of states in 
combating this threat may do so – in that it can facilitate the erosion of the states 
aforementioned ‘identity’.661 Nevertheless, it is worth considering if a human rights based 
determination on the legitimacy of the interference with rights would reject a health based 
threat to state security in the same way.  
Indeed, the relevance of a states’ identity is itself surely dependent upon the 
continuation/survivability of a peoples who retain the capacity to enjoy it.662 Whilst this is not 
necessarily a concern when it comes to traditional internal militarised threats such as terrorist 
attacks (such as those recently witnessed in the United Kingdom and referenced earlier in this 
thesis), it is a relevant consideration in relation to a potential PHEIC for reasons we have 
previously discussed. The concept of absolute rights can, at least theoretically, survive a 
terrorist based attack to the collective interests of a state. However, the scope of these 
consequences is not truly comparable with those potentially posed by emerging public health 
emergencies of international concern (which by their very nature have the capacity to 
undermine the enjoyment of all interests - collective or otherwise - through mass loss of life 
and social destabilisation).663 In this sense, it is appropriate to question the validity of the 
concept of absolute rights in such contexts. If a potentially deadly outbreak of an Ebola like 
                                                            
660 A (FC) and others (FC) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department; X (FC) and another (FC) v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56 [91]. 
661 ibid. 
662 On this see once again Jeremy Bentham’s assertion ‘[that] which has no existence cannot be destroyed – that 
which cannot be destroyed cannot require anything to preserve it from destruction’. Jeremy Bentham, 
‘Anarchical Fallacies’ in John Bowring (ed), The Works of Jeremy Bentham Vol. II (Edinburgh: William Tait 
1843) 500. 
663 This simply reflects the view, succinctly expressed by Timothy M. Maher Jr. and Seth D. Baum, that 
pandemics ‘threaten the sustainability of human civilization’. Timothy M. Maher Jr. and Seth D. Baum, 
‘Adaptation to and Recovery from Global Catastrophe’ (2013) 5 Sustainability 1461, 1461. 
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virus can be stopped through actions which unavoidably violate interests presently regarded as 
being absolute rights – such as via forced inoculation or medical experimentation (e.g. a 
violation of the prohibition of torture) of those actually (or suspected to be) infected – would it 
be morally right to justify these interferences? Moreover, would doing so ultimately and 
irreparably undermine the concept of universal human rights (as presently understood)?  
On first consideration, many might be inclined to answer both questions affirmatively. 
To paraphrase Bentham, rights can have no real worth in the event that no one is left to enjoy 
them, or if they cannot be effectively protected and enforced.664 Similarly, acknowledging the 
non-absoluteness of these claims, even if only in exceptional (or seemingly implausible) 
circumstances, appears to call into question the manner in which they can accurately be 
regarded as guaranteed protections (i.e. the sense in which they are actually human rights). 
However, as previously established, it is necessary to accept such conclusions only if we 
approach the issue in specific, restrictive terms – with the presupposition that a contemporary 
rights-based approach is the only possibility. As established in chapters two and three, the idea 
of human rights is a particular vehicle which is capable of communicating a specific (and 
morally significant) purpose (to actualise human agency). The true test in relation to the 
justifiability of interference with individual interests as established in the aforementioned 
hypothetical scenario would therefore seem to rest with its consistency with this overarching, 
universalising purpose. This is because, in practice, human rights simply represent a 
contemporary (and perfectible) instrument through which the purpose of such claims may be 
legitimated.  
Theoretically, the inalienability of rights will not be compromised by interference 
which is consistent with the underlying purpose of these claims. Yet, this should only be 
                                                            
664 Jeremy Bentham, ‘Anarchical Fallacies’ in John Bowring (ed), The Works of Jeremy Bentham Vol. II 
(Edinburgh: William Tait 1843) 500. 
Daniel M Lowe                           Assessing the Universality of Human Rights in the Context of Health  
240 
 
satisfied in exceptional circumstances. There is a need to demonstrate the necessity of 
interfering and arbitrary interference should not be condoned. Thus, in the context of a 
suspected terrorist attack there is a clear means by which non-interference can be justified - 
when it is uncertain whether interference is truly necessary. Such an approach attempts to 
legitimate specific, exceptional interferences without compromising the integrity of the 
concept of universal rights as guaranteed protections. The fact that there are circumstances 
when interference can be denied in such contexts adds further credence to this position.665 Yet 
there is a greater level of difficulty with this approach when it attempts to address the issue of 
PHEIC based threats to the enjoyment of human rights. Directly applying the same criteria here 
could be insufficient due to particular components of these unique threats – ultimately leading 
to the denial of interference (based on lack of understanding/certainty) which will subsequently 
be proved to have been necessary. The alternative is to allow for a more flexible approach 
which seemingly risks justifying arbitrary interference (and which is arguably representative 
of contemporary efforts to regulate derogations within the ECHR).666 The universal purpose 
which underpins the concept of human rights can potentially justify interference with these 
same claims. However, can it legitimately authorise varying degrees of interference depending 
on the context without undermining the idea itself? That is to say - does the approach to 
justifying interference require consistency of application in order for it to remain credible? 
In responding to these questions, it is worth re-considering some significant conclusions 
from the previous chapter on the right to health. Here, reassessing traditional conceptualisations 
                                                            
665 Indeed, protections such as the prohibition of torture are largely accepted (at least ostensibly) to be jus 
cogens of international law. In the context of the ECHR, this is represented by the discourse surrounding the 
absolute (e.g. non-derogable) nature of Article 3. For a detailed examination of the implications of this 
protection see Natasa Mavronicola, ‘What is an ‘absolute right’? Deciphering Absoluteness in the Context of 
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2013) 12 Human Rights Law Review 723.  
666 As previously discussed, this relates to Article 15 of the ECHR which empowers member states to derogate 
from certain (conditional) protections in a ‘time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the 
nation’. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as Amended by Protocols 
No.11 and No.14 (opened for signature 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) CETS No. 005 
(ECHR) art 15 <http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf> accessed 18 May 2018.   
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of the idea of this protection led to the determination that, due to the expansive nature of this 
claim, it should be understood as a right to human healthiness. It was thus identified as a 
foundational protection. Indeed, it is foundational in the sense that it provides a means for other 
claims to achieve meaning (as a lack of an appropriate level of health undermines the value 
and significance of other protections). Moreover, it is foundational in that successful 
application of this right is not dependent upon definitive, comprehensive coverage of relevant 
issues/aspects, nor a universally consistent standard of application. It instead provides a 
foundation for continued and progressive development.667 The content and scope of the 
protection is ultimately evolutive, in that it should expand over time (with the ultimate aim of 
achieving eventual universally consistent application).668 Therefore, and similarly to the 
concept of security itself, health based threats are arguably foundational due to their capacity 
to undermine all other interests or subsistence (collective or otherwise). As such, whilst lack 
of certainty in relation to the need to act cannot justify interference in relation to traditional 
terrorist based threats (e.g. isolated, localised attacks on general populations), that same lack 
of certainty, when it pertains to a PHEIC, will not necessarily preclude the justification of 
interference (due to the exceptional nature of the threat and the lack of time which may be 
available to organise an effective response). Indeed, in this scenario the approach is actually 
consistent with the one applied in the suspected terrorist attack scenario, as in both instances 
the justifiability of interference is contingent upon the specific nature of the ‘exceptional’ 
threat. Interference will be restricted so far as is possible without compromising the capacity 
to secure the continuation of these same interests.  
                                                            
667 As discussed in Chapter Four in relation to the work of Aoife Nolan. In accordance with the concept of 
progressive realisation, this model proposes prioritising interests based upon their foundational significance to 
other interests. With such an approach, whilst the ultimate objective is to secure the highest attainable standard 
of health, the pre-requisites for health will need to be prioritised before this standard of health becomes 
obtainable (or, indeed, meaningful). Aoife Nolan, ‘The Childs Right to Health and the Courts’ in John 
Harrington (ed) and Maria Stuttaford (ed), Global Health & Human Rights: Legal and Philosophical 
Perspectives (Routledge Press, 2012) 140. 
668 ibid. 
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5.3.2 Reconceptualising the Fulfilment of Human Rights 
 
From this analysis, it would appear that we can draw the following general conclusions:  
1. Whilst human rights may be regarded as inalienable, this inalienability does not 
require absolute application, but can instead justify legitimate interference in 
exceptional circumstances (when they are consistent with the underlying purpose of 
such claims – to actualise fundamental interests). 
2. The justifiability of such interference is dependent upon the nature of the threat. 
Legitimate interference must be an unavoidable means of securing the ability to 
continue to fulfil this underlying purpose (i.e. when the absence of interference poses 
a greater threat to the capacity to protect these interests). 
3. Lack of certainty will, in most circumstances, preclude justifiable interference due to 
potentially negative costs of allowing it. Specifically, by compromising the 
continuation of the ‘identity’ of the state (i.e. by sacrificing values and liberties which 
make the preservation of the state a worthy objective). 
4. However, some exceptional circumstances (such as with an exceptionally dangerous 
PHEIC), may justify interference irrespective of the immediate certainty of the need 
to act, if the possible consequences of failing to do so ultimately undermines the 
relevance of preserving this identity (when continuation of the state itself is not 
assured).  
This is itself, of course, based upon a traditional conceptualisation of terrorism in that 
it presupposes future attacks/threats falling within the currently accepted model of individual, 
isolated acts perpetrated by specific groups. Yet it is worth noting that the meaning of terrorism 
has changed several times throughout history. Originally this was conceived in post-revolution 
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France as means of maintaining public order with Maximilien Robespierre famously declaring 
‘terror is nothing other than justice … applied to our country’s most urgent needs’.669  In this 
way, its original conception was arguably as a legitimate tool of governance. Within a 
contemporary context, it is now understood as a barbaric act of violent resistance - of 
ideological, religious, or political protest with the explicit intent to cause suffering and harm 
with the aim of influencing the conduct of states.670 To date, the scope of individual terrorist 
attacks has been relatively restricted - in that their consequences are largely isolated in 
geographical terms - in the sense that a specific state will have been targeted (and more 
particularly, in that they will directly affect a specific part of that state.)671 The scope of the 
threat is, therefore, seemingly incomparable with that truly global risk posed by a PHEIC. 
However, the context of these attacks is susceptible to change (expanding the confines of the 
consequences). This, as yet unimagined development, cannot be assessed in specific terms (as 
the nature of the changing threat is unknown). Despite this, realisation of the possibility of 
change encourages reassessment of the means by which interference with human rights 
protections may be justifiable. There are two possible developments in particular that should 
be examined: (i) the first, bioterrorism, relating to a terrorist threat which directly incorporates 
aspects of a PHEIC (for example by weaponising disease);672 (ii) and the second involving a 
completely unique threat which represents a separate (but substantively commensurate) 
unknown alternative. Crucially, the established criteria for justifying interference can, at least 
theoretically, potentially be satisfied in both instances. 
                                                            
669 Erik Männik, ‘Terrorism: Its Past, Present and Future Prospects’ (2009) 12 Kaitseväe Ühendatud 
Õppeasutused 151, 152. 
670 For more on this see Antonio Cassese, ‘The Multifaceted Criminal Notion of Terrorism in International Law’ 
(2006) 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice 933. 
671 For relatively recent examples of this see the attacks which took place at the Ataturk Airport in Istanbul, 
Turkey on the 28th of June 2016 or at the Promenades de Anglais in Nice, France on the 14th of July 2016. 
672 See once again Stefan Elbe, Security and Global Health: Toward the Medicalisation of Insecurity (Polity 
Press 2010) 66. 
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With regard to the first scenario, this is due to its direct correlation with traditional 
PHEIC based threats. It should, in this sense, be addressed in the same manner. A health based 
threat to the continuation of the enjoyment of rights can, due to the nature of this threat, justify 
exceptional interference with these same protections. This surely remains the case regardless 
of the cause of the threat (whether it is ‘organic’ in the sense that it develops without human 
interference or indeed whether it is the result of deliberate intent). Rather the most important 
distinction in this scenario would not relate to the scope posed by the specific threat, but rather 
the limitations of justifiable interference. In a traditional PHEIC scenario (e.g. as discussed in 
the previous pandemic example), interference with absolute rights could conceivably take the 
form of forced quarantining, inoculation or, exceptionally, of medical experimentation without 
consent (the latter of which can be argued to be commensurate to torture).673 Following the 
aforementioned template, these actions would become justifiable the moment the nature of the 
threat had been confirmed (specifically at the initiation of the outbreak of the particular 
disease). Thus, they would be largely reactive in nature. A direct response to actual events 
based upon the fear of possible consequences of failing to act (and as such capable of 
demonstrating the unavoidable nature of the interference). Yet in the case of a terrorist based 
PHEIC, the scope of the need for interference would arguably change. In addition to 
justification for reactive measures there is the question of proactive (or preventative) ones. 
Specifically, the issue of whether subjecting a suspected terrorist to torture in the hopes of 
obtaining information conducive to precluding the attack should be considered/condoned.674 
                                                            
673 In envisioning the possibility of justification being afforded (or even attempted) for such courses of action, 
one must imagine that the state in question is facing an extinction level pandemic threat. If the situation is 
worsening - resulting in mass loss of life, and the loosening of governmental control – would it be justifiable for 
state authorities to use any means possible to restore order (even at the cost of so-called absolute rights)? 
674 It would therefore be subject to similar considerations as with the traditional ‘ticking time bomb’ style 
terrorist threat. See once again Joseph Spino and Denise D. Cummins, ‘The Ticking Time Bomb: When the Use 
of Torture Is and Is Not Endorsed’ (2014) 5 Review of Philosophy and Psychology 543. 
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Can an anticipated threat of this nature provide justification for interference in the absence of 
certainty of its actual scope? 
Objectively, consistent application of the previously established criteria would lead to 
the conclusion that such justification may be possible. This is because the determining criteria 
behind this method was the specific nature of the exceptional threat. In the event of a terrorist 
attack based upon the incorporation of a PHEIC which could be effectively mitigated 
preventatively - thus negating the need for significant reactive measures - then action taken in 
accordance with this aim will be consistent with the overarching purpose of the idea of human 
rights. The difficulty would once again stem from the issue of certainty of the need to act. 
Whilst in regular PHEIC scenarios justification can be provided even in the absence of 
certainty, this is arguably influenced by the cause of the threat itself. Namely, as mentioned, 
the fact that pandemics are unpredictable, organic developments that ‘invariably cause high 
morbidity and mortality and great social disruption and economic losses’.675 In other words, its 
existence is not predicated on a deliberate intent to harm (as they are natural, unpredictable 
events). However, in the reimagined terrorist scenario, the intent to harm is the fundamental 
cause of the possible threat. Absence of certainty, not only in relation to the suspected terrorist’s 
capacity to perpetrate the attack (or disclose information capable of preventing/averting it), but 
also pertaining to the scope of the possible harm which could result become significant 
considerations.676 In this sense, whilst interference may be justifiable in these contexts, it would 
not be absolute (or automatic). Instead there would be a requirement to satisfy, to a reasonable 
extent, the need for action (but perhaps to a lesser degree than with a traditional terrorist based 
threat). 
                                                            
675 Stacey L. Knobler et al (eds), The Threat of Pandemic Influenza: Are We Ready?: Workshop Summary 
(National Academies Press 2005) 144. 
676 Joseph Spino and Denise D. Cummins, ‘The Ticking Time Bomb: When the Use of Torture Is and Is Not 
Endorsed’ (2014) 5 Review of Philosophy and Psychology 543. 
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The second scenario would also seemingly justify interference in the event that the 
scope of the harm was considerably greater than contemporary terrorist attacks. Once again, 
the threat with regard to its potential impact on the capacity to secure the continuation of the 
enjoyment of rights based protections is of paramount importance. Interestingly, attempts at 
identifying possible developments in accordance with this lead to considering threats which 
themselves pose significant difficulties/concerns for matters of health: for example, the 
detonation of a nuclear or chemical weapon.677 Similarly, as with the previous example, the 
issue of justifying preventative measures is present. As highlighted, such interference should 
only be justified exceptionally. The threshold for establishing/demonstrating the necessity of 
interference is also significantly higher than the reactive measures considered in a traditional 
PHEIC. This is simply because it is easier to demonstrate the need for action when the 
immediacy of the threat is undeniable (in that has happened/is continuing to happen). This is 
true irrespective of whether the scope of the harm caused by this threat ultimately proves to be 
less than expected or anticipated. The possibility of greater harm, coupled with the lack of 
appropriate time to establish the certainty of the need to act, enables justifiable interference in 
its absence. A threat which has yet to occur, or which exists purely hypothetically, cannot 
provide the same scope for justifying interference. It cannot truly be known whether 
interference is necessary when the aim of proposed measures would be preventative rather than 
reactive.  
5.3.3 Striking a More Effective Balance: Considerations for Possible Reform  
 
Following on from this analysis, it is useful to consider some recommendations for 
reform regarding the manner in which the objectives of safeguarding security and human rights 
                                                            
677 As Elbe notes, this was personified with the ‘destructive nuclear arms race between the United States and the 
Soviet Union during the Cold War’. Stefan Elbe, Security and Global Health: Toward the Medicalisation of 
Insecurity (Polity Press 2010) 72. 
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may be effectively balanced (and fulfilled). It has been established that these aims are not in 
fact incompatible (in contrast to what much of the current discourse appears to suggest). The 
fulfilment of the purpose of rights can require interference with their implementation in certain 
exceptional circumstances. Thus, it is to be acknowledged that rights cannot be absolute in 
either substantive content (e.g. represented by definitive accounts of these protections), or in 
application. Crucially, this observation affirms that all rights are derogable - albeit with varying 
degrees of derogability (e.g. with certain rights easier to justify interference with than others). 
With rights presently regarded as absolute/non-derogable (such as Article 3 of the ECHR),678 
the degree of derogability would be much narrower than with protections which are already 
accepted as being susceptible to lawful derogation (such as Article’s 8, 9 & 10 of the ECHR).679 
Acceptance of the possibility of lawful derogation from any human right can ultimately result 
in the enhancement of the legitimacy of the concept of rights itself. This is achieved by ensuring 
that the purpose of such protections can consistently (and continuously) be fulfilled; even if 
such fulfilment requires interference with the practical application of these protections. 
Similarly, by allowing member states to derogate from every human right in genuine 
emergencies, we reduce the credibility of the argument that rights act as obstacles to the 
successful obtainment of a national security. 
Within the context of the ECHR, the embracement of this theoretical approach could 
also result in the enhancement of the perceived legitimacy (as well as sufficiency) of the 
ECtHR. As we have already addressed, the use of existing derogation machinery of the ECHR 
(e.g. Article 15) is ineffectively governed by the Strasbourg Court.680 In particular, it has been 
                                                            
678 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as Amended by Protocols No.11 
and No.14 (opened for signature 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) CETS No. 005 
(ECHR) art 3 <http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf> accessed 18 May 2018.   
679 ibid art 8-10.  
680 Alan Greene, ‘Separating Normalcy from Emergency: The Jurisprudence of Article 15 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights’ (2011) 12 German Law Journal 1764, 1782. 
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noted that the Court has consistently deferred to the affected member state regarding the actual 
existence of an emergency situation (presupposing the validity of the need to derogate), and 
instead restricted itself to conducting robust judicial review of the proportionality of the 
measures undertaken in response.681 Thus, it is clear that there is presently no effective test 
applied to determine whether an emergency actually exists (and therefore to determining 
whether derogation was actually necessary). This thesis argues that reforms based on the 
analysis conducted in this chapter could help to resolve some of these issues. There are two 
aspects to this proposed reformed approach. The first would require the adoption of a stricter 
first test which would look to determine the legitimacy of the need to derogate more effectively. 
In order to satisfy this test, it would not be enough for affected states to highlight security needs 
(e.g. an ostensible emergency situation) as providing justification for their actions (as is 
presently the case),682 but would also require that this justification be made in accordance with 
the objective of securing the continued fulfilment of purpose of human rights. This should 
minimise the potential abusability of the derogation framework - by ensuring that member 
states acknowledge that permission to derogate is not to be interpreted as confirmation of the 
general superiority of security over human rights norms (and thus prevent states from adopting 
an overly-broad approach that risks unjustifiable/unnecessary interference with the 
Convention).  
Similarly, the Court is provided with more credible (and effective) criteria for 
regulating the legitimate scope of interference with human rights – as it pertains to both the 
necessary length of derogation as well as the specific protections requiring suspension 
                                                            
681 See for example Lawless v Ireland (no. 3) (1961) 1 EHRR 15; Ireland v. the United Kingdom (1978) 2 
EHRR 25; Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom (1993) 17 EHRR 539; Aksoy v. Turkey [1996] ECHR 
68; A and Others v. the United Kingdom (2009) 49 EHRR 29; Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey [2018] ECHR 
251; Sahin Alpay v. Turkey [2018] ECHR 253. 
682 For example, the continuing ‘state of emergency’ initiated in Turkey almost two years after the failed coup 
d'état. For an effective critique of Turkey’s apparent misuse of emergency powers see Amnesty International 
Report 2017/8: The State of the World’s Human Rights (London: Amnesty International 2018) 367-72. 
Daniel M Lowe                           Assessing the Universality of Human Rights in the Context of Health  
249 
 
(significantly increasing the possibility of finding against the affected state at the first test 
stage). This aspect of the proposed reformed approach should ultimately result in the preclusion 
of the possibility of non-temporary derogations, as well as significantly reduce the prospect of 
affected states escaping accountability for unjustifiable interferences with Convention rights 
through misuse of Article 15. 
The second aspect would require member states to accept the non-absoluteness of 
human rights as it pertains to their implementation. As previously discussed, this would simply 
relate to the acknowledgement that all rights are derogable (as fulfilment of the purpose of such 
protections may require temporary interference with their provision). In accordance with this 
position, the second test would basically mirror the current approach of the ECtHR (and the 
adoption of a strict review of the proportionality of the derogating measures) but with wider 
scope; allowing for proportionate/lawful derogation from protections currently regarded as 
non-derogable – such as Article 3 – in exceptional circumstances (and in order to ensure the 
continual fulfilment of such protections). This would potentially secure a number of positive 
benefits that could enhance the credibility of the ECHR itself. In the first instance, by 
demonstrating that the fulfilment of the purpose of human rights protections can (in exceptional 
circumstances) be used to justify legitimate interference with their implementation (and the 
subsequent prioritisation of national security), this is achieved by disarming the narrative that 
human rights and national security are competing aims (with provision of the former 
presented/perceived as inhibiting the guaranteed safeguarding of the latter). This, in turn, would 
minimise the prospect of the ECtHR allowing for arbitrarily overbroad interference with human 
rights norms (e.g. as arguably witnessed within the jurisdiction of the ECHR in the context of 
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France,683 as well as on a wider international level in the context of Japan684 in recent years) by 
ensuring that legitimate interference would be held to be dependent upon the affected state 
satisfactorily establishing that their chosen derogations represented the optimal means of 
fulfilling the purpose of such protections.   
5.4 The ‘Securitisation’ of Human Rights: Subsistence as Security 
 
It has previously been addressed that the securitisation of rights is achieved through 
political discourse. In addition to promoting the idea that the fulfilment of human rights and 
the provision of state security are competing objectives, this has results from what Stephen 
Hopgood defines as ‘the politicization of human rights language’.685 Ultimately, Hopgood 
suggests that this represents the fact that  
[The] language of human rights is just too contaminated in many places, as well 
as suffering from a kind of familiarity and vagueness that makes almost any 
demand for equal treatment, justice or freedom expressible in rights language, 
whether or not such a demand is truly justified.686 
These factors serve to undermine the feasibility (and desirability) of the idea of human 
rights as necessary, fundamental protections.687. In response, sovereign authorities exploit the 
nature of these protections to challenge their very realisability, by promoting a ‘universality’ 
which is merely a variation of the subject of the political construct (e.g. the law-abiding 
citizen). Rights are thus securitised against their claimants, with their universal relevance 
                                                            
683 Specifically, the recent enactment of tougher counter-terrorist laws which have been criticised for effectively 
enabling a ‘permanent’ state of emergency. For an effective summary of the controversy surrounding these new 
emergency powers see Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, ‘France: The Dangers of Emergency Legislation’ (2017) Just 
Security <https://www.justsecurity.org/45263/france-dangers-permanent-emergency-legislation/> 
684 This is reflected in the recently enacted legislation which looks to tackle organised crime (including terrorist 
acts) more effectively. This law provides the state with greater scope and discretion in taking preventative 
action. However, ambiguity regarding the circumstances in which these powers may be lawfully engaged raises 
fears that they are open to abuse. For an insightful critique of these measures see OHCHR, ‘Letter to the 
Japanese Government by the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy’ (2017) OL JPN 3/2017 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Privacy/OL_JPN.pdf> accessed 18 May 2018.  
685 Stephen Hopgood, ‘Challenges to the Global Human Rights Regime: Are Human Rights Still an Effective 
Language for Social Change?’ (2014) 11 SUR – International Journal on Human Rights 67, 69. 
686 ibid 70. 
687 ibid. 
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anchored to a pragmatic denial of universal applicability.688 As mentioned, principally the 
securitisation of rights is premised on the idea that human rights and national security are 
competing aims for the sovereign authority of states.689 Whilst this approach does not 
necessarily suggest that these aims are fundamentally incompatible, it seeks to illustrate that 
(ultimately) there is no certainty of continual mutual fulfilment. The securitisation of rights is 
therefore indicative of the inherent challenges of the human rights concept in contemporary 
times. In addition to ostensibly establishing the non-universality of such protections in 
practical terms, it further highlights the limitations of prevailing approaches (through the 
demonstration of the lack of accountability of member states and the hierarchisation of 
interests) – which results in the relegation of human rights based claims to matters of 
subsidiary or incidental concern.690 The securitisation of rights may be examined within the 
specific context of human healthiness – as we have seen itself now securitised for national 
security aims (as established in the preceding section). Health is therefore an appropriate 
subject to examine significant implications of the securitisation of rights. Moreover, as 
mentioned above, it allows us to further establish the inter-connectedness of both national 
security and the universalising idea of human rights.  
To begin, we should look to contextualise the concept of human security within the 
securitisation discourse itself. In Chapter Two, we addressed the concept of a ‘referent subject’ 
of rights. The conclusions of this study depicted two separate but inter-connected components 
                                                            
688 In that it is argued (legitimately or not) that for the ‘law abiding citizen’ to be able to enjoy these protections 
it should be accepted that terrorists, as well as suspected terrorists and others seeking to cause severe harm to the 
state, should not qualify for human rights protections on account of their conduct (or possible conduct). 
689 Philip Ruddock summarises this position as the (fallacious) choice between ‘protecting either national 
security, or civil liberties’. Phillip Ruddock, ‘A New Framework: Counter-Terrorism and the Rule of Law’ 
(2004) 16 The Sydney Papers 112, 117. 
690 As represented with the examples of France, Turkey, and Japan examined in section 5.2.2 of this chapter. 
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of this ‘subject’.691 The first was the abstract concept of ‘man’ consistently referred to in 
human rights treaties and declarations; the possessor of universal claims. The second was the 
political construct represented as the ‘citizen’, the officially recognised, and practically 
significant, individual with sufficient means to put such claims into practice; the beneficiary 
of rights.692 This is relevant to our current investigation in that it illustrates the benefits of 
adopting a critical approach to accepted knowledge as means of sublimating understanding. 
For the ‘subject’ of human rights, this allows us to deconstruct the idea of a ‘universal man’ 
for the purposes of identifying limitations with traditional or historical interpretations of this 
concept. Indeed, the inescapability of the universality of humankind, at least as it pertains to 
shared species membership,693 is countered, in practice, by the particularity of circumstance 
required to transform ‘universal rights’ from rhetorical claims into reliable protections. In the 
context of security, a critical approach to the discourse could look to disentangle its focus 
from more traditional interpretations; specifically, the national security paradigm. In its place, 
it could emphasise that various forms of established militarised threats are but one aspect of a 
complex and evolutive concept. Furthermore, it would look to centre contemporary efforts at 
enhancing comprehension on emerging (and under-appreciated) components - such as human 
security. The significance of such an approach is that it allows us to reaffirm the significance 
of security to the human rights discourse – and, in particular, the universality of such 
                                                            
691 This resulted from an examination of a hypothesis of Costas Douzinas which stated ‘[the] "man" of the 
"rights of man" has no concrete characteristics, except for free will, reason and soul ... Yet the empirical man 
who actually enjoyed legal rights was literally a man — a well-off, white, Christian, urban male. He condenses 
the abstract dignity of humanity and the privileges of the powerful’. Costas Douzinas, ‘Human Rights for 
Martians’ (2016) Critical Legal Thinking <http://criticallegalthinking.com/2016/05/03/human-rights-for-
martians/> accessed 18 May 2018.   
692 In Chapter Two, this position was reinforced by referencing the work of Hannah Arendt. Peg Birmingham 
remarks that the significance of the possession of a sufficient level of recognition to the enjoyment of rights was 
well known to Arendt who, as a refugee, ‘lost her status as a citizen, lost all claim to human rights’. Peg 
Birmingham, Hannah Arendt and Human Rights: The Predicament of Common Responsibility (Indiana 
University Press 2006) 35. 
693 The idea of human beings being ‘equally human’ is personified by Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights which states: ‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights’. Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A (III) (UDHR) 
<http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a25> accessed 18 May 2018. 
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protections - through a modern reconstruction of this concept. Indeed, the causative link 
between the concept of health as a threat to security and the enjoyment of human rights is 
evidential (as established in the preceding section). This is because health based threats such 
as pandemics can lead to mass loss of life, population displacement, and regional insecurity. 
As Burci concludes, within the global arena there is an ‘increasing perception that the threat 
of an infectious disease – whether natural or as a result of an act of terrorism – could threaten 
regional and global security’.694  
Perhaps less transparent, however, is the actual scope of the implications of this link. 
Whereas consideration of militarised health based threats has been a regular factor in security 
discourse for many years, appreciation of the significance of non-traditional (but ironically 
organic) health based threats, such as pandemics, is a relatively recent development.695 As we 
have just established, as a modernised variation of traditional militarised threats, the 
weaponisation of health, or disease, could theoretically provide states with sufficient 
justification for denying the enjoyment of human rights in a manner commensurate with 
existing derogation machinery. Irrespective of the actual justifiability of such action, this 
would clearly represent the ‘denial’ of application (in the form of direct, intentional 
interference with fundamental claims). Alternatively, human exposure to health based threats 
– such as pandemic diseases – would constitute an obvious diminishment of the ‘enjoyability’ 
of universal rights. In contrast to the previous example, this depreciation of enjoyment would 
seemingly happen regardless of state action; it would thus represent an unintentional 
restriction of the actionability of such claims.  
                                                            
694 Gian Luca Burci, ‘Ebola, the Security Council and the Securitization of Public Health’ (2014) 10 QIL 27, 32. 
695 As discussed, this is epitomised with UNSCR 2177 and the confirmation contained therein that the Ebola 
outbreak constituted ‘a threat to international peace and security’. United Nations Security Council, ‘On the 
Outbreak of the Ebola Virus in, and its Impact on, West Africa’ (18 September 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2177 
(UNSCR 2177) <http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2177%20(2014)> accessed 18 
May 2018. 
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5.4.1 The ‘Object’ of Human Rights: In Pursuit of Security 
 
For our purposes, it is the relevance of these aforementioned threats to the universality 
of universal human rights that is of primary interest. In this context, specific focus is to be 
given to the developing discourse surrounding the purported securitisation of rights. The 
concept of securitisation itself relates to the identification of ‘referent objects’ – in the form 
of ideals – which face a direct threat to their preservation or continuation (and which the 
affected state/states ultimately deem necessary to protect): 
Different forms or logics of security revolve around claims about referent 
objects and their existential character. For instance, societal security is 
organized around the concept of identity, while state security is organized 
around the concept of sovereignty … the referent object of humanitarianism is 
human life and dignity.696 
 A fundamental purpose (and supposed advantage) of a securitisation model for 
determining threats is that, by expanding the focus beyond a traditional national security 
paradigm, a greater number of legitimate threats may be identified. This expansion is made 
possible because, as Vladimir Šulović explains, a securitisation approach is based on the belief 
that ‘security is about survival; it is when an issue, presented as posing an existential threat to 
a designated referent object, justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them’.697 As 
such, the concept of securitisation is also useful to our analysis: principally with regard to efforts 
at identifying a ‘referent object’ of human rights. In a similar fashion to the ‘referent subject’ 
of rights previously discussed, it is proposed that this ‘object’ takes two forms; (a) national/state 
security and (b) human security – with each seemingly centred upon juxtaposing ideals. With 
the former, this is indicative of the foundational interest of states and, by implication, also the 
                                                            
696 Scott Watson, ‘The ‘Human’ As Referent Object? Humanitarianism as Securitisation’ (2011) 42 Security 
Dialogue 5, 5-6. 
697 Vladimir Šulović, ‘Meaning of Security and Theory of Securitisation’ (2010) Belgrade Centre for Security 
Policy 1, 3. 
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greatest threat to the feasibility of inviolable claims; with the security of the state, of the 
collective, providing justification for interference with the fundamental rights of the individual. 
The securitisation of rights here is centred on an ideal – state security – which is seen to be 
threatened by the fulfilment of individual claims. This position is founded on the understanding 
that the concept of absolute individual protections constrains the feasibility of state security by 
limiting its ability to respond to emergent threats. It is thus Benthamian in nature in that the 
viability of state security is predicated on accepting the impossibility of absolute rights.698  
In contrast, with the latter, this ‘object’ is representative of the foundational threat to the 
enjoyment of human rights for the individual; namely human security (specifically by securing 
autonomous agency).699 Here, the ideal – human subsistence – is seen to be threatened by the 
non-fulfilment of individual claims. Under this interpretation, the state is constructed as the 
entity responsible for providing such protections, and as such, is also identified as the most 
likely means by which their enjoyment will be frustrated. This frustration could conceivably 
take the form of denial, suspension, or modification of application as it pertains to these rights 
on both an individual and/or collective level.700 It is therefore universalising, in relation to the 
‘referent subject’ of rights, in that it is of equal relevance to both the abstract man and the 
political construct. The relevance of health - in the form of the human body (physiological 
subsistence) - to the referent object of ‘human security’ is self-evident. It is the foundational 
component of this discourse. In the context of human rights, this subsistence is generally 
articulated (at least initially) in the form of the right to life – with the concept of ‘life’ 
understood to represent the most basic of human needs. Yet it is important to consider that the 
                                                            
698 As Bentham asserts, ‘there is no right which, when the abolition of its advantageous to society, should not be 
abolished’. Jeremy Bentham, ‘Anarchical Fallacies’ in John Bowring (ed), The Works of Jeremy Bentham Vol. II 
(Edinburgh: William Tait 1843) 501. 
699 Thus, it is dependent upon the provision of necessary components of human subsistence as discussed in 
Chapter Four. For a detailed examination of the concept of ‘human subsistence’, see Chapter Four, section 4.3. 
700 Within the context of the U.K. this is most obviously represented by the derogation powers of the ECHR 
once again (e.g. Article 15). 
Daniel M Lowe                           Assessing the Universality of Human Rights in the Context of Health  
256 
 
idea of ‘life’ – and human life in particular – is itself inherently complex. Indeed, whilst the 
right to life is often depicted as the most obvious, basic protection, its relevance will be 
contingent upon a state of pre-established existence (a fact reflected in existing normative 
accounts of this protection - such as Article 2 of the ECHR).701 In purely practical terms, a 
universal right to life cannot realistically be interpreted as an actionable claim for its creation, 
but only its preservation.  
Amtai Etzioni offered a more ambitious account but along similar lines when she 
defined this protection as ‘a right to be free from deadly violence, maiming, torture, and 
starvation’.702 Even more expansive theoretical accounts, such as provided by James Griffin, 
suggest that the right to life is better understood (and conceptualised) as a right to live.703 Under 
this interpretation, life is to be protected, not only through the preservation of physical 
existence, but a process of actualising autonomous agency. The relevance of this is that it would 
appear to challenge the perception, epitomized by Etzioni’s conclusion, that the right to life is 
the most basic protection simply because ‘dead people cannot exercise their rights’.704 This is 
because, whilst it is clear that physiological existence is required for rights to become effectual, 
it is also apparent that human subsistence – characterised as a worthwhile life (of a life worthy 
of a human being) – is contingent upon more than physical security/subsistence. In this way 
‘life’ can be regarded as a product of human healthiness.  
Whilst the relevance of human health to the referent object of human security is self-
evident, it should be noted that even with the referent object of ‘national security’ human health 
                                                            
701 It is worth noting that the judicial definition afforded to the right to life under the ECHR is extremely narrow. 
For our purposes, the relevant language is found in the expression that: ‘Everyone’s right to life shall be 
protected by law’. Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf> accessed 18 May 2018.   
702 Amitai Etzioni, ‘Life: The Most Basic Right’ (2010) 9 Journal of Human Rights Law 100, 100. 
703 Principally, this is achieved by protecting our ‘personhood’; understood as the ability to function as 
autonomous agents. See James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2008) 215-220. 
704 Amitai Etzioni, ‘Life: The Most Basic Right’ (2010) 9 Journal of Human Rights Law 100, 105. 
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is seemingly integral to its fulfilment. In establishing this, it is useful to draw more directly 
from the works of Stefan Elbe. In Security and Global Health: Towards the Medicalisation of 
Insecurity, Elbe discusses the increasing significance of health to the field of securitisation, and 
particularly the national (and international) security discourse. There are various components 
to this, but the most significant for our analysis relates to the purported securitisation of the 
human body. Traditionally, this discourse has focused on a particular interpretation of the idea 
of ‘human security’ - as Elbe aptly notes: 
Health is essential to human security … [the] very heart of security is 
protecting human lives.705 
 Here, the founding proposition is that there are specific interests stemming from (or 
relating to) the human experience within a state – and operating beyond simple military defence 
– which contribute to the level of security enjoyed by that state. An underlying objective behind 
the human security discourse is to deconstruct the concept of security so that it may be refocused 
in a more robust and effective manner (e.g. by addressing both internal and external 
factors/threats).706 However, within international law, the relevance of human health itself is 
generally confined to alternative or contributing means by which national security is to be 
achieved (with human security personified as an additional component of the traditional 
security discourse, rather than as a separate objective). This is perhaps best personified with the 
aforementioned UNSC Resolution 2177.707 Although this played an important part in 
legitimating the concept of human security, by choosing to adopt traditional security language, 
this resolution ultimately allows for human security to be perceived (if not explicitly presented) 
                                                            
705 Stefan Elbe, Security and Global Health: Toward the Medicalisation of Insecurity (Polity Press 2010) 101. 
706 See Vladimir Šulović, ‘Meaning of Security and Theory of Securitisation’ (2010) Belgrade Centre for 
Security Policy 1. 
707 United Nations Security Council, ‘On the Outbreak of the Ebola Virus in, and its Impact on, West Africa’ 
(18 September 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2177 (UNSCR 2177) 
<http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2177%20(2014)> accessed 18 May 2018.   
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as a subset of state security.708 Various aspects of human health – regarded as being necessary 
for the enablement of human subsistence - are presented as requiring protection if a sufficient 
level of national security is to be attained. Yet, structuring the security discourse in this way 
ultimately risks relegating the significance of human security, in purely practical terms, by 
presenting the securitisation of human health – of the exploitation of the human body – as a 
means by which national security may be preserved (e.g. and thus counter to the concept of 
human security). In support of this we can draw from the work of Burci once again who, in 
reflecting upon the significance of UNSCR 2177 remarked that:  
[C]haracterising diseases as security threats pushes responses away from civil 
society toward military and intelligence organisations as well as towards an 
authoritarian approach and coercive measures that may easily lead to human 
rights violations and stigmatizes victims without evident public health 
benefits.709 
 Indeed, in present times, as Elbe highlights, governing powers already accept that the 
preservation of state security is dependent upon the imposition of various forms of regulation 
or monitoring on the physical health of the population of the state.710 When conducted in this 
way, such action does not evidence an acknowledgement of human health (and security) as a 
commensurate consideration to national security, but rather another means by which national 
security is itself to be secured. It is therefore an appropriation of the object of human security 
for the purposes of advancing national security initiatives exclusively. Thus, the distinction 
between interpretations of the securitisation of health centred on human or national security 
perspective would appear to be that, whereas the former represents the belief that the human 
                                                            
708 For example, by framing the resolution within the UN’s ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security’. ibid. 
709 Gian Luca Burci, ‘Ebola, the Security Council and the Securitization of Public Health’ (2014) 10 QIL 27, 36. 
710 Specifically, this relates to linking public health with sufficiency in combating emerging pandemics, or 
disease. Put simply, a healthier population is seen to be less susceptible to the proliferation of such a threat. 
Accordingly, Stefan Elbe notes that there has been an increase in state led efforts to enhance the physical 
healthiness of populations through measures such as ‘trying to influence what foods and nutrients people “put” 
into their bodies, and trying to increase the time people spend exercising their bodies’. Stefan Elbe, Security and 
Global Health: Toward the Medicalisation of Insecurity (Polity Press 2010) 171. 
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body is itself deserving of protection irrespective of any positive implications (either intentional 
or incidental) of doing so to the state, the latter purports that this body is ultimately worthy of 
protection so that it may be utilised in order to protect the state. To reference Elbe once again, 
both interpretations are founded on an increasing realisation that the human body exists as an 
‘entry point for providing security’.711 For Elbe, two principal areas where the securitisation of 
health is becoming increasingly influential are (1) biosecurity and (2) bioterrorism. In brief, 
they can be summarised as follows: 
1) Biosecurity: defined as health based threats originating from natural causes (to be 
understood as those which are independent of human intent/action).  
2) Bioterrorism: defined as health based threats deliberately predicated on human 
intent/action. 
Elbe explains how the effectiveness of biosecurity measures and initiatives, in response 
to threats such as AIDS, SARS, and H1N1, has been undermined due to their unnecessarily 
restrictive scope. In effect, he suggests that the ‘focus on medical intervention …means that 
pandemic preparedness debates rarely interrogate or address a range of wider global 
developments that are contributing to the increased threat of an influenza pandemic’.712 Instead, 
the discourse frames the sustainability (and continuation) of security in the form of the 
preservation of a healthy human body. However, in doing so, as Elbe notes, contributing factors 
to the development of such threats are largely ignored.713 Insufficient emphasis is given to the 
conditions within which such threats may be presented. In the form of biosecurity, this relates 
to social and economic conditions, as well as various technological and political developments, 
that perpetuate poverty, inequality, and generally provide space for health based threats to 
                                                            
711 ibid 172. 
712 ibid 168. 
713 ibid. 
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proliferate and emerge.714 With regards to bioterrorism, this limitation would relate to various 
political, social, ideological and/or religious factors which motivate individuals to undertake 
violent action against the state.715 In failing to adequately address these issues, Elbe suggests, 
states inadvertently impair their own security initiatives. They become, essentially, an attempt 
to secure human health in the absence of the required conditions of sustainable healthiness. 
With such an interpretation, human health may be regarded as the precursor for security, 
but with the understanding that such health is itself contingent upon various contributing 
factors. In other words, the healthiness of the human body would not be exclusively regarded 
as the ‘entry point’ for the provision of its own security. However, as such factors are 
themselves caused by the results of human actions (or inactions), it is perhaps unhelpful to 
completely disregard the human body as the foundation of the biosecurity/bioterrorism 
discussion. The causal link between these contributing factors and human health is undoubtedly 
human agency – or, specifically, action undertaken on behalf (and on account) of such agency. 
As such, their continuing relevance is dependent upon such agency. Framing the debate around 
the concept of a healthy human body is therefore arguably necessary as it human beings, 
exclusively, who possess the power to attempt to rectify the contributing factors that perpetuate 
their own un-healthiness. The legitimacy of the concept of biosecurity cannot be separated from 
the continuation of human survival – in that the significance of biosecurity threats is contingent 
upon having something to threaten.716 Therefore (and as with the right to health itself), this 
survival must be framed – at least in the first instance - within the context of physiological 
                                                            
714 Specifically, as represented by ‘overseas tourism, wetland destruction, a corporate ‘livestock revolution’, and 
Third World urbanisation with the attendant growth of megaslums’. ibid. 
715 In relation to this point, Elbe confirms that ‘the emphasis has thus been on developing medical interventions 
that can be rapidly deployed in the event of such an attack taking place …all too few participants in biosecurity 
debates reflect on the wider international political factors that are driving the formation of terrorist groups, or 
the reasons why these groups wish to attack populations in the West’. ibid 170. 
716 This is therefore similar to the logic used to legitimate conceptualising health as a foundational claim. 
Specifically, this is achieved by identifying that the validity of the idea of human rights cannot ignore the 
significance of a subject capable of making a claim - and as such cannot deny the importance of human 
healthiness/subsistence - or the need for a governing entity capable of implementing it. 
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subsistence.717 Thus subsistence is a necessary foundation for the meaningfulness of other 
protections, whilst security is a necessary foundation for this subsistence. In acknowledging 
this we reach the conclusion that the alleviation of the contributing factors of unhealthiness and 
the securitisation of the human body represent complimentary means of achieving the same 
objective. Whereas resolution of the contributing factors would provide a stronger foundation 
for the realisation of sustainable levels of (sufficient) human healthiness, the securitisation of 
the human body provides for the continuation of the subjects required to achieve this (i.e. human 
beings). One, therefore, is seemingly focused on long term survivability, and the other on 
immediate preservation. However, it should be noted that the purpose of the latter is simply to 
provide means by which fulfilment of the former may be achieved. 
5.4.2 The ‘Subject’ of Rights: Perspectives from Health and Security 
 
The relevance of this discussion on human health to the referent subject of human rights 
becomes evident when we consider existing parallels between both concepts within the context 
of security.  As mentioned, it has been suggested that the entry point for the provision of security 
is the human body (understood as a physiological entity). It has also been noted that the 
foundational state of the referent subject of rights is the abstract man of declarations (itself 
represented by a physiological entity in the specific form of normative human beings). The 
malleability of the image/perception/identity of this abstract figure is redundant to this point. 
Rather, it is the consistent presence of the human being as a physiological entity that is relevant 
to this discussion. Put simply, in modern times the entry point to the discourse on human rights 
is humanity – the acknowledgement that certain interests are fundamentally human, and, as 
                                                            
717 Within the context of the right to health it was held that ‘one cannot be concerned about freedom without 
being concerned with subsistence …’. Lisa Foreman, ‘What Future for the Minimum Core?’ in John Harrington 
(ed) and Maria Stuttaford (ed), Global Health & Human Rights: Legal and Philosophical Perspectives 
(Routledge Press, 2012) 65. 
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such, all human beings are entitled to their provision or protection.718 It was previously 
established that the purpose of such rights is generally acknowledged as providing security to 
individuals regarding these fundamental interests (as means by which their humanity may be 
actualised and preserved). Such security is to be achieved - and is inherently achievable - for 
human beings by obtaining recognition as a political construct: the possessive subject of 
actionable claims.719 Furthermore, in obtaining their own personal security (through the 
fulfilment of individual rights), political constructs must themselves agree to becoming 
subjected to the political will of the sovereign entity of the specific state in which they reside 
(as exchange for the states willingness to guarantee their individual protection).720 The creation 
of this social contract results in political constructs contributing to the process of legitimising 
the balancing of individual rights with collective interests. As consequence, their bodies become 
susceptible to being securitised by the state in the form of any measures deemed necessary to 
the states protection or survival. Within the context of the securitisation of rights, the abstract 
man of declarations can therefore be interpreted to represent claims to the provision of security, 
with the political construct representing both the possessor of actionable claims to individual 
interests and, once their personal security has been secured – resulting in adequately protected 
physiological entity - a means by which collective security may be maintained through 
necessary action or regulation. In this sense, a robust/completed understanding of the ‘object’ 
of human rights would perhaps better understand this as the pursuit of security.  
                                                            
718 This is exemplified with Douzinas’ assertion that to have human rights is ‘synonymous to being human’. 
Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century (Hart Publishers 
2000) 255. 
719 That which Douzinas termed ‘the empirical man who actually enjoyed legal rights’. Costas Douzinas, 
‘Human Rights for Martians’ (2016) Critical Legal Thinking 
<http://criticallegalthinking.com/2016/05/03/human-rights-for-martians/> accessed 18 May 2018.   
720 This is commensurate with the social contract formation envisioned by Thomas Hobbes ‘condition of war … 
of everyone against everyone’. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan: Revised student edition (Cambridge University 
Press, 1996) 91-92. 
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As noted earlier, the referent object of humanitarianism is defined as ‘human life and 
dignity’.721 Indeed, the protection of human life and dignity is a widely regarded as being a 
founding purpose of the concept of human rights. Moreover, human health may be regarded as 
the foundational aspect of such rights by providing the opportunity for other rights to be 
enabled. In this sense, physiological health - the human body – could be understood as the 
foundation of such health. As humanitarianism is purposed with protecting and preserving 
human subsistence by securitising various ‘fundamental’ interests – primarily within the 
context of human security - it is possible to therefore establish health as the foundation of such 
security. Interestingly, this conclusion would appear to legitimate the inclusion of rights based 
ideals and principles even within traditional national security considerations (as opposed to 
regarding them as competing objectives or ideals).  
There are two components to this proposal. Firstly, and as addressed in the preceding 
chapter, human subsistence relates to more than simple physiological survival: a sufficient level 
of ‘human healthiness’ results in a life which exhibits actualised autonomy. It has been argued 
that such a result is only possible if various fundamental interests are protected. The provision 
of such protection falls within the contemporary remit of human rights (although, as expressed 
in Chapter Three, the universalising idea/purpose which legitimates them is not contingent upon 
contemporary - or historical - perceptions of rights). Consequently, the concept of human 
security evidently transcends mere physiological health. Secondly, the integrity of national 
security – that which was historically understood as state security - is today largely accepted as 
requiring the acknowledgement of legitimacy of human security as a corresponding 
                                                            
721 Scott Watson, ‘The ‘Human’ As Referent Object? Humanitarianism as Securitisation’ (2011) 42 Security 
Dialogue 5, 5-6. 
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component722 (even if in practice it is generally treated as an additional component of national 
security). By incorporating the objectives of human security – which, as we have seen, expand 
beyond basic physiological subsistence - within the national security paradigm, human rights 
themselves may become a vehicle of such security. That is to say, through securing 
acknowledgement that the fulfilment of the purpose of such rights is a necessary aspect of the 
attainment of a satisfactory standard of state security. It could be argued that acceptance of this 
position is already represented by the general recognition of the validity of the concept of 
humanitarian intervention (as we will examine in more detail in section 5.5 of this chapter). 
Yet, the contemporary political focus of states within the international community 
seemingly fosters the perception that the fulfilment of security (particularly national security) 
and the provision of individual rights are competing concerns: 
National security has been the privileged term giving the state discretion to 
override policies and human rights when it feels threatened by real or imaginary 
enemies.723 
Indeed, it is clear that through repeated attempts to ‘other’ the concept of human rights, 
sovereign authorities have diminished the reputation of such protections amongst their 
respective populations. Such action is purposed upon a desire to enhance the authority of these 
governing powers – ostensibly under the auspice of increased capacity to protect – through the 
reduction of various restrictions relating to their ability to act in response to perceived threats. 
In effectively contextualising individual protections as a hurdle of their own protection, states 
reduce the potentiality of the universality of rights (at least as it pertains to universal application 
                                                            
722 Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and Carol Messineo confirm that the concept of human security ‘has become 
increasingly widely used since the mid 1990s ... initially used primarily with reference to state policies and the 
search for new international security and development agendas after the end of the Cold War, it is increasingly 
being used in policy advocacy by civil society groups on a broader range of contemporary issues from civil war 
to migration to climate change’. Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and Carol Messineo, ‘Human Security: A Critical Review 
of the Literature’ (2012) Working Paper No. 11 Centre for Research on Peace and Development, 1, 2.    
723 Costas Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (Routledge 
Cavendish 2007) 184. 
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in contemporary times). This is exacerbated by the defined scope of interpretations of the 
justificatory purposes of human rights we have previously addressed.724 By encouraging 
interpretations which amalgamate consequentialist and deontological components, the rights 
discourse has allowed for the concept of human rights to be regarded, schizophrenically, as 
fundamental universal human claims deserving of protection and fulfilment that cannot be 
violated, but which can only reasonably be expected to be defensible and enforced when their 
violation is not deemed politically expedient by the sovereign power of that state. The academic 
discourse thus represents the continual promotion of a utopian ideal which is prone to collapse 
upon itself when put into practice. In this way, modern failures of the human rights movement, 
specifically relating to scope and the reliability of coverage, can be regarded as being 
emblematic of its own success. By effectively communicating the idea of human rights as being 
transcendent (in attempts to provide it with a robust justificatory foundation), proponents of 
rights have restricted its practical realisability. Speaking on both the power and limitation of 
utopian ideals Costas Douzinas explained: 
Utopia is the name of the power of imagination, which finds the future latent in 
the present even in the ideologies and artifacts it criticises. Utopia unsettles the 
linearity of empty historical time: the present foreshadows and prefigures a 
future not yet and, one should add, not ever.725  
As a consequence of this dichotomy, human rights are therefore becoming increasingly 
easy to marginalise, especially in relation to the ‘competing’ issue of national security. This is 
due to the fact that the sovereign powers of states are able to reference a duty to protect the 
collective interests of their population as justification for a reduced commitment to human 
                                                            
724 This is personified by the so called ‘rights inflation’. When speaking on this James Griffin explained that ‘[i]t 
is not just the twentieth-century inflation in the number of rights that has to be challenged: the inflation of the 
content of individual rights does too’. James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2008) 175. 
725 Costas Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (Routledge 
Cavendish 2007) 296. 
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rights. As such, an examination of the concept of sovereignty will seek to assess the 
contemporary realisability of such protections. 
5.5 Sovereignty and the Actualisation of Rights  
 
Earlier in this chapter we addressed the task of determining a referent object of human 
rights. Here, the discussion highlighted how referent objects represent ideals which are integral 
to the integrity of relevant concepts (and which therefore must be protected). This analysis 
concluded with the proposal that the referent object of human rights is the pursuit of security 
(itself represented by different forms of subsistence – human and national/state). As way of 
contextualising the concept of referent objects we drew from the work of Scott Watson. This 
is relevant to us once again as, in addition to establishing human life and dignity as the referent 
object of humanitarianism, Watson identified sovereignty as the referent object of state 
security.726 Indeed, for governing powers to retain the capacity to secure the space/state over 
which they preside, they must logically possess a requisite level of authority (and power). This 
authority/power is perhaps best represented by sovereignty – the ability to act (or not to act) in 
accordance with interests of the state based upon autonomous determinations of the governing 
entity (autonomous in the sense that they are not entirely predicated on the will of other 
entities). Indeed, as Douzinas confirms, a sovereign is defined: 
[T]hrough the power to institute a state of exception and suspend normal legality 
in order to save the social and legal system from radical threats. The decision to 
suspend the law, which marks out the sovereign, is both outside law’s procedures 
and inside the law as a precondition of its operation.727 
As consequence, the absence of sovereignty critically undermines the concept of state 
security – in that the governing power will lack sufficient means of preserving the state when 
                                                            
726 Scott Watson, ‘The ‘Human’ As Referent Object? Humanitarianism as Securitisation’ (2011) 42 Security 
Dialogue 5, 5-6. 
727 Costas Douzinas, Philosophy and Resistance in the Crisis (Polity Press, 2013) 100. 
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it is threatened. Moreover, and as addressed in Chapter Three in relation to our examination of 
the use of subsidiarity mechanisms by the ECtHR,728 when considering the legitimacy of 
interfering with fundamental protections sufficient attention must be afforded to the issue of 
sovereignty. This is significant not only because it governs the process within which the 
determination to protect rights or not is ultimately made but also – and in reference to the 
political construct of the referent object of rights - provides us with confirmation of where the 
power to make this decision ultimately presides.729 Historically the implementation and 
enjoyment of rights has been dependent upon the will of the state. In modern times, member 
states have shaped the substantive content of these protections, and through the process of 
voluntarily participation, also determined the scope of the obligations accepted within specific 
jurisdictions.730 In addition, and as we have addressed, they have also identified circumstances 
in which the governing entities of member states should retain the power to suspend these 
protections (theoretically on a temporary basis). As highlighted earlier in this chapter, this is 
perhaps best exemplified with Article 15 of the ECHR. It has been seen that the legitimacy of 
the utilisation of this provision has been heavily questioned by contemporary legal scholarship. 
For academics, such as Alan Greene, whilst the ECtHR have demonstrated a willingness to 
review the proportionality of interferences with human rights after a declaration of emergency 
has been declared, they have not adequately addressed the issue of whether an emergency truly 
exists (and thus suspensions of protections are necessary and legitimate) with the same level 
of scrutiny.731  
                                                            
728 See Chapter Three, section 3.3.1. 
729 Of specific interest here is the notion that the concepts of sovereignty and rights are inseparable. This was 
famously suggested by Hannah Arendt when considering the practical realities of universal rights. For detailed 
analysis of this see Peg Birmingham, Hannah Arendt and Human Rights: The Predicament of Common 
Responsibility (Indiana University Press 2006) 44-45.  
730 See for example the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the European Convention on Human 
Rights (1950), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) et al. 
731 Alan Greene, ‘Separating Normalcy from Emergency: The Jurisprudence of Article 15 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights’ (2011) 12 German Law Journal 1764. 
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The limitations of the derogating mechanism incorporated within the ECHR can 
arguably be traced back to its justificatory purpose of balancing between two presumptively 
conflicting interests – individual rights and national security. However, as previously 
addressed, there are several convincing reasons for concluding that this presumption is 
erroneous. Whilst the practical effectiveness of rights must be dependent upon issues of 
sovereignty – specifically in the form of an existent power and will to implement them – it is 
not immediately apparent why their significance should automatically be diminished through 
interference when justified purely as a means of preserving such sovereignty (without first 
establishing the legitimacy of such action as it relates to fundamental human interests). 
Crucially, this conclusion does not aim to preclude the possibility of legitimate interference. 
Rather it simply seeks to ensure that this matter is regulated in a valid and effective manner. 
Theoretically, as we have just discussed, it is evident that interference can itself be regarded as 
consistent with the objective of protecting fundamental interests when its justification is 
conducive to the foundational aim of such protections – to protect human needs integral to the 
actualisation of normative agency.732 Specifically, this is accomplished by preserving a 
practical space within which the benefits of such protections are to be given meaning.733 This 
appears to be a logical conclusion when it is considered that the absence of such space would 
automatically negate the relevance and thus significance of human rights (at least as it pertains 
to practical benefits of implementation) or indeed human subsistence.  
It follows that, just as the human body, physiological health, acts as the foundational 
component of the enablement of human rights in general, national security provides the 
                                                            
732 Crucially, this objective, foundational form of protection is to be distinguished from the historical use of 
entitlements as means of quantifying accepted standards of humanity (and the justification of the exclusion of 
those not seen to be deserving). For more on this see Costas Douzinas, ‘The Paradoxes of Human Rights’ (2013) 
20 Constellations 51. 
733 As established, this is based on Jeremy Bentham’s argument ‘[that] which has no existence cannot be 
destroyed – that which cannot be destroyed cannot require anything to preserve it from destruction’. Jeremy 
Bentham, ‘Anarchical Fallacies’ in John Bowring (ed), The Works of Jeremy Bentham Vol. II (Edinburgh: 
William Tait 1843) 500. 
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foundations for state/sovereign subsistence by securing the capacity to implement the will of 
governing powers on its population. This would appear to be commensurate with the type of 
historical sovereignty described by Michel Foucault and exemplified with the sovereigns 
‘power of life and death’.734 In analysing the operation of this power, Foucault ultimately 
concluded that it ‘was in reality the right to take life or let live … a right to appropriate a portion 
of the wealth, a tax of products, goods and services, labor and blood, levied on the subjects’.735  
This represents the state’s power to sustain itself, financially – through taxation (upon which 
its internal functions depend) – and also physically, with regard to the authority to kill when its 
survival is endangered. 
Interestingly, under such an interpretation the protection of human beings – and thus 
human health - would once again become a fundamental factor of both human rights and state 
sovereignty. Indeed, for any state where human rights are presently enforced it has already 
been accepted that certain interests conducive to human subsistence should be protected. This 
acknowledgment results, not only from appreciation of the value of protecting the individual 
interests themselves, but also the fact that fulfilment of such protections provides means of 
preserving the sovereign authority of the state (by ensuring the continued existence of 
subjects).736 This seemingly further evidences the inter-dependency of human rights and state 
security (as security is a necessary component of the enablement of human rights, and such 
enablement is necessary to ensure state security). As previously discussed, a difficulty which 
exists here relates to the potential amalgamation of these objectives in a manner which serves 
the interests of one exclusively (e.g. state security). This is particularly apparent within the 
                                                            
734 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol 1: An Introduction (Robert Hurley tr Vintage 1990) 136. 
735 ibid. 
736 Douzinas suggests that the apparent interdependency of sovereignty and subject is made explicit through the 
implementation of law. On this point he notes that ‘[a]s the creation and creator of law, the subject is law’s 
indispensable partner and servant. Its historical continuity and institutional permanence indicate that the law is 
not just the creation of popular sovereignty; it is also the carrier of the dictates of social reproduction’. Costas 
Douzinas, The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century (Hart Publishers 2000) 
227. 
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context of the ‘War on Terror’. To be precise, through the political hierarchisation and 
politicisation of the human rights discourse, states may now seek to justify denying protection 
to certain individuals – such as terrorists or suspected terrorists – as a supposed necessary cost 
of ensuring the enjoyment of such protections for the majority of the population. To Douzinas 
the significance of this was clear, for ‘[when] national security becomes human security, when 
the ‘others’ are defined as anyone who may be affected by a terrorist act (potentially everyone) 
there is very little these overbroad qualifications disallow’.737 We see therefore that the 
principal danger with this approach is that justification to interfere with fundamental 
protections can be made in accordance with the interests of the governing powers of the state 
exclusively (as it pertains to ensuring its own subsistence or preserving its own authority) – 
and thus insufficient consideration is given to the legitimacy (or necessity) of the interference 
itself with the enjoyment of the protections.738 The decision to enact or interfere with human 
rights is therefore reduced to a results based determination centred on the perceived interests 
of the state – with fulfilment of individual objectives (such as human rights) largely incidental.  
5.5.1 Redefining Sovereignty: Contemporary Developments 
 
The reason this is mentioned is because it is arguably represented within the derogating 
processes presently adopted by member states of the ECHR. By enabling states to derogate 
without robust consideration, as well as explanation, of the need to do so, the judicial 
instruments responsible for regulating the use of such powers instead become complicit in their 
very diminishment.739 In response to the perceived lack of scrutiny regarding the utilisation of 
Article 15, some have defended the approach of the ECtHR by suggesting that the sovereignty 
                                                            
737 Costas Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (Routledge 
Cavendish 2007) 60. 
738 An insightful examination of this point in relation to the use of derogation powers in the context of ECHR 
member states can be found in section 5.2.2 of this chapter. 
739 Alan Greene, ‘Separating Normalcy from Emergency: The Jurisprudence of Article 15 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights’ (2011) 12 German Law Journal 1764, 1782. 
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of states would be unfairly (and unsustainably) jeopardised if they were to be retroactively held 
accountable for mistaking a situation as an emergency when deciding to act during a time of 
significant uncertainty.740 This argument suggests that, in addition to jeopardising the 
sustainability of the ECHR itself (as member states would be less willing to participate in such 
a system), it would also seemingly threaten the principle of ‘exclusive domestic jurisdiction’ - 
a founding tenet of international law.741 As Fernando R. Teson explains, this concept represents 
acknowledgement that ‘[the] essential attributes of the sovereign state require that certain 
matters be left to the state’s own sovereign judgement’. 742 In effect, it reflects that as a matter 
of principle all states have absolute jurisdiction within their own territories (widely understood 
as geographical regions where they exercise jurisdiction) when regulating domestic affairs.743 
However, the absoluteness of this sovereignty is of course limited by other provisions 
of international law.744 Indeed, this principle cannot usually exempt states from fulfilling 
obligations that they have previously accepted in the global arena. Moreover, in the context 
of human rights abuses intentionally inflicted upon a civilian population, there is increasing 
acceptance that exclusive jurisdiction can no longer reliably protect states from the possibility 
of collective humanitarian intervention. In effect, the concept of humanitarian intervention is 
grounded in the supposed moral and legal legitimacy of taking ‘military action in cases of 
humanitarian necessity …’.745 This concept is relevant to our current discussion for several 
reasons. Most importantly, as suggested above, recent embracement and utilisation of this 
                                                            
740 For a detailed assessment on the necessity of the deferential approach adopted by the ECtHR see Joseph 
Zand, ‘Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Notion of State of Emergency’ (2014) 
5 Journal of the Faculty of Law of Inonu University 159.  
741 This is exemplified within Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter where it stipulates: ‘Nothing contained 
in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any state …’. Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945 1 UNTS XVI 
<http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/> accessed 18 May 2018.  
742 Fernando R. Teson, ‘Collective Humanitarian Intervention’ (1996) 17 Michigan Journal of International Law 
323, 327. 
743 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press 2012) 447. 
744 ibid 447-455. 
745 David Mednicoff, ‘Humane Wars? International Law, Just War Theory and Contemporary Armed Conflict’ 
(2006) 2 Law, Culture and the Humanities 373, 373. 
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idea by the international community demonstrates general acceptance of the non-absoluteness 
of state sovereignty.746 Instead, it would appear that such sovereignty is to be respected (and 
preserved) so long as doing so does not disproportionately disadvantage (or undermine) the 
basic human rights of the populations of states.747 This, in turn, demonstrates a general 
acknowledgement of the legitimacy (and significance) of human security by these same states 
(e.g. in relation to the fact that state security is held to be contingent upon human security – 
and as such interference/violation with state sovereignty can be regarded as a valid means of 
providing security). Finally, the logic adopted to justify the non-absoluteness of state 
sovereignty here may be also be used to validate the process of derogating from universal 
human rights as means of guaranteeing their fulfilment (e.g. as in the emergency scenarios 
discussed above). If state sovereignty cannot be absolute because, in accepting as much, we 
limit the realisability of basic human needs/interests, then the very rights which seek to 
fulfil/guarantee these needs cannot be absolute either (in terms of practical inviolability), as 
such an inflexible position has the potential to undermine the security of such interests (e.g. 
by restricting the capacity for governing powers to act).  By demonstrating how a concept 
may be protected through violation, these conclusions would appear to support the rejection 
of binary interpretations of ‘universal’ and ‘absolute’. Moreover, they illustrate how a 
transcendental ideal may require reinterpretation and reappreciation through continual 
assessment in order to secure its own subsistence (e.g. reflecting the ‘critical’ approach 
advocated by Nietzsche as discussed in Chapter Three).748 This process, witnessed in relation 
to both sovereignty (as we will discuss in more detail in the subsequent section), as well as 
                                                            
746 Mohammed Ayoob explains the rationale behind this as ‘intervention that is undertaken to achieve 
“humanitarian” objectives … these objectives are intrinsically far too valuable to be held hostage to the norm of 
state sovereignty and, therefore, ought to override that norm’. Mohammed Ayoob, ‘Humanitarian Intervention 
and State Sovereignty’ (2002) 6 The International Journal of Human Rights 81, 83-84. 
747 ibid.   
748 This approach is represented in Nietzsche’s contention that ‘[m]an must have the strength to break up the 
past, and apply it, too, in order to live. He must bring the past to the bar of judgement, interrogate it 
remorselessly, and finally condemn it’. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History (Macmillan for the 
Library of Liberal Arts 1957) 26. 
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human rights, is representative of the perfectibility of ideas/concepts with contextual 
reconstruction facilitating the continuation of their significance/relevance.749 
The relevance of highlighting these issues is to establish that, although the concept of 
sovereignty is highly respected, it is far from irreproachable. Humanitarian interventions 
evidence this fact by authenticating the process of disregarding the principle of sovereignty 
in favour of another, allegedly higher/superior interest (namely protecting the human security 
of population of the affected member state). It would appear that such an outcome is to be 
accepted as justifiable when the consequences of inaction would have wider ramifications for 
the integrity of international law (e.g. when non-interference with state sovereignty in 
accordance with international law – such as Article 2(7) of the UN Charter – ultimately 
renders it becoming complicit in widespread human rights violations). In brief, the concept 
of humanitarian intervention is based upon an acknowledgement of the legitimacy of human 
security, as well as the inter-dependency of rights and security with regard to ensuring their 
respective fulfilment. Moreover, as cases of grave human rights violations have been held to 
justify interfering with the right to exclusive jurisdiction of other member states,750 it is also 
worth considering whether similar action should be possible with unjustifiable derogations or 
interferences with such protections. Is the legitimacy of human rights dependent on ensuring 
that sovereign power is held accountable for justifying the need to interfere with the human 
rights of their population in all contexts? In response to this question, it is of course important 
to note distinctions between interferences with rights which are directly caused by member 
states – where their conduct threatens fundamental interests of their own population (such as 
those which would justify humanitarian interventions) – or instead simply result from a 
                                                            
749 For a detailed account of the potential importance of this approach for the concept of universal human rights, 
see Chapter Three, section 3.4. 
750 For a relatively recent example of this see the invasion of Libya (2011). An insightful assessment of this 
UNSC authorised intervention can be found in James Pattison, ‘The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention in 
Libya’ (2011) 25 Ethics and International Affairs 271. 
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necessary response to threats against their own integrity (such as with lawful derogations in 
emergency situations). This chapter has already addressed the fact that parties to international 
human rights treaties are afforded the opportunity to suspend certain protections in times of 
emergency (as reflected in Article 15 of the ECHR). It has also been noted that the approach 
to regulating use of the derogation machinery is arguably ineffective (allowing member states 
too much discretion in determining when derogations are necessary). In defence of this 
deferential approach, a strict consequentialist account could argue that protections are only 
sustainable (and desirable) if the wider benefits of application outweigh those of 
interference.751 As soon as this is legitimately threatened, governing entities are justified in 
taking whatever measures they deem necessary to protect the interests of the population at 
large. However, and as discussed in Chapter Three, the limitation of this approach is that it 
reduces rights to simple tools of political expediency and provides no guaranteed 
protection.752 Moreover, there will also be no assurance that the decision to derogate will 
actually be in the interests of the fundamental claims themselves – as was proposed as a 
necessary safeguard when considering possible reforms of derogation machinery of the 
ECHR earlier in this chapter.753 
Nevertheless, it is evident that a deferential approach to determining a state of 
emergency may be justified on the basis of preserving state sovereignty. Regarding this issue, 
Alan Greene notes that ‘judges often defer on the issue of the existence of a state of emergency 
… leaving the issue to political actors and according them a wide margin of discretion’.754 
This approach is supposedly justified on the basis that, as they are best placed to weigh up all 
                                                            
751 For a concise summary of a consequentialist defence of human rights see William Talbott, Consequentialism 
and Human Rights (Philosophy Compass 2013) 1030-1040. 
752 Specifically, allowing politics to dictate the scope and focus of rights, thus rendering them ‘the handmaiden 
of the particular’. For more on this see Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at 
the Turn of the Century (Hart Publishers 2000) 138. 
753 See section 5.3.3 of this chapter. 
754 Alan Greene, ‘Separating Normalcy from Emergency: The Jurisprudence of Article 15 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights’ (2011) 12 German Law Journal 1764, 1774-5. 
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relevant factors (having access to the greatest level of intelligence), it is inappropriate to 
question them (or their motives).755 Consequently, we can never truly know whether action 
was necessary in the absence of a robust judicial review from the ECtHR in the case of ECHR 
member states, which we have highlighted is unlikely to occur for similar reasons – to 
preserve the sovereignty of member states. 
 We see therefore that the practical effectiveness of human rights is inextricably 
connected to the concept of sovereignty – specifically regarding the cooperation of governing 
entities of member states - as they alone have the right to determine when action is necessary 
(including measures aimed at limiting the reliability of certain ECHR provisions in times of 
emergency). Jean Bodin famously expressed that the concept of sovereignty encapsulates the 
responsibilities a sovereign will have for their ‘estates’756 - understood in contemporary times 
as the general population. These responsibilities are argued to be grounded in natural law and 
are inherent to the act of governing. Indeed, a sovereign exists for the very purpose of protecting 
the collective interests of the state and its population. However, states will naturally have many 
differing obligations and interests. As such, Bodin asserts the sovereign can wilfully choose to 
disregard any of their responsibilities when acting in accordance with public interests 
interpreted as being of greater significance and importance.757 
When considered in the context of human rights specifically, this would appear to 
support a flexible approach to justifying interference. This is because, as discussed, individual 
interests are widely regarded (at least by some member states) as subsidiary concerns that 
                                                            
755 This view is echoed in the argument presented by the government of the Republic of Ireland in the ECtHR 
case of Lawless v Ireland (no. 3) (1961) 1 EHRR 15. Here, it was maintained that it would be ‘inconceivable 
that a government acting in good faith should be held to be in breach of their obligations under the convention 
merely because their appreciation of the circumstances which constitute an emergency, or of the measures 
necessary to deal with the emergency, should differ from the views of … the Court’. 
756 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (University of Chicago Press 
2005) 8. 
757 ibid 8-9. 
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cannot override means of collective survival. Indeed, claims in relation to the inalienability of 
such protections could be held to be unfeasible if their practical worth is entirely dependent 
upon the existence of a sovereign which possesses the will and means to enforce them – 
something that cannot be guaranteed. Yet, the legitimacy of the concept of human rights, as 
foundational claims, is not invalidated simply through the identification of other (allegedly 
superior) foundational concerns. This is due to the fact that a state’s survival is not contingent 
purely upon preserving a physical space, but will also incorporate principles and ideals which 
are integral to its identity. It has been suggested within this chapter that preservation of this 
identity is highly dependent upon respect for the rule of law in accordance with the fundamental 
interests of the individuals such laws exist to protect. Thus, whilst the preservation of 
sovereignty is logically a priority, the manner in which this is secured is arguably more 
important to the survival of the state. Accepting the validity of this position leads us to conclude 
that, in actuality, and contrary to apparent view of many contemporary politicians and 
academics, a ‘state’s most important duty is to protect individual rights’.758 
The prioritisation of foundational interests, therefore, cannot truly disregard the idea of 
the concept of human rights. Although the sovereign has the authority to identify exceptions to 
existing legal norms, and thus circumvent these norms for the public interest, as the 
justificatory idea underpinning such protections is an inherent aspect of the identity of all 
member states, the concept of human rights cannot be divorced from this consideration. Indeed, 
as our analysis of the co-dependency of both human and national security demonstrates, the 
legitimacy of the concept of human rights is based upon the assertion that it can never be in the 
publics or states’ interest to completely ignore these protections.759 As such, the sovereign, 
                                                            
758 Costas Douzinas, Philosophy and Resistance in the Crisis (Polity Press 2013) 92. 
759 Due to the belief that such protections are necessary for a worthwhile life. For more on this see James 
Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2008) 147. 
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even when justified in circumventing established legal norms, cannot legitimately do so in a 
manner which negates the purpose of these fundamental claims. 
5.5.2 Reimagining Sovereignty in the Context of Health 
 
This is furthered with the realisation that contemporary developments within the 
context of international law have arguably resulted in the erosion of a fixed, restrictive 
interpretation of the concept of sovereignty itself. Indeed, this concept is increasingly multi-
faceted, and is no longer solely defined by state centric authority (as noted in relation to the re-
emergence of humanitarian intervention).760 The first development worthy of consideration 
pertains to the idea of what could be termed ‘International Sovereignty’. It is suggested that 
international sovereignty is represented by various influential instruments within the 
international order (e.g. the UN). Here, by looking to regulate the operation of agreements 
achieved within international law (e.g. treaties), this sovereignty embodies the authority to hold 
member states accountable for decisions based upon the exercise of their own national 
sovereignty within the global arena. The second development could be defined as ‘Human 
Sovereignty’. In contrast to the more expansive approach taken with international sovereignty, 
human sovereignty represents the authority of all human beings as individuals to shape their 
own experience. As Andrew Fagan explains, ‘human sovereignty is achieved through the 
representation of the material environment as an object of our collective and individual will’.761 
It is therefore influential to the field of human rights specifically, as it defines the power (and 
importance) of personal autonomy. 
                                                            
760  Mohammed Ayoob, ‘Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty’ (2002) 6 The International Journal 
of Human Rights 81, 83-84. 
761 Andrew Fagan, ‘Paradoxical Bedfellows: Nihilism and Human Rights’ (2005) 6 Human Rights Review 80, 
97. 
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To develop this further, it is useful to examine the operation of sovereignty within the 
context of health: 
1) National sovereignty: regarding the surveillance of health based threats and the 
implementation of ‘solutions’ to such emerging hazards. This represents a states’ right 
to act (or not to act). 
2) International sovereignty: regarding the sharing of information between states 
pertaining to initiatives to eradicate or respond to known and emerging health based 
threats. With regard to public health emergencies of international concern, this 
potentially supplants the superiority of national security with collective security. 
3) Human sovereignty: regarding the ‘sovereignty of the body’ – the idea that individual 
human beings have absolute authority in relation to the medical treatment of their own 
bodies. This seeks to limit the scope of national sovereignty by ensuring that governing 
entities are accountable to their populations. 
Conflict between the first and second would appear to be focused upon the issue of 
prioritisation of interests within an increasingly globalised and inter-dependent world. It 
presents states, both individually and collectively, with the task of resolving disparities between 
traditional Westphalian sovereignty762 – where states have near absolute authority within their 
own jurisdictions – with contemporary sovereignty, where states must balance such authority 
with international interests and initiatives.763 As mentioned, the (re)emergence of humanitarian 
intervention in recent years acutely evidences this ongoing debate. This example is relevant to 
                                                            
762 As Stephen D. Krasner explains, ‘the fundamental norm of Westphalian Sovereignty is that states exist in 
specific territories, within which domestic political authorities are the sole arbiters of legitimate behaviour’. 
Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy (Princeton University Press, 1999) 20. 
763 This would have some similarity with Krasner’s depiction of ‘international legal sovereignty’, which he 
proposed was based upon the equality of states. Specifically, he suggested that international legal sovereignty 
was ‘concerned with establishing the status of a political entity in the international system …[the] basic rule for 
international legal sovereignty is that recognition is extended to entities, states, with territory and formal 
juridical autonomy’. ibid 14.    
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this discussion as it highlights general (or at least increasing) acceptance in the non-
absoluteness of exclusive jurisdiction.  In the context of health, this debate is founded on 
differing interpretations of the concept of security (as previously addressed within this chapter). 
The securitisation of health allows states to regulate the physiological operation of human 
beings within their own territories, whilst also attempting to influence the regulation of this 
health within other jurisdictions with the purpose of preventing the development of a health-
based security threat to their own state. The Decision Instrument contained within Annex Two 
of the International Health Regulations (2005)764 is representative of this purpose. Similarly, 
the insufficient utilisation of this instrument by those states directly affected by the Ebola 
outbreak in 2014 is demonstrative of the impact the conflict between interpretations of 
sovereignty has on its effectiveness.765 A second component of national sovereignty (within 
the context of health) relates to medical surveillance: the collection of medical data for the 
purposes of identifying emerging health based threats (based on the examination of relevant 
symptomatic factors). As Elbe suggests, the objective behind such measures is to achieve the 
modification of human diet, lifestyle, as well as general physiological operation.766 In modern 
times, this process is legitimised by the state under the auspice of protection:  
                                                            
764 This instrument provides guidance on when member states should notify the WHO regarding the emergence 
of a possible PHEIC. It comprises of four questions, if two or more are satisfied the member state must notify 
the WHO of the emerging threat. In brief, the questions ask is/does the event (1) Serious; (2); Unexpected (3); 
Pose Significant Risk of International Spread (4) Pose Significant Risk of Travel/Trade Restrictions? WHO, 
‘Revision of the International Health Regulations’ (23 May 2005) WHA Res 58.3 [IHR 2005] 
<http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/43883/9789241580410_eng.pdf;jsessionid=5EEF289965B568
17D79E1A37ED2ED4FE?sequence=1> accessed 18 May 2018.   
765 In particular, this relates to the unwillingness of the affected states (e.g. Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone) to 
notify the WHO of the Ebola outbreak (in accordance with satisfying the IHR criteria) until several months after 
it had emerged. The bureaucratic nature of the operations of world health governance ensured that the WHO 
were unable to act until they had been notified. When remarking on this Deloffre concluded that, ‘paradoxically, 
the standard operating procedures and legal framework meant to guide the WHO also constrained its ability to 
act quickly in face of a public health crisis’. Mary Zarnegar Deloffre, ‘Human Security in the Age of Ebola’ 
(2014) E-International Relations <https://www.e-ir.info/2014/10/25/human-security-in-the-age-of-ebola-
towards-people-centered-global-governance/> accessed 18 May 2018.   
766 Stefan Elbe, Security and Global Health: Toward the Medicalisation of Insecurity (Polity Press 2010) 179-
188. 
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Today the medicalization of security is ultimately demanding of citizens that, 
in order to be secure, they must also allow security to be practised through their 
bodies.767 
Human sovereignty (that which was previously defined in Chapter Three as the 
‘sovereignty of the body’) seeks to limit the scope of national sovereignty. It represents the 
inherent value and worth of the human body to individual human beings: the foundational 
possession of human life. At the heart of this idea is the belief that the utilisation of the human 
body should be contingent upon the autonomous operation of its possessor – of the presence of 
an opportunity to make a choice.768 However, as with national sovereignty, the sovereignty of 
human beings cannot be regarded as absolute. Indeed, we would be mistaken to limit the scope 
of such sovereignty to deliberations based on the perceived necessity of immediate concerns. 
Indeed, human sovereignty does not provide justification for decision making based entirely 
upon ensuring the temporary subsistence of an individual, as it must also consider the impact 
of such decisions on long term survivability of everyone else (e.g. as discussed in relation to 
proposed derogations in the reimagined Ebola outbreak scenario). For example, if containment 
of an extinction level pandemic disease is dependent upon inoculating the entire population of 
a specific state, would it be reasonable to suggest that the concept of human sovereignty should 
protect the choice of an individual who refused to consent to this practice?  In effect, this 
concept can therefore be regarded as having direct correlation with that of international 
sovereignty. The scope of human sovereignty is determined by addressing whether an 
individual subject can, through the refusal to provide consent, justifiably undermine the 
interests of other subjects. Similarly, the legitimate functionality of international sovereignty is 
established upon the consideration of whether the interests of a plurality (or simple majority) 
                                                            
767 ibid 165. 
768 This is represented by the sort of ‘normative agency’ described by James Griffin which allows individuals to 
make autonomous choices in pursuit of a ‘worthwhile life’. James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford University 
Press 2008) 45. 
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of subjects (e.g. states) could justify non-consensual interference in the interests of a minority 
of others.  
In reflecting on the significance of human sovereignty, it is important to address an 
apparent contradiction relating to attempts to limit its actionability with the idea of normative 
agency. Indeed, throughout this thesis it has been suggested that the purpose of rights is best 
understood as the objective of actualising normative agency. In Chapter Four, it was suggested 
that the right to health is perhaps better understood as the right to human healthiness, with the 
ultimate purpose of this protection to secure the enablement of normative agency. In 
accordance with this purpose, it was further suggested that this right could therefore provide 
individuals with a right to die, if choosing to die represents an autonomous choice (and thus 
the enablement of agency).769 It was clarified that the validity of this decision would not be 
contingent on matters of physical health (e.g. the presence of a terminal illness). 
Ultimately, this right to die was defined as the right to choose to relinquish the 
continuance of normative agency. It was argued that this choice is to be respected (and should 
be fulfilled) as it represents the exercise of such agency.770 In contrast, with this chapter we 
have established that the denial of protection/provision of rights can be justifiable if such action 
represents a necessary means of securing subsistence (and thus the continuance of normative 
agency). The legitimacy of such interference with human rights is held to extend beyond the 
wishes of the individuals themselves and can therefore be acknowledged as valid irrespective 
of whether the interference is willingly accepted. Whilst these conclusions appear to 
contradictory (i.e. by seemingly suggesting that the objective of enabling normative agency 
                                                            
769 ‘A right to suicide is an instance of the general anti-paternalist rights to autonomy and liberty. In general, to 
respect a person’s autonomy and liberty is to let the person decide and then carry out the decision’. James 
Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2008) 222. 
770  On this point James Griffin suggests that ‘[i]f one is denied that momentous decision, or the possibility of 
implementing it, then one’s right to autonomy and liberty are hollow shams. If one has a right to anything, one 
has a right to death ... rights are to living autonomously and living at liberty’. ibid 221. 
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can justify allowing individuals to make a choice in one context, but not in another), it should 
be noted that they are in fact consistent and compatible. This is because both instances represent 
the fulfilment of the same purpose (i.e. protecting the enablement of normative agency).  
For the choice of denying quarantine/inoculation to be truly commensurate to the right 
to die scenario (and thus represent a choice that should be protected), we would have to satisfy 
that this denial was, in effect, a voluntary relinquishment of normative agency. If this can be 
satisfied then the issue becomes moot - as instead of forced inoculation/quarantine, the 
individual should instead be provided with a humane means to end their life (as in the regular 
right to die scenario). However, if this choice is not based upon a willingness to die, then, and 
in accordance with the purpose of human rights, it cannot be given precedence over interference 
with the enjoyment of such protections deemed necessary to the continuation of the exercise 
of the individual’s normative agency (as to do so would be contradictory). 
From this analysis it is evident that one of two things must be true in a scenario such as 
this: 
1. The individual does not wish to die, and the decision to deny medical treatment/forced 
quarantine is not commensurate to the right to die scenario. As such, and because this 
evidences a desire to secure the continuation of normative agency, interference/denial 
of protection can be justified in exceptional circumstances (as necessary means of 
securing such agency); 
 
2. The individual, in choosing to deny medical treatment/forced quarantine, is in actuality 
exercising an autonomous choice to die. In this case the right to die should be afforded 
to them in place of the aforementioned emergency measures (e.g. forced 
quarantine/inoculation). 
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Either eventuality could be justified on the basis of fulfilling the objective of actualising 
normative agency (and can thus be seen to be consistent with the purpose of human rights). 
 Returning to the three interpretations of sovereignty proposed in this section, it is to 
be noted that, hypothetically at least, justifiable interference with fundamental protections can 
be ensured by affording sufficient consideration to each form.  In practical terms, this begins 
by accepting that individuals have a right to make decisions about their own medical needs. 
Similarly, it is to be understood that the scope for this is limited by the state, who may claim 
the right to either ignore the action chosen by the individual or to make decisions on their 
behalf in exceptional circumstances. Finally, the state, in turn, is to be restricted from abusing 
this ability by international sovereignty – the will of the international community – which may 
use unjustifiable interference with the human sovereignty of the affected state – of 
diminishment of human security - to validate interference with its exclusive jurisdiction. Each 
form of sovereignty thus acts as a safeguard against potential abuses of others. 
As we have established, a genuine universal aspect of the concept of human rights is 
the enduring idea behind the need to protect upon which they are founded. History has 
demonstrated the significance of this need in the sense that all communities, regardless of their 
cultural origin, have been constructed upon some variation of it.771 The specific content of such 
needs - the matter of determining which interests should be prioritised over others - is, of 
course, susceptible to change depending upon such cultural differences. This point has 
famously been used to undermine the universality of the concept of human rights.772 However, 
the existence of alternative approaches to a similar objective does not, in and of itself, 
                                                            
771 See Conor Gearty, ‘Human Rights: The Necessary Quest for Foundations’ in Costas Douzinas and Conor 
Gearty (eds), The Meaning of Rights: The Philosophy of Social Theory and Human Rights (Cambridge 
University Press 2014) 21-38. 
772 An excellent summary of this position was provided by Peter Jones who suggested that we live in ‘a world in 
which people live in different circumstances, bear different cultures, and pursue different forms of life. At best, 
that diversity can inconvenient for, and at worst fatal tom the universality claimed for human rights’. Peter 
Jones, ‘Human Rights and Diverse Cultures: Continuity or Discontinuity?’ in Simon Caney and Peter Jones 
(eds), Human Rights and Global Diversity (Frank Cass Publishers 2001) 27.  
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disqualify the universal applicability of the aim. Indeed, the process of determination, of 
establishing a means by which the prioritisation of fundamental interests can occur is evidently 
present within all communities (even if in some cases this process appears irreconcilably at 
odds with the concept of human rights itself).773  
For this reason, it has been suggested that the universality of human rights is perhaps 
better understood as the purpose which legitimates the significance of foundational individual 
interests. In the context of rights, absolute does not need to translate into constant adherence 
to specific practices. A right may accurately be considered absolute if its overarching purpose 
cannot be disregarded. Fulfilment of these protections can therefore be achieved through 
derogation in certain exceptional circumstances. However, action which attempts to interfere 
with such protections for a cause which conflicts with their purpose cannot be justified. As 
such, at least conceptually, they can accurately be regarded as absolute rights, even though 
their practical application is never completely guaranteed. 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that the supposed incompatibility held to exist between 
human rights and national security is non-fatal to the idea of universal protections. Whilst 
contextual circumstances certainly lend credence to the view that national security initiatives 
must logically be held to be superior to human rights, it has been demonstrated that their 
respective causes can be fulfilled in a manner which is consistent with the purpose of human 
rights claims. This is true even in the event of necessary intervention or interference with these 
protections. In establishing this position, it has been argued that the fundamental purpose of 
state security and human rights are intertwined (and inter-connected). This was supported 
                                                            
773 For example, in Islamic or Asian states and based upon the understanding that human rights are a ‘Western 
construct with limited applicability’. As discussed by Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab, Human Rights: 
Cultural and Ideological Perspectives (New York; Praeger 1979) 1-18. 
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through an examination of various important evolutions of the concepts of security and 
sovereignty – particularly within the context of human security. The integration of this concept 
into international law (and political discourse) enables human rights interests to incorporate 
themselves into national security initiatives. Whilst it was shown that, to date, human security 
is still routinely utilised (and ultimately regarded) as subsidiary (or indeed supplemental) 
concern to traditional national security perspectives, it was suggested that the emergence of the 
concept is itself a notable development. Contextual utilisation of this concept may currently 
appear insufficient at effectively altering national security initiatives in a manner which affords 
greater consideration to human rights interests in a practical (and reliable) manner. Yet, in 
accordance with discussions in previous chapters, it is proposed that the concept of human 
security is inherently perfectible and will continue to develop, resulting in greater appreciation 
of rights based interests within matters of state security. 
This chapter further suggests that the concept of human rights can be justified as a 
universally realisable concept, even within the context of national security/counter-terrorist 
discussions. In establishing this position, it was shown that the principal purpose of rights is to 
actualise human agency. In Chapter Four, it was argued that its successful fulfilment is 
therefore logically dependent upon securing a necessary level of healthiness/subsistence. 
Similarly, with this chapter it has been shown that a pre-requisite for such healthiness is a 
stable, secure space in which it can be enabled. This ensures that the protection of this space 
can legitimately be held to be a superior concern when it is genuinely threatened in a serious 
manner. Consequently, it further emphasises the impossibility (and undesirability) of absolute 
human rights. If their legitimating purpose is better (more optimally) served through 
intervention, then states must be allowed to do so. To propose otherwise is to undermine the 
validity of such protections (as it will evidence impossibility of performance of their 
justificatory purpose). The safeguard with such an approach is that only legitimate, severe 
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threats to the subsistence of the state should provide governing powers with justifiable grounds 
for interfering with these protections. This approach was distinguished from existing 
derogation machinery which affords governing powers excessive opportunity to interfere with 
human rights claims (and in a manner not conducive to fulfilment of the purpose of the claim, 
but instead based upon political interests of the governing powers).  
It is proposed that the approach advocated within this chapter would be a preferable 
alternative (e.g. more sufficient), as it seeks to provide clearer criteria wherein derogation may 
be justified. Specifically, by requiring the relevant regulative body (e.g. the ECtHR) to adopt a 
scrutinous approach to determining the presence of an actual emergency (and thus the 
legitimacy of the need to derogate). Moreover, as it is based upon acknowledgement of the 
non-absoluteness of human rights, and in accordance with the manner in which this is 
communicated (by prioritising the purpose behind such protections), it is argued that this would 
provide the concept with enhanced credibility (especially within the present counter-
terrorist/security dominated context). This is achieved by ensuring that all human rights are 
acknowledged as being derogable, with derogations only accepted as being justifiable when 
interference with human rights norms represents the most optimal means by which their 
purpose is ultimately fulfilled. It is proposed that this approach is preferable to alternative 
accounts (e.g. based on perceived non-derogability of certain protections) as it has a greater 
capacity to provide for the continual fulfilment of the purpose of such protections, even when 
this is represented by interference with their practical application. Furthermore, as this 
approach accepts that security could take precedence in certain exceptional circumstances only 
as means of providing for the continuation of the enjoyment of human rights, it evidently 
diminishes the potential for sovereign states to unjustifiably reduce their commitment to human 
rights norms in the name of national security initiatives (e.g. in the absence of a genuine need 
to derogate). 
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Finally, in comparison (and in distinction) with traditional interpretations of national 
security threats (e.g. terrorism), this point was demonstrated within an examination of health 
based threats to security (and the fulfilment of rights). Through this analysis it was determined 
that, whilst interventions may be justifiable, this does not invalidate the universal realisability 
of human rights – as it pertains to either their desirability or applicability. This conclusion was 
based upon the fact that the cause for intervention is commensurate with the purpose of such 
fundamental protections – the enablement of autonomous agency. Notably, it is evident that all 
human beings (as normative agents) are capable of recognising the significance of this purpose, 
and its continual fulfilment, irrespective of whether this is secured by virtue of the provision 
or non-provision of certain protections. In Chapter Three it was established that the legitimacy 
of concepts and ideals must be continually assessed and reaffirmed in order to determine their 
sufficiency within the present context. It is proposed that the sufficiency of human rights is 
dependent upon consistent (and optimal) performance of its underlying purpose. In this way, 
as our investigation has determined that it is possible for this purpose to be more optimally 
fulfilled through violation in certain exceptional circumstances, the absoluteness of these rights 
cannot be made contingent upon a need for permanent application. Instead, the nature of 
absolute should be understood to stem from a permanence of purpose rather than the certainty 
of practical implementation. 
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6 Conclusion 
 
It is uncontentious to suggest that human rights have made significant contributions 
to contemporary politics, morality, and international law.774 Their continuing presence 
within each of these discourses has resulted in an unprecedented level of public exposure to 
the idea of rights. The politicisation and securitisation of the rights discourse has allowed for 
these perceptions to be shaped and reshaped by states in ways which suit the contextual 
needs of specific times. In the Western context, this is represented by the changing focus of 
member states of relevant human rights treaties away from individual rights and towards 
collective security and survival (in the face of a purported ‘existential terrorist threat’).775 
The idea that all human beings are equal in status and entitlement to such 
rights/protections776 is becoming increasingly untenable. In Western and non-Western states 
alike, there is a growing willingness to prioritise the interests of those regarded as being of 
value to the state over those who wish to cause it harm.777 The language of human rights is 
used to justify this process by articulating its motivating purpose as being the protection of 
collective rights/interests. In accepting this narrative, populations validate the functionality 
of such rights as the constructors of human identity/human worth (e.g. the idea that human 
rights construct humans).778 Separately, proponents of the utopian ideal of human rights – as 
absolute, universal claims – exploit the non-universality of human experience (as it pertains 
to human subsistence) so as to establish the need for robust enforcement of such protections. 
Crucially, however, even here, the primary focus does not appear to be on contesting the 
presence of a legitimate gradation of worth through the construction of the modern political 
                                                            
774 See Costas Douzinas, ‘The Paradoxes of Human Rights’ (2013) 20 Constellations 51. 
775 See Ipek Demirsu, Counter-Terrorism and the Prospects of Human Rights (Palgrave Macmillan 2017). 
776 See Jack Donnelly, Human Rights in Theory and in Practice (Cornell Press 2002). 
777 See Joan Fitzpatrick, ‘Speaking Law to Power: The War Against Terrorism and Human Rights’ (2003) 14 
European Journal of International Law 241. 
778 See Costas Douzinas, ‘Human Rights for Martians’ (2016) Critical Legal Thinking 
<http://criticallegalthinking.com/2016/05/03/human-rights-for-martians/> accessed 18 May 2018.   
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construct – as a law-abiding citizen. Instead, disparities in the quality of human experiences 
- generally in the developing world – and which are not predicated (or authenticated) on/by 
a national security narrative, are highlighted to galvanise Western efforts to facilitate the 
emancipation of ‘deserving’ (but as yet unprotected) individuals.779 This is to take place 
either in the form of militarised ‘humanitarian interventions’ or the provision of financial 
and medical aid. The concept and language of human rights are thus presently utilised for 
separate purposes. This ultimately convolutes the discourse and negatively impacts upon 
public perceptions (by promoting contradictory interpretations that ensures that no fixed 
definition of the concept is adopted).  
As seen, there appears to be limited possibility of universal agreement in relation to 
defining the primary purpose or function of such protections. This in turn creates space for 
the emergence of robust critiques targeting the feasibility of human rights as basic human 
claims - as proposed by Griffin et al (e.g. protections required to actualise normative 
agency).780 Instead, they are increasingly presented – by both governments and media - 
through a consequentialist/pragmatic lens where the limitations of their provision are to be 
understood as the point at which they merge/interact with other primary interests of the state 
(e.g. security). If we are to accept the legitimacy of this outcome, we would then be 
compelled to also accept the impossibility of a traditional utopian, ideological interpretation 
of human rights. This is because, in effect, we would be acknowledging the justifiability of 
both the non-universality and non-absoluteness of such protections. This would therefore 
appear commensurate with the ‘End of Human Rights’ that Douzinas once famously 
envisioned, and the reimagining of this concept along much narrower, more restrictive lines 
                                                            
779 See Costas Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (Routledge 
Cavendish 2007). 
780 See James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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(which only serve the contextual interests of states).781 What it does not do, however - as this 
thesis has established - is authoritatively undermine the justificatory purpose upon which the 
utopian ideal of human rights was historically constructed: to protect certain fundamental 
needs. Instead, it simply highlights limitations with adopting a restrictive approach to 
actualising human rights based upon prevailing interpretations of this concept.  
It is apparent that all states recognise the validity of protecting certain interests, both 
individual and collective, if a satisfactory quality of life (as determined by each people and/or 
state) is to be ensured. The idea of human rights, of inalienable protections of certain 
interests, may not be universal in the sense that a specific definition can be readily applied 
to every state. Yet, the idea behind the need for human rights, the purpose which necessitates 
such protections, is seemingly universal. This determination therefore renders a purely 
philosophical or pragmatic approach to justifying the universality of human rights 
unnecessarily restrictive. Instead the focus should be on stressing the similarity of purpose 
shared between all states (as it relates to the aim of protecting normative agency), regardless 
of their specific view of a ‘Western’ interpretation of fundamental interests. In this way, it 
is apparent that a robust critique of the universal applicability of the concept of human rights 
can only ever invalidate the prevailing, contemporary account of how to effectively fulfil a 
shared objective, rather than the idea upon which the need for this objective is based.782 Thus, 
it is arguably through a continual process of invalidation and reinterpretation that the concept 
of human rights will continue to evolve.783  
                                                            
781 See Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century (Hart 
Publishers 2000). 
782 See Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (Harvard University Press 2006).  
783 See Friedrich Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History (Macmillan for the Library of Liberal Arts 1957). 
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With regard to the modern ‘subject’ of human rights it is important to note that this, 
too, is multifaceted.784 In reference to its deontological origins, the ‘abstract man’ of 
declarations and treaties represents the ‘possessor of fundamental entitlements’. In contrast, 
the citizen – as the ‘political construct’ – exists as the beneficiary of actionable claims. The 
‘populism’ of anti-rights discourse, facilitated by state action and media depictions, has 
resulted in preference generally being afforded to the latter. Here, once again, the modern 
era has witnessed a restricting of the scope and meaning of such protections which has been 
influenced by these same populist attitudes. The public perception of the purpose of human 
rights has noticeably changed. The utilisation of the language of rights now facilitates the 
gradation of human worth and the non-absoluteness of fundamental claims. In the context of 
security, the alleged necessity of balancing between competing interests – namely individual 
liberties and collective/national security – validates attempts to further restrict the scope of 
such protections.785 The significance of the universal subject of rights – the abstract concept 
– is continually diminished through this process. It is the political construct, alone, however, 
that is affected (and affects) the actualisation of human rights. State interference with the 
enjoyment of these rights does not invalidate the legitimacy of the abstract concept – of the 
entitlement to claim. This ‘subject’ is therefore absolute in the sense that its legitimacy and 
existence is not predicated on positive action. Conversely, the realisability of rights – as 
actionable claims – is dependent upon the political construct – and as such non-application 
can undermine its practical feasibility. The ‘abstract concept’ provides a foundation for 
actionable claims by articulating the legitimacy of entitlements to their provision, whilst the 
‘political construct’ creates opportunity for their implementation. The potentiality of the 
                                                            
784 See Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century (Hart 
Publishers 2000). 
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political construct is contingent upon the existence of a secure state (in the form of a practical 
space in which the protection of individual needs is both meaningful and possible).786  
This is represented by the political focus of the human rights discourse in 
contemporary times (and the aforementioned prioritisation of a pragmatic approach to their 
enforcement). As seen, interference with human rights can be legitimate in the event that it 
is consistent with the purpose of human rights – specifically by contributing to the 
continuation of circumstances necessary for the implementation of such claims (e.g. a secure 
physical space necessary for the enablement of normative agency). This fact does not 
legitimise or justify unjustifiable interferences – understood as those which are unnecessary. 
Unnecessary, in this context, relates to interference or violation which does not serve the 
fundamental purpose of such protections, but is instead premised exclusively on furthering 
interests of the state/governing powers. The politicisation of the rights discourse results in 
the eradication of considerations of necessity (and the increased potentiality of illegitimate 
interference).787 The language of rights, once utilised as means of articulating rightful 
emancipation,788 is now used to restrict the desirability of absolute protections (as well as 
the possibility of universal claims). Consequently, the human rights discourse has become 
an insufficient vehicle for achieving the implementation of the justificatory purpose which 
legitimates such protections – to guarantee basic human needs. To briefly return to the 
Douzinas, contemporary developments may represent the ‘End of Human Rights’ in the 
sense that they highlight limitations with current/prevailing interpretations of the concept of 
human rights, or apparent public acceptance of the legitimacy of the superiority of security 
                                                            
786 Jeremy Bentham, ‘Anarchical Fallacies’ in John Bowring (ed), The Works of Jeremy Bentham Vol. II 
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over fundamental liberties. If so, however, this would simply mark an ‘end’ of the 
sufficiency of existing approaches to achieving the universal implementation of fundamental 
human claims – and not the ‘end’ of the legitimacy or justifiability of such claims 
themselves. 
In establishing this point, and due to the fact that its fulfilment is dependent upon 
various inter-connected needs/interests, it has been suggested that it is appropriate to 
reconceptualise the right to health as a right to human healthiness. In effect, this right was 
proposed as being a foundational claim in that its implementation (either directly or 
indirectly) is necessary for other claims to become actionable (in the sense that individuals 
could practically claim them). Ultimately, this claim seeks to ensure the fulfilment of human 
subsistence. The idea of subsistence has been seen to be integral to the validity of this 
protection as a universal claim/right.789 Human subsistence can be argued to extend beyond 
physiological, biological interests and rest, ultimately, with state security (a necessary 
component for the existence of a governing power capable of fulfilling this claim). The right 
to health, as the facilitator of human healthiness, human subsistence, is therefore inextricably 
linked to the idea of security. As Douzinas notes, security (specifically national security) is 
the name given to various initiatives which look to diminish the effectiveness/reliability of 
human rights.790 Subsistence, rather contradictorily, therefore appears to provide 
justification for both the expansion and restriction of fundamental human claims. In addition 
to other limitations which are argued to highlight the impossibility of universal rights (e.g. 
economic, social, and cultural issues), the right to health (or healthiness) appears to represent 
the impossibility of absolute protections (as its foundational purpose can be used to 
                                                            
789 See Lisa Foreman, ‘What Future for the Minimum Core?’ in John Harrington (ed) and Maria Stuttaford (ed), 
Global Health & Human Rights: Legal and Philosophical Perspectives (Routledge Press, 2012). 
790 Costas Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (Routledge 
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legitimise interference with its own implementation). Alternatively, it can be argued to 
evidence the compatibility (and inter-dependency) of the idea of human rights and national 
security. Subsistence validates the promotion of basic fundamental interests/claims, but also 
legitimates interference with such protections in exceptional circumstances (when the 
continuation of such promotion is itself under threat). 
It is in accordance with this approach that recommendations for reform of existing 
human rights derogation machinery have been made. In essence, these reforms have 
endorsed the adoption of a stricter approach to determining the existence of an emergency 
which justifies the need to derogate from the application of human rights norms, alongside 
acknowledgement of the non-absoluteness (e.g. derogability) of all human rights in practical 
terms. It has been argued that these changes have the potential to enhance the realisability of 
universal human rights by both providing the concept with a greater level of credibility 
(through demonstrating that human rights and national security are not competing aims), 
whilst also strengthening the prospect of securing the continual fulfilment of the justificatory 
purpose of such protections (by allowing for interference with the application of human 
rights when their purpose is more optimally fulfilled through such conduct). 
This thesis has ultimately sought to determine that human rights are universal. In 
accordance with this aim, it has suggested that the foundation of rights is the desire to protect 
various basic needs. This desire is universal in that it is evidenced in all peoples and cultures 
in some form or another. Irrespective of present and future developments (as it pertains to 
the balancing of interests) this 'need' cannot be completely dismissed. It exists, in 
potentiality, even if its continuation or significance seems hard to appreciate in contemporary 
times. Human rights are foundational claims because they provide means of actualising this 
desire. Moreover, they are foundational in the sense that their substance is subject to 
variation and change (in reflection of societal and historical progress). Such protections 
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cannot be implemented absolutely for this reason - as it is neither practical nor desirable to 
do so. Instead, the absoluteness of rights relates to a permanence of purpose: to actualise 
human agency.  
It is important to note that this conclusion does not provide justification for inaction 
in relation to securing such protections – even though it appears to establish that the 
idea/purpose of rights is separate from their content. The non-absoluteness of the practical 
implementation of human rights is best understood in terms of non-definitiveness of their 
substantive content; and is therefore not a concession that no meaningful form of protection 
may actually be prescribed. Instead, this non-definitiveness simply relates to the absence of 
fixed, absolute interpretations of human rights (as well the means by which they must be 
secured). Such an approach does not warrant arbitrary interpretations, or indeed unjustifiable 
derogations from such protections, but instead simply allows a necessary and sufficient level 
of flexibility in determining how such rights are to be interpreted (and their protection best 
achieved). This determination is itself to be based upon the aforementioned permanent 
purpose – which is argued to be absolute – and which can therefore provide a stable 
foundation for assessing the legitimacy of interpretations of the content and application of 
human rights. Consequently, it is evident that this approach still obligates states to undertake 
action to secure a sufficient level of protection of human rights norms (either by way of 
application or necessary derogation) – it is simply the case that a specific (e.g. definitive) 
form of action (in relation to successfully securing such protections) is not required. Thus, 
whilst the content of human rights is argued to be relative, the scope of this relativeness is 
significantly limited – only accepting interpretations that legitimately conform to the 
underlying purpose of such protections.    
In conclusion, therefore, it seems reasonable to suggest that the foundation of human 
rights appears to be the idea that all human beings are worthy of a certain level of 
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‘functioning’. That human life has innate moral value. Undoubtedly, this sentiment has been 
articulated in different ways throughout human history – in religions, philosophy, ethics and 
the law791 - but all stem from a variation of the same belief. So long as this remains true, it 
is evident that there can be no end to human rights - or the universality of what they represent. 
6.1 Proposed Areas for Further Research 
 
This thesis looked to address the universality of human rights within contemporary 
contexts surrounding the prioritisation of state/national security – and the apparent resulting 
diminishment in popular support of the idea of universal protections. In doing so, it has 
argued in favour of refocusing/reconsidering the human rights discourse in accordance with 
the foundational purpose behind such claims. By removing the need to limit discussion to 
contemporary understanding in relation to what human rights are (and ought to be), we 
expand the possibility of providing a robust defence of the legitimacy of the concept of 
fundamental human claims. At the heart of this refocusing is the proposal that the purpose 
of human rights and national security are complimentary in nature (if not directly inter-
connected) as they are both rooted in the task of securing different types of subsistence. This 
inter-connectedness was evidenced within the contexts of health by reimagining human 
healthiness (e.g. human subsistence) as the foundation of state security (and, conversely, by 
demonstrating that the provision of state security is a necessary component for enabling 
human healthiness). In advancing this position only brief consideration was afforded to the 
potential scope/substance of a universal right to human healthiness. Whilst this thesis 
attempted to sketch a rough template for this right, it was clearly noted that this would be 
strengthened further with additional study. A detailed examination of the normative content 
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of a universal right to human healthiness would therefore be a worthwhile area for future 
research.  
Similarly, the idea of human subsistence itself (and which specific interests are 
inherently human/fundamental) could also benefit from further analysis. For the purposes of 
this thesis it was important to establish the idea of human subsistence in order to support the 
proposition that human rights can be regarded as foundational claims. The limitations/scope 
of the foundational nature of these protections was not addressed in great detail. As such, 
another significant issue deserving of additional development is how reconceptualising 
rights as foundational claims may affect other fundamental protections (e.g. the right to life, 
freedom from torture, freedom of expression). Further research into this in relation to other 
human rights (either collectively or individually) would therefore be beneficial to developing 
the discourse. Likewise, a more detailed examination of the practical implications (and 
potential applicability) of the proposed reforms for existing derogation machinery (e.g. the 
ECHR), as well as for the use of subsidiarity techniques by the ECtHR (based on the 
‘perfectibility of law’ framework) would also be useful. Finally, it is anticipated that the 
theoretical frameworks used throughout this thesis, such as Nietzsche’s ‘antiquarian’, 
‘monumental’ and ‘critical’ use of history, together with Dworkin’s abovementioned ‘right 
answer’ approach (utilised here as the perfectibility of law/legal concepts) could also be 
applied to different fields of research (both within and beyond legal issues). 
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